Judgment :- This revision has been filed against the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate V. Coimbatore in Crl. M.P. No. 3053 of 2002 in C.C. No. 843 of 2001, dismissing the petition filed for dropping proceedings against the accused/petitioner of offences under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'the Act'). The circumstances under which the said order came to be passed is as follows :- (a) The complainant/respondent herein namely M/s. Cauvery Timber Company Pvt. Ltd. represented by C. Subramanian filed a complaint against the accused/petitioner for offences under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the averments that the accused-company represented by its proprietor, namely Vinod M. Patel had purchased timber under Invoice No. 157 dated 17-5-2000 for Rs. 3,69,409. Invoice No. 170 dt. 20-5-2000 for Rs. 10,90,149/- and Invoice No. 182 dated 27-5-2000 for Rs. 3,59,096/- totalling in all for a sum of Rs. 18,18,654/-. In discharge of the abovesaid liability, three cheques dated 20-4-2001, 30-4-2001 and 27-4-2001 for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, Rs. 1,30,860/- and Rs. 1,50,000/- respectively, totalling in all a sum of Rs. 4,0,860/-, drawn on State Bank of Travancore, Senkottah in favour of the complainant/respondent were issued. On presentation for collection in the Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, Main Branch, Oppanakara Street, Coimbatore-1, they were returned dishonoured on the ground "Insufficient Funds". Hence, the matter was informed over phone to the accused/petitioner whereupon, direction was issued to represent the three cheques again for collection. Believing the said representation, all the three cheques were again represented for collection in the same Bank. However, they received the same fate as before. Hence, a notice dated 24-9-2001 as contemplated under the Act was issued upon the accused/petitioner to pay the money within fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the said notice. On receipt of the said notice, a reply dated 2-10-2001 was sent, thereby admitting the purchase of timber. However, a denial has been made with regard to the issuance of cheques to the effect that they were issued only as security. Since the money had not been paid within the stipulated time, the present complaint has been lodged. (b) Upon taking cognizance, process was issued to the accused/petitioner. On appearance, a preliminary objection stating that the prosecution is barred by limitation was urged. Since the money had not been paid within the stipulated time, the present complaint has been lodged. (b) Upon taking cognizance, process was issued to the accused/petitioner. On appearance, a preliminary objection stating that the prosecution is barred by limitation was urged. After hearing both parties, the contention of the accused/petitioner was negatived by the learned Magistrate mainly on the ground that it is only during the course of trial, the issue raised by the accused/petitioner could be decided. It is against this order, the present revision has been filed. The learned counsel appearing for the accused/petitioner has raised the same points that has been urged before the Court below. His main ground of attack here in this revision is that the prosecution is barred by limitation. According to him, though no doubt the cheques were issued to the complainant and for a moment admitting the entirety of the complaint and the documents produced therewith, it clearly establishes that the prosecution is barred by limitation. To substantiate the argument advanced above, the counsel appearing for the accused/petitioner had adverted to the facts mentioned in the complaint. According to him, the intimation relating to the dishonour of the cheques, which were represented for collection on 8-9-2001, was received by the complainant/respondent on 14-9-2001 and it is on the receipt of the said notice, the complainant/respondent appears to have issued a lawyer's notice dated 15-9-2001, mentioning about the dishonour of the cheques, which are the subject-matter of the case. The crux of the issue high-lighted by the learned counsel from the abovementioned facts is that in the notice dated 15-9-2001 issued by the complainant/respondent, mention has been made that it is on behalf of the M/s. Chinnammal Timber Company Pvt. Limited, Saravanampatti, Coimbatore-35, the notice has been issued, thereby calling upon the accused/petitioner to repay the money within 15 days thereof to M/s. Chinnammal Timber Co. However, a reply notice dated 23-9-2001 had been sent by the accused/petitioner, denying the allegations that he had any business transactions with M/s. Chinnammal Timber Company Pvt. Limited. In the said reply, the accused/petitioner had stated that Timbers had been purchased only from M/s. Cauvery Timber Company Pvt. Limited and the cheques in question, were also issued only in favour of them. It is on the receipt of the said notice, the complainant/respondent had issued an another notice dated 24-9-2001. In the said reply, the accused/petitioner had stated that Timbers had been purchased only from M/s. Cauvery Timber Company Pvt. Limited and the cheques in question, were also issued only in favour of them. It is on the receipt of the said notice, the complainant/respondent had issued an another notice dated 24-9-2001. On behalf of Cauvery Timber Company Pvt. Ltd., thereby mentioning about the dishonour of the three cheques, which are the subject-matter of the issue and called upon the accused/petitioner to pay the cheque amounts. In addition to the above averments, the notice also contained a paragraph, which reads as follows : "I have already sent a registered notice dated 15-9-2001 to you in the above matter. But in the said legal notice dated 15-9-2001, it is wrongly typed as "under instructions from my client Chinnammal Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd." instead of "Cauvery Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd." You have issued the aforesaid cheques in favour of my client Cauvery Timber Company (P) Ltd. Cauvery Timber Company P. Ltd. and Chinnammal Timber Co. P. Ltd. are sister concerns. Now this notice is issued by Cauvery Timber Co. P. Ltd. by rectifying the mistake in legal notice D/- 15-9-2001". On the basis of the above, the emphasis made by the counsel appearing for the accused/petitioner is that when the complainant/respondent upon realising the mistake committed by him in his earlier notice dated 15-9-2001, wherein a mention was made that the cheques in question were issued in favour of M/s. Chinnammal Timber Company Pvt. Ltd. had tried to rectify the same in his second notice dated 24-9-2001, stating that a typographical error has been caused, while issuing the notice and that instead of Chinnammal Timber Company Pvt. Ltd. the same shall be read as Cauvery Timber Pvt. Ltd. it means that the notice dated 15-9-2001, issued by the complainant/respondent under S. 138 of the Act has been admitted by him. Further according to the learned counsel, the notice dated 24-9-2001 is only the notice sent to intimate the mistake that has occurred in the notice dated 15-9-2001 and consequently, for all practical purposes the notice dated 15-9-2001 is the one that has to be taken into consideration and not the notice dated 24-9-2001, for computing the period of limitation in launching the prosecution. In support of the contention advanced above, the counsel would place reliance on the judgment reported in SIL Import v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters (1999) 2 CTC 354, wherein the issue involved is similar to that of the case on hand. In the said case, the cheques issued by the accused for discharge of the liability to the complainant on presentation was returned dishonoured and consequently, a FAX message was sent to the drawer on 11-6-1996, followed by which a registered notice dated 12-6-1996 was also sent. Thereafter, in view of the non-payment of the amount, the prosecution was launched by the complainant on 8-8-1996, taking into account the date on which the registered notice was sent. On appearance, the accused took a plea that the prosecution is barred by limitation, since it is the FAX message which was sent on 11-6-1996 that has to be taken in consideration for the purpose of computing the limitation. In the given circumstances. Their Lordships have held that it is only the FAX Message which is earlier in point of time that has to be taken into account and that the period of limitation has to be computed only from the date of the receipt of the FAX Message and not from the date of receipt of the Registered notice. Therefore, on the basis of the above decision, the learned counsel would submit that the notice which had been already issued on 15-9-2001 alone has to be taken into consideration for computing the period of limitation. As against the above, the counsel appearing for the complainant/respondent would submit that the notice dated 15-9-2001 cannot be taken into consideration at all, since that is the notice issued on behalf of Chinnammal Timber Company Private Ltd. and not by Cauvery Timber Company Private Limited and that the said notice does not come under the purview of Section 138 of the Act. According to him, it is only the notice dated 24-9-2001 which has to be taken into consideration for computing the period of limitation and hence the present complaint which is filed on 19-12-2001, is well within the period of limitation. According to him, it is only the notice dated 24-9-2001 which has to be taken into consideration for computing the period of limitation and hence the present complaint which is filed on 19-12-2001, is well within the period of limitation. Answering the submissions advanced above, the counsel appearing for the accused/petitioner would submit that the notice dated 24-9-2001 cannot be taken into consideration at all, in view of the fact that this notice has been sent only for the purpose of intimating about the typographical error that has occurred in the notice dated 15-9-2001. Here the learned counsel would lay more emphasis on the lines mentioned in the notice dated 24-9-2001, wherein it has been specifically stated that it is only a typographical mistake and that the notice should be read as being given on behalf of Cauvery Timber Company Pvt. Ltd. and that the legal notice dated 15-9-2001 is hereby rectified. According to the learned counsel, the language namely "rectifying the mistake in legal notice dated 15-9-2001", for all practical purposes would only mean that the notice dated 15-9-2001 stands and it is only the rectification that has to be brought into account and consequently, the period of limitation has to be computed only from 15-9-2001. I fully agree with the contention of the counsel appearing for the accused/petitioner and in view of the judgment of the Apex Court cited supra. I have no hesitation to hold that the notice dated 15-9-2001 is the one that has to be taken into account for computing the period of limitation, Though the notice dated 15-9-2001 shows that it has been issued on behalf of Chinnammal Timber Company Pvt. Ltd. when a subsequent notice dated 24-9-2001 had been issued to rectify the mistake that has occurred in the notice dated 15-9-2001, to the effect that the notice has been issued on behalf of the Cauvery Timber Mart, then automatically the period of limitation has to be computed only from 15-9-2001 only and by applying the said ratio, if the period of limitation is computed, then the prosecution is clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons. I have no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate in Crl. M.P. No. 3053 of 2001 in C.C. No. 843 of 2001 and the same is accordingly set aside. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons. I have no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate in Crl. M.P. No. 3053 of 2001 in C.C. No. 843 of 2001 and the same is accordingly set aside. In the result the proceedings against the accused in C.C. No. 843 of 2001 are quashed and the revision is hereby allowed. Consequently, connected Crl. M.P. is closed. Petition allowed.