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2004 DIGILAW 1196 (MAD)

MANAGEMENT OF SALEM STEEL PLANT v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT

2004-09-17

PRABHA SRIDEVAN

body2004
ORDER : Prabha Sridevan, J.—The second respondent was issued two charge-sheets for following misconducts: (1) Submission of false claim for payment (Rule 27.100 of Standing Orders) (2) Wilful suppression of any material and false declaration given or information furnished in connection with his appointment (Rule 27.102 of Standing Orders) 1 This charge-sheet was, dated July 14, 1973. The second charge-sheet, dated April 5, 1986. This relates to following charges: (1) Interference with machine not connected with work (Rule 27.34 of Standing Orders) (2) Fraud or dishonesty in connection with plant's business (Rule 27.45 of Standing Orders) (3) Gross negligence or neglect of work (Rule 27.50 of Standing Orders). An enquiry was conducted and at the conclusion, it was found that the charges under charge-sheet No. 1 were proved. As regards charge-sheet No. 2, these charges were also held to be proved and therefore, he was dismissed from service. 2. In respect of the acts of misconduct set out in the first charge the Labour Court held that there was no error in the conclusion of the enquiry officer. As regards the acts of misconduct in the second charge-sheet, the Labour Court held that the first two charges 3 have not been proved, but regarding the third the conclusion of the enquiry officer is correct. After holding thus, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that removal from service was a very harsh punishment and the very fact that respondent was without work for three years from the date of termination till the award was sufficient punishment and ordered reinstatement without continuity of service and back wages. Against this, the employer has filed the writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had made a wrong claim with regard to medical reimbursement by declaring his brother's wife and brother's daughter as his wife and daughter. In the details furnished by him in the attestation form which is marked as Exhibits (PE 4), dated February 7, 1983, he had not given the name of his brother Durairaj while giving the names of his other brothers. It is wife and daughter of this brother who were referred to as the respondent's wife and daughter while claiming medical reimbursement. It is wife and daughter of this brother who were referred to as the respondent's wife and daughter while claiming medical reimbursement. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the Labour Court had concluded that the marriage had not been proved and there was no proof of adoption of the brother's daughter then there is false declaration or material suppression of fact by the respondent in which case there was no justification for the Labour Court to exercise its discretion u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. As regards other charges, which related to under weighing the load transported in a lorry as against the actual weight of 9160 Kgs. the weight certified by the respondent was 8020 Kgs. The goods loaded on to the truck was kraft interleaving scrap paper. Though the respondent was not found to be guilty of fraud or deliberate connivance of the lorry owner it was found that he had been atleast negligent in allowing this error to creep in the weighment certificate. When the Labour Court had also confirmed the finding of negligence interference was unjustified. 5. Several decisions were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that there cannot be any misplaced sympathy when the charge is one of dishonesty or gross negligence and when the employer has lost his confidence in the workman. (1) In The Management of the Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. Vs. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras-104, and another, (1999) 1 CTC 757 the clerk was dismissed on proved misconduct and the Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement with continuity of service and 15 per cent of back wages. This Court set aside the order of the Tribunal on the ground that it is not too much to ask for any employer to accept his workman to maintain minimum standard of integrity and though in cases justice may be required to be rendered with mercy that itself however is not to be carried to the extent of abandoning of ethical standards. (2) In Dr. V.N. Rajan v. Chairman National Dairy Development Board 2002 (4) L.L.N. 370 the petitioner was charged with making false leave travel claim and terminated after due enquiry and this Court held that the conduct of the petitioner does not inspire any sympathy. (2) In Dr. V.N. Rajan v. Chairman National Dairy Development Board 2002 (4) L.L.N. 370 the petitioner was charged with making false leave travel claim and terminated after due enquiry and this Court held that the conduct of the petitioner does not inspire any sympathy. (3) The petitioner submitted that while exercising its discretion u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court must consider that whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate or shockingly severe to the charges held proved and relied on Engine Valves Ltd. v. Labour Court 19911 LLJ 372 (Mad). (4) In Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Principal Labour Court 1996 (2) L.L.N. 627 this Court held that when the charges related to acts of dishonesty they cannot be condoned since they may even demoralise others in the industry. (5) In Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. Vs. A. Unnikrishnan and Another, (1994) 2 LLJ 888 , the Supreme Court observed that at p. 890: "7.... the judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability." (6) The learned counsel referred to Madura Coats Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Others, (2004) 102 FLR 780 wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that the loss of confidence on the part of the employer would be a factor which was required to be taken into account while considering the experience or otherwise of reinstating such workman in the service of the employer. (7) The learned counsel also referred to Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr. (supra) wherein it is held Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. Vs. A. Unnikrishnan and Another, : "7.... In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well meant, but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the frame work of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability." (8) In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohan Lal Gupta and Others, (2000) 9 SCC 521 . The Supreme Court again held that when the misconduct stood proved the interference in the punishment was not called for because it involved employer confidence in its employee. (9) In Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. B.S. Hullikatti, the Supreme Court observed that, AIR 2001 SC 930 orders of reinstatement by the Labour Courts amounted to misplaced sympathy when there is gross misconduct. (10) In Regional Manager, RSRTC v. Ghanshyam v. Sharma, (2002) 1 LLJ 234 SC the Supreme Court held that u/s 11-A, the Labour Court has jurisdiction and powers to interfere with the quantum of punishment but it had to be done judiciously. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent brother had deserted his wife and daughter and after a Panchayat, the respondent decided to take care of his brother's wife who had been abandoned at young age and also to rear his brother's daughter. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the respondent really treated the brother's wife and his brother's daughter as his own wife and daughter and therefore, there was no wilful suppression of any fact. He also submitted that in the community to which the respondent belongs there is the custom of and the respondent's wife had separated herself from the respondent's brother by enacting the customary form of divorce and it is only thereafter she had married the respondent and therefore there was no mistake in the attestation forms. He would also submit that while one misconduct relates to fraud and the other misconduct relates to negligence. The two are mutually contradictory and cannot co- exist and therefore on that ground the second charge-sheet should be quashed. He would also submit that while one misconduct relates to fraud and the other misconduct relates to negligence. The two are mutually contradictory and cannot co- exist and therefore on that ground the second charge-sheet should be quashed. He would also submit that there was nothing to show that he had been negligent and the detailed discussion by the Labour Court with regard to the manner in which the lorry was loaded and the lorry passed on the weighbridge and the fluctuation in the electricity though noted by the Labour Court had not been given the weight it deserved. 7. According to the learned counsel, the Labour Court had noted all this and had perhaps concluded that only one of the three charges in the second charge-sheet had been proved and as regards the first charge that it was too trivial a charge and that is why no mention was made of it and that is why the Labour Court felt that the punishment suffered was enough and no further punishment was required apart from the denial of back wages and continuity of service. The learned counsel also submitted that the personal life of the workman is not the employer's concern and the employer has no authority to decide the legality of the workman's marriage. * 8. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following judgments: (1) In Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others, AIR 1984 SC 505 the Supreme Court has held at p. 16 (head note): "It cannot be left to the vagaries of the management to say ex-post that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. The contention that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in the Standing Order, can be still punished must be rejected." (2) In S. Alamelu Vs. The contention that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in the Standing Order, can be still punished must be rejected." (2) In S. Alamelu Vs. The Superintending Engineer, South Arcot Electricity System (S), Villupuram, (1990) 2 LLJ 96 , the Court held at p. 96 (head note): "It is true Regulation 25(2) sets forth an embargo on a woman employee-contracting a marriage with any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission of the Board. The Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act having got formulated and certified and they having not provided for such a misconduct, the regulations would not prevail and could not be invoked to take disciplinary action. That is the result of the sanctity annexed to the Act and the Rules, and the Standing Orders under them, and their overriding effect on other service rules and regulations." (3) In J. Dhanraj Vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Others, (1995) 1 LLJ 931 in which it was held that though Regulation 25 of the conduct regulation would be an embargo on employee contracting a marriage with any person when he/she has a spouse living without obtaining the permission on the Board inasmuch as the certified Standing Orders do not provide therein for such an eventuality no disciplinary action can be taken by the management in this regard. (4) In A.L. Kalra Vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1361 the employee took advance for house building and thereafter utilized it for another purpose: he was ordered to be removed. The Supreme Court held (sic) that it did not constitute misconduct. 9. The factual findings of the Labour Court must be accepted as it is unless some shockingly untenable conclusion is drawn by the Labour Court from the materials available otherwise this Court may not and cannot it in appeal over the factual findings. 10. To the first chargesheet given by the petitioner the respondent gave an explanation in which he has stated, "as this is the customary form of divorce thereafter she was free to marry anyone of her choice the child Annapoorna was also left in my custody and I was educating her in a convent as per my brother's desire.... 10. To the first chargesheet given by the petitioner the respondent gave an explanation in which he has stated, "as this is the customary form of divorce thereafter she was free to marry anyone of her choice the child Annapoorna was also left in my custody and I was educating her in a convent as per my brother's desire.... she is under my protection and depending upon me and is practically treated as my own daughter.... In the light of the above, I would like to emphasise that I because of my marriage she became my wife and I made the claims what I deserved for as an employee, exercised declarations, which are true to the best of my knowledge, and request you to withdraw the above charge-sheet." Therefore, while some explanation is given regarding "the wife apart from stating that he brought up the child as his own daughter he does not say that he has adopted her. The medical rules have been extracted and Rule 2.2 of the Medical Rules reads thus: Family means- (i) An employee's wife or husband as the case may be; (ii) Legitimate children/step children wholly dependent upon the employee; (iii) Parents wholly/mainly dependent on and normally residing with the employee; Note: Parents whose total monthly income from all regular sources does not exceed Rs. 500 per month shall be regarded as wholly/mainly dependent on the employee. (iv) Minor brothers and sisters, unmarried/widowed sisters wholly dependent on and residing with the employee, if father - (a) is not alive ; or (b) is himself wholly/mainly dependent on the employee." 11. The finding of the Labour Court is that, these are the factual findings. 12. If there was no divorce then the respondent could not have married his brother's wife while the brother was living and she could not have been referred to as "his wife." Actually Rule 27.28 reads as follows: "27.28 Contracting of marriage by a workman who has a spouse living, without prior permission notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time-being applicable to him/her." But the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly admits that they had never referred to Rule 27.28 while issuing the charge-sheet. However, the Labour Court's finding is that the respondent had not proved divorce and had not proved that he had adopted the daughter. However, the Labour Court's finding is that the respondent had not proved divorce and had not proved that he had adopted the daughter. It is in these circumstances that the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry officer's finding is correct. If the enquiry officer's finding is correct then the misconduct under Rules 27.100 and 27.102 are proved. 13. Next we come to the charge No. 3 in the charge-sheet. The enquiry officer's report with regard to this is as follows: "The third charge levelled against Sri Vajravelu is that he committed gross negligence or neglect of work. This charge-sheet is on the second charge. The procedure of weighment in 40 tonne road weighbridge has been described and it is not necessary to repeat the same. Yet for the purpose of considering charge, it is seen that at the time of weighment the representative goods is directed to remove the tarpaulin ropes, etc., when tare weighment is taken. The CISF and the representative of the goods are present at the time of weighment. Sri Vajravelu in his evidence has stated that he asked the ASK and CISF to go round the lorry to seek, whether all the four wheels are on the platform and that from the weighbridge room he can see the position of two wheels only. Sri Vajravelu wanted the enquiry officer to make a personal inspection to enable him to point out certain facts. On February 21, 1987 the enquiry was held in the weighbridge room for that purpose. At that time I found that it is visible for the weighbridge operator to see whether 2 all the wheels are on the platform or not. It is not necessary for the weighbridge operator to rely on ASK or CISF to find out whether the wheels of the vehicle are properly placed on the platform or not. Sri Vajravelu must have been vigilant in discharging his duties. He ought to have taken care to see whether the lorry was properly parked for weighment. Believing and trusting on the weighment slip issued by the weighbridge operator, the management transacts its business. Sri Vajravelu must have been vigilant in discharging his duties. He ought to have taken care to see whether the lorry was properly parked for weighment. Believing and trusting on the weighment slip issued by the weighbridge operator, the management transacts its business. Either by design or accident if the weighbridge operator, fails to record the correct and proper weight of the empty lorry or with the goods as the case may be it may lead to difficult situation to the management in sustaining monetary loss or impair the fair name of the plant in the business circle. From the foregoing conclusion and the evidence on record, I hold that Sri Vajravelu has committed gross negligence in his duty. Thus the charge stands proved." On the basis of this, the Labour Court holds that the negligence has been proved. 14. The petitioner is Salem Steel Plant and as observed by the enquiry officer it matters little whether the respondent has failed to record the correct and proper weight deliberately or by chance. The petitioner is engaged in manufacture of steel, and the weighbridge operator, who works there must be vigilant. The petitioner totally relies on the weighbridge operator's certificate with regard to the goods taken out of the factory premises. The negligence of the respondent has to be seen in this background. After having found that the enquiry officer's conclusion with regard to charge-sheet No. 1 and charge-sheet No. 3 in charge-sheet No. 2 are wholly acceptable, the Labour Court has yet modified the order of dismissal. 15. The employee has lost the confidence of the master both by his negligence and by furnishing wrong even if not deliberately false information and cannot be forced on the employer. In spite of this the Labour Court felt that he did not deserve the order of dismissal and awarded reinstatement without back wages. The respondent had only worked for four years when he was placed on suspension. The petitioner has obtained stay and 17-B wages have not been claimed by the respondent nor paid by the petitioner. Taking into account these factors and the proved misconduct and the exercise of discretion u/s 11-A the order passed by the Labour Court is set aside and modified to one of payment of compensation of Rs. The petitioner has obtained stay and 17-B wages have not been claimed by the respondent nor paid by the petitioner. Taking into account these factors and the proved misconduct and the exercise of discretion u/s 11-A the order passed by the Labour Court is set aside and modified to one of payment of compensation of Rs. 70,000 which shall be deposited in the Labour Court within five weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 16. The writ petition is allowed modifying the impugned order as above. No costs.