JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. :- Petitioner-Bank is aggrieved from the order dated 31.7.1999, Annexure-4, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as the .Labour Court), in case titled as Smt. Subhadra Bhardwaj v. H.P. State Cooperative Bank Ltd. Kasumpti. This order was passed on an application filed by the respondent under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Facts regarding which learned Counsel for the parties were not at variance at the time of hearing of this petition need to be briefly noted. Case of the respondent is that she was engaged as an Apprentice on a consolidated monthly way of Rs. 950/- for 89 days on 30.7.1994 vide Annexure-A to the writ petition. For ready reference contents of this Annexure are extracted herein below. "With reference to your application for the post of clerk in the Bank, we have the pleasure to appoint you as an apprentice on a consolidated salary of Rs. 950/- (Rupees Nine hundred fifty) only per month for a period of 89 days on the following terms and conditions:- 1. That your appointment is purely on temporary basis and your services will be terminated at any time without assigning any reason, and this letter does not automatically give you a right for appointment against regular vacancy of the bank. 2. That you will not be entitled to any other benefits as are admissible to regular employees of the Bank. 3. That you will produce a character certificate from a Magistrate/Gazetted Officer within 15 days from the date of joining. 4. That you will be liable to be proceeded against in accordance with law against any discrepancy shortage and mis-appropriation etc. if occurs during your working period with the bank. 5. That you will be abide by the service rules of the Bank which are in force and framed from time to time. 6. This appointment is subject to your physical and mental fitness to be ascertained from a medical test to be preferred by medical board of Govt. Hospital as approved by the Bank. You will be referred to a Medical Board after you join as an apprentice on consolidated wages. In case you fail to fulfill any of the conditions stated above, this offer of appointment shall stand withdrawn. Hospital as approved by the Bank. You will be referred to a Medical Board after you join as an apprentice on consolidated wages. In case you fail to fulfill any of the conditions stated above, this offer of appointment shall stand withdrawn. In case this offer is acceptable to you, please report for duties at Branch Office. Sanjauli within 15 days from the receipt of this letter. Sd/- Managing Director." She has continued to work on this monthly wage till she was regularized by the petitioner Bank in its employment. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further stated that petitioner could have continued as an apprentice for one year as per the provisions of Apprenticeship Act, 1961. Thus, her apprentice-ship period was to come to an end on 31.8.1995 and as already noted she was continued by the petitioner Bank at the fixed monthly wage. 3. Now the dispute started between the parties giving rise to this writ petition, when the respondent filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court. Sum and substance of her application, copy whereof is Annexure P-2 with the writ petition was, that she was discharging the duties like a regular Clerk and their nature of duties was similar and identical, as also their working and responsibilities of both i.e. petitioner and the regular clerk were same, therefore she is entitled to equal pay for equal work and thus she claimed the pay scale of Rs. 1310-1980 w.e.f.; 5.11. 1994. 4. Petitioner, when put to notice by the Labour Court contested and resisted the claim. Its stand was that application was not maintainable as petitioner was neither a workman nor respondent is an Industry within the meaning of the Act. As if (the petitioner) is Society, registered under the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act and governed thereunder. Regarding service matters of its employees, petitioner has its own service bye-laws. Another plea also set-up was that before getting into the regular job every employee is given a written order of his appointment after passing of the written exam. With a view to justify the engagement of the petitioner on a fixed monthly wage, it is also pleaded that engagement for limited days of a person like the petitioner, is essentially of a temporary- nature or such person is temporarily employed as a conditional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work. With a view to justify the engagement of the petitioner on a fixed monthly wage, it is also pleaded that engagement for limited days of a person like the petitioner, is essentially of a temporary- nature or such person is temporarily employed as a conditional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work. Thus, no temporary employee can be regularized without prior approval of the Registrar of Societies, Himachal Pradesh. In this behalf it may also be appropriate to mention that in paragraphs 5 to 7 of her application Annexure P-2, lodged before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court she had specifically laid foundation for making her claim. Reference to these paras of the reply clearly indicates that her case has not been specifically disputed, though it is pleaded that she was not performing the alleged duties and as per appointment letter she is not entitled to claim any benefits as are admissible to regular employees. Further thrust of the reply is, that petitioner cannot claim anything over and above what is mentioned in Annexure PA and subsequent orders. 5. In the aforesaid background, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the bank submitted that the Labour Court could not have adjudicated upon of the matter under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and the petitioner could not have invoked this provision. According to him, Labour Courts jurisdiction is limited to adjudicate the dispute of entitlement on the basis of a claim of a workman like the petitioner. It can only interpret the award or statement on which claim is based. Its jurisdiction is like that of an executing court. According to him when right of the petitioner to claim wages equivalent to that of a regular employee was denied as well as disputed, the Labour Court should have kept of its hands off. Another plea urged was that there is qualitative difference between the nature, functions and duties being allocated to and discharged by the petitioner and a regular clerk, thus, as per Mr. Sharma, Labour Court has traveled beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order which deserves to be set aside. 6. These pleas have been controverted by Sh. Sharawan Dogra learned Counsel for the respondent. Sharma, Labour Court has traveled beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order which deserves to be set aside. 6. These pleas have been controverted by Sh. Sharawan Dogra learned Counsel for the respondent. Per him on a bare perusal of Section 33-C(2), it cannot be said that there was any dispute as was urged on behalf of the petitioner which could not have been gone into by the before Court. Action of the petitioner tentamounts to extracting "Begar" from his client, thus being unconstitutional, no fault can be found in the award impugned in this writ petition. 7. Keeping in view the mandate of the Supreme Court of India in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, 1995(1) SCC 235, and looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Labour Court in my considered view could not and in fact should not have adjudicated the claim of the respondent on her application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In case, respondent felt that she had any claim and/or right, she should have approached the Conciliation Officer by raising a dispute and thereafter law should have taken its course. 8. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), a three Judge Bench after taking note of number of its earlier decisions held as under :- "9. Another decision on the point is Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, wherein also Gajendra gadkar, J., (as he then was) speaking for the Bench, referring to the above Constitution bench decision, stated that the proceedings contemplated by Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court, like the Executing Court in the execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, would be competent to interpret the award on which the claim is based. It is obvious that the power of the Executing Court is only to implement the adjudication already made by a decree and not to adjudicate a disputed claim which requires adjudication for its enforcement in the form of decree. The Executing Court, after the decree has been passed, is however comptent to interpret the decree for the purpose of its implementation. This position was settled by the above Constitution Bench decision and has been the consistent view of this Court ever since then. 10. Next case on this point in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. The Executing Court, after the decree has been passed, is however comptent to interpret the decree for the purpose of its implementation. This position was settled by the above Constitution Bench decision and has been the consistent view of this Court ever since then. 10. Next case on this point in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Fameshar wherein the above decisions were relied on. It was held that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be "an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for". The propositions on the question as to the scope of Section 33-C(2) deducible from the earlier decisions of this Court were summarized and they include the following, namely : (SCR pp. 142-144). "(1) The legislative history indicates that the legislature, after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognized the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore inserted Section 33-A in 1950 and Section 33-C in 1956. These two Sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Section 10(1) and without having to depend on their Union to espouse their case. ****** (3) Section 33- which is in terms similar to those in Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. ****** (5) Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmens right rests. ****** (7) Though the Court did not indicate which cases other than those under sub-section (1) would fall under sub-section (2), it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under subsection (2), viz., cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under Section 10(1) or claims which have already been the subject-matter of settlement to which Sections 18 and 19 would apply. (8) Since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an Executing Court, the Labour Court like the Executing Court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under Section 33-C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction." After stating the propositions the decision proceeds to state as under: (SCR p. 144) "It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer." 13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent-workmen who were all- daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmens claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on. that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could- be sought. Respondents claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication ensuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents." In the facts of this position and without having gone into any other question urged on the merits of the case of the parties, impugned order passed by the Labour Court on 31.7.1999 Annexure P-4, impugned in this writ petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and it is ordered accordingly. 9. Faced with this situation Mr. Dogra, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted, that the respondent was bona fide prosecuting her case under Section 33-C(2) of the Act on the advice available to her. Per him petitioner as well as State Government, it is apprehended are, likely to use time gap from 1997 till date to reject her claim being stale and belated suffering from latches. Therefore, according to him she will be left high and dry being remediless. This submission appears to be well founded. Thus, it is ordered that in case the petitioner approaches the Conciliation Officer by or before 31st January, 2004, her such claim shall be entertained and will be dealt with by such officer, without taking into account delay/latches/staleness of her claim factor on the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is not the case of the petitioner in this writ petition that she was not bona fide prosecuting the case under Section 33-C(2) of the Act when she approached the Labour Court for the grant of relief, which in fact was granted to her. It is a different mater that the award has been set aside by this Court. In the event of conciliation being claimed before the said date, the Officer concerned is directed to hear the parties and then dispose of the matter strictly in accordance with law. In case, Conciliations is there matter will stand closed. Otherwise Conciliation Officer shall by or before 15th of March, 2004, submit failure report to the appropriate authority of the State Government. In case, Conciliations is there matter will stand closed. Otherwise Conciliation Officer shall by or before 15th of March, 2004, submit failure report to the appropriate authority of the State Government. On receipt whereof within next two months the State Government shall examine the matter and take a decision (of course by not making delay, latches or claim of the respondent being stale as ground to refuse reference) and then pass necessary order as it may deem fit. If it decides to refer the same, then needful would be done within this period. And if the matter is referred after its receipt from the Government, Presiding Officer of the Labour Court shall finally dispose of the reference after issuing notice to the parties, as well as strictly in accordance wit law without being influenced by anything said in this judgment and in no case later than 31st December, 2004. It is clarified that direction regarding time frame is pre-emptory to be carried out by all concerned not only in its letter, but spirit also. 10. Writ petition is allowed but subject to the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. All the interim orders shall stand vacated forthwith. Amount lying in deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner with upto date interest.