BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) TWO suits being O. S. No. 8 of 1983 and o. S. No. 300 of 1982 on the file of Addl. Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad have been decided by a common judgment on 24-4-1986. One Iqbal Singh was defendant in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 and plaintiff in O. S. No. 300 of 1982. He has filed these two appeals against the common judgment of the trial Court. During the pendency of these appeals he died and his son-2nd appellant was brought on record as his legal representative. The parties will hereinafter be referred to as they are arrayed in O. S. No. 8 of 1983. ( 2 ) THE subject matter of both the suits related to an extent of 1000 sq. yards (975 sq. yards) of open land in premises bearing no. 5-9-96 (corresponding to old number as b-1 -89 or B-1 -96) on the public garden road, nampally, Hyderabad. O. S. No. 8 of 1983 was a suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking possession of 1000 sq. yards in premises bearing No. 5-9-96. They also claimed mesne profits for three years amounting to rs. 36,000/- and future mesne profits at rs. 1000/- per month from the date of the suit till the delivery of possession. O. S. No. 300 of 1982 was filed by the defendant for a declaration that he had acquired title to the suit site admeasuring 975 sq. yards. He also sought perpetual injunction against the plaintiffs from causing any interference or obstruction in his possession and enjoyment over the suit property. The trial Court decreed O. S. No. 8 of 1983 and directed the defendant to deliver vacant possession of 1000 sq. yards in premises No. 5-9-96, public garden road, Nampally to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were also held entitled to mesne profits of Rs. 36,000. 00 and Rs. 1,000. 00 per month from the date of suit till the delivery of possession. O. S. No. 300 of 1982 was dismissed. Hence these appeals. The assertions made in the plaint in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 may be briefly mentioned hereinbelow. ( 3 ) THE plaintiffs claimed that an open site admeasuring 4046 sq. yards with a house bearing old No. B-1-89 corresponding to new no. O. S. No. 300 of 1982 was dismissed. Hence these appeals. The assertions made in the plaint in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 may be briefly mentioned hereinbelow. ( 3 ) THE plaintiffs claimed that an open site admeasuring 4046 sq. yards with a house bearing old No. B-1-89 corresponding to new no. B-1-96 and present No. 5-9-96 was an evacuee property and was in the custody of custodian of Evacuee Properties. On one side of the suit property one N. M. Khan had taken a small portion of open site on lease and had started an automobile workshop known as Cosmos Automobiles before the property became evacuee property. The said N. M. Khan also migrated to Pakisthan and the said workshop vested in the custodian. The defendant was a displaced person who had migrated from West Punjab in Pakistan after partition of the country and had settled in Hyderabad in 1952. The custodian of evacuee property let out a small portion of the house existing in plaint A schedule property on a month to month tenancy at Rs. 12. 56 ps. per month to the defendant. Thereafter the defendant approached the custodian and obtained from him an allotment order No. 5929, dated 12-9-1953 with respect to Cosmos automobiles and it was accordingly rented out to the defendant by the custodian. The defendant, therefore, became a tenant in respect of a small portion of the premises in plaint A schedule property and also an allottee of the machinery as Cosmos automobiles existing in a small portion of the open site. Subsequently the custodian sold plaint A schedule property in a public auction to one Vasudev Jothanand Bhavani who in turn sold it for a consideration of rs. 95,000/-through a registered sale deed dt. 17-4-1965 to A. V. Subba Rao, a. Tirupathi Raidu, A. Sudhakar Rao. The machinery belonging to Cosmos Automobile was sold to the defendant for Rs. 3125. 00. Of these three purchasers who purchased plaint A schedule property, A Subba Rao died on 24-9-65 and A. Tirupathi Rayudu died on 5-1-1975. The plaintiffs 2 to 6 were the legal representatives of Subba Rao and tirupathi Rayaudu. The plaintiff No. 1 is one of the original purchasers. 3125. 00. Of these three purchasers who purchased plaint A schedule property, A Subba Rao died on 24-9-65 and A. Tirupathi Rayudu died on 5-1-1975. The plaintiffs 2 to 6 were the legal representatives of Subba Rao and tirupathi Rayaudu. The plaintiff No. 1 is one of the original purchasers. The defendant had become a tenant of Bhavani Prasad on his purchasing the property in the auction and later on because of the sale deeds in favour of the plaintiff No. 1 and two others, the defendant had also become their tenant. Along with the defendant, there was another tenant in the suit property whose name was jaunathy. After purchase the plaintiffs asked the defendant to vacate the portion of house occupied by him as they needed the portion of the house and vacant site for their personal use and occupation. The defendant did not vacate the premises, so the plaintiffs moved the Government for an exemption under Section 26 of the A. P. Housing Rent control Act of 1960. The Government issued a notification vide G. O. Ms. No. 324 on 12-4-1967 exempting the premises from the operation of the Rent Control Act. Thereafter the plaintiffs issued a notice to the defendant on 27-5-1967 terminating the tenancy with effect from 1 -7-1967 to which the defendant sent a reply setting up false and untenable claims. He did not vacate the premises and o. S. No. 12 of 1968 was filed against him before the III Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad in which he admitted that he was a tenant in a portion of the schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 12. 56 ps. He filed a petition Case No. 712/dr. of 1967 before the Addl. Rent Controller, Hyderabad against the father of plaintiff No. 1 for deposit of rents. In the written statement filed in that suit the defendant pleaded that two rooms occupied by him as a tenant in the house existing in plaint A schedule premises belonged to the plaintiffs and their predecessor in title, but pleaded that the shed existing over 100 sq. foot and 60 yards of site in which the machinery was installed in the compound of plaint A schedule premises belonged to him. He asserted that he purchased it in auction from Regional settlement Commissioner, Bombay for rs. 3125 and the plaintiffs therein had no concern whatsoever with that property. foot and 60 yards of site in which the machinery was installed in the compound of plaint A schedule premises belonged to him. He asserted that he purchased it in auction from Regional settlement Commissioner, Bombay for rs. 3125 and the plaintiffs therein had no concern whatsoever with that property. O. S. No. 12 of 1968 was renumbered as o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 and it was decreed on 28-3-1970 by the IV Asst. Judge, against which the defendant preferred an appeal being A. S. No. 120 of 1974. During the pendency of the appeal the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in that suit died and their legal representatives were brought on record. After the amendment of the plaint the appellate Court remanded the matter back to the trial Court for fresh disposal. The defendant filed an additional written statement on 23-10-1976. He asserted that he was in possession and enjoyment of the surrounding open land admeasuring 1000 sq. yards without any hindrance or interruption and from August, 1953 he had been in continuous possession and had perfected his title by way of adverse possession. He claimed that he was running the automobile workshop and the vehicles which were brought for repairs would always park on the surrounding open land which was in his exclusive occupation and there was no privity of contract or tenancy in respect of the workshop or in respect of the surrounding land. The defendant also claimed that he had filed a suit being o. S. No. 195 of 1976 for a declaration of ownership and possession in respect of workshop on the basis of a sale dated 13-3-1976. This suit and the suit being o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 filed by the plaintiffs were tried together by the IV Asst. Judge, city Civil Court, Hyderabad and they were disposed of by a common judgment on 19-7-1977. O. S. No. 1044 of 1999 was decreed with costs in respect of residential portion occupied by the defendant, but it was dismissed as regards the portion occupied by the defendant to the extent of 60 sq. yards and 100 sq. feet for want of proper notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. O. S. No. 195 of 1976 was dismissed with costs. yards and 100 sq. feet for want of proper notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. O. S. No. 195 of 1976 was dismissed with costs. The plaintiffs filed a. S. No. 366 of 1977 and the defendant filed a. S. No. 368 of 1977 against the judgment in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. The defendant also filed A. S. No. 371 of 1977 against the judgment in O. S. No. 195 of 1976. All the three appeals were disposed of by the Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by a common judgment dt. 19-12-1978. He allowed A. S. No. 366 of 1977 and granted four months time to the defendant to vacate the premises covered by the workshop, shed and machinery in plaint A schedule properties and he dismissed both the appeals being A. S. Nos. 368 and 371 of 1977 filed by the defendant. The defendant preferred second appeals against the common judgment of the trial Court being s. A. Nos. 416, 417 and 418 of 1979. In s. A. No. 418 of 1979 the defendant pleaded that no immoveable property was conveyed to him under the sale certificate issued in respect of the sale of the machinery. So he did not press his claim made in O. S. No. 195 of 1976 and hence S. A. No. 418 of 1979 was dismissed on 24-12-1981. With respect to two rooms of the house in plaint A schedule property in which the defendant was residing, the defendant in S. A. Nos. 416 and 417 of 1979 accepted that he was a tenant only and he sought reasonable time to vacate the premises. The High Court granted him time to vacate the premises till 1 -1 -1982. The High Court also held that with respect to 1000 sq. yards in plaint A schedule property the defendant was only a trespasser, but as court fee paid was under section 40 of the A. P. Court Fees and Suits valuation Act in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 the high Court felt that the defendant could not be evicted and observed that if so advised the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 could file a fresh suit for evicting the defendant. The High Court also granted time to file such a suit on or before 1 -2-1982. Thereafter the present suit was filed. The High Court also granted time to file such a suit on or before 1 -2-1982. Thereafter the present suit was filed. ( 4 ) THE defendant in his written statement resisted the suit on various grounds. He contended that mere observation of the High court to file a separate suit does not create any right to the plaintiffs to file the present suit nor does it operate as permission to file the suit in respect of C schedule property. It was only a gratuitous observation, but would not enable the plaintiffs to file the present suit which was hopelessly barred by limitation. The defendant also contended that the suit was barred by principles of res judicata. The judgment of the High Court in the earlier suits operates as res judicata. He further contended that two rooms were let out to him in the house bearing No. 5-9-96 on a monthly rent of Rs. 12. 56 ps. by the custodian on 21-2-1952. He purchased workshop with open land as per the sale on 25-3-1957. Plaint A schedule property had been purchased by one Bhavani and his associates in public auction held on 29-1-1956, whereas the defendant purchased Cosmos Automobiles on 25-3-1957. Bhavani and associates issued notice to him on 19-6-1959 directing him to remove the workshop from the compound i. e. , from plaint C schedule property as there was no tenancy and also claimed damages of Rs. 21- per day for keeping the moveable property in the compound. The defendant denied the rights of Bhavani and his associates by a reply dt. 24-6-1969. Bhavani and his associates did not file any suit to evict him, but sold A schedule property by sale deed dt. 17-4-1965 to the plaintiffs, therefore even by the date of sale the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession in respect of plaint C schedule property. He also claimed that at no point of time the possession of schedule property was delivered by the custodian to the vendees and so also the vendors of the plaintiff were not in possession at any time. Jaunathi was not in possession of open site of C schedule property. The defendant at no point of time admitted the ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. Jaunathi was not in possession of open site of C schedule property. The defendant at no point of time admitted the ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. It was his plea that he was a tenant in respect of only two rooms of the house No. 5-9-96 and plaint C schedule property was in his exclusive possession and enjoyment from 1952. The plaintiffs were not in actual physical possession of any part of the land in plaint A schedule property. He had filed a suit being O. S. No. 1162 of 1982 in respect of northern portion of vacant site for declaration and permanent injunction which was transferred and renumbered as OS No. 300 of 1982. So the defendant sought for staying of the present suit till the disposal of the suit filed by him. He also pleaded that the suit was not properly valued and the court fee paid was insufficient. ( 5 ) DURING the pendency of the suit the plaintiffs amended the plaint by adding para 19-A after their application being I. A. No. 35 of 1986 was allowed by the trial Court on 11-2-1986. By way of this amendment the plaintiffs pleaded that they had bona fidely prosecuted O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 which went to the High Court in second appeal and therefore they claimed that they were entitled for deduction of the period from the date of filing of O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 till the date of disposal of the second appeal on 24-12-1981. They claimed the benefit for deducting the period as mentioned hereinabove in terms of Section 14 of the limitation Act. They also pleaded that since the defendant admitted the tenancy of b schedule property, he was not entitled to set up claim of adverse possession in respect of the entire surrounding open space of plaint A schedule. ( 6 ) AN additional written statement was filed by the defendant on 17-2-1986 to the averments made in para 19-A of the plaint. He pleaded that the suit was not founded on the same cause of action on which O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 was filed. ( 7 ) IN this suit the following issues were framed by the trial Court, (1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit land? He pleaded that the suit was not founded on the same cause of action on which O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 was filed. ( 7 ) IN this suit the following issues were framed by the trial Court, (1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit land? (2) Is not the suit maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration of title? (3) Are the plaintiffs entitled to possession? (4) Are the plaintiffs entitled to mesne profits and if so, to what amount? (5) Is the suit within limitation? (6) Whether the judgments in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 and S. A. No. 416 of 1979 operate as res judicata? (7) Whether the defendant has acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession? (8) Whether the suit is not properly valued and the court fee paid is not sufficient? (9) To what relief?an additional issue was framed on 18-2-1986, (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of limitation Act? ( 8 ) BEFORE going to the other suit, we think it will be necessary to go through the evidence and the related questions of law relating to this suit because the fate of the other suit being O. S. No. 300 of 1982 would depend on the outcome of this suit. ( 9 ) O. S. NO. 8 of 1983 was decreed and the defendant was directed to vacate and deliver vacant possession of 1000 sq. yards in premises No. 5-9-96, public garden road, nampally to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were also held entitled to Rs. 30,000. 00 towards mesne profits for three years before filing of the suit and Rs. 1,000. 00 per month towards future mesne profits from the date of suit till the delivery of vacant possession. ( 10 ) P. W. 1 was the 3rd plaintiff. He stated that the property originally belonged to the joint family consisting of his father, junior paternal uncle and paternal grand father. His grand father and his two sons purchased an extent of 4046 sq. yards of site with building standing thereon bearing new No. 5-9-96 situated opposite to public garden. It was purchased in the year 1965. He, plaintiffs 2 and 4 to are the legal representatives of his father late Tirupathi Rayudu. On the date of purchase the building was in occupation of two tenants viz. yards of site with building standing thereon bearing new No. 5-9-96 situated opposite to public garden. It was purchased in the year 1965. He, plaintiffs 2 and 4 to are the legal representatives of his father late Tirupathi Rayudu. On the date of purchase the building was in occupation of two tenants viz. , Janathy and Iqbal Singh who is the defendant in this suit. The defendant was in possession of two rooms of the suit house, besides a tin shed and a workshop, both of which cover an area of 60 sq. yards and 100 sq. feet respectively. Another tenant Janathy was in possession of the remaining building with open land. After purchase they asked the tenants to vacate. They did not vacate. They filed two suits for eviction of the tenants from the suit property i. e. , O. S. No. 1045 of 1969 against Janathy and O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 against the defendant. They were tried by IV Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. O. S. No. 1045 of 1969 which was filed against janathy was compromised and in pursuance of t he compromise, possession was handed over by Janathy to the plaintiffs in 1971. The witness exhibited Exs. A-1 to A-4 which were certified copies of plaint, written statement, compromise memo and compromise decree in O. S. No. 1045 of 1969. Ex. A-5 was the plaint in O. S. No. 1045 of 1969. O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 which was filed against the defendant was decreed by the trial Court. On appeal by the defendant it was remanded to the trial Court. Subsequently it was decreed in part in respect of two rooms. When the matter was remanded, the defendant filed another suit being O. S. No. 195 of 1976 in respect of tin shed and workshop for a declaration that he was the owner thereof. This suit was dismissed. The defendant preferred an appeal against the decision in his suit and also against the decision in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. The plaintiffs also filed an appeal. All the three appeals were heard together. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed and the suit being o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 was decreed in toto. Both the appeals filed by the defendant were dismissed. The plaintiffs also filed an appeal. All the three appeals were heard together. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed and the suit being o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 was decreed in toto. Both the appeals filed by the defendant were dismissed. The defendant preferred three second appeals to the High Court against all the three adverse decisions in the first appeals and they were dismissed by the high Court. Ex. A-6 was exhibited as the certified copy of common judgment passed by the High Court in three second appeals. In pursuance of the directions of the High court in Ex. A-6, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession in respect of 1000 sq. yards. He exhibited ex. A-8 which was the certified copy of the plaint in O. S. No. 12 of 1968 filed by his grand father and his paternal uncle against the defendant in respect of the same property. Ex. A-9 was the certified copy of the written statement in that suit. O. S. No. 12 of 1968 was renumbered as O. S. No. 1044 of 1969. Ex. A-10 was the certified copy of the amended plaint. Ex. A-11 was the amended written statement. Ex. A-12 was the certified copy of plan in that suit. In the unamended written statement in that suit the defendant herein had not claimed that he was in possession of open land. He took this plea in 1976 when he filed an additional written statement. After taking possession from janathy, they had not been using it, but they had a watchman at the building. The watchman was residing there from the time they had taken possession from Janathy. They had to pass through the open site of 996 sq. yards to reach the building vacated by Janathy. This site was not enclosed by any compound wall on either side of the road. Previously there was a common wall, but it had fallen down. The open space was being used by plaintiffs for parking their vehicles. Passers by also used it as it was an unclosed open site. In the former suit the defendant had admitted the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property. They have filed an execution petition which was pending with respect to the tin shed, workshop and two rooms. The open space was being used by plaintiffs for parking their vehicles. Passers by also used it as it was an unclosed open site. In the former suit the defendant had admitted the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property. They have filed an execution petition which was pending with respect to the tin shed, workshop and two rooms. In the present suit the plaintiffs have sought recovery of possession in respect of the land marked in green colour in ex. A-7. In the present suit they have excluded two rooms, zinc shed and workshop shown in the plaint plan of o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. The defendant was a tenant in respect of two rooms, zinc shed and workshop, while he illegally occupied the other portions. In the earlier suit relief of possession was not granted in respect of open land on the ground that no court fee has been paid. On the date of purchase of the suit property by the plaintiff, the defendant might have been in illegal possession of the suit property. Then he stated that the defendant was not in possession of the suit property when they purchased. The defendant came into possession of the suit property subsequently in 1976, till then he never claimed that he was in possession of the sail property. They took actual possession of the open land in 1965 when they purchased. Till 1976 they were in possession of the suit property. They claimed the relief of possession in O. S. No. 1044 of 1999 in respect of the property which was subject matter of this suit and the defendant was not allowing them to enter into the suit site. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the suit property. In the suit site the defendant was running a motor driving school and also a mechanic shop. He had no idea that the defendant was running the motor driving school since 1952. At the time of purchase the defendant was running the motor driving school. Because of deficit court fee in the previous suit and in view of the observations of the High Court, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. As on the date of filing of o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 on 4-9-1967 the plaintiffs were in actual and physical possession of the suit property. Because of deficit court fee in the previous suit and in view of the observations of the High Court, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. As on the date of filing of o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 on 4-9-1967 the plaintiffs were in actual and physical possession of the suit property. He could not tell the actual date of dispossession as his grandfather was looking after the matters. They were dispossessed in 1974. He denied the suggestion that the suit property was in possession of the defendant from 1950. ( 11 ) D. W. 1 is the defendant in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 and plaintiff in O. S. No. 300 of 1982. He stated that he was residing in h. No. 5-9-96 situated at public garden road. He was allotted two rooms in the said house in 1952 by the custodian of evacuee property on a monthly rent of Rs. 15. 00. He was running a car driving school called hindu Motor Training School from 1953 in the open land in front of his residence. His residence is shown in red colour in Ex. A-7. The open land is shown in C schedule property. One Bhavani and his associates purchased open land in C schedule and other properties in 1956 or so. They gave a notice to the witness demanding rent of rs. 2/- per day as damages. He gave a reply. The plaintiffs were not the owners of plaint C. schedule property. Earlier in respect of C schedule property a suit was filed being o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. The plaintiffs had contended that he was a tenant in the c schedule property. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. An appeal preferred against the said judgment was allowed. He preferred a second appeal to the High Court and it was partly allowed. It was held that if the plaintiffs were so advised, they could file a separate suit. Hence the present suit was filed. The High Court gave a finding in his favour that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. During the pendency of first appeal or second appeal the plaintiffs did not file any application seeking permission to file a fresh suit. The entire property was declared evacuee property. He was a displaced person having come from Punjab of pakisthan. During the pendency of first appeal or second appeal the plaintiffs did not file any application seeking permission to file a fresh suit. The entire property was declared evacuee property. He was a displaced person having come from Punjab of pakisthan. The custodian of evacuee property allotted to him only two rooms on a monthly rent of Rs. 15. 00 in 1952. The remaining open land and other C schedule property was illegally occupied by him. He started a motor driving school in 1952 which he was running even now. In the open land he was having a workshop and also keeping cars. One Bhavani associates had purchased the entire properties including C schedule property from the custodian of evacuee properties and other open land. In the sale certificate issued by the custodian of the evacuee properties no boundaries or area was mentioned. It does not mention that possession was delivered to the purchaser. M/s. Bhavani Associates purchased the properties in 1957. After their purchase, they issued a notice to him stating that he should remove his cars, workshop and articles from the open land and he should pay rent of Rs. 2. 00 per day for the open land. He sent a reply to the said notice. In the reply he also asserted his right over C schedule property and the adjoining open land. M/s. Bhavani Associates did not file any suit against him for ejectment and for recovery of possession. In 1965 m/s. Bhavani Associates sold the property to the plaintiffs. By that date he acquired title by adverse possession. His possession over the open land and C schedule property was open, continuous and peaceful. M/s. Bhavani Associates did not deliver possession of the open land and C schedule property to the purchaser at any time. Ex. B-1 was the notice issued before filing of o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. Ex. B-2 was his reply to Ex. B-1. Even in Ex. B-2 he had denied the title of the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 in respect of the property. In 1976 Urban land Ceiling Regulations Act came into force and in pursuance of the said Act he filed a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Ex. B-3 was the copy of the said declaration. Ex. B-4 was the acknowledgment. Exs. In 1976 Urban land Ceiling Regulations Act came into force and in pursuance of the said Act he filed a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Ex. B-3 was the copy of the said declaration. Ex. B-4 was the acknowledgment. Exs. B-5 to b-7 were the notices received by him from u. L. C. R. authorities. He applied to the director of Industries for granting exemption for running a driving school. Ex. B-8 was the application dt. 14-9-1976. Ex. B-9 was the acknowledgment. Ex. B-10 was the letter dt. 8-2-1977 given by him to the Director of industries. Ex. B-11 was the letter of Director of Industries dt. 13-5-1977 addressed to him along with annexure which was Ex. B-12. Ex. B-13 was another letter of Director of industries dt. 13-5-1977. Ex. B-14 was the demand notice for payment of non- agricultural land tax. He paid the tax under ex. B-15 challan. Ex. B-16 was the reply dt. 19-6-1959 given by him to M/s. Bhavani associates. In the earlier litigation he admitted tenancy only in respect of two rooms. In another portion of the building there was a tenant by name M. H. Jayanthi who had a furniture shop. The open land opposite to that portion had been in his possession. At no time M. H. Jayanthi was in possession of it. The version of plaintiffs that m/s. M. H. Jayanthi was in possession of the open land was not correct. The plaintiffs herein filed a suit against M. H. Jayanthi being O. S. No. 1045 of 1969. That suit ended in a compromise between the parties. Ex. A-3 was the compromise memo which shows that only 14 rooms were delivered to the plaintiffs. For the open land in front of these 14 rooms he had filed O. S. No. 300 of 1982. The open land is about 1000 sq. yards. He was in possession of the said land since 1952. During the pendency of the suit the municipal Corporation of Hyderabad acquired a portion of the open land for widening the road. On the land acquired by the MCH there was a shed and workshop. Nearly 1000 sq. yards had been acquired by the MCH. He had taken only two rooms out of B schedule property on lease from the custodian of evacuee properties. The tenancy was oral. There was no rental deed. On the land acquired by the MCH there was a shed and workshop. Nearly 1000 sq. yards had been acquired by the MCH. He had taken only two rooms out of B schedule property on lease from the custodian of evacuee properties. The tenancy was oral. There was no rental deed. The total extent of plaint A schedule properly is 4046 sq. yards. A schedule property was bearing old Municipal No. B-196. There were no separate numbers for plaint B and C schedule properties. The custodian of evacuee properties had given him two rooms of B schedule property on lease in 1952. He came over to Hyderabad in 1950. At the time of granting of lease for the first time he came into possession in 1952. He illegally occupied the open land surrounding b schedule property in 1952. The MCH constructed a compound wall around A schedule property. He used to park vehicles of customers and he used to park his training school vehicles in the open land surrounding b schedule property. An Inspector on behalf of the Custodian of evacuee properties had come and opened the locks put to the two rooms and delivered possession to him. The custodian had given him in writing about the portion which had been given to him on lease. The entire 4046 sq. yards which is A schedule property vested in the Custodian and it belonged to the same evacuee. He was paying a rent of Rs. 157- per month for the two rooms. He did not construct the two rooms. C schedule property in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 and the subject matter of O. S. No. 300 of 1982 was open land at the time when he was inducted into possession of the two rooms. Every month the Inspector of evacuee property used to come and collect the rent from him for the two rooms and he used to pass rent receipts. He had not purchased any portion of A, B and C schedule properties or the properties which are subject matter of the suit filed by him. Apart from the two rooms of the plaint B schedule, rest of the portion of B schedule was allotted to him by the custodian. The custodian executed a document in his favour in that regard. Apart from the two rooms of the plaint B schedule, rest of the portion of B schedule was allotted to him by the custodian. The custodian executed a document in his favour in that regard. Though MCH people were collecting licence fee from him, they were not issuing licence for running the motor driving school or even for the workshop also. So he had not any licence from 1952 till date. He stated that he got a licence for running the motor driving school from the Police commissioner, but he had not filed it in the court. He admitted that the licence was not in respect of any portion of the suit premises, but it was in respect of Troop Bazar house where he used to live when he obtained licence in 1952. Before coming to hyderabad he was running a motor driving school at Poona. Till today he had not paid any corporation tax in respect of any portion of the suit properties. Till date nobody had come to assess or collect any tax. Till date no demand notice was issued by MCH towards property tax. He had not constructed any structure on any portion of the suit properties which are subject matter of both the suits. Execution petition was pending in connection with the decree in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 and he was resisting that execution petition. The workshop portion of B schedule property had been taken by the Municipal Corporation for widening the road. The balance of A schedule property now remains 3396 sq. yards. Under Ex. B-15 he paid non-agricultural land tax for the open land on 31-3-1980. Prior to that he had not paid the tax. Only once he received a demand notice and paid the non-agricultural land tax. Subsequently he had not received any notice and he had not paid any tax. It was not correct to say that the suit filed by him i. e. , O. S. No. 300 of 1982 relates to the same subject matter which was a subject matter of O. S. No. 1045 of 1969. It was true that he had filed a petition for deposit of rents in the Rent Controller Court as, according to him, the plaintiffs were not receiving the rents. There was a rent deposit case being rc. No. 712/dr 1967 filed by him before the additional Rent Controller. Ex. It was true that he had filed a petition for deposit of rents in the Rent Controller Court as, according to him, the plaintiffs were not receiving the rents. There was a rent deposit case being rc. No. 712/dr 1967 filed by him before the additional Rent Controller. Ex. A-20 was the true copy of the said petition served on the other side in that case. In that petition he had not stated whether the rents relate to two rooms or structure or open land or the extent to which it relates. He had purchased the automobile tools from the custodian. Then he added that he had purchased them along with the land. The workshop measures about 60 sq. yards. There was also a tin shed measuring 100 sq. feet. The plaintiffs filed o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 before the trial Court in respect of two rooms, 60 sq. yards of workshop and 100 sq. feet of tin shed. That suit included open land which was shown in red colour attached to that plaint. In S. A. No. 416 of 1979 the High Court directed him to vacate the premises bearing No. 5-9-96, opposite to public gardens road, workshop over 60 sq. yards and tin shed over 100 sq. feet on or before 1-2-1982. The plaintiffs were allowed to file a separate suit for his eviction from the land which is shown in red colour in the sketch plan of that suit-Ex. A-5. The custodian sold him the workshop along with the land thereunder and the tin shed along with the land thereunder. He was claiming adverse possession in respect of the open land of plaint A schedule property. In the written statement in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 he had taken a plea of adverse possession in respect of open land. He did not occupy the portion vacated by m/s. Jayanthi furniture. ( 12 ) THESE two statements of the defendant and one of the plaintiffs are important because the defendant in the present suit is the plaintiff in other suit and the plaintiffs in this suit are defendants in other suit. Two more witnesses have been examined by the defendant. Before coming to their documents, it may be pertinent to note that the defendant nowhere disputed the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property. Two more witnesses have been examined by the defendant. Before coming to their documents, it may be pertinent to note that the defendant nowhere disputed the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property. He was only claiming that he had perfected his title by adverse possession. ( 13 ) NOW in the light of the pleadings and the documents to which we made a reference hereinabove, it will have to be seen as to when the defendant claimed adverse possession and whether he perfected his title. O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 was originally numbered as O. S. No. 12 of 1968. Ex. A-8 is the certified copy of the plaint in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969. In this plaint the plaintiffs stated that the defendant was a tenant in a portion of the schedule mentioned premises on a monthly rent of rs. 12. 56 ps. The plaintiffs sought a decree for recovery of possession of the portion of the premises bearing Municipal No. 5-9-96, public garden road, Nampalli, Hyderabad. They also sought future damages and recovery of past arrears. The defendant filed his written statement which was Ex. A-9. In this written statement he admitted that he was a tenant in a portion of the schedule mentioned premises on a monthly rent of rs. 12. 86 ps. and he had obtained oral lease from plaintiff No. 1. But when he filed a petition being Case No. 712/dr of 1967 for deposit of rent, he came to know that the plaintiffs 2 and 3 were the joint owners along with plaintiff No. 1. He had no agreement of tenancy with the plaintiffs 2 and 3. The plaintiffs had claimed in that suit that they obtained an exemption from the applicability of Section 10 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. This was termed by the defendant to be illegal. He stated that the suit premises consisting of two rooms in which he was residing belonged to the plaintiff. But the shed and 60 sq. yards of land in the compound belonged to him as he had purchased them in an auction from Regional Settlement commissioner, Bombay. He had received a notice on 27-5-1967 which was Ex. A-21 and he gave a reply to this notice on 27-6-1967 which was Ex. A-22. But the shed and 60 sq. yards of land in the compound belonged to him as he had purchased them in an auction from Regional Settlement commissioner, Bombay. He had received a notice on 27-5-1967 which was Ex. A-21 and he gave a reply to this notice on 27-6-1967 which was Ex. A-22. In para 1 of the reply given to the notice the counsel for the defendant stated, "my client admits that he is a tenant only in respect of two rooms of the main building. He is the owner of the shed and 60 sq. yars of land in the compound having purchased the same in the auction held by the Regional Settlement commissioner, Bombay. " In the written statement and in the reply to the notice the defendant claimed the ownership of the shed and 60 sq. yards of land on the basis of an auction held by the Regional Settlement commissioner, Bombay, whereas in the present suit in his own testimony he stated that he had only purchased tools in the auction which will be clear after perusing the documents relating to auction. So at the stage of filing of the suit being O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 adverse possession was not pleaded by the defendant. On the other hand, tenancy of two rooms was admitted by him. After the defendant claimed that he had purchased shed and 60 sq. yards of land, it appears para 3 of the plaint was amended. This has happened after the case was remanded back to the trial Court by the appellate court. An additional written statement being Ex. A-11 was filed by the defendant to the amended plaint. In this written statement he stated, "the workshop admeasuring 60 sq. yards with machinery and temporary G. I. sheet shed admeasuring 100 sq. feet were both allotted to the defendant by the Regional Settlement commissioner, Bombay in August, 1953 for carrying on business. Later on the said work shop with machinery and temporary shed both were auctioned in favour of the defendant for Rs. 3,125. 00 in public auction held on 25-3-1957 through auctioneers, gandhi and Company by the Regional commissioner. Thus since 25-3-1957 this defendant had been in possession and enjoyment of the said workshop and shed as absolute owner and has been running his business as motor mechanic and motor driving school. 3,125. 00 in public auction held on 25-3-1957 through auctioneers, gandhi and Company by the Regional commissioner. Thus since 25-3-1957 this defendant had been in possession and enjoyment of the said workshop and shed as absolute owner and has been running his business as motor mechanic and motor driving school. Further this defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the surrounding open land admeasuring about 1000 sq. yards, without any kind of hindrance, interruption by or from anybody whomsoever ever since the date of allotment of workshop and shed i. e. , since August, 1953 continuously for more than 12 years and thereby the defendant has perfected his title by way of adverse possession in regard to the said surrounding land of 1000 sq. yards". For the first time in the written statement filed after amending the plaint, the defendant claimed adverse possession in 1976. ( 14 ) NOW before going further it will be necessary to have a look at the common judgment which was delivered by iv Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 and o. S. No. 195 of 1976. O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 filed by the plaintiffs was allowed and o. S. No. 195 of 1976 filed by the defendant was dismissed. Thereupon appeals were filed which were also decided by a common judgment dt. 19-12-1978 which was ex. A-13. The appellate Court in these appeals framed questions for determination and decided them and consequently passed a decree of eviction and gave the defendant four months time to vacate the premises. Thereafter second appeals were filed. The high Court decided the second appeals by a common judgment on 24-12-1981. This is a short judgment which is reproduced below:"the other two second appeals arise out of O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 in which iqbal Singh is the sole defendant. The suit was lodged to evict him from the following four parcels of land, (1) Two rooms described as 5-9-96 opposite to public garden road, (2) Premises of a work shop which is said to be sixty square yards, (3) A tin shed admeasuring hundred square feet, (4) A vacant site demarcated with a red line in Ex. A-5 admeasuring one thousand square yards. A-5 admeasuring one thousand square yards. Sri Narasimha Acharya, who appears for the appellant in the two appeals submitted that as respects the premises in (1), he accepts that the two lower courts have correctly construed the appellant is a tenant. As respects items 2 and 3, the learned Advocate general for the respondents argued that Iqbal Singh is a tenant and in support of it, he relied on Ex. A-7 in order to show that he is a tenant. Sri Narasimha Acharya accepts that as respects items (1), (2) and (3) Iqbal singh is a tenant. He seeks a reasonable time to vacate the premises in items (1) (2) and (3) may be ordered. In the result, the only question that has to be considered is with reference to item (4) (1,000 sq. yards) marked "red" in Ex. A-5. From the facts it is seen, the appellant came into possession after 25/03/1957. There is no document and acceptable evidence to hold with reference to item (4) (1000 sq. yards) marked "red" in Ex. A-5, the appellant is a tenant. It is asserted, his possession is that of a trespasser. The title vested in the auction purchasers in the auction dated 29/01/1956 mentioned in ex. A-2, namely the respondents in these appeals and under the sale deed. . . . . the respondents are claiming to be the owners and that part of the respondents case is not denied in these appeals. Therefore, it is held the plaintiffs in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969 are the owners of item (4) (1,000 sq. yards) of the property and Iqbal Singh is a tenant and he is a trespasser. The suit was lodged on the premise that Iqbal Singh is a tenant paying court fee under section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh court Fees Act, 1956. Since it is now accepted that there is no evidence to show that he is a tenant, the decrees of the lower courts that he should be evicted as a tenant from item (4) (1,000 sq. yards) of the property, cannot be sustained. While it is true that Iqbal singh has no title, he cannot be evicted in the proceedings in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 for more than one reason, apart from the pecuniary jurisdiction of the lower courts. yards) of the property, cannot be sustained. While it is true that Iqbal singh has no title, he cannot be evicted in the proceedings in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 for more than one reason, apart from the pecuniary jurisdiction of the lower courts. In the result, in O. S. No. 1044 of 1969 as respects premises of two rooms covered by 5-9-96, the workshop over the sixty square feet, Iqbal Singh is directed to vacate the premises on or before 1/02/1982. Plaintiffs in o. S. No. 1044 of 1969, if so advised, may lay a suit for eviction from the possession of t he land marked in ex. A-5. On the request of the respondents in these appeals, it is stated that they may file the suit on or before 1/02/1982. Thus the above two appeals (S. A. Nos. 416 and 417/1979) are partly allowed. No costs. " ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the High Court, while upholding the ownership of the plaintiffs over 1000 sq. yards of land, did not approve the decree of eviction with respect of this portion of the suit property on the ground that Iqbal singh was not the tenant of this portion of land and the trial Court had also no pecuniary jurisdiction, but the judgment did not non-suit the plaintiffs and it permitted them to file a separate suit, if so advised. The suit was directed to be filed before 1-2-1982 and the suit has been filed within time i. e. , on 28-1-1982. The material facts are not at dispute. ( 16 ) THE learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant assailed the judgment of the trial Court mainly on two grounds, that the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession and that the suit was barred by limitation. Therefore this court would have to decide whether the suit was time barred and whether the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession. These two issues were framed by the trial Court as issues 5 and 7 and decided against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiffs. ( 17 ) NOW coming to these questions, the evidence led by the parties has already been discussed hereinabove. The property was admittedly evacuee property and it was purchased in auction by one Vasudev jethanand Bhavani and another on 29-1-1956 for a consideration of rs. 95,500/- and a sale certificate Ex. ( 17 ) NOW coming to these questions, the evidence led by the parties has already been discussed hereinabove. The property was admittedly evacuee property and it was purchased in auction by one Vasudev jethanand Bhavani and another on 29-1-1956 for a consideration of rs. 95,500/- and a sale certificate Ex. A-15 was issued on 15-3-1965. Thereafter this property came to be sold by a sale deed dt. 17-4-1965 Ex. A-14. In 1958 Vasudev jethanand Bhavani was given provisional possession of the suit property. He issued a notice being Exs. B-16 and B-17 to the defendant to remove the machinery. The defendant accepted this notice having been received by him, but he claimed that he had replied and put forth his claim to the property. But this reply was not produced. It appears that after purchase of the property w. J. Bhavani approached the evacuee authorities as certain properties belonging to cosmo Automobiles were in the compound and they were not being removed, therefore he asked the authorities to get it removed. The authorities replied that the property belonged to the defendant, therefore he should be approached. Ex. A-18 was the letter written by W. J. Bhavani to Managing officer, Custodian of Evacuee Property. In this letter he said, "we find that some moveable properties are lying in the compound and is understood to be that of one Cosmo Automobiles. These items were auctioned on 25-3-1957 but so far they have not been removed. Kindly arrange to have these removed without further delay. In the meanwhile we are constrained to give notice that if these materials are not removed before the 30/06/1959 we shall be charging you at the rate of Rs. 5. 00 per day for keeping the materials in our compound. . . . . . . . . . . . ". This was replied by evacuee authorities through Ex. A-19 informing W. J. Bhavani that the property lying in the compound of the house has been sold to the defendant vide Regional settlement Commissioner, Bombay s letter no. SL/ep/auc. Cosmo Automobiles/hyd/ 9243/44, dt. 19-2-1958, as such the defendant may be contacted for the rent of the compound or its clearance. Thereafter a notice being Exs. B-16 and B-17 was issued to the defendant to which he claims to have replied, but the reply was not produced. SL/ep/auc. Cosmo Automobiles/hyd/ 9243/44, dt. 19-2-1958, as such the defendant may be contacted for the rent of the compound or its clearance. Thereafter a notice being Exs. B-16 and B-17 was issued to the defendant to which he claims to have replied, but the reply was not produced. Thereafter a sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiffs by Ex. A-14. On 27-5-1967 a notice Ex. A-21 was issued to the defendant to vacate the premises. In this notice the plaintiffs claimed that they were the owners of the premises bearing no. 5-9-96, public garden road, Hyderabad. The defendant was also told that he was a tenant of a portion in the premises. The defendant gave a reply to the notice being ex. A-22 in which he never claimed that he was in possession of the land appurtenant to the house. On the other hand, he claimed that he had purchased a portion of the property in the auction. He also claimed that in the application filed by the plaintiffs under section 10 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act for granting exemption, he had filed objections. The exemption granted to the plaintiffs was challenged by him in a writ petition as well. Therefore although the defendant got chances of claiming and asserting the ownership of the land as an adverse possessor, he did not choose to do so till 1976 when on 23-10-1976 he filed additional written statement to the earlier suit. He asserted his right on the basis of adverse possession for the first time on 23-10-1976. The present suit was filed in the year 1982. Therefore no rights whatsoever accrued to the defendant on the basis of his claim of adverse possession. It is not sufficient to be in possession of a property to claim its title by adverse possession. It is well settled that it is not merely the possession that enables a person to claim title by adverse possession, but there must be overt act on behalf of possessor to show that he was claiming adverse title. Till 1976 the defendant did not claim title to the property by any overt or covert act. The defendant contended that he made representations and filed applications under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. He relies on Ex. Till 1976 the defendant did not claim title to the property by any overt or covert act. The defendant contended that he made representations and filed applications under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. He relies on Ex. B-3 which was a copy of declaration filed by him under Section 6 of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and notices were also issued to him by the Urban land Ceiling authorities on 2-7-1979, 16-2-1978 and 18-6-1977 under Exs. B-5 to b-7. This declaration had also been filed on 4-9-1976 i. e. , only after filing of the written statement in the earlier suit. He claimed to have filed an application on 14-9-1976 before Director of Industries for granting exemption for running a driving school which was Ex. B-8. He also claimed to have paid tax once in all these years and that was in the year 1980 through Ex. B-15 Awards municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. Neither he paid the tax before 1980 nor after 1980. Ex. B-15 is the challan which shows that he had deposited some amount in response to the demand notice Ex. B-14 wnich was a notice issued under Section 4 of the Andhra pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands assessment Act, 1963. If he had claimed the land to be his own land, he would have paid the tax before 1980 as well as after 1980. It is worthwhile to mention that the defendant filed a suit being O. S. No. 195 of 1976. He did not claim any title to the land admeasuring 1000 sq. yards. He only claimed two rooms, tin shed and workshop. Had he been in possession of the land at that time, he would have certainly claimed the ownership to this land which he is now claiming in the present suit. Admittedly the defendant was the tenant of a part of the suit property. By virtue of being a tenant of part of premises, if he occupied land adjacent to the lease property, in our view, he cannot claim adverse possession thereto because he entered the property as a tenant. Admittedly the defendant was the tenant of a part of the suit property. By virtue of being a tenant of part of premises, if he occupied land adjacent to the lease property, in our view, he cannot claim adverse possession thereto because he entered the property as a tenant. Reliance may be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Abdul rahman v. Prasony Bai wherein it held in para 32,"in this case, we are also satisfied that having regard to the fact that the appellant himself was the tenant of mangal Singh, he could not have raised the plea of adverse possession. As a tenant he could not have questioned the title of Mangal Singh. The very fact that escheat proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State also points out that the State proceeded on the premises that Mangal Singh had the right title in relation to the land in question and as he died intestate without leaving behind him any legal heir/representative, the same vested in the State. The appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was allotted the land in question admittedly on the aforementioned premise, namely, mangal Singh at the time of his death had title to the land in question or the suit property, but he died intestate. He, therefore, cannot be permitted to prevaricate from his stand at this stage. " ( 18 ) TEAMED counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Gava Parshad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and another wherein the tenant claimed that after the tenancy was terminated, he continued to be in possession and perfected his title. This is a short judgment. Part 1 of the judgment is reproduced below,"we have heard the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant and after hearing him and perusing the judgment of the High Court, we find ourselves wholly in agreement with the view taken by the High Court that mere termination of the licence of a licensee does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession, unless and until he sets up a title hostile to that of the licensor after termination of his licence. It is not merely unauthorized possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorized possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough. Here in the present case there is nothing to show that at any time after termination of his licence by Dr. Rama Shanker or by the first respondent the appellant asserted hostile title in himself. The high Court, was therefore, right in taking the view that the appellant had not established any title by adverse possession and in that view of the matter, the suit of the first respondent for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant was not barred under Article 65 which is the only Article of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable in the present case. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the high Court and dismiss the appeal. " ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in our view, the defendant was not able to prove that he had perfected his title by adverse possession and the finding of the trial Court on this issue cannot be disturbed. In view of our finding on this question, we do not find that the suit was barred by limitation. When the appellate court allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs, ex. A-5 was attached to the decree. This ex. A-5 was taken into consideration by the high Court while disposing of the second appeals. Therefore the parties, while deciding O. S. No. 1044 of 1969, knew that the bone of contention included 1000 sq. yards as well. The High Court took note of it as is evident from the judgment of the High Court which has been reproduced hereinabove. The High Court reversed the finding with regard to 1000 sq. yards shown in Ex. Therefore the parties, while deciding O. S. No. 1044 of 1969, knew that the bone of contention included 1000 sq. yards as well. The High Court took note of it as is evident from the judgment of the High Court which has been reproduced hereinabove. The High Court reversed the finding with regard to 1000 sq. yards shown in Ex. A-5 mainly on the ground that court fee had not been paid, as court fee would have been paid on the premise that the defendant was a tenant of the land, but the High Court found that there was no tenancy, therefore, it allowed the plaintiffs to file a fresh suit within a specified date. Therefore in these circumstances even if there was any delay, the plaintiffs were entitled to benefit of the provision under Section 14 of the Limitation act. Since only these two questions were agitated to assail the judgment of the trial court with which, for the reasons given hereinabove, we are not in agreement, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons given hereinabove, the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 8 of 1983 is upheld. For the same reasons, the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 300 of 1982 is also upheld. Both the appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.