JUDGMENT S. N. Srivastava, J.—Impugned herein are the orders dated 27.12.1967, 26.11.1969 and 11.11.1974, passed by Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer of Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation respectively. 2. The land in dispute is recorded as talab in the basic year and petitioners had their names recorded in column No. 6 of the khatauni. On publication of the record under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, objections were preferred under Section 9A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the petitioners claiming themselves to be ‘sirdar’ and placed reliance on Khasra Nos. 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1368 and 1370 fasli to buttress their claims. The Consolidation Officer, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order dated 27.12.1967 containing direction to record the land as Gaon Sabha land and to expunge name of the petitioners from column No. 6 of the khatauni. In appeal as well as in revision, this order of the Consolidation Officer received affirmance of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation respectively. It is in the above backdrop that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution came to be filed in this Court. 3. The precise submissions advanced across the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the land in dispute was recorded as talab in 1320 fasli and their ancestors were shown to be tenant in 1320 fasli and since they have been in possession from the time of their ancestors over the talab, it is further submitted, they have graduated to become owner of the talab. The learned counsel, however, fairly conceded that no bhumidhari or sirdari rights under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act could be conferred on petitioner over talab land, still he sought the relief of declaring them as bhumidhar. In vindication of the stand that rights of Zamindar extinguished after the date of vesting but if a person was tenant of talab, he acquired the position of an owner of the same, the learned counsel placed credence on a decision of this Court in Nirhjihin Kumari and others v. Gram Samaj and another, 1980 RD 164, the applicability of which shall be considered in the latter part of this judgment. 4. In connection with the above propositions, cumulative effects of Section 4, Section 6 (A) and Section 132 may be examined. 4. In connection with the above propositions, cumulative effects of Section 4, Section 6 (A) and Section 132 may be examined. Section 4 (1) of the Act envisages that the State Government may, by notification declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest, except as hereinafter provided in the State free from all encumbrances. It brooks no dispute in the instant case that rights of Zamindar had extinguished after the date of vesting, and therefore, it cannot be disputed that the property in question vested in the State Government with vesting of estates having taken effect from July 1, 1952. Section 6 of the Act contemplates consequences of vesting of an estate in the State and 6 (A) envisages that all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in grove land, forests, fisheries, tanks, ponds water channels, ferries etc. shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. Likewise, Section 132 postulates that bhumidhari rights shall not accrue in pasture lands or lands covered by water and used for the purpose of growing singhara or other produce or land in the bed of a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation etc. 5. Reverting to the facts, it is eloquent from the record that the petitioners were not recorded in the relevant revenue record on the date of vesting over the land in question and their names came to be displayed to column No. 6 as being in possession in the years 1362 to 1370 fasli. Now regard being had to the provisions of Section 4 read with Section 6 (A) of the Act, and viewing the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, it will not be difficult to hold that the property being the estate of Zamindar and on the date of vesting, the same had vested in State in view of Section 4 read with Section 6 (A) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, the right, title and interest of all intermediaries in every estate in the area including the land, grove land, forest, tank, pond, etc. had ceased and had come to be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances and by this reckoning, since petitioners were not recorded nor were in possession on the date of vesting, no rights, title or interest had come to accrue to them. 6. It is also noticeable in the present petition that the petitioners have introduced a new plea for the first time of claiming ownership rights over the land in question in contra-indication of the plea of sirdari rights (now bhumidhari with non-transferable rights) taken at the stage of Consolidation Officer. By any reckoning, new plea as set up in the instant petition by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the first time cannot be permitted to be introduced and considered also considering that the petitioners came unstuck to substantiate his claim of sirdari rights on the dint of any document. Besides, section 132 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that no bhumidhari rights could accrue on a talab. Mere entry of 1320 fasli is not capable of conferring any right in favour of the petitioner nor there is any vestige of evidence of continuity of possession thereafter till the date of vesting. As stated supra, there was no valid entry in favour of the petitioner and any forged entry obtained without any authority in law and without any order of competent authority in 1362, 1364, 1365, 1368 and 1370 fasli cannot confer any right upon them. 7. Coming to the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in vindication of their stand that the petitioners right of ownership subsists, I am of the view that the case has been decided in different perspective and the facts of that case have no resemblance to the facts involved in the present petition and cannot be taken aid of to put strength into his failing case. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to establish continuity of possession of the petitioners nor is there any evidence on record to show that the petitioners were in possession on the date of vesting. In the circumstances, this decision cannot be taken aid of by the learned counsel for the petitioner to bring home his viewpoint. 8. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to establish continuity of possession of the petitioners nor is there any evidence on record to show that the petitioners were in possession on the date of vesting. In the circumstances, this decision cannot be taken aid of by the learned counsel for the petitioner to bring home his viewpoint. 8. As a result of foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the orders impugned herein were rightly passed and affirmed by the respective authorities and they were strictly in accordance with law on consideration of the relevant law and materials on record and cannot be said to be tainted with any infirmity, or perversity. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly.