JUDGMENT Dr. B. S. Chauhan and Umeshwar Pandey, JJ.—This special appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 18.5.2004, by which the writ petition filed by the appellants, No. 51327 of 2003 has been dismissed. Appellants claim that they were class IV employees and as per the statutory provisions applicable in the respondent University they became eligible to be considered for a limited quota for promotion to class III. Both the appellants along with one other person were found suitable and were promoted to class III. The said promotions were not approved by the learned Vice-Chancellor, rather rejected vide order dated 10.5.2001, on the ground that the documents with regard to the selections were not available, nor there was any vacancy to be filled up in the promotional quota. It appears, that subsequently, the Vice Chancellor approved the selection however, vide order dated 10.11.2003, the learned Vice Chancellor initiated the inquiry receiving serious complaints made by large number of employees of the University, wherein, it has been alleged that no selection had ever taken place, therefore, the question of promoting the appellants with the third employee did not arise. In spite of the enquiry not a single document could be traced to show that the selection had ever been held. The appellants were reverted to class III and thus being aggrieved, the appellants preferred the writ petition which has been dismissed. Hence this special appeal. 2. Dr. H. N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has raised large number of issues submitting that no enquiry had been held, appellant could not be reverted to class III without giving any opportunity of hearing. The Vice Chancellor did not have a power to review, i.e., reverting the appellants once he had accorded the approval, an hostile discrimination has been given to the appellants as the third employee promoted along with them has not been reverted. The Vice Chancellor did not have power to revert the appellants as the Registrar was their appointing authority. Hence the appeal deserves to be allowed. 3. The Vice Chancellor did not have power to revert the appellants as the Registrar was their appointing authority. Hence the appeal deserves to be allowed. 3. On the contrary Smt. Sunita Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the University has submitted that selection was never held, no document is available in the University for holding the selection ; this was a complete fraud and in case of a fraud, no enquiry is required nor any opportunity of hearing can be claimed by the person concerned. The submissions made by Dr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants that the Vice Chancellor did not have a power of review is self contradictory for the reason that the Vice Chancellor did not approve their promotions vide order dated 10.5.2001, and if the submission made by Dr. Tripathi in this regard is accepted as the learned Vice Chancellor did not have a power of review, the question of promoting all the appellants could not arise. Even if the Registrar was the appointing authority, it requires approval by the Vice Chancellor, reversion given by the learned Vice Chancellor cannot be held to be illegal, thus, appeal is liable to be dismissed. 4. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. In Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that in absence of any power of review, the Tribunal could not have subsequently reconsidered its previous decision and the subsequent order re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. 6. In Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that in absence of any provision in the Act granting express power of review, it is manifest that review could not be made and the order in review was ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court has rightly quashed it by the grant of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. While deciding the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly in Drew v. Mills, 1891 (1) QB 450 ; Hession v. Johns, 1914 (2) KB 421 ; In re St. 7. While deciding the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly in Drew v. Mills, 1891 (1) QB 450 ; Hession v. Johns, 1914 (2) KB 421 ; In re St. Nazaire Company, (1879) 12 Ch D 88 and Baijnath Ram Goyanka v. Nand Kumar Singh, 14 IA 54 (PC), wherein it had categorically been held that the power of setting aside an order, which has been made after hearing the arguments, does not lie unless it is given by the Statute. The Court, under the Statute, cannot review an order deliberately made after argument and entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it. The Courts may have limited power only to make a necessary correction if the order, as drawn up, did not express the intention of the Court. A party is entitled to assail the judgment only by the mode as indicated in the Statute and in absence of express provision of review, it cannot be entertained for the reason that review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. 8. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghi Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act, review of an earlier order is impermissible. 9. In Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan and others, AIR 1978 SC 1814 , the Apex Court followed the earlier referred two judgments in Chunnibhai and Harbhan Singh (supra), and observed that it is well-settled that review is a creature of statute and cannot be entertained in absence of a provision therefor. 10. In Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur, 1988 (1) AWC 347 (SC) : AIR 1987 SC 2186 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “It is now established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. In the circumstances, it must be held that Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction. In the circumstances, it must be held that Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction. The said order of the Vice Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.” (Emphasis added). 11. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa and others v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162 . 12. In Krishna Ashram Educational Trust v. District Judge, AIR 1995 All 415 , after placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court held that in absence of a provision for review, the authority becomes functus officio after deciding the case and it has no competence to entertain review application and change the order passed by it earlier. Nor the order/Award be reviewed under the garb of clarification/ rectification/ correction. 13. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, it can be summarised that in absence of any statutory provision proving for review, entertaining an application for review is not permissible. 14. However, it is the admitted case of the appellants also that their promotions were not approved by the learned Vice Chancellor vide order dated 10.5.2001, and was approved subsequently and they were promoted. If the aforesaid settled legal proposition is applied strictly in this case and the power of review was not with the learned Vice Chancellor, the promotions accorded to the appellants itself became void—inexecutable and unenforceable. Appellants cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. 15. In R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.” 16. Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babu Ram v. Indrapal Singh, 1998 (4) AWC 864 (SC) : (1998) 6 SCC 358 . Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babu Ram v. Indrapal Singh, 1998 (4) AWC 864 (SC) : (1998) 6 SCC 358 . In P. R. Deshpandey v. Maruti Balram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. 17. More so, it is a case of fraud as no record is available in the University, therefore, even if promotion is granted to the appellants it had no legal sanctity. 18. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office memo by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal.” Vide S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . In Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Besalay, 1956 All ER 349, the Court observed without equivocation that “no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 19. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and another, AIR 1994 SC 2151 and State of Maharashtra and others v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law.” 20. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers, AIR 1992 SC 1555 , it has been held as under : “Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 21. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers, AIR 1992 SC 1555 , it has been held as under : “Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 21. In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others, 2000 (2) AWC 1349 (SC) ; (2000) 3 SCC 581 , the Apex Court observed that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 22. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. In Union of India and others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 100, the Apex Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655 , observed as under : “If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a Court of Law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer.” 23. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitra Devi and others, (2003) 8 SCC 319 . 24. The Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects/offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. 25. In the instant case, as no record is available and there is nothing on record to show that the selection had ever been held, the learned Vice Chancellor had rejected the approval of their promotion at the very initial stage vide order dated 10.5.2001, the appellants are not permitted to claim any relief on equity or a right of hearing. 26. It is further submitted that it is the Registrar who is the competent authority and therefore, the Vice Chancellor could not revert the appellants. 26. It is further submitted that it is the Registrar who is the competent authority and therefore, the Vice Chancellor could not revert the appellants. We also find no force in the submission for the reason that if the promotion had to be granted only after seeking approval by the learned Vice Chancellor he could definitely initiate the proceedings for their reversion. 27. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary. It is not issued merely because if it is lawful to do so. Once a factual stand is taken, it cannot be changed on any legal proposition whatsoever nor it is permissible for the Court to examine the correctness of the findings of fact unless it is found to be perverse being based on no evidence or contrary to evidence, as the writ court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction and not of appellate forum. The purpose of the writ court is not only to protect a person from being subjected for violation of law but also to advance justice and not to thwart it. The Constitution does not place any fetter on the power of the extraordinary jurisdiction but leaves it to the discretion of the Court. However, being the power discretionary, the Court has to balance competing interest, keeping in mind that interest of justice and public interest can coalesce in certain circumstances. Vide Champalal Binani v. Income Tax Commissioner, West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 645 ; Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 AWC (Suppl) 1.49 (SC) (NOC) : (1997) 1 SCC 134 ; Chimajirao K. Shrike v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2532 ; Ganpatrao Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpat Rao, AIR 2000 SC 3094 ; L.I.C. of India v. Asha Goyal, 2001 (1) AWC 2.2 (SC) (NOC) : AIR 2001 SC 549 ; Roshandeen v. Preeti Lal, AIR 2002 SC 33 ; S. D. S. Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2003 (4) Supreme 44 and Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and another, JT 2003 (6) SC 20. 28. More so, it is settled legal proposition that writ court should not quash the order if it revives a wrong and illegal order. Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2003 (4) Supreme 44 and Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and another, JT 2003 (6) SC 20. 28. More so, it is settled legal proposition that writ court should not quash the order if it revives a wrong and illegal order. Vide Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC 828 ; Maharaja Chintamani Saranath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar and others, (1999) 8 SCC 16 ; Mallikarjuna Muddnagal Nagappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, 2000 (4) AWC 3052 (SC) : (2000) 7 SCC 238 and Chandra Singh (supra). 29. In A. M. Allison v. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 , the Apex Court held that writ court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction as the writ proceedings cannot ‘of course’, if it is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice. 30. In Dal Singh v. King Emperor of India, AIR 1917 PC 25, the Privy Council held that in case the Authority/Court has done substantial justice, the appellate court may not interfere even if the order was passed with jurisdiction or suffers from some kind of illegality. Same view has been reiterated in Mohammad Swalleh and others v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut, AIR 1988 SC 94 and Shree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (s) v. Phundan Singh and others, AIR 1999 SC 2322 . 31. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “..............When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done...........” 32. Therefore, Court has to examine the case with this angle also bearing in mind that cause of substantial justice cannot be defeated on mere technicalities. 33. In the instant case as quashing the order of reversion to revive the order of appointment, i.e., promotion of the appellants in equity jurisdiction, we do not want to revive the order based on no selection. 34. 33. In the instant case as quashing the order of reversion to revive the order of appointment, i.e., promotion of the appellants in equity jurisdiction, we do not want to revive the order based on no selection. 34. We also find no force in the submission made on behalf of the appellants that they had been given discriminatory treatment as the third person promoted along with them has not been reverted, for the reason that before passing the order of reversion he stood retired, therefore, there was no question of reverting a person after retirement. 35. Dr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners could not explain as under what circumstances the private respondent Nos. 4 to 17 had been impleaded in the writ petition as well as in this special appeal as none of them had been promoted along with the appellants who have been retained after reverting the petitioner, nor it is stated that they had been promoted subsequent to the petitioners portion or reversion. The memo of appeal as well as the writ petition suffers from misjoinder of parties which shows that the petition had been filed in a most casual and cavalier manner without any sense of responsibility. 36. Thus, in view of the above, we find no force in the appeal, it is, accordingly, dismissed.