( 1 ) THE respondent claimed that he was appointed as a daily wage employee by the petitioner on 18. 6. 1980. he continuously worked without any break till 20. 11. 1985 on which date his services were terminated without complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act. He approached the Government on 10. 7. 1995 raising an industrial dispute. After conciliation having failed the Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court on 20. 11. 1995. Before the Labour Court the respondent contended that the termination is bad as being contrary to Section 25f of the Act. In so far as the delay in raising the dispute is concerned, it was stated in view of the orders passed by the Supreme Court directing Government not to terminate the services of daily wagers, the respondent was making representations after representations to the petitioner for reconsideration of his case in the light of the Supreme Court judgment. When ultimately the petitioner refused to take him back to duty he was constrained to raise the industrial dispute approaching the Government on 10. 7. 1995 and, therefore, if there is any delay it is for a sufficient cause and requires to be condoned. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS denied all the contentions of the respondent and specifically contended that for uncertainly claimant at his own accord left the work to gain more money. He did not work for 240 days in 12 calendar months. Apart from that, the claimant is not entitled for any relief since there was delay of more than nine years in raising the dispute and, therefore, sought for rejection of the said claim. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Labour Court both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions. After hearing both the parties and by looking into the evidence adduced on record, the Labour Court purported to deal with the question of limitation first and the relevant discussion we find in paragraph 6 of the award. The Labour Court referred to a judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 1999 LAB IC 1435 where it was held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. Further it was held that the relief under the Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. Further it was held that the relief under the Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. On the ground of delay would be taken into consideration while moulding the reliefs. Subsequently, it proceeded to appreciate the material on record and came to the conclusion that the respondent has established that he has completed 240 days in a calendar year and admittedly no notice is served on him under Section 25f and other legal requirements are not complied with, the termination was held to be bad. Therefore, it proceeded to pass an order directing the reinstatement of the respondent into service with continuity of service and consequential benefits but declined to grant any back wages. This award of the Labour Court was passed on 29. 9. 1999. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner assailing the award of the Labour Court contended firstly that though issue regarding limitation was raised before the Labour Court after noticing the said question has declined to consider it on merits on the ground that only on the ground of delay relief cannot be refused and this approach of the Labour Court is totally erroneous and requires interference. Secondly, it was contended that the establishment is now taken over by the Zilla Panchayat and in spite of a specific plea being raised before the Labour Court that Zilla Panchayat is a necessary party, the Government and the PWD Department were not made a party to the proceedings and, therefore, on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties, the reference was bad. Thirdly it was contended because of the lapse in time they could not place before the Labour Court sufficient evidence to contradict the claim of the respondent. Under these circumstances, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court has to be quashed. Thirdly it was contended because of the lapse in time they could not place before the Labour Court sufficient evidence to contradict the claim of the respondent. Under these circumstances, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court has to be quashed. ( 5 ) PER contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended in the aforesaid judgment referred to by the Labour Court not only the Supreme Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to claim under the Industrial Disputes Act but it also held that the plea of delay if raised by the employer, is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence and no reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone and, therefore, he contended the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the contention of delay and passing the impugned award. He further contended the material on record discloses that respondent No. 1 put in 240 days of service for the last preceding one year before he was terminated and, therefore, the Labour Court findings on that score cannot be found fault with. Lastly, it was contended that reference is by the Government and it is for the Government to have made the PWD as a party to the said reference and the petitioner being a successor of interest, it cannot be said that the reference is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and the rival contentions, the short point that arise for my consideration is, whether the award passed by the Labour Court requires to be interfered with on the ground that the Labour Court has not considered the question of delay in raising the industrial dispute and consequently the award passed by the Labour Court requires to be interfered with. ( 7 ) THERE are several judgments of the Supreme Court on the question of the effect of delay in raising the industrial dispute. ( 7 ) THERE are several judgments of the Supreme Court on the question of the effect of delay in raising the industrial dispute. The first of its judgements of the Supreme Court is in the case of M/s SHALIMAR WORKS LIMITED vs THEIR WORKMEN reported in AIR 1959 SC 1217 where a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has held as under:- it is true that there is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale, as in this case. ( 8 ) AGAIN in the case of AJAIB SINGH vs SIRHIND COOPERATIVE MARKETING-CUM-PROCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LIMITED AND ANOTHER reported in (1999) 6 SCC 82 on which the reliance was placed by the Labour Court where the question involved was whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act which provides three years as the period for filing any application is applicable to a proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. Answering the said question, the Supreme Court held as under:-"10. . the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination of dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. "it is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. "it is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding over the Court cannot be stretched to authorize them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. . ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of BALBIR SINGH vs PUNJAB ROADWAYS AND ANOTHER reported in (2001) SCC 133 upholding the judgment of the High Court and the Labour Court where a reference was rejected on the ground of delay, when it was pointed out the said findings were contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Ajaib Singhs case, the Supreme Court held as under:-"we do not find that any general principal as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid down in that decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the present case. " ( 10 ) FURTHER, the Supreme Court in the case of GURMAIN SINGH vs PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND OTHERS reported in 2000 (84) FLR 920 held following the law laid down in Ajaib Singhs case to the effect that if an order of dismissal is challenged belatedly, the dispute would still continue for adjudication, the only question would be to deprive back wages for the period of delay in raising such a dispute if on merits it is to succeed, set aside the judgment of the Court below where on the ground of delay the workman was denied the relief. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of NEDUNGADI BANK LIMITED vs K. P. MADHAVANKUTTY AND OTHERS reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 dealing with the question of law in raising industrial dispute has held as under:-"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of NEDUNGADI BANK LIMITED vs K. P. MADHAVANKUTTY AND OTHERS reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 dealing with the question of law in raising industrial dispute has held as under:-"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. " ( 12 ) IN SAPAN KUMAR PANDIT vs U. P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2001 SC 2562 after noticing therefore said earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Nedungadi Banks case, the Supreme Court held as under:- 8though no time limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindled by making a reference to it to adjudication? The words at any time as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended have to be read in conjunction with the words at any time. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended have to be read in conjunction with the words at any time. They are, in a way, complimentary to each other. The Governments power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression at any time terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government it is idle to ascertain the number of years which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. 9. Hence the real test is was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Governments power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed, on the possibility of what another party would think whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can from such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government there existed such a dispute. 15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute cease to exist after some time. 15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute cease to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse ( 13 ) THE latest judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S. M. NILAJKAR AND OTHERS vs TELECOM DISTRICT MANAGER, KARNATAKA reported in (2003) 4 SCC 27 where it has been held as under:- 17it is true, as held in Shalimar Works Limited vs Workmen that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute, it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefore. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even reemployment of most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in Shalimar Works Limited vs. Workmen. In Nudingadi Bank Limited vs K. P. Madhavankutty a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled the workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta v Union of India it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself; lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, the aforesaid law declared by the supreme Court in various context makes the legal position clear. Therefore, the law on the point is well settled and it can be stated as under;-" (1) There is no limitation prescribed for reference under Section 10 (1) (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, the aforesaid law declared by the supreme Court in various context makes the legal position clear. Therefore, the law on the point is well settled and it can be stated as under;-" (1) There is no limitation prescribed for reference under Section 10 (1) (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Indian Limit action Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. (3) The relief under the I. D. Act. , cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. (4) Though no period of limitation is prescribed even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be raised as soon as possible after it has arisen, and referred as soon as possible for adjudication after conciliation proceedings have failed. (5) The words at any time as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But, such an interpretation making the power would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in the section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended have to be read in conjunction with the words at any time. If so read, the Governments power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication can be done only so long as the dispute exists. (6) The period envisaged by the expression at any time terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. If the industrial dispute exists on the date of reference the Government has the power to make a reference irrespective of the lapse of time and delay since the inception of the dispute. However, [if the industrial dispute does not exist on the date of reference, the Government power to make a reference would have extinguished. (7) A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. (8) If the Government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government there existed such a dispute. It is a rebuttable presumption. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. (8) If the Government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government there existed such a dispute. It is a rebuttable presumption. (9) It is open to the employer to contend before the Labour Court that no dispute existed on the day reference is one without jurisdiction and bad. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice, and not as a merely hypothetical defence. On such proof of showing the existence of the dispute on the date of reference a shifts on the workman and he is required to adduce evidence to substantiate the contention that industrial dispute existed on the date of reference. Thereafter, an obligation is cast on the Labour Court to decide the question of the existence of the dispute on the date of reference on the basis of the pleadings and evidence produced before it. (10) Lapse of time results inclosing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be certainly fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. " ( 15 ) IN this regard it is to be noticed, the Karnataka Amendment Act to the Industrial Disputes Act by which Section 10 (4-A) was introduced provides for raising of such individual disputes within a period of six months from the date termination of service. In fact a Division Bench of this Court has held in the absence of provision for condonation of delay in making such application, if the application is not filed within the stipulated period, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a time barred claim. Therefore, it shows the mind of the legislature. Under these circumstances, I am of the view though a reference cannot be rejected solely on the ground of delay, if a contention is raised that on the day of the reference was made there was no dispute at all and, therefore, the reference is bad the Labour court ought to have considered the said question and then only if it holds that the reference is maintainable it can proceed to decide the reference on merits. May be in a given case after holding that the reference is maintainable, still while mounding the relief, by way of awarding of back wages it could be declined on the ground of delay in approaching the Labour Court or the Government. ( 16 ) IN the background of this legal position, [in the instant case, though the Labour Court rightly raised the issue regarding limitation but had misled itself in not deciding the said issue on the ground that the Supreme Court has laid down the law to the effect that on the ground of delay no reference could be rejected. Thus, it failed to go into the rival contentions of the parties and look into the record and has not recorded any finding on the question of delay. This approach of the Labour Court is contrary to the law and, therefore, calls for interference]. Consequently, I pass the following order:- (a) Writ Petition is allowed. (b) The award of the Labour Court is hereby quashed (c) The entire matter is remitted back to the Labour Court for fresh consideration and in accordance with law. (d) The Labour Court shall decide the question whether with the lapse of time the dispute existed or not on the day the Government made the reference after hearing both the parties and looking into the material on record. If the parties want an opportunity to lead further evidence it shall be given. (e) Depending on the answer to the said issue it shall proceed to decide the other issues on merits. (f) All contentions urged by both the parties are left upon to be urged before the Labour Court and to be decided by the Labour Court. Having regard to the fact that the order of termination is of the year 1985 and nearly 20 years have lapsed, the Labour Court is directed to dispose of this reference within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. --- *** --- .