JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.: - This judgment and order would dispose of the above numbered Notice of Motion, whereby the plaintiff has claimed for interim relief of injunction against the defendant from implementing the impugned orders, Exhibits Y-3 and BB, and oral communication dated 7th November, 2003, that is to say, from putting into effect the suspension of the plaintiff from training his race horses and other embargo, as provided for in the said impugned orders. 2. Briefly stated, the plaintiff is a trainer of race horses by profession of long standing spread over 20 years and has been licensed to train race horses by the defendant Company. It is the case of the plaintiff that he has been felicitated on several occasions and has won Trainers' Championship Trophy and other events. The plaintiff claims that he is one of the leading professionals in his field and has substantial earnings by way of professional fees. It is stated that the plaintiff trains a large string of horses numbering approximately 70 and most of the horses trained by him belong to a well known and renewed race horse owner, namely, Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswami, who also happens to be the Chairman of Chennai Race Club. In the instant case, the horses, in respect of which alleged offences have been committed, are "Star Carvel" and "Supreme Crown", hereinafter referred to as "the said horses". The said horses had participated in two different races on 25-4-2003 at Mahalaxmi Race Course. Routine Urine samples were drawn from these horses and sent to the Primary Laboratory at Dubai; and on 7-5-2003, these two samples were found to contain some quantities of prohibited substance called, "Stanozolal". The findings of the Primary Laboratory were communicated by the Senior Stipendiary Steward of the defendant to the plaintiff by the two letters, dated 12th June, 2003 and 17th June, 2003. It is not in dispute that the process of sampling and sealing of sample bottles, as was required as per the extant Regulations, was complied. As findings of the Primary Laboratory went against the plaintiff, in terms of Clause 2.2 of Calendar Notification at page 43 (relevant portion at page 46), the plaintiff was given an option for a confirmatory analysis. As findings of the Primary Laboratory went against the plaintiff, in terms of Clause 2.2 of Calendar Notification at page 43 (relevant portion at page 46), the plaintiff was given an option for a confirmatory analysis. The plaintiff exercised that option, on account of which the split sample, which was kept in second sealed bottles was sent to reference and confirmatory laboratory, namely, HFL, England. That was sent on 26th June, 2003. However, it appears that the said sample did not reach the destination, namely, the confirmatory laboratory, within the expected time of 3 to 4 days, for which reason the defendant took up the matter with the Courier Agency, through which the second sample was despatched, by letter dated 2nd July, 2003, as the Customer Service Executive, Miss Bharuna, of the said Courier Agency (DHL Express) had informed the defendant that the consignment sent by them containing the second sample has been destroyed. By this letter, the defendant called upon the Courier Agency to furnish necessary information. It is seen that correspondence was exchanged between the defendant and the Courier Agency. Initially, the information furnished to the defendant was that the consignment sent by them was destroyed, but later on, on 17th July, 2003, the Courier Agency informed that the same has been recovered. However, according to the stand taken by the Courier Agency in its letter, there was some leakage in the shipment, because of which the same was impounded by the security personnel. The defendant was also informed by the Courier Agency that despite the signs of leakage, the contents of the package appeared to be intact and each receptacle is appropriately 3/4 full. The defendant was also informed that they have not destroyed the shipment and the security personnel have duly sealed the shipment after verifying that it was horse urine. Eventually, the shipment containing split sample-second sample bottles reached the confirmatory laboratory, who, in turn, by its letter dated 22nd July, 2003 placed on record that both sample bottles and security seals were intact, though the outer packing had been badly damaged. After this report was received, the plaintiff was apprised of the developments and was called upon by the defendant to state whether he would still agree for the confirmatory analysis to be done by the Confirmatory Laboratory. After this report was received, the plaintiff was apprised of the developments and was called upon by the defendant to state whether he would still agree for the confirmatory analysis to be done by the Confirmatory Laboratory. In response to that, the plaintiff consented for proceeding with the analysis to be done by the confirmatory laboratory of the split sample-second sample. He also agreed for appointment of his analyst, who was to be witness to the entire operation to be undertaken by the confirmatory laboratory. The analyst has submitted report, which is at page 88, graphically describing as to the condition in which the sample package was received by the cofirmatory laboratory, which was duly photographed in his presence, also mentioning the fact that the sample bottles had not leaked. The report also states that he had witnessed the whole of operation and was entirely satisfied that the condition of the packing and the bottles and their packaging looked as good as new, though outside packaging looked rather worn and the wrapping was badly. The report also mentions that the plaintiff's analyst had signed as witness confirming the condition and integrity of the samples. The confirmatory laboratory on evaluating the split sample submitted report, which confirmed the findings of the Primary Laboratory about the presence of some quantity of prohibited substance stanozolal. Thereafter, the enquiry against the plaintiff in respect of the alleged offences proceeded. The plaintiff participated in the said enquiry. At one stage, the plaintiff was informed that one of the member of the Enquiry Committee, Mr. Arun Nanda, was closely associated with the Courier Agency. However, the plaintiff consented for his continuation as member of the Committee. The Committee eventually considered all aspects of the matter and imposed punishment of suspension, as per the rules, which were communicated to the plaintiff by letter dated 27th October, 2003 of the Senior Stipendiary Steward of the defendant along with the reasoned order of the Committee, clarifying the said punishment. The plaintiff carried the matter in appeal, as per the provisions contained in the Rules of Racing. It is the case of the plaintiff that some of the members, who constituted the first Committee, were also members of the Appellate Authority and the appeal was eventually decided against the plaintiff. The plaintiff carried the matter in appeal, as per the provisions contained in the Rules of Racing. It is the case of the plaintiff that some of the members, who constituted the first Committee, were also members of the Appellate Authority and the appeal was eventually decided against the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the second impugned order also contained a host of wrong statements, misrepresentations and inaccuracies, which were promptly pointed out by the plaintiff, through his spokesman, to the Chairman of the defendant by letter dated 5-11-2003 addressed to the Chairman of the Stewards of the defendant. The appeal was rejected on 7th November, 2003, according to the plaintiff, without assigning any reason. The rejection was orally communicated to the plaintiff and it is stated that formal communication was awaited. It is in this backdrop the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff for the following relief : "(a) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to declare that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd impugned orders of the defendant (Exhs. Y-3 BB hereto and oral communication dated 7-11-03) are illegal, void, bad in law; (b) That this Hon'ble Court also be pleased to quash and set aside the 1st, 2nd and 3rd impugned orders (Exhs. Y-3 BB hereto and oral communication dated 7-11-03) as being illegal, bad in law and in violation of the principles of natural justice and consequently the punishment and penalty levied on the plaintiff be quashed and set aside; (c) that the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the said Rs. 2 lacs or alternatively his racing account be re-credited to the extent of the amount originally debited from his account which is approximately Rs. 2 lacs; (d) that the plaintiff is also entitled to claim of damages to the extent of Rs. fifty lacs or such other sums as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper to award; (e) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit this Hon'ble Court be pleased to injunct the defendant from implementing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd impugned orders (Exhs. fifty lacs or such other sums as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper to award; (e) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit this Hon'ble Court be pleased to injunct the defendant from implementing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd impugned orders (Exhs. Y-3 BB hereto and oral communication dated 7-11-03) that is to say from putting into effect the suspension on the plaintiff from training his race horses and the other embargo as provided for in the said impugned orders; (f) that interim and ad interim orders in terms of prayer above be grated for; (g) for costs of this suit; (h) for such further and other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fir and proper to grant." 3. During the pendency of this suit, the plaintiff has taken out the present Notice of Motion for the relief, as already indicated in the opening paragraph. 4. This Notice of Motion has been resisted by the defendant by filling reply affidavit. Parties have exchanged their pleadings. The Notice of Motion was originally placed for consideration of ad interim relief before me. However, by consent of the Counsel appearing for the parties, it was thought appropriate that the Notice of Motion itself can be finally disposed of. Accordingly, I proceed to finally disposed of the Notice of Motion by this judgment. 5. The substratum of the grievance made on behalf of the plaintiff is that from the various documents on record, it is more than clear that three different versions have been given by the Courier Agency. Firstly, it was stated that the consignment was destroyed. Then, it was stated that it was recovered, but was found in leaking condition and was opened and impunged by the security personnel at London. The third version is that the sample bottles were intact. It was argued that on the basis of documents made available to the plaintiff by the defendant, the above position can be clearly spelt out and if that is so, one thing is certain that what has been despatched by the defendant containing split sample-second sample-to the confirmatory laboratory was not the same material received at the other end. It was argued that on the basis of documents made available to the plaintiff by the defendant, the above position can be clearly spelt out and if that is so, one thing is certain that what has been despatched by the defendant containing split sample-second sample-to the confirmatory laboratory was not the same material received at the other end. It is submitted that in any case, a doubt is created in that behalf, and if that is so, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for being entitled for grant of interim relief as prayed. The argument proceeds on the premises that, as per the extant provisions, the finding of the Primary Laboratory can be said to be conclusive only when the reference Laboratory confirms the positive finding of the Primary Laboratory. It was argued that in the present case, the sample, which has been received by the Reference Laboratory being doubtful, the report or confirmation given by the Reference Laboratory would be of no avail and it would be a case of inability of the reference Laboratory to carry out the tests of the said sample, for which reason the finding of the Primary Laboratory would be of no avail. It was next contended that the proceedings against the plaintiff are vitiated, because in the Enquiry Committee, Mr. Arun Nanda was one of the members, who is closely associated with the Courier Agency, on account of which the entire problem had surfaced. He disclosed his close association with the Courier Agency only at the fag end of the enquiry. His participation in the enquiry has obviously vitiated the enquiry. It is submitted that in any case, the suspicion of bias is created due to the participation of said Mr. Arun Nanda, for which reason also, the proceedings against the plaintiff are vitiated. It is further contended that out of the three gentlemen, who constituted steward Committee, two of them were common even in the first Committee. Same members forming part of the appellate board resulted in the appeal from caesar to caesar, which was clearly against the principles of natural justice. Even on this count, the entire proceedings will have to be held as vitiated. It was also contended on behalf of the plaintiff that no action was warranted, because, on fair reading of the relevant provisions, it would appear that there was no complete prohibition. Even on this count, the entire proceedings will have to be held as vitiated. It was also contended on behalf of the plaintiff that no action was warranted, because, on fair reading of the relevant provisions, it would appear that there was no complete prohibition. On the contrary, even the instructions issued by the defendant would reveal that presence of Stanozolal, being class III substance, could be traced to a variety of factors, such as environmental contamination in the legitimate food supplements given to the same horse, such as Liv 52, electrolytes, herbal products and the like. 6. On the other hand, Counsel for the defendant contends that the plaintiff is to entitled for any relief, because he has not approached with clean hands. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has made misleading statements in the plaint. Besides, it is contended that there is no statement on oath made by the plaintiff that he has not administered steroid to the said horses, nor it is his case that any staroids were administered by the Club's Veterinary Doctor, which must have resulted in presence of Stanozolal in the urine of the horses. It is further contended on behalf of the defendant that it is not the case of the plaintiff that the samples which were taken out and sealed and, in particular, one which has tested positive by the Primary Laboratory, was also tampered, nor it is the case of the plaintiff that any member or official of the Club has any malice towards the plaintiff. According to the defendant, however, the defendant were not to benefit in any manner due to the misplacement or destruction of the samples in question, because, in that case, the Rules clearly provide for the consequence that the finding of the Primary Laboratory shall be conclusive and binding. On the other hand, it is only the plaintiff, who was to gain benefit by creating a cloud of suspicion taking advantage of the situation as has obtained. It is further submitted that if the defendant had any intention to manipulate with the second sample, that could have been possible because the second sample was in the custody of the defendant from 21st April, 2003 to 26th June, 2003 when it was despatched to the Reference Laboratory. It is further submitted that if the defendant had any intention to manipulate with the second sample, that could have been possible because the second sample was in the custody of the defendant from 21st April, 2003 to 26th June, 2003 when it was despatched to the Reference Laboratory. According to the defendant, it has given a fair opportunity to the plaintiff in every respect and has taken a very lenient view of the matter inspite of the past conduct of the plaintiff, who has been found guilty and fined on more than one occasion for different offences. It is also contended that the defendant has shown fairness in the action, having parted with the correspondence with the Courier Agency to the plaintiff. It was argued that the plea taken on behalf of the plaintiff that presence of the prohibited substance can be excused because of the possibility of environmental contamination, such a case is not made out by the plaintiff not any particulars given in the pleadings as to what was fed to the said horses, which could have caused presence of the offending substance in their urine. It is argued that in any case, the plaintiff cannot be extricated because of the mandate of the Rules; in as much as, assuming that the presence of the offending substance was due to environmental contamination, even so, the plaintiff would be held responsible because of his vicarious liability. Insofar as the grievance regarding enquiry proceedings, as well as the appellate proceedings being vitiated, the learned Counsel contends that argument is not available to the plaintiff as the plaintiff had consented to the participation of the said Mr. Arun Nandu in the first enquiry. Insofar as the appeal is concerned, the learned Counsel contends that appeal is not a matter of right. Moreover, the plaintiff preferred appeal, as was available in terms of the extant rules. The extant Rules permitted participation of the same members as appellate board. It is argues that the plaintiff has not challenged the validity of the said rules. Further, even assuming that the plaintiff would succeed in challenging the validity of the said rules, in that case, this Court would strike down the rule providing for appeal, and if that is so, there would be no remedy of appeal available to the plaintiff. It is argues that the plaintiff has not challenged the validity of the said rules. Further, even assuming that the plaintiff would succeed in challenging the validity of the said rules, in that case, this Court would strike down the rule providing for appeal, and if that is so, there would be no remedy of appeal available to the plaintiff. To buttress the above contentions, reliance has been placed on decisions of the Apex Court in ( 1988(3) S.C.C. 26 )1, and (Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786 at page 1818. Reliance is also placed on the decision reported in (S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs.)3, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853, to contend that the plaintiff having approached this Court with unclean hand was not entitled for any relief and should be thrown out at the threshold. Besides, reliance is also placed on the decision reported in ( 1995(5) S.C.C. 545 )4, as to the parameters that should be kept in mind for granting interim relief of injunction. It is contended that merely because some smoke-screen is created on the arguments of the plaintiff, that alone cannot be the basis for granting any injunction, because the plaintiff has to positively make out prima facie case and only then he would succeed in getting that relief. It is also contended that the defendant has made reference to the past conduct of the plaintiff of having found him guilty of several offence and punishments suffered by him only to dispel the claim set up by the plaintiff that his record was unimpeachable. 7. Having considered the rival submissions, to my mind, following points will arise for my consideration : (1) Whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case ? (2) Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff ? (3) Whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss in the event interim relief was to be refused ? (4) What order ? Point No. 1 8. It is not in dispute that the samples as drawn on 25th April, 2003 were in conformity with the procedure provided for in the Rules. It is also not in dispute that the sealing procedure followed in respect of these samples was also in conformity with the rules. (4) What order ? Point No. 1 8. It is not in dispute that the samples as drawn on 25th April, 2003 were in conformity with the procedure provided for in the Rules. It is also not in dispute that the sealing procedure followed in respect of these samples was also in conformity with the rules. There is also no controversy with regard to the procedure or otherwise in relation to the samples sent to the Primary Laboratory and findings returned thereon by that laboratory. The Primary Laboratory has given a positive finding of presence of Stenozolal, an enabling steroid in the urine of the said horses. That finding is not challenged before this Court. Going by that finding it, necessarily follows that there has been infraction of Rule 1 of the Regulations, which provides that whenever tested, no horse shall show the presence in tissues, body fluids or excreta in any quantity of any substances which is either a prohibited substance or a substance the origin of which cannot be traced to normal and ordinary feeding. The said provision is attracted irrespective of the quantity of any substance, which is either a prohibited substance or a substance the origin of which cannot be traced to normal and ordinary feeding. Besides, Rule 2 of the Regulations provides that-the effect/efficacy of the prohibited substance on the performance of the horse is irrelevant to the implementation of these Rules. In other words, the consequence of prohibited substance was whether for accelerating or slowing down the pace of the horse would be irrelevant. The Regulation further provides that the horses could be administered medicines only by veterinarians duly approved by the Stewards. Administration of medicines by any other means expect by such veterinarians is forbidden by Rule 6 of the Regulation. I am not impressed with the arguments canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff that of conjoint reading of the Regulations and the Racing Calendar, it would appear that administering medicines is not totally prohibited, rather permitted; and what is forbidden is administering of any substance other than used in the normal feeding of a horse within 24 hours before the start of the first race. Rule (viii) of the Regulations clearly provides that the Rule (vii) does not in any way derogate from the absolute nature of the prohibition in Rule 1. Rule (viii) of the Regulations clearly provides that the Rule (vii) does not in any way derogate from the absolute nature of the prohibition in Rule 1. To put it differently, going by the finding of the Primary Laboratory, regarding presence of Stanozolal, in the urine of the said horses in view of the mandate of the Regulations the horse as well as the trainer would stand disqualified not only from that race, but also subjected to penalty provided for under the Regulations. The Regulation clearly postulates that the guidelines provided for in the Regulations are only vicarious liability of a trainer. In other words, the presence of prohibited substance during the test, by itself can be the basis of take action against the trainer, as has ben done in the present case, being vicarious liability of a trainer. As per the Regulations, if the proof of actual involvement of the trainer was available, that would be a serious matter inviting stricter punishment. The Scheme of the Regulations, therefore, seems to be that irrespective of the manner of administration on the reason for the presence of prohibited substance found during the test, that would be sufficient basis to impose punishment in accordance with the Regulations. Understood thus, in view of the positive finding of the Primary Laboratory, which has not been challenged, the plaintiff was bound to suffer the punishment provided for under the Regulations. 9. The plaintiff, however, exercised option in terms of Rule 2.2 of the Regulations of sending the split sample to the reference Laboratory. As mentioned earlier, the manner of taking the split sample or the sealing has not been challenged, rather accepted by the plaintiff. The split sample, which was sent to the reference Laboratory, as per the request made by the plaintiff, was duly sealed and codified as per the Regulations. The same was properly packed and handed over to the Courier Agency. The Courier Agency, in turn, was expected to deliver the said consignment in a reasonable time. However, as that did not happen, the defendant took up the matter with the Courier Agency as early as on 2nd July, 2003 though the consignment was handed over to Courier Agency only on 26th June, 2003, for forward delivery to the Reference Laboratory. Indeed, there has been some confusion, may be on account of misunderstanding or misinstructions of the Courier Agency. Indeed, there has been some confusion, may be on account of misunderstanding or misinstructions of the Courier Agency. The question, however, is whether the split sample which was despatched on 26th June, 2003, the same sample reached the Reference Laboratory intact and capable of being evaluated. On this aspect, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the split sample, which was despatched by the defendant through the Courier Agency, the same sample reached the Reference Laboratory intact and capable of being evaluated. This is so because the photographs taken in the Reference Laboratory, presumably on 6th September, 2003 which were produced, would fortify the position that the outer packing of the consignment was worn out, but the bag containing the sample bottles was intact. The sample bottles bore the same code number which was put at the time of sealing in the presence of the plaintiff and his representative. In that sense, it is the same set of bottles which was despatched by the defendant to the Reference Laboratory, had reached the Reference Laboratory. Besides the photographs, what is important to note is that the above position is reinforced by the report of the condition of the samples submitted by the analyst appointed by the plaintiff, dated 4th September, 2003. It is apposite to reproduce the said report, which reads thus : "Report of the condition of the samples When the sample package was received by HFL, it was recorded and set aside for the counter analysis. It was photographed in my presence by a member of the laboratory staff, and then opened. The contents were photographed and then the individual sample bottle were removed and photographed. The bottles were tested to demonstrate that they had not leaked and then shaken well to mix the contents and opened to provide the analysts with their samples. I witnessed the whole of these operations and I was entirely satisfied with the condition of the packaging. There was no evidence at all to support the opinion of the DHL handlers that they had been splashed by the contents. The bottles and their packaging looked as good as new. Only the outside packaging looked rather worn and the wrapping was badly. The attached photographs support these observations. Also I am enclosing copies of reports I signed as a witness confirming the condition and integrity of the samples. The bottles and their packaging looked as good as new. Only the outside packaging looked rather worn and the wrapping was badly. The attached photographs support these observations. Also I am enclosing copies of reports I signed as a witness confirming the condition and integrity of the samples. E J N 4th September, 2003." The plaintiff has not disputed, not could possibly dispute, the correctness of this document, because it has been issued under the signature of the analyst appointed by the plaintiff himself. From this report, it is more than clear that the outside packaging of the consignment looked rather worn and the wrapping was bad, but the condition and integrity of the samples have been confirmed by this witness. Moreover, the bottles were tested to demonstrate that they had not leaked and then shaken well to mix the contents and opened to provide the analyst with their samples. The samples, as it appears from the record were capable of being evaluated and were so evaluated by the Reference Laboratory in the presence of the analyst appointed by the plaintiff. The finding of the Reference Laboratory is also positive and confirm the position stated by the Primary Laboratory. On the above reasoning, it necessarily follows that the finding recorded by the Primary Laboratory would be conclusive and binding in terms of the extent Regulations. I find no force in the submission that it be presumed that the sample which was sent from the Indian shore, the same sample did not reach the Reference Laboratory in England, so as to doubt the genuineness of the report submitted by the Reference Laboratory or, for that matter, to disregard the finding of the Reference Laboratory. If that is so, there is no substance in the argument canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff that if the report of the Reference Laboratory was to be discarded, then the finding of the Primary Laboratory cannot be treated as positive. That contention pressed into service relying on rule is wholly misplaced and ill-advised. Accordingly, in my opinion, the finding recorded by the Reference Laboratory confirming the opinion of the Primary Laboratory would clinch the issue against the plaintiff. 10. That contention pressed into service relying on rule is wholly misplaced and ill-advised. Accordingly, in my opinion, the finding recorded by the Reference Laboratory confirming the opinion of the Primary Laboratory would clinch the issue against the plaintiff. 10. Besides the photographs produced by the defendant before the Court and the report of the analyst of the plaintiff, as referred to above, it is also seen from the documents produced by the plaintiff on record that the theory that the samples, which had reached the Reference Laboratory, were intact is borne out from those documents. The letter sent by the Courier Agency to the defendant dated 17th July, 2003 does make a reference to the fact that the contents of the package, namely, the sample bottles appeared to be intact and each receptacle was approximately ¾ full. The procedure for sampling and sealing provides for filling the samples bottles upto ¾ level full. Obviously, therefore, there had been no leakage. In any case, the fact that there had been no leakage of the sample bottles is also reflected from the letter of Courier Agency dated 22nd July, 2003 at page 82, and as mentioned earlier, from the report of the analyst appointed by the plaintiff himself. 11. Assuming that the plaintiff was justified in contending that there has been cloud of suspicion about the genuineness of the sample bottles, which had reached the Reference Laboratory in England, as not being the same, which had left the shores of India; even so, that will be of no avail to the plaintiff. Inasmuch as, on fair construction of Rule 4(a) of the Regulations, it is possible to take the view that in the fact situation of the present case, by virtue of the said Rule, the result of the test performed by the Primary Laboratory will have to be held as conclusive and binding. Inasmuch as, on fair construction of Rule 4(a) of the Regulations, it is possible to take the view that in the fact situation of the present case, by virtue of the said Rule, the result of the test performed by the Primary Laboratory will have to be held as conclusive and binding. Rule 4(a) reads thus : "If the Reference Laboratory determines that it is unable to carry out the test for any reason including there being an insufficient sample volume to make specific identification of the sample contents or if an act of God, power failure, accident, labour strike, decomposition of the sample for any reason or any other force majeure circumstance prevents the second sample being tested then the result of the test performed by the Primary Laboratory shall be conclusive and binding." On plain language of the aforesaid provision, in my opinion, the same is an expansive provision, so as to envelope the situation on hand within the expression "or any other force majeure circumstance prevents the second sample being tested". Even in that case, the plaintiff was to be bound by the report of the Primary Laboratory. The argument that by virtue of Rule 3, it be held that there was no report of the Reference Laboratory and, therfore, the finding of the Primary Laboratory cannot be treated as positive cannot be pressed into service in the fact situation of the present case. In my view, such liberal constructions would render the provisions of the Regulations, which provide for vicarious liability of the trainer, which provision has been made with purpose as nugatory. In that approach was to be adopted, in every case such a plea would be taken, so as to defeat the strict provisions of the Regulations. 12. Insofar as the grievance regarding fairness of the enquiry, because of the presence of Mr. Arun Nanda, is concerned, even that contention does not commend to me. As rightly submitted on behalf of the defendant, that plea is unavailable to the plaintiff having agreed and/or waived the objection to the participation of Mr. Arun Nanda in the Enquiry Committee. The argument that the plaintiff had no option and was not properly advised at the relevant time would be of no avail. Understood thus, the enquiry as undertaken and concluded against the plaintiff cannot be said to have vitiated on that count. 13. Arun Nanda in the Enquiry Committee. The argument that the plaintiff had no option and was not properly advised at the relevant time would be of no avail. Understood thus, the enquiry as undertaken and concluded against the plaintiff cannot be said to have vitiated on that count. 13. Even the argument that the proceedings in appeal are vitiated due to participation of common members even in the appellate board can be of avail to the plaintiff. As is rightly contended on behalf of the defendant, appeal is not a matter of right. That position is well settled. The appeal is a remedy provided by statute. As per the Rules, remedy of appeal has been provided to the plaintiff. The Rules have not been challenged before this Court. The constitution of the appeal Committee is in accord with the said Rules. That is also not in dispute before me, except the argument that the members of the appeal board were common and, resultantly, it would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar, thereby infracting the principles of natural justice. I find no substance in this argument and, obviously, the fact that the said persons were biased against the plaintiff or that their participation resulted in infraction of principles of natural justice is a question of fact, which will have to be established at the trial. If the plaintiff's case is one of bias qua those persons, they were necessary parties to the suit. They are not before the Court for which reason the allegation cannot be enquired any further. At this stage, therefore, it is not possible to presume that the appeal proceedings were vitiated on account of bias, as contended. Moreover, even if the plaintiff was to succeed on this contention, all that would happen is, the decision of the appellate board would be set aside, directing the defendant to re-examine the appeal on merits in accordance with law, but that would not by itself result in setting aside the punishment imposed by the first authority. Prima facie, in my opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the first authority; and if that is so, the plaintiff was oblished to suffer punishment imposed by it. 14. Prima facie, in my opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the first authority; and if that is so, the plaintiff was oblished to suffer punishment imposed by it. 14. I find no substance in the argument canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff that the presence of prohibited substance was on account of environmental contamination and, in such a case, the plaintiff cannot be made responsible. On the other hand, as already observed earlier, on fair reading of the Regulations, to my mind, the cause of presence of prohibited substance would be of no consequence, but once such a substance is traced, the penalty provided for under the Regulations was as a matter of course on account of the vicarious liability of a trainer. 15. Taking overall view of the matter, in my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to make out any prima facie case and, therefore, point No. 1 will have to be answered in the negative. Point No. 2 16. Insofar as the balance of convenience or equity is concerned, it is possible to take the view that the implementation of the punishment imposed on the plaintiff can be deferred to be revived soon after the plaintiff fails in the present suit. Even so, the point under consideration will have to be answered against the plaintiff, for the efficacy of the provision of punishment provided for under the extact Regulations will be rendered nugatory, for such argument will be canvassed in every case, as it is well known fact, of which judicial notice can be taken that the suits would remain pending for even two decades, by which time implementation of the punishment would serve no purposes. Understood thus, even the issue of balance of convenience or equity will have to be answered in the negative against the plaintiff. Point No. 3 17. The next question is whether the plaintiff would suffer irresparable loss in the even interim relief as prayed for was to be refused. In my opinion, having regard to the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, the plaintiff can be adequately compensated by providing for damages and other reliefs in terms of prayer Clauses (c) and (d) of the suit. In my opinion, having regard to the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, the plaintiff can be adequately compensated by providing for damages and other reliefs in terms of prayer Clauses (c) and (d) of the suit. Besides, I find force in the submission canvassed on behalf of the defendant that by no standards, the plaintiff would be able to establish the claim of damages, as claimed in the suit, even if maximum damages was to be awarded for the remainder of the penalty period. As mentioned earlier, since the plaintiff has already claimed relief of damages for adequate amount and such a relief can be granted to the plaintiff at the end of the trial, for that reason the point under consideration will have to be answered in the negative and against the plaintiff. 18. While parting, I may clarify that several finer points were raised on behalf of the plaintiff as well as on behalf of the defendant during the course of arguments. But, I do not think it necessary to advert to those contentions, as for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the order that I propose to pass would remain the same. It is, however, made clear that the observations made in this judgment are only prima facie opinion recorded at this stage of the proceedings. 19. Accordingly, there is no substance in this Notice of Motion. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Motion dismissed. -----