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2004 DIGILAW 1221 (PNJ)

Ritu Gupta v. Financial Commissioner

2004-11-03

AJAY K.MITTAL, G.S.SINGHVI

body2004
Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against order dated 28.5.1997 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby he partly allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4-Subhash Chander and set aside the auction held by Tehsildar (Sales)-cum-Managing Officer, Kaithal, Camp Shahabad (respondent No. 3) on 24.5.1989 for disposal of 4 Kanals 4 Marias of land which formed part of property bearing No. B-IV-685 situated in Shahabad Markanda. 2. A perusal of the record shows that the property in question was owned by Muslims, who migrated to Pakistan in the wake of partition of the country in 1947. Before migration, they are said to have leased out the property to Baini Parshad, father of respondent No. 4. After migration of the Muslims, the property was put to auction on 22.10.1959 by being treated as an evacuee property. Baini Parshad gave bid of Rs. 3,400/- but did not deposit the bid amount despite the extension granted by the competent authority. Consequently, his bid was cancelled and the earnest money was forfeited. In 1971, Baini Parshad applied for transfer of the property. The matter was processed by respondent No. 3 and he, i.e., Baini Parshad was directed to deposit about Rs. 5,000/- (approximately) as the price. On his refusal, 1 Kanal and 6 Marias out of the total land measuring 5 kanals 10 marlas was put to auction on 26.11.1971. However, no one came forward to bid. The remaining land measuring 4 kanals 4 marlas was put to auction on 7.1.1972. Smt. Kanta Rani gave highest bid of Rs. 5,500/-. Baini Parshad challenged the auction by filing appeal before Additional Settlement Commissioner (Sales)-cum-Assistant Settlement Commissioner, which was dismissed on 12.1.1973. However, the officer concerned did not confirm the bid of Smt. Kanta Rani and ordered reduction of the property. She challenged the same but failed up to the High Court. Civil Writ Petition No. 676 of 1975 filed by her was dismissed by this Court on 19.11.1982. Thereafter, Baini Parshad moved a miscellaneous application which was registered as Case No. 26/Misc./CSC./83 for transfer of the property in his favour. She challenged the same but failed up to the High Court. Civil Writ Petition No. 676 of 1975 filed by her was dismissed by this Court on 19.11.1982. Thereafter, Baini Parshad moved a miscellaneous application which was registered as Case No. 26/Misc./CSC./83 for transfer of the property in his favour. The same was dismissed by Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana (respondent No. 2) vide order dated 27.2.1984, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below: "If, at all, the petitioner is interested in the purchase of the property, first of all he should obtain the order from the concerned Managing Officer and then approach this forum by way of appeal/revision as the case may be, in case he feels dissatisfied with the orders which would be passed by the concerned Managing Officer. In view of the discussion made above, I do not find any force in the present miscellaneous petition which is hereby dismissed." 3. Baini Parshad, filed another application dated 21.3.1984 by respondent No. 3 and claimed transfer of the entire land in his favour at reserve price by asserting that he was in possession since 1947. His application was rejected by respondent No. 3 vide his order dated 18.8.1986 on the ground that the applicant is not a displaced person within the meaning of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (for short, the Act) and the rules framed thereunder. The revision petition filed by Baini Parshad was disposed of by respondent No. 2 vide order dated 29.6.1988, the operative part of which reads as under:- "I have given my careful thought to the matter. There is no doubt about the fact that the petitioner is running a factory OB a portion of the site in question, but has rightly been pointed out by ADA, his case is not covered under the Displaced Persons (C&R) Rules, 1955. However, keeping in view the fact that this will cause great hardship to him if he is dislocated from the area on which he has installed the factory since long. It would be in the interest of justice if his case be examined in the light of the new policy of the Govt. which is being formulated shortly for the transfer of urban properties to their respective occupants. It would be in the interest of justice if his case be examined in the light of the new policy of the Govt. which is being formulated shortly for the transfer of urban properties to their respective occupants. In these circumstances, the Tehsildar (Sales) is directed to process his case for the transfer of the site under the factory comprised in property No. B-IV-686 measuring 1K-6M if he applied for the same afresh in accordance with the Press Note to be issued in this behalf. As regards the land comprised in Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 Tehsildar (Sales) shall be at liberty to dispose it of as per rules. This revision petition is disposed of accordingly." 4. Feeling aggrieved by order dated 29.6.1988, Baini Parshad filed a petition under Section 33 of the Act which was dismissed by Financial Commissioner, Haryana vide his order dated 24.8.1988. 5. The aforementioned orders were challenged by respondent No. 4 in Civil Writ Petition No. 9390 of 1988 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 14.9.1988 by recording the following order: "Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the case of the petitioner to apply for purchasing the complete area in dispute is fully covered by the Press Note Annexure P11 issued by the Haryana Government. At the time when the impugned order Annexure P-10 was passed on August 24, 1988, learned counsel says that the new policy had not been announced and that is why relief was denied to him by the Financial Commissioner, Haryana. We find from the impugned order Annexure P10, the Financial Commissioner observing that it was not possible to give any order without going into the provisions of the new policy as decided upon by the Govt. and that the petitioner could examine the provisions of the new policy when announced and apply accordingly. A clear provision in the order has been made for the petitioner to avail of the policy. The order of the Financial Commissioner being final, the petitioner may if so advised avail of the observations made therein and apply under the new policy for the transfer of the area in question. In these circumstances, there is nothing for us to interfere in the matter. We accordingly, dismiss this petition in limine." 6. The order of the Financial Commissioner being final, the petitioner may if so advised avail of the observations made therein and apply under the new policy for the transfer of the area in question. In these circumstances, there is nothing for us to interfere in the matter. We accordingly, dismiss this petition in limine." 6. In the meanwhile, the State Government issued a press note and notified policy for transfer of urban evacuee properties/sites to its occupants. In furtherance of that policy, respondent No. 4 in his capacity as proprietor of Amrit Engineering Foundry submitted application dated 14.10.1988 for transfer of 4 kanals 4 marlas of land in his favour. Simultaneously, he applied to respondent No. 2 for issuance of a direction to respondent No. 3 not to proceed with the auction scheduled to be held in terms of the direction contained in order dated 29.6.1988. Upon this, respondent No. 2 passed order dated 22.5.1989, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below: "I have considered the arguments of the parties and feel that the application, if any, of the petitioner for the transfer of the land should be decided before the land is reauctioned in the interest of natural justice. So, the Tehsildar (Sales)-cum-M.O. Kaithal is directed to decide the application, if any, of the petitioner before the land is put to auction. The petition is disposed of accordingly. Order dasti." 7. In compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 2 respondent No. 3 passed order dated 24.5.1989 vide which he dismissed the application of respondent No. 4 by assigning the following reasons: "The land sought to be transferred by Shri Subhash Chand son of Baini Parshad having two parts. One is 4 kanals 4 marlas of land bearing Khasra No. 43/2/1/1. This portion of land is an urban agricultural land and it was auctioned on 7.1.1992. One Smt. Kanta Rani offered the highest bid of Rs. 5,500/-. This bid was not confirmed and it was ordered on 12.1.1973 by the A.S.O.(C)-Cum A.S.C. that his land be reauctioned after wide publicity. The same was again put to auction on 23.2.1973 in which same Smt. Kanta Rani offered the highest bid of Rs. 5,500/-. The said bid was also not confirmed. 5,500/-. This bid was not confirmed and it was ordered on 12.1.1973 by the A.S.O.(C)-Cum A.S.C. that his land be reauctioned after wide publicity. The same was again put to auction on 23.2.1973 in which same Smt. Kanta Rani offered the highest bid of Rs. 5,500/-. The said bid was also not confirmed. Again this Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 was again put to auction on 18.12.1986 and Smt. Shanti Devi widow of Ram Sarup, Smt. Tara Wati widow of Lekh Raj offered the highest bid of Rs. 56,000/- for 2-4 and 2-0 respectively. Shri Ramesh Kumar son of Durga Dass filed objection against this sale and the C.S.C. vide his order dated 18.9.1987 set aside both the sales and ordered that initial bid in auction should start from Rs. 68,000/- and Rs. 60,000/- respectively being that of the objector after wide publicity and due notice to the parties concerned well in time. Again on 25.6.1988, this No. khasra was put to auction and Smt. Shanti Devi and Smt. Tara Devi offered highest bid of Rs. 69,400/- and Rs. 60,500/- respectively which was also not confirmed and it was objected by Shri Baini Parshad father of the petitioner and C.S.C. has ordered that as regard the land comprised in Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 Tehsildar (Sales) shall be at liberty to dispose it of as per rules and revision petition was dismissed on 29.6.1988. Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 measuring being urban agricultural land and not in possession of Shri Subhash Chand petitioner in the revenue record it is under cultivation of Smt. Kanta Rani widow of Ram Sarup. Therefore, this Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 cannot be transferred to Shri Subhash Chand son of Baini Parshad under the Govt. Press Note issued by the Govt. according to new policy." 8. After deciding the application of respondent No. 4 in the manner afore-mentioned, respondent No. 3 conducted auction of 4 kanals and 4 marlas of land in two lots. The appellants gave bids of Rs. 61,200/- and Rs. 69,800/- respectively. Their bids were confirmed by the Competent Authority. Thereafter, sales certificates were issued in their favour. Respondent No. 4, who was present at Shahbad on 24.5.1989, did not participate in the auction. However, after conclusion of the auction proceedings, he filed revision petition questioning the legality of order dated 24.5.1989 passed by respondent No. 3. 61,200/- and Rs. 69,800/- respectively. Their bids were confirmed by the Competent Authority. Thereafter, sales certificates were issued in their favour. Respondent No. 4, who was present at Shahbad on 24.5.1989, did not participate in the auction. However, after conclusion of the auction proceedings, he filed revision petition questioning the legality of order dated 24.5.1989 passed by respondent No. 3. He also filed two objection petitions against the auction conducted by the said respondent. The same were dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide order dated 4.6.1993. Further revision filed by respondent No. 4 was dismissed by Financial Commissioner Revenue and Secretary to Govt., Haryana, Rehabilitation Department, exercising the powers of the Central Government (respondent No. 1) under Section 33 of the 1954 Act, vide order dated 13.1.1994. 9. Respondent No. 4 challenged orders dated 24.5.1989, 4.6.1993 and 13.1.1994 in Civil Writ Petition No. 1383 of 1994 by contending that the same were vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record. He also questioned the legality and propriety of the auction held on 24.5.1989 by asserting that he had not been given effective opportunity to participate in it. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing, counsel for respondent No. 4 did not press his clients challenge to the impugned orders and con-fined his submission to the legality of auction by contending that his client had not been given opportunity to give bid. The learned Single Judge accepted the plea of respondent No. 4 and partly allowed the writ petition by making the following observations: "As already mentioned above, Mr. Saini has confined his prayer to the fact that the auction held on 24th May, 1989 was not validly held as it violated the terms of the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 22.5.1989 to the effect that before the auction was conducted, the application filed by the petitioner on 14th October, 1988 had to be decided. For the reasons already mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the petitioner was effectively precluded from participating in the auction held on 24th May, 1989. This petition is thus partly allowed. The auction held on 24th May, 1989 is quashed and a direction is issued to the respondents to re-auction the property in dispute giving liberty to the petitioner and to any one else, who may chose to compete for the said property. No costs." 10. This petition is thus partly allowed. The auction held on 24th May, 1989 is quashed and a direction is issued to the respondents to re-auction the property in dispute giving liberty to the petitioner and to any one else, who may chose to compete for the said property. No costs." 10. Shri C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the auction held by respondent No. 3 on 24.5.1989 did not suffer from any legal infirmity and the learned Single Judge committed a grave illegality by setting aside the same on the spacious ground that respondent No. 4 was effectively precluded from participating in it. He pointed out that the proposed auction was duly publicised and those who wanted to give bids were freely allowed to do so. Shri Goel referred to orders dated 24.5.1989, 4.6.1993 and. 13.1.1994 passed by respondent Nos. 3, 2 and 1 respectively and argued that by having given up challenge to those orders, respondent No. 4 will be deemed to have abandoned his so-called grievance against the auction proceedings. Learned counsel then argued that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge regarding denial of effective opportunity to respondent No. 4 to participate in the auction is perverse, inasmuch as, it is based on pure cojectures and not on any substantive evidence and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 11. Shri Jaswant Singh, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana supported Shri C.B. Goel and argued that the order passed by the learned Single Judge should be set aside because it suffers from a patent legal infirmity. He referred to the averments contained in the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to show that the auction was held after giving due publicity and all those who wanted to give bids were allowed to do so without any hindrance and argued that the learned Single Judge gravely erred by interfering with the finding recorded by respondent Nos. 2 and 1 that the auction held by respondent No. 3 did not suffer from any infirmity. 12. Shri Rakesh Garg, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 argued that the learned Single Judge did not commit any illegality by quashing the auction held on 24.5.1989 because the same was total farce. 2 and 1 that the auction held by respondent No. 3 did not suffer from any infirmity. 12. Shri Rakesh Garg, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 argued that the learned Single Judge did not commit any illegality by quashing the auction held on 24.5.1989 because the same was total farce. Shri Garg submitted that in the purported compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 2 on 22.5.1989, respondent No. 3 decided his application on 24.5.1989, despite the fact that he did not have the relevant records and immediately thereafter, he conducted the auction which prevented respondent No. 4 from taking part in it. Shri Garg also referred to order dated 30.9.1997 passed in L.P.A. No. 543 of 1997-Subhash Chand v. Financial Commissioner (Revenue)-cum-Secretary (Rehabilitation) and two Ors. and argued that this appeal is liable to be dismissed because the order of the learned Single Judge has been upheld by the Division Bench. 13. Before dealing with the respective arguments, we consider it proper to notice the ambit and scope of the High Courts jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in matters involving challenge to the orders passed by administrative, judicial and quasi judicial authorities. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts of Tribunals. A writ can also be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly i.e. it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the rules of natural justice. At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and not appellate one. A finding Of fact recorded by the inferior Court or Tribunal, as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or question in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers, from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. A finding Of fact recorded by the inferior Court or Tribunal, as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or question in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers, from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The question as to what is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and in what circumstances a finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal or a quasi judicial authority can be interfered with by the High Court cannot be decided by adopting straitjacket formula, but broadly speaking, an error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or award under challenge along with the documents which have been relied upon by the inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi judicial authority. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthy debate at the bar cannot be regarded as an error of law for the purpose of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal can also be corrected if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Court or the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit material evidence or erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior court or Tribunal or the quasi judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court. Likewise, the mere possibility of forming a different opinion on re-appreciation of evidence-produced by the parties before the inferior Court on Tribunal is not sufficient to issue a writ of certiorari. 14. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior court or Tribunal or the quasi judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court. Likewise, the mere possibility of forming a different opinion on re-appreciation of evidence-produced by the parties before the inferior Court on Tribunal is not sufficient to issue a writ of certiorari. 14. In Syed Yakoob V/s. K.S. Radhakrishan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Courts power to issue the writ of certiorari and laid down the following propositions;- "A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can, similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has, influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court." 15. In Shaikh-Mohammad Umarsaheb V/s. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab and Ors., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 61, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the power of the High Court under Article 226 to re-appreciate the evidence produced before the trial Judge, held as under:- "Where the evidence adduced before the trial Judge was not so immaculate that another Judge might not have taken a different view, it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial Judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227." In Jitendra Singh Rathor V/s. Sh. Baidynath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and Anr., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 976, a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court qua the award passed by the Tribunal under the Act and held as under: "The High Court is undisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate cases quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it." In R.S. Saini V/s. State of Punjab and Ors., J.T. 1999(6) S.C. 507, the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by this Court dismissing the writ petition filed against the order of the petitioners removal from the office of the President of Municipal Committee. Some of the observations made in that decision, which are worth noticing are as under- "The Court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the enquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the enquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The enquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings." The view taken in Sayed Yakoobs case (supra) has been reiterated in a recent judgment of Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar and Anr. V/s. Ist A.D.J. Varanasi and Ors., 2002 8 JT 69. 16 Reverting back to the facts of the case, we find that even though, in the writ petition filed by him, respondent No. 4 had challenged the legality of orders dated 24.5.1989, 4.6.1993 and 13.1.1994, counsel appearing on his behalf did not press the same. Rather, he conceded that it was not possible for him to persuade the Court to interfere with those orders and confined his argument to the legality of the auction held on 24.5.1989. The only ground on which respondent No. 4 challenged the auction proceedings was that he was not allowed to effectively participate in it. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. l to 3, it was categorically averred that Baini Parshad was found in possession of only 1 kanal and 6 marlas of land forming part of property bearing No. B-IV-685 and the same was transferred in his name. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. l to 3, it was categorically averred that Baini Parshad was found in possession of only 1 kanal and 6 marlas of land forming part of property bearing No. B-IV-685 and the same was transferred in his name. It was further averred that the remaining land measuring 4 kanals 4 marlas, which was not in his possession, was offered to him, but he failed to deposit the price necessitating its auction. Still further, it was averred that the auction was held after due publicity but respondent No. 4 did not participate in it. In paragraphs 14(vi), (viii) and (xv) of the written statement, the following averments were made: "14.(vi) Sub-para (vi) of the petition is wrong and denied. It is submitted that the application was decided after giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The auction was held after due publicity and the petitioner could participate in the auction but he chose to abstain. The auction of the Tehsildar (Sales), Kaithal is in accordance with law, rules and instructions. (viii) That the averments made in sub-para (viii) of the petition are admitted to the extent that the observation made by respondent No. 2 while passing the impugned order dated 4.6.1993 (P6) to the effect that it is well reasoned order and suffers from no legal infirmity. The rest of the para is wrong and denied. At the cost of repetition, it is submitted that the application for transfer was decided and the petitioner was found eligible for the transfer of only 1 kanal 6 marlas comprised in property Nos. B-IV-685, the same was transferred to him. The petitioner was not in possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 43/2/1/1 and it being urban agricultural land was not transferable. The auction of the property was widely advertised and the same was held in favour of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 under Rule 90 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. The action is clearly bona fide just to dispose of the Govt. property in accordance with the rules and instructions. The allegations levelled in sub-para are baseless, hence denied. (xv) Sub-para (xv) of the petition is wrong and denied. 4 and 5 under Rule 90 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. The action is clearly bona fide just to dispose of the Govt. property in accordance with the rules and instructions. The allegations levelled in sub-para are baseless, hence denied. (xv) Sub-para (xv) of the petition is wrong and denied. It is submitted that the auction is wholly legal and was held under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 after getting the reserve price fixed from the authority concerned. The higher price being offered by the petitioner is after thought and does not covey any right to him." 17. In the separate written statement, respondent Nos. 4 and 5 (appellants herein) averred that the auction was held after due publicity and the writ petitioner (respondent No. 4 herein) has to blame himself if he did hot participate in the auction. 18. The petitioner (respondent No. 4 herein) filed replication but did not controvert the fact that the auction was held after due publicity and that he did not participate in it. However, he reiterated the plea that the auction could not have been held without proper decision of his application dated 14.10.1988. 19. In our opinion, the auction held by respondent No. 3 on 24.5.1989 did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the learned Single Judge committed a serious error by upsetting the same on the spacious ground that respondent No. 4 was precluded from effectively participating in it. At the cost of repetition, we consider it proper to mention that respondent No. 4 had not controverted the categorical averments contained in the written statements filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the appellants that the auction was held after due publicity and all those who wanted to give bid were allowed to do so. Not only this, respondent No. 4 did not produce any evidence before the learned Single Judge to prove that respondent No. 3 had prevented him from taking part in the auction. 1 to 3 and the appellants that the auction was held after due publicity and all those who wanted to give bid were allowed to do so. Not only this, respondent No. 4 did not produce any evidence before the learned Single Judge to prove that respondent No. 3 had prevented him from taking part in the auction. In the course of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 repeatedly submitted that his client was not given effective opportunity to participate in the auction because of time-gap between the decision of his application dated 14.10.1988 and the holding of auction was too short to enable him to make up his mind to take part in the auction, but he could not show that the auction was held in violation of Rule 90 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 or that due publicity was not given to the proposed auction. 20. In view of the above, it is not possible to approve the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the legality of the auction held by respondent No. 3 and the action of the concerned authority to confirm the bids given by the appellants. 21. We also agree with Shri C.B. Goel that by having given up challenge to orders dated 24.5.1989, 4.6.1993 and 13.1.1994 passed by respondent Nos. 3, 2 and 1 respectively, respondent No. 4 will be deemed to have abandoned his challenge to the auction proceedings and the learned Single Judge committed a grave error by entertaining his grievance in this regard. 22. Order dated 30.9.1997 passed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 543 of 1997 filed by respondent No. 4 cannot be made basis for non-suiting the appellants because they were not parties to that appeal. Moreover, as the Division Bench did not have the occasion to examine the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge to annul the auction held on 24.5.1989, the summary dismissal of the appeal filed by respondent No. 4 is of no consequence. No other point has been argued. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.