( 1 ) THESE applications are being adjudicated upon, on remand by the Honble Supreme Court in its judgment in N. S. S. Narayana Sarma v. M/s Goldstone Exports Private Ltd. ( AIR 2002 SC 251 ). ( 2 ) THE relevant facts may briefly be stated as under: in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad ruled by H. E. H. The Nizam, the tenure or nature of rights, over the lands, used to be broadly of three categories. i) Surfe-Khas i. e. , the Ruler himself being the owner of the lands, ii) Diwani, lands which are earmarked for the benefit of the public, and iii) Non-Khalsa jagirs; grants made by the Ruler in favour of various individuals as a reward for rendering services, or conferring rights on individuals to collect the revenue from the occupants. ( 3 ) THE maintenance of Armed Forces of the Hyderabad State was entrusted to certain families, known as Paigahs. As a consideration for the same, the paigahs were granted Jagirs over vast extents of land in and around the city of Hyderabad. It was know as Paigah Estate and was initially constituted in 1299 Hizri, corresponding to 1817 A. D. with the passage of time, 3 paigas came into existence, mostly by way of succession, known after the heads of the respective branches. They are, Asman Jahi Paigah, Khurshid Jahi Paigah, and Vikar-ul-Umra Paigah. In the relevant grants known as Farmans, in relation to the paigahs, partition or alienation of paigah property was prohibited. With the independence of country in the year 1947, followed by annexation of Hyderabad Province, to the Union of India in September 1948, the Nizams Rule ended. After the independence and annexation, the new Government framed Jagir Abolition Regulation No. 69 of 1358 Fasli, now known as the A. P. (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the Jagir Regulation) abolishing all the Jagirs in the State of Hyderabad. ( 4 ) A lineal descendant of Khurshid Jah Paigah, by name Dildar Unnisa Begum, filed O. S. No. 4/1 of 1955/1956, in the Court of II Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for partition of Matruka properties of late Khurshid Jah, which comprised of bungalows, surrounded by lands, vast extents of agricultural lands, and jewellery. ( 4 ) A lineal descendant of Khurshid Jah Paigah, by name Dildar Unnisa Begum, filed O. S. No. 4/1 of 1955/1956, in the Court of II Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for partition of Matruka properties of late Khurshid Jah, which comprised of bungalows, surrounded by lands, vast extents of agricultural lands, and jewellery. Obviously, on account of the complications involved or the value of the property sought to be partitioned, the suit was withdrawn to this Court and it was numbered as C. S. No. 14 of 1958. Apart from the various individuals, the Jagir Administrator of Government of Hyderabad (which thereafter became Government of A. P.) was impleaded as defendant No. 43. When the suit was filed, there were only 43 defendants. Subsequently, the Government of A. P. , through Chief Secretary, was impleaded as defendant No. 53 and several individuals were also added as parties. By 1963, the number of defendants became 135. ( 5 ) WHEN the suit was pending, a compromise was entered into, among some of the parties, as regards the portion of the suit schedule properties. Appl. No. 264 of 1961 was filed under Order 23 Rule 3 C. P. C. , for recording a compromise. The plaintiff and 58 defendants figured as applicants, and 41 other defendants figured as respondents in that application. Several defendants, including the Jagir Administrator, the defendant No. 43, and Government of A. P. , defendant No. 53, did not join the compromise. This Court rendered its judgment in the suit on 28-06-1963. In the Judgment, the terms of compromise were referred to, insofar as they relate to the items of properties, agreed to be partitioned. Discussion was also undertaken in relation to the other items of properties. Ultimately a preliminary decree was drawn, mainly incorporating the terms of compromise. ( 6 ) AFTER the preliminary decree, some of the parties to the suit transferred their undivided share in the suit schedule properties in favour of the H. E. H. the Nizam and another person by name Kazim Nawaz Jung. They were impleaded in the suit as defendant Nos. 156 and 157, respectively. Subsequently, defendant 156 transferred his undivided half share in favour of M/s Dinshaw, which later on became M/s Cyrus Investments Ltd. This assignment/transfer was recognized, and M/s Cyrus Investment was impleaded as defendant No. 207. Defendant Nos. They were impleaded in the suit as defendant Nos. 156 and 157, respectively. Subsequently, defendant 156 transferred his undivided half share in favour of M/s Dinshaw, which later on became M/s Cyrus Investments Ltd. This assignment/transfer was recognized, and M/s Cyrus Investment was impleaded as defendant No. 207. Defendant Nos. 157 and 207 filed several applications, including Appl. No. 266 of 1983 for a direction to deliver the possession of the land in Sy. Nos. 83 and 172 of Hydernagar to them, by issuing direction to the Receiver to take necessary steps. That application was ordered on 20-1-1984, as not opposed. ( 7 ) DEFENDANT No. 207 assigned its half share in Sy. No. 172 of Hydernagar, in favour of M/s Goldstone Private Limited and others, the petitioners herein. The petitioners filed 4 applications, including Appl. No. 994 of 1995, for the following reliefs:a) to recognize the assignment of rights in respect of some of the suit schedule properties. b) to implead them as defendants in the suit, in view of the assignment. c) to deliver the possession of the land assigned to them (Appl. No. 994 of 1985) through a warrant to be issued by the District Court, R. R. District, by modifying the order in Appl. No. 266 of 1983, and d) to direct the Revenue Authorities, to enter their names in the concerned records, in relation to those lands. These applications were ordered on 28-12-1995, as not opposed. ( 8 ) THE petitioners filed E. P. No. 3 of 1996, in the Court of District Judgve, Ranga Reddy District. A delivery warrant was issued in that E. P. and the bailiff of the Court submitted a report stating that he delivered the possession of the land. ( 9 ) THE applicants in Appl. Nos. 585 of 2002 and 1318 to 1320 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) filed applications in the Court of District Judge, Ranga Reddy District (for short the District Court) raising objections to the proceedings in the E. P. While some of them filed applications under Rule 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. , alleging that they were wrongfully dispossessed, others filed under Rule 97, objecting to the steps taken to dispossess them, pleading that they are still in possession of the land. Their case, in brief is that Paigah Committee, which administered the paigah properties, granted pattas to as many as 25 occupants of the land in Sy. No. 172 of Hydernagar, and the pattadars, and thereby the occupants become the owners. According to them, some of the pattadars sold their lands in favour of Sri Satya Sai Cooperative Housing Society, and the respondents in turn purchased plots from that yderhyhjhhhhhhhhhhhsociety. Some of the respondents claim to have purchased plots directly from the pattedars. ( 10 ) THE applications filed by the respondents were not received by the District Court on the ground that it did nothing more than implementing the direction of this Court issued in Appl. No. 994 of 1995, in the matter of delivery of possession. Thereupon, the respondents preferred O. S. A. Nos. 10, 11, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of 1996 in this Court. In these appeals, the orders dated 28-12-1995 in Appl. No. 994 of 1995 and the consequential orders passed by the District Judge in E. P. No. 3 of 1996 were challenged. The appeals were disposed of by a Division Bench, through its orders dated 06-11-1996, holding that applications under Rules 97 and 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. , are maintainable before the District Court, and that the order dated 28. 12. 1995 in Appl. No. 994 of 1995 is not amenable to challenge. ( 11 ) PETITIONERS filed Civil Appeal Nos. 5609 of 1997 and batch, before the Supreme Court against the order dated 14. 08. 1996 in O. S. A. No. 10 of 1996 and batch. The appeals were disposed of through an order dated 14-08-1997, directing that the applications shall be dealt with afresh, by a Division Bench of this Court, after taking the legal and factual aspects into account. On such remand a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the original side appeals by taking the view that the claim of respondents, is on the basis of grant of pattas, which in turn are deemed to be, by the State Government or the Jagir Administrator and thereby the respondents cannot be treated as 3rd parties to the decree. On such remand a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the original side appeals by taking the view that the claim of respondents, is on the basis of grant of pattas, which in turn are deemed to be, by the State Government or the Jagir Administrator and thereby the respondents cannot be treated as 3rd parties to the decree. In effect, it was held that the claims of respondents are through some of the judgment debtors and that applications under Rule 97 or 99 of Order 21 are not maintainable, at the instance of the judgment-debtors, or persons claiming through them. Aggrieved thereby the respondents approached the Supreme Court. ( 12 ) IN the decision in N. S. S. Narayana Sarma v. M/s Goldstone Exports Private Ltd. (1 supra), the Honble Supreme Court took the view that the applications are very much maintainable, since the respondents are claiming their rights independent of any steps under the provisions of the Jagir Regulation and that the view taken by the Division Bench is unsustainable and is the result of mis-conception of legal position, relevant to the matter. The order dated 28-11-1995, passed by the learned Single Judge in Appl. No. 994 of 1995, and the one passed by the Division Bench in O. S. A. No. 10 of 1996 and batch were set aside and the entire matter was directed to be dealt with, by a Single Judge. Hence, the remand takes in its fold, Application No. 994 of 1995, as well as the consideration of the objections raised by the respondents in the respective applications filed by them. ( 13 ) IN Application No. 994 of 1995, filed under Section 151 C. P. C. , the petitioners seeks a relief of modification of the order passed in Application No. 266 of 1983, dated 20. 1. 1984, by substituting their names, and to direct delivery of possession of land, to the extent of half share, out of Ac. 196. 20 guntas, in Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar village, in their favour, by issuing warrant of possession executable by District Court. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is stated that M/s Cyrus Investments Limited, the first respondent in that application had executed a deed of assignment of its rights in the preliminary decree in this suit, in respect of Ac. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is stated that M/s Cyrus Investments Limited, the first respondent in that application had executed a deed of assignment of its rights in the preliminary decree in this suit, in respect of Ac. 98-10 guntas of land in survey No. 172 of Hydernagar, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The manner in which the first respondent acquired the rights in that land was also stated. According to them, the first respondent therein was assigned the undivided share of defendant No. 156, in the suit and on recognition of such an assignment, this Court passed an order, dated 20. 01. 1984 in Appl. No. 266 of 1983, directing delivery of possession of the land in survey Nos. 83 and 172 of the said Village. They stated that the petitioners stepped in to the shoes of their assignor, vis--vis the rights that have accrued to the latter, under the order in Appl. No. 266 of 1983, and that they are entitled to be delivered the possession of the land. ( 14 ) AS observed in the preceding paragraphs, this application was ordered by the learned Single Judge on 28. 11. 1995. Consequently, the petitioners filed E. P. No. 3 of 1996 in the District Court and obtained warrant for delivery of possession. Several applications were filed raising objections to E. P. No. 3 of 1996. Sri N. S. S. Narayana Sarma and 32 others filed an application before the District Court seeking re-delivery of possession. Similar application was filed by Ehteshamuddin and 104 others. M. S. Murthy and 13 others filed application under Order 21 Rules 97 and 98 C. P. C. , alleging that that they are still in possession of parts of the schedule property in the E. P. Consequent on the remand, they filed Application Nos. 605 to 607 of 2002 in this Court for withdrawal of those applications to this Court. Through a detailed order dated 18. 02. 2003, this Court has withdrawn the said applications to this Court. Thereupon, they came to be numbered as Application Nos. 1318, 1319 and 1320 of 2003. U. Anjaneyulu and others filed Application Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002 in this Court under Order 21 Rule 97 C. P. C. , directly in this Court. 02. 2003, this Court has withdrawn the said applications to this Court. Thereupon, they came to be numbered as Application Nos. 1318, 1319 and 1320 of 2003. U. Anjaneyulu and others filed Application Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002 in this Court under Order 21 Rule 97 C. P. C. , directly in this Court. ( 15 ) THE gist of the contention of the respondents (petitioners in the above applications) is as under: originally the land admeasuring Ac. 198. 00 in survey No. 172, Hydernagar, was held by Kursheed Jaj Paigah. This land was under occupation of about 25 individuals in various extents. The Paigah Committee which was administering the property, granted pattas to the occupants in the year 1947 by dividing the land into survey Nos. 172/1 to 172/25. Pattas were granted under The Rules regarding grant of pattas in non khalsa lands (for short the Rules) framed under the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. These steps have taken place much before the Jagir Regulation was issued. After prolonged correspondent between the Government and the Paigah authorities, the rights of the persons who were granted pattas were recognized in the year 1974 by issuing supplementary setwar and in the year 1977, their names were entered in the revenue records. ( 16 ) SOME of the persons, who were granted pattas in survey No. 172 sold their lands in favour of Sri Satya Sai Co-operative Housing Society and Setwin Employees Co-operative Society. The claimants in Application No. 1318 of 2003 are said to be the purchasers of plots from Sri Satya Sai Co-operative Society and those in Application Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 2003 are said to have purchased the plots from Setwin Employees Co-operative Society. Claimants in Application Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002 are said to have directly purchased plots from one of the pattadars viz. , Boddu Veera Swamy. ( 17 ) IT is stated that on 16. 04. 1996, some unsocial elements came to the area and demolished the structures high-handedly and on the next day, the bailiff of the District court came and endorsed that the possession thereof is delivered. While some of the petitioners claim to be still in possession of the plots, the others seek re-delivery of possession. ( 18 ) THE petitioners filed counter-affidavits denying the contentions of the respondents. While some of the petitioners claim to be still in possession of the plots, the others seek re-delivery of possession. ( 18 ) THE petitioners filed counter-affidavits denying the contentions of the respondents. It is stated that the Paigah Committee did not have the power to grant pattas or assign the Paigah properties. According to them, the various Farmans issued by H. E. H. The Nizam prohibiting the alienation of paigah properties continued to be in operation, till the Jagir Regulation was promulgated and in that view of the matter it is incompetent for the Committee to have granted any pattas. They further submit that the pattas said to have been granted are factually non-existent and legally inoperative. Another plea taken by the petitioners is that after the promulgation of the Jagir Regulation, the competent authority to deal with the lands was either the Jagir Administrator or the State of Andhra Pradesh, defendants 43 and 53 respectively, and since the rights of the respondents, if any, are through defendants 43 and 53, the applications filed by them under Rules 97 or 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. are not maintainable. ( 19 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues and additional issues have been framed in all the applications. 1) Whether the land covered by S. No. 172 of Hydernagar village is the matruka property of late Nawab Kursheed Jha Paigah? 2) Whether the Nizam administration has been prohibited by means of Farman by the Nizam prior to the abolition of inams from transferring the land in favour of any person? 3) Whether the lands in question are inam (Jagir) lands and stand vested in the Government after the abolition of inams (jagirs)? 4) Whether the patta was granted in favour of Boddu Veera Swamy and others in 1947? 5) Whether the alleged pattas said to have been executed in favour of Boddu Veeraswamy and others are genuine documents or not? 6) Whether the claimants have been in possession and enjoyment of the property since the time of Boddu Veeraswami (grant of pattas)? 7) Whether the claim is barred by limitation? 8) Whether the Judgment and decree in C. S. No. 14 of 1958 is binding on the petitioners/claimants? 9) Whether the claimants have any right, title and interest over the property in question? 7) Whether the claim is barred by limitation? 8) Whether the Judgment and decree in C. S. No. 14 of 1958 is binding on the petitioners/claimants? 9) Whether the claimants have any right, title and interest over the property in question? 10) Whether the claim petition is barred by limitation in view of the remand order of the Supreme Court? 11) To what relief?additional Issues: 1) Whether the alleged delivery of possession on 17. 4. 1996 is not valid, illegal and has no legal effect, since, final decree has not been engrossed on proper stamp paper and property has not been divided by metes and bounds? 2) Whether the claimants have otherwise perfected their title by adverse possession? no issues were framed in Appln. No. 994 of 1995. However, issues referred to above will cover the controversy in that application also. ( 20 ) THE petitioners did not adduce any oral evidence. They filed copies of the orders passed by this Court from time to time in relation to the subject matter and copies of statutory rules. In Appln. Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002, P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-56 were marked. In Appln. No. 1318 of 2003, the first applicant therein was examined as P. W. 1 and through him, documents Exs. A-1 to A-84 were marked, another witness was examined as PW-2. In Appl. No. 1319 of 2003, two witnesses were examined and documents Exs. A-1 to A-271 were marked. A representation is made to the effect that the evidence in Appln. No. 1319 of 2003 be treated as the one in Appln. No. 1320 of 2003 also. The witnesses have stated the manner in which they acquired rights. Pattas granted in respect of some of the sub-divisions of Sy. No. 172 are filed. They have also filed the originals of Setwards, Faisal patties and Jamabandis. Substantial portion of the documentary evidence comprises of sale deeds and agreements of sale. ( 21 ) THE Contentions: learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, submits that as a result of the preliminary decree passed by this Court in C. S. No. 14 of 1958, the shares of the various parties to the suit have been determined and that the properties available for partition were identified. ( 21 ) THE Contentions: learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, submits that as a result of the preliminary decree passed by this Court in C. S. No. 14 of 1958, the shares of the various parties to the suit have been determined and that the properties available for partition were identified. He submits that substantial number of parties have transferred their rights under the preliminary decree in favour of defendants 156 and 157 and at a later point of time defendant 156 transferred his undivided share in favour of defendant 207. He submits that at various stages, this Court passed orders on the basis of the reports submitted by the Commissioner/receiver and the land in survey No. 172 of Hydernagar came to be allotted to defendants 157 and 207. He contends that the petitioners acquired rights in that property through a deed of Assignment executed by defendant 207. ( 22 ) LEARNED Counsel submits that whatever may have been the circumstances under which the Supreme Court set aside the order dated 28. 11. 1995, passed in Application No. 994 of 1995 directing delivery of possession, nothing remains, at this stage, to be adjudicated upon, once the possession was delivered to the petitioners through the warrant issued in E. P. No. 3 of 1996. He submits that the Farmans issued by H. E. H. The Nizam from time to time prohibiting transfer or alienation of paigah properties were in force till the issuance of Jagir Regulation and in that view of the matter, the respondents cannot be said to have derived any title through the so-called pattas said to have been issued by the Paigah Committee. He submits that the respondents have not filed all the pattas covering the land claimed by them. Even as regards some of the pattas filed by the respondents, learned counsel submits that unless the person to whom it was issued is examined, they cannot be said to have been proved and that the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be invoked, for such documents. ( 23 ) LEARNED counsel further contends that the respondents failed to the sale deeds, through which the Co-operative Housing Societies have purchased the land and in the absence of the same, the claim made by the respondents cannot be accepted. ( 23 ) LEARNED counsel further contends that the respondents failed to the sale deeds, through which the Co-operative Housing Societies have purchased the land and in the absence of the same, the claim made by the respondents cannot be accepted. Learned counsel also submits that in spite of the sales, the names of the pattadars continued to be shown in the revenue records and it discloses that the sales were only nominal in nature. Another submission made by the learned counsel is that the societies have not obtained any lay out in respect of the land in question, as contemplated under the A. P. Urban Areas Development Act. He submits that the description of the properties in the respective sale deeds in favor of the respondents is vague and that the sale deeds are hit by Section 29 of the Contract Act. He contends that the respondents failed to establish that they are in possession of the land in question. ( 24 ) HE further contends that the order passed by this Court in Application No. 266 of 1983 became final and through the present application, the petitioners seek nothing more than implementation of that order. He urges that in an application filed under Rules 97 or 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. , the decree-holder cannot be required to prove this title and any relief can be granted only when the objectors like the respondents herein establish their own independent and superior title. He submits that the applications are barred by limitation. ( 25 ) SRI A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents (applicants in Appln. No. 1318 of 2003) submits that his clients have derived and acquired independent and valid title in respect of the plots purchased by them. He contends that even according to the plaintiffs in the suit, the estate of Paigah was not amenable to any partition in view of the Farmans issued by H. E. H. The Nizam and such Farmans continued to hold the field till the Jagir Regulation was made. Learned Counsel submits that once the Jagir Regulation came into force, all the Jagirs including item No. 38 of Schedule IV of the suit vested in the Government and any proceedings in relation to such lands are barred. Learned Counsel submits that once the Jagir Regulation came into force, all the Jagirs including item No. 38 of Schedule IV of the suit vested in the Government and any proceedings in relation to such lands are barred. Learned Counsel points out that the grant of pattas in favour of the purchasers-in-title of the respondents has taken place much before the Jagir Regulation was issued and that the pattas were granted as provided for under the Rules relating to grant of pattas in non-khalsa lands. ( 26 ) LEARNED counsel further contends that even assuming that the suit in relation to lands covered by the Jagir Regulations was maintainable, a decree in respect of such lands could have been referred only to the District Collector under Rule 18 (1) of Order 20 C. P. C. for taking necessary steps under Section 54 C. P. C. He submits that in fact such an order was passed at one stage in this suit and despite the same, the orders were passed directing delivery of possession without there being division of the property, allotment of shares and a final decree. He submits that the petitioners have resorted to gross misuse of process of the Court, to knock away the property worth several crores by filing untenable applications and obtaining collusive orders. He draws the attention of this Court to various orders and submits that they were obtained collusively without impleading the necessary parties. ( 27 ) REFERRING to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, he submits that most of the pattadars are no more and that the available pattas have been placed before this Court. He submits that the subsequent steps, such as sub-division of the land, Jamabandi, issuance of Setwar and Faisal patti, etc. , clearly disclose that valid little passed to the pattedars, the Societies and thereby the respondents acquired valid title. According to him, Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act squarely gets attracted, since the document has come from the proper custody. , clearly disclose that valid little passed to the pattedars, the Societies and thereby the respondents acquired valid title. According to him, Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act squarely gets attracted, since the document has come from the proper custody. ( 28 ) SRI Pulla Reddy further submits that in the absence of an executable decree, it was not competent for this Court to have directed delivery of possession, that too, in an application filed under Section 151 C. P. C. Analyzing the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned Counsel submits that in respect of properties other than estates, any steps subsequent to preliminary decree can lead only to the passing of a final decree and it is the latter which is executable. He submits that once the applications were remanded by the Supreme Court for disposal by this Court, the question of limitation does not arise. He contends that, even otherwise, the applications are filed within limitation. ( 29 ) SRI B. Nalin Kumar, learned counsel for the claimants in Application Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 2003 and Sri V. A. Hari Haran, learned counsel for the claimants in Application Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002, adopt the arguments of Sri A. Pulla Reddy. They further contend that their clients have established their title by placing oral and documentary evidence before this Court, whereas the petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim or title to the land. They plead that the so-called delivery of possession was nothing but an exercise on paper and despite the same, most of their clients are still in possession of the property in question. ( 30 ) APPLICATION No. 994 of 1995: this application is filed under Section 151 C. P. C. , with a prayer to modify the order passed in Application No. 266/83, dated 20. 01. 1984 by substituting the names of the petitioners herein and to direct the delivery of possession to them to an extent of half share out of 196. 20 guntas in Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, by issue of warrant of possession executable by the Court of District Judge, Rangareddy District and the other interlocutory proceedings therein as such other and further orders as the Honble Court may deem fit. ( 31 ) C. S. NO. 20 guntas in Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, by issue of warrant of possession executable by the Court of District Judge, Rangareddy District and the other interlocutory proceedings therein as such other and further orders as the Honble Court may deem fit. ( 31 ) C. S. NO. 14 of 1958, as stated earlier, was filed for partition of Matruka properties of Khurshid Jaj Paigah. The properties comprised of three categories, viz. , buildings and bungalows, with surrounding land; jewellery, and lands in maktas and jagirs. The third category of properties are about 15,000 to 20,000 acres of lands, by rough estimate. The paigah properties were under the management of the 1st defendant, the Amire Paigah. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant specifically pleaded that the maktas and jagirs are covered by the provisions of the Jagir Regulation. A preliminary decree was passed, partly on the basis of the findings in the judgment and mostly in terms of the compromise entered into between the plaintiff and some of the defendants. Its preamble reads as under: this Court DOTH RECORD the terms of the said Memorandum of Compromise, the Original whereof is filed in the record of the said application No. 264 of 1961, and a copy whereof the annexed hereto, and DOTH in terms of the said Memorandum of Compromise in the manner they are directed to given effect to, in the judgment DECLARE ORDER AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS ONLY SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE COMPROMISE ARE concerned and without prejudice to the rights of the contesting parties recognized, declared and ordered in this decree. Para 10 of the preliminary decree is almost a replica of para 12 of the memorandum of compromise. After the unnecessary portion is omitted, it reads as under: that all other properties mentioned in original and amended schedules Nos. VI and IV-A attached to the plaint excluding (1) item No. 26 and house Nos. 28 and 29 in item No. 22, and items Nos. After the unnecessary portion is omitted, it reads as under: that all other properties mentioned in original and amended schedules Nos. VI and IV-A attached to the plaint excluding (1) item No. 26 and house Nos. 28 and 29 in item No. 22, and items Nos. 51, 52 and 53 of IV Schedule or any other property movable and immovable such as Maktas, Baghat, (Non-Atiyat) and patta lands subsequently found as belonging to the Estates Paigah Khurshid Jahi whether in possession of any parties to the suit or any other persons not parties to the suit shall be divided among the parties to the compromise in the following proportions ( 32 ) THE preliminary decree provided for appointment of receiver to undertake various steps. There did not exist much of difficulty in partitioning the bungalows and jewellery. The maktas and Jagir and shown in Items 29, 37 to 40 of Schedule IV and almost the entire schedule IV-A. The lands in Hafizpet and Hydernagar are shown in Items 37 and 38 of Schedule-IV. The manner in which these properties are described in the suit schedule can properly be appreciated only by extracting the same: schedule IV TO (THE PLAINT) list OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES OF KHURSHID JAHI PAIGAH. In the preliminary decree dated 28-06-1963 the shares of all the parties were determined. They range from 1/8th share (defendants 51, 52, 103 and 104) to 657/2, 76, 480th share (defendants 44, 45 and 46 ). ( 33 ) THE fact that the preliminary decree left much to be done even in the matter of ascertaining the properties available for partition, is evident from Clause (18) of the Preliminary decree. They range from 1/8th share (defendants 51, 52, 103 and 104) to 657/2, 76, 480th share (defendants 44, 45 and 46 ). ( 33 ) THE fact that the preliminary decree left much to be done even in the matter of ascertaining the properties available for partition, is evident from Clause (18) of the Preliminary decree. It reads as under: that in case any party or parties to this suit do not join this compromise or back out or resile from this compromise before or after signing the compromise or verification or at any other stage and if they contest the suit, all the parties to the compromise shall jointly prosecute the suit against the aforementioned party or parties; and in case the said party or parties who are left out of this compromise, succeed in getting a decision that the suit properties are Matruka of late Nawab Khurshid Jah and are declared entitled to get a sharai share as heirs, the extra share over and above the share they would have been entitled to as a participant or participants in the compromise ( 34 ) UNDER the decree the Commissioner/receiver was required; a) to take charge and possession of all the movable and immovable properties, b) to collect rents of the properties, c) to institute cases, if necessary, for recovery of properties, d) to auction the properties as may be directed by the Court, e) to get the properties assessed, etc. ( 35 ) AS indicated above, vast majority of the properties were maktas and jagirs. The nature of decree to be passed in a suit for partition is for under Rule 18 of Order 20. Under Clause (1) of Rule 18, where the subject matter of such decree is the land in Estates, assessed to revenue, necessary directions are to be issued to the District Collector for taking appropriate steps, as provided for under Section 54 C. P. C. In fact, such a direction was issued by this Court on 31-01-1976 in Appl. No. 139 of 1971. This application was filed by the receiver; and the plaintiffs and all the defendants are made parties to it. No. 139 of 1971. This application was filed by the receiver; and the plaintiffs and all the defendants are made parties to it. The order is short and it is beneficial to extract the same: the parties have not been able to agree upon the allotment of the extents of 1 and to the share of each one of them in accordance with the decree of this court. Nor have they been able to suggest the name of a surveyor who is wiling to take up the work and parcel out the lands in accordance with the scheme accepted under the final decree. The matter has, therefore, to be forwarded to the collector under Sec. 54, C. P. C. for the purpose of separation and allotment of a share to each of the parties under the scheme incorporated in the final decree. The District Collector, Hyderabad may depute any Gazetted Officer subordinate to him in this behalf to parcel out the lands in accordance with law and take further action under Sec. 54 C. P. C. The parties including the Receiver shall appear in person or through their counsel before the District Collector, Hyderabad on 21-2-1976. No, further notices need be issued to them. ( 36 ) ONCE a matter is referred to the District Collector under Rule 18 (1) of Order 21, for taking necessary steps, Section 54 C. P. C. , for all practical purposes, the Court, which passed the decree, is not supposed to take any steps in relation to partition. There is no provision in C. P. C. , which enables the Court to deal with a decree, once it is referred to the District Collector under the provision referred to above. The steps under those provisions are in fact, mandatory. In Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1986 SC 414 ) the Supreme Court held as under: under S. 54 of the Civil P. C. , 1908, where a decree for the partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate is passed, the partition of the estate or the separation of the share is to be made by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in that behalf. Rule 18 (1) of O. 20 of the Code makes a similar provision. Rule 18 (1) of O. 20 of the Code makes a similar provision. Thus, in the case of a partition decree of land assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government the execution of such decree by actually effecting partition and giving separate possession of a share of such land is to be effected by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate deputed by him in that behalf ( 37 ) THERE is no order passed in the suit, which has the effect of setting aside the order dated 30-01-1976, passed in Appl. No. 139 of 1976. Rule 13 of Order 26 C. P. C. , disables the Commissioner to undertake any exercise, if the matter is covered by Section 54 C. P. C. ( 38 ) THIS being the state of affairs, fairly good number of applications came to be filed by persons, who are not parties to the suit, for a set of reliefs, viz. , for, a) recognition of assignment said to have been made in their favour by the parties to the suit, or their assignees, b) impleading them as parties; c) delivery of possession of the property referred to therein, and d) for mutation of their names in the revenue records. The record discloses that, in such applications, the defendants in the suit are not made parties and only a receiver, or the assignors were made parties. ( 39 ) APPL. NO. 266 of 1983 is one such application. Defendant Nos. 157 and 207 prayed for the relief of delivery of possession to an extent of 464 acres in Sy. No. 163 of Hafeezpet Village and 190 acres in Hydernagar Village. By the time the application was filed, there were about 300 defendants in the suit, having been added as legal representatives of the deceased defendants, or on being recognized as assignees, etc. The receiver was added as the sole respondent in that application. The preliminary decree did not identify the extent of lands, much less allotted the land in item 38 of Schedule IV to any party or parties; as is evident from the schedules and the directions issued to the Commissioner. The assignment that has taken place in favour of defendants 156 and 157, initially, and the subsequent assignment by them, did not improve the matter any further. The assignment that has taken place in favour of defendants 156 and 157, initially, and the subsequent assignment by them, did not improve the matter any further. There is no order passed by this Court dividing the properties by metes and bounds and allocating the divided items to the respective parties. No final decree was passed, on the strength of the preliminary decree, and the steps taken by the Commissioner/receiver. Still, the application was filed for delivery of possession of land in Item No. 38 of Schedule-IV, of about 600 acres of land in sub-urban areas of the Hyderabad City, and the text of the order passed therein is. The receiver has no objection. Ordered. ( 40 ) IF really the Receiver was in possession of the said lands, and if he had no objection for delivery of possession, the direction issued by this Court could have been implemented, forthwith. However, even as per the contentions of the petitioners, nothing had taken place for about 11 years thereafter. The petitioners sought for modification of the order in Appl. No. 266 of 1983, and to direct the District Court to deliver possession of half of the extent in Sy. No. 172 of Hydernagar Village. In the present application (994 of 1995), the petitioners maintained a strategic silence, on the aspects such as, in whose possession the land covered by Appln. No. 266 of 1983 is there; why the order in Appln. No. 226 of 1983 needs modification, which portion of the half of Sy. No. 172 is required to be delivered to them. This Court is confronted with several basic questions of law and fact, in considering this application. Some of them are as under: i) When the plaintiff and the only contesting defendant in the suit pleaded before the Court that the lands are covered by the Jagir Regulation and thereby the Jagir land stood transferred to the Government, it is difficult to discern as to how the land in thousands of acres in maktas and jagirs spread over several villages is available for partition among the parties to the suit. This Court is aware of the legal position that once a preliminary decree assumed finality, it cannot be ignored, or challenged at a later stage [see Rachakonda Venkat Rao v. R. Satya Bai (2003) 7 SCC 452 ]. This Court is aware of the legal position that once a preliminary decree assumed finality, it cannot be ignored, or challenged at a later stage [see Rachakonda Venkat Rao v. R. Satya Bai (2003) 7 SCC 452 ]. However, in this case, the preliminary decree did not finally ascertain the properties available for partition. It provided for such ascertainment at a subsequent stage. A reading of the Clauses of the decree referred to in the preceding paragraphs makes this amply clear. It is in this context that the various steps taken by the Government, as a measure of agrarian reforms become relevant. The Jagir Regulation was made way back in the year 1948. On abolition of Jagirs, the Jagirdars were to be provided with amount of commutation. For determination of commutation amount, the Government issued A. P. (Telangana Area) Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359. There was no serious dispute that several items in Schedule IV and all the items in Schedule IV-A of the decree were Jagirs and covered by these Regulations. That, in fact, was the contention of the plaintiff and the contesting defendant. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the plaint, it was pleaded as under:13. The Jagirs in Hyderabad State including Paigah having been abolished by Jagir Abolition Regulation No. 69 of 1358 F. with effect from 15th August, 1949 the said Firman precluding the partition of the aforesaid two categories of Mathruka properties, ceased to be operative, and plaintiff became entitled to claim her legitimate share of Mathruka Estate of the Late Nawab Khurshid Jah viz. , her 29/2944th share which she tentatively values at the aggregate sum of O. S. Rs. 6559. 6. 10 as detailed in the Schedule IV and para 2 referred to above of the aggregate tentative value of O. S. Rs. 6. 76. 058-20. 14. The cause of action for this suit arose at Hyderabad-Dn. On 15th August, 1949, when the Jagir Abolition Regulation came into force and the Farmans of H. E. H. the Nizam preventing the partition of the suit properties ceased to be operative. The suit is in time, in any event, as the bulk of the properties in Schedule IV are immovable properties and the other properties in category (b) and referred to in para 12 were held by the defendant No. 1 the Amir Paigah in trust and are now with defendant No. 43. The suit is in time, in any event, as the bulk of the properties in Schedule IV are immovable properties and the other properties in category (b) and referred to in para 12 were held by the defendant No. 1 the Amir Paigah in trust and are now with defendant No. 43. The first defendant alone contested the suit. In his written statement, he pleaded, inter alia, as under: after the Jagir Abolition, the Government took possession of the properties, Khas Bagh and maqtas, mentioned as S. Nos. 35 to 37 and 40 of the Schedule No. 4. Proceedings were taken in the appropriate departments for the release of these properties, which resulted in failure. In case the plaintiff is having any claim over these properties, she can proceed against the Government. Even if there existed any doubt as to the applicability of these Regulations to the said lands or the properties held by the Paigahs, it stood removed with the specific inclusion of these paigahs in the Schedule to Commutation Regulations, containing the list of Jamiat Jagirs. Under Section 4 of the Commutation Regulations, the basic annual revenue fixed for the purpose of determination of the commutation amount was to be reduced by 20% in respect of such Jagirs. Kursheed Jaj Paigaj figures at item No. 2. The Regulations were treated as so important that they came to be included in the IX Schedule of the Constitution of India through the historic first amendment. These two Regulations figured at Sl. Nos. 12 and 13 of the IX Schedule. The operation of the Legislation of such prime importance over vast extents of properties could not have been the subject matter of a suit for partition or a decree passed mainly on compromise, that too, where there was no controversy as to the applicability of the said Regulations over the lands in question. Had this vital information been placed before this Court when it was proceeding to pass the preliminary decree, things would certainly have been different. In fact, Rule 11 (d) of Order 7 C. P. C. provides for rejection of the plaint where a relief claimed in it is barred by law. These aspects, can certainly be taken into account, at a stage subsequent to preliminary decree bet it a step in the direction of passing of the final decree or in the execution proceedings. In fact, Rule 11 (d) of Order 7 C. P. C. provides for rejection of the plaint where a relief claimed in it is barred by law. These aspects, can certainly be taken into account, at a stage subsequent to preliminary decree bet it a step in the direction of passing of the final decree or in the execution proceedings. ii) In a suit relating to immovable property, whether for specific performance, possession, declaration or partition, description of the property is very important and vital. Unless the property is clearly described, with reference to its identification marks, such as the survey numbers, or municipal numbers, depending on the location, extent and ( 44 ) AFTER perusing the voluminous record, running into thousands of pages, and hearing the counsel for the parties, almost for two weeks, apart from recording evidence this Court is compelled to observe that, acts, which were otherwise impermissible in law, were sought to be pushed through under the orders of this Court, and in most of the cases successfully. The modus operandi was to file applications with reliefs, patently outside the scope of the suit, and law, by impleading handful of friendly defendants/respondents and to obtain consent orders. The role played by the Government (defendant Nos. 43 and 53) is far from satisfactory. When it woke up after about 30 years from its deep slumber or pretended sleep, it was told that it is too late. In the process, the provisions of a prime legislation were systematically defeated. ( 45 ) THE fictitious nature of such claims is evident from the following instance. A Division Bench of this Court took serious exception to the manner in which identical applications in a similar suit, relating to another paigah, were passed, and set aside the same. While remanding, direction was issued to the effect that the parties, except where they are residing in foreign countries, shall appear at least once before the Court and seek necessary permission from the Court, in case they intend to be represented by G. P. As. The parties were also directed to be identified by the Court. The vakalatnamas were required to be executed in the presence of the Oaths Commissioner. The result is that about 20 applications so remanded had to be dismissed, either as withdrawn or as not pressed and none of the parties appeared, as directed. The parties were also directed to be identified by the Court. The vakalatnamas were required to be executed in the presence of the Oaths Commissioner. The result is that about 20 applications so remanded had to be dismissed, either as withdrawn or as not pressed and none of the parties appeared, as directed. The magnitude of misuse of the process of the Court, fraud played by them is thus evident. Reference to it is not to doubt the genuinty of the petitioners herein, but to drive home the point that all was well in such matters. ( 46 ) IN view of the findings recorded in the preceding paragraphs, Appln. No. 994 of 1995 is rejected. ( 47 ) APPLICATION Nos. 585, 708 of 2002 and 1318 to 1320 of 2003: before proceeding with the matter on merits, issues 7 and 8, relating to limitation need to be dealt with. ISSUE Nos. 7 AND 8: it has been seen that while some of the respondents claim to be in possession and seek to obstruct attempts to dispossess them by filing application under Rule 97, rest of them have filed applications under Rule 97, rest of them have filed applications under Rule 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. The Limitation Act prescribes 30 days time for filing of applications under these provisions (Articles 128 and 129 of the Schedule ). For applications filed under Rule 97 of Order 21, the starting point is the date on which resistance or obstruction is offered. The language of the Rule 97 of Order 21 basically indicates that the applications under it are to be filed by the decree-holders. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust (1998) 3 SCC 723 ) and Shreenath v. Rajesh (1998) 4 SCC 543 ), the Supreme Court held that a person holding possession of immovable property on his own right and objecting to the execution of proceedings, can also file an application under this Rule. In the latter of the cases, it was observed as under: thus a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21 Rule 97. One has not to wait for his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. In the latter of the cases, it was observed as under: thus a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21 Rule 97. One has not to wait for his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. This shows that such a person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree-holder. This was relied upon by the Supreme Court in relation to the present case itself, in N. S. S. Narayana Sarma (1 supra ). If the application under Rule 97 is by a person offering resistance, it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the starting point for computation of limitation. The limitation for filing the applications under Rule 99 for re-delivery of possession, is prescribed under Article 128 of the Limitation Act. It reads as under: for possession by one dispossessed of immovable property and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree thirty days the date of the dispossession. It is also beneficial to extract Rule 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. in this context. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser: (1) where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property, or where such property has been sold in execution of a decree by the purchaser thereof, he may make application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any may such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. ( 48 ) A combined reading of these provisions discloses that the dispossession in question, has to take place only in pursuance of, a decree for possession of immovable property, or where the property is sold during the course of execution. In this case, the property was not sold in the execution of a decree. Therefore, it has to be seen as to whether the dispossession was in pursuance of a decree for possession of immovable property. In this case, the property was not sold in the execution of a decree. Therefore, it has to be seen as to whether the dispossession was in pursuance of a decree for possession of immovable property. Such decrees are provided for under Rule 9 of Order 20 C. P. C. The present suit is one for partition and the nature of the decree to be passed therein is provided for under Rule 18 of Order 20 C. P. C. The content and purport of those two kinds of decrees is substantially different, from each other. ( 49 ) APART from this, the possession was delivered to the petitioners in pursuance of an order passed by this Court in an application filed under Section 151 C. P. C. The recovery of possession contemplated under Rule 99 of Order 21 C. P. C. , and the limitation therefore under Article 128 of the Limitation Act pre-suppose the delivery in the process of execution. When the application filed by the petitioners seeking delivery of possession does not fit into the said provisions, it is difficult to accept their contention as to the limitation. In fact, they brought about an incongruous situation by seeking delivery of possession by filing an application under Section 151 C. P. C. It was already pointed out that there does not exist an executable decree in favour of the petitioners. The respondents moved the applications without any delay. In fact, they were faced with a peculiar situation, in filing their applications. The delivery of possession was directed by this Court, whereas the warrant was issued by the District Court. It was too difficult for them to ascertain as to which exactly is the executing Court for filing the applications. Hence, it cannot be said that the applications are barred by limitation. ( 50 ) ISSUE Nos. 1, 2 and 3: these issues, in fact, constitute the backbone of the entire litigation in the suit as well as these applications. Some items of Schedules IV and the entire Schedule IV-A included thousands of acres of land in various revenue villages which are part of the city of Hyderabad or surrounding it. All these lands formed part of paigah property. It has already been observed in the preceding paragraphs that H. E. H. the Nizam prohibited partition or alienation of the said lands. All these lands formed part of paigah property. It has already been observed in the preceding paragraphs that H. E. H. the Nizam prohibited partition or alienation of the said lands. The sole plaintiff had clearly stated that the prohibition imposed in the Farmans ceased to be operative with the abolition of Jagirs through the Jagir Regulations w. e. f. 15. 08. 1949 and that the cause of action arose in that context. ( 51 ) IT was clearly stated that the Jagirs, comprising of the lands in various items in Schedule IV stood abolished and that they are with the Jagir Administrator, defendant No. 43. The first defendant, Amir-e-Paigah, also pleaded that the possession of the lands vested with defendant No. 43. It was obviously for this reason, that defendant No. 43 did not feel the necessary to raise any controversy as to the same. In such an event, the effect of the Jagir Regulations became highly relevant. ( 52 ) THE Jagir Regulations were issued by the Prime Minister in Council, of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, in whom the administration vested. Section 4 of the Regulations prohibited appointment of Jagirdars. Under Section 5, the Jagirs stood transferred to the Government and were to be administered by the Jagir Administrators. The Jagir Administrator is conferred with the powers to decide the various claims in relation to Jagirs or share in income thereof. Section 20 provided for appeal and revision against the orders of Jagir Administrator to a prescribed authority. Section 21 barred any proceedings against the Jagir Administrator or any other public servant in respect of any thing done or purporting to have been done with the Regulations. The jurisdiction of the civil courts was only in respect of those matters, which were not covered by the said provisions. ( 53 ) IN this suit, as many as 50 issues were framed and some of them contain several parts. As to the effect on the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to makthas and the effect of Jagir Regulations, issues Nos. 14 (a) and 45 were framed. They read as under. 14 (a): Are the properties mentioned in items 37 to 40 of schedule 4 the maktas and inam properties and if, so, whether the civil court has no jurisdiction relation to the same? 14 (a) and 45 were framed. They read as under. 14 (a): Are the properties mentioned in items 37 to 40 of schedule 4 the maktas and inam properties and if, so, whether the civil court has no jurisdiction relation to the same? 45: Are the suit properties still impartiable and the Farmans prohibiting partition notwithstanding the abolition of Jagirs and paigahs are still binding in this behalf? ( 54 ) THE plaintiff and 59 defendants filed Application No. 264 of 1961 under Rule 3 of Order 23 C. P. C. , to pass a decree in terms of compromise. The record discloses that no separate orders were passed on this application. In the Judgment in the suit, this application was also referred to. Therefore, it is difficult to discern as to which portion of the suit claim was compromised and which part of it is adjudicated on contest, or on merits. A preliminary decree was drawn on the basis of a judgment which reliefs to the suit as well as the Application No. 264 of 1961. As many as 41 defendants, including Jagir Administrator and the State of Andhra Pradesh (defendants 43 and 53) remained outside the compromise. ( 55 ) IN the body of the judgment, while discussing issue No. 14 (a), it was observed that mere assertion by the 1st defendant that the Jagirs were taken over by the Government would not defeat the plaintiffs claim to the property and that the same is liable to be partitioned. As regards issue No. 45, it was observed in the Judgment as under: now the paigah as also the institution of the Amir has come to an end as a result o the Jagir Abolition Regulation. The paigahs became integrated with the Diwani, and the Amir and the Hissedars were declared entitled to a share in the compensation amount in the rate of 2/5:3/5. The property in question however was not taken over, as it was not within the definition of Jagir. So the question of compensation would not arise. But that property, as already noticed, is not the property of any individual. It is of the Paigah family. It was impressed by the Firman with the incidents of Paigah property. The property in question however was not taken over, as it was not within the definition of Jagir. So the question of compensation would not arise. But that property, as already noticed, is not the property of any individual. It is of the Paigah family. It was impressed by the Firman with the incidents of Paigah property. Though on account of abolition of paigah and consequently also the institution of Amir, it may not be possible for the property to continue in possession of the Amir as the paigah property. It has already been pointed out that the paigahs were covered by the Jagir Regulation and that the Regulation is included in IX Schedule to the Constitution of India. ( 56 ) IN Bandari Ramachander v. Special Court under A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act ( 2003 (3) ALT 292 (D. B.), a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with one of the villages in the Jagir held by the paigah, with reference to the Jagir Regulations. The Special Court constituted under the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act held that the land in question deserves to be treated as having absolutely been vested in the Janaba Raheemunnisa Begum Saheba. Dealing with the said findings, his Court observed as under: the law relating to Crown Grants obtaining in the former Nizams Dominions is well settled by the several decisions of the former Hyderabad High Court as well as the subsequent decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. The sum and substance of the law declared is that every grant made by the Ruler was only for the lifetime of the grantee. On the death of the grantee, the grant reverted to the Crown and it was in the sole discretion of the Crown either to regrant it, or not, it was open to the Crown to regrant it to the heirs and successors of the previous grantee, or to one or more of them, or to total stranger. The grants were of several kinds and were known under different expressions, viz. , Jagir, Samasthan, Maktha, Inam, etc. The fact remains that each one of them was a grant and was governed by the same rule referred to hereinabove. The grants were of several kinds and were known under different expressions, viz. , Jagir, Samasthan, Maktha, Inam, etc. The fact remains that each one of them was a grant and was governed by the same rule referred to hereinabove. If the grant was of a whole village, it was generally referred to as Jagir or Samasthan; but, if the grant pertained only to a certain land in a given village, it was called Inam or Maktha as the case may be. Regulation 2 (f) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangna Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli (for short the 1358 Fasli Regulation) defines Jagir. Jagir includes a Paigah, Samsthan, part of a jagir, village Muktha, village Agrahar, Umli and Mukasa, whether granted by a Ruler or a Jagirdar, and, as respects the period commencing on the date appointed for a Jagir under Section 5, means the estate therefore constituting a Jagir. It was ultimately concluded in para 64 as follows: in such view of mater, it is not possible to accept the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel that the land itself has been granted to Raheemunnisa Begum Saheba as Jat Jagir. Even if it is so she does not get any title to the land, as what could have been granted is only revenues of lands as a Personal Grant. Learned Counsel for the petitioners is correct when he submits that the preliminary decree has become final and its validity cannot be assailed as this stage. The law in this regard is settled long back by the Supreme Court in Venkat Reddy v. Pethi Reddy ( AIR 1963 SC 992 ). Where the suit is of such a nature which warrants passing of a preliminary and final decree, what becomes executable is only a final decree and if no appeal is filed against the preliminary decree, its validity cannot be challenged at a later stage. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the Judgment becomes an authority or binding only in relation to the controversy involved in the proceedings. It is debatable as to whether this Court could have doubted the operation and effect of the Jagir Regulations on various items of suit schedule when the plaintiff and contesting defendants did not express any doubt about it. It is debatable as to whether this Court could have doubted the operation and effect of the Jagir Regulations on various items of suit schedule when the plaintiff and contesting defendants did not express any doubt about it. Rule (1) of Order 14 C. P. C. mandates that an issue would arise only when there is an assertion by one party and denial by the other. It is possible for a Court to decide a controversy in the absence of an issue, provided the parties adduce evidence on that aspect, and the party who is adversely affected by it, does not protest. However, where no controversy exists between the parties, the Court cannot pronounce upon a non-issue. As and when the matter calls for consideration, in an appeal or in execution proceedings, this aspect can certainly be dealt with, but not in these proceedings. Be that as it may, the Matruka property can be held only by a Muslim individual and not an institution or group comprising of such persons. No proceedings shown by the petitioners to disclose that the land in survey No. 172 of Hydernagar was recognized as the matruka property of late Nawab Kursheed Jah Paigah. ( 57 ) EVEN assuming that the land in Hydernagar (item 38 of the suit schedule) did not vest in the Government on abolition of Jagirs, it needs to be seen as to whether there were any Farmans prohibiting alienation of such land and if so, up to what point of time they operated. This question arises in view of the contention raised by the petitioners that the Farmans issued by the H. E. H. the Nizam prohibiting alienation continued to be operative till the Jagir Regulations were promulgated and it was not at all competent for the Paigah Administrator or Committee to have granted pattas in favour of the predecessor-in-title of the respondents. ( 58 ) RESPONDENTS filed originals or certified copies of the pattas granted in favour of their predecessors-in-title. Ex. A1 in Appln. No. 1318 of 2003 is the certified copy of the patta issued in favour of one Mr. Lokabhiram Naidu, in respect of land in survey No. 172/6 of Hydernagar village, together with its English translation. Ex. A3 is the original of the patta granted in favour of Puspaula Sulochanamma, in respect of the land in survey No. 172/7, together with its transaction. Lokabhiram Naidu, in respect of land in survey No. 172/6 of Hydernagar village, together with its English translation. Ex. A3 is the original of the patta granted in favour of Puspaula Sulochanamma, in respect of the land in survey No. 172/7, together with its transaction. Similar pattas granted in favour of one Boddu Veera Swamy mere also filed by the applicant in Appln. No. 586 of 2002 as Ex. A-55. The pattas were granted in the year 1947, much before the Jagir Regulation was issued. The text of the patta reads as under: with reference to the subject cited above, it is to state that as per your application dated 11th Farwardi, 1357 F. , the patta of the land measuring (10) acres as per the Circular no. 11 dated 12th Thir, 1356 Fasli, out o the land in Survey No. (172) totally admeasuring 196 acres and 20 guntas situated at Makhta Hydernagar is hereby granted in your name by the Revenue Secretariat with the land assessment of Re. 1/- per acre, as the Gairan of this Makhta is more than the table. Thus, remit the assessment amount each year in the office of the Tahsil and obtain the receipt as per rules. Second copy of this letter is forwarded to Tahsildar Saheb, Taluka Narsapur for favour of information and compliance. Petitioners placed before this Court the certified copies of the Farmans issued by H. E. H. the Nizam, which prohibited partition or alienation of the paigah properties. The contention of the petitioners based on this Farman would certainly have been accepted but for a development which has taken place in the meanwhile. The Prime Minister in council of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad issued rules known as Rules regarding grant of pattedary rights in non khalsa villages, 1356 Fasli. These Rules were issued under the Land Revenue Act. The Prime Minister in council of the erstwhile Government of Hyderabad issued rules known as Rules regarding grant of pattedary rights in non khalsa villages, 1356 Fasli. These Rules were issued under the Land Revenue Act. Rule 2 of the same reads as under: from the date of the coming into force of these rules persons who hold Jagir land and pay revenue direct to the Jagirdars shall, in all Jagirs, whether settled or unsettled for all purposes be deemed to be pattadars of the land held by them notwithstanding any oral or written agreement between the Jagirdar and such persons or any entry in the concerned village records to the contrary, and their rights and liabilities shall be the same as those of the Pattadars of Khalsa lands. Rule 10 prescribed the procedure for grant of such pattas. While the operation of Rule 2 in all kinds of Jagirs resulting in the persons in occupation of the Jagir land, becoming pattedars was almost a matter of course, exception was carved out in case of Jagirs Umara-I-Paigah and Umara-Uzzam under Rule 14. The Paigah, which is the subject matter of the suit belongs to such category. In case of these paigahs, the necessary proposals were to have been submitted to the H. E. H. the Nizam for further action. A reading of the patta in Exs. A-1, A-3 and A-55 itself discloses that the patta was granted by the Revenue Secretariat, as per Circular No. 11, dated 12th Thir 1356 Fasli. Learned Counsel for the respondents stated that the Circular is the one issued by H. E. H. the Nizam according special permission for grant of pattas in respect of the paigah property. Nothing was elicited from the witnesses to discredit the authenticity of this document nor any independent evidence was adduced by the petitioners. This discloses that permission contemplated under exception to Rule 14 was accorded. Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioners which constituted the basis for issue No. 3 cannot be accepted. Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the respondents/objectors. ( 59 ) ISSUE Nos. 4, 5 AND ADDITIONAL ISSUE No. 2: as observed in the preceding paragraphs, pattas were granted in favour of various individuals over the land covered by various sub-divisions of Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village. Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the respondents/objectors. ( 59 ) ISSUE Nos. 4, 5 AND ADDITIONAL ISSUE No. 2: as observed in the preceding paragraphs, pattas were granted in favour of various individuals over the land covered by various sub-divisions of Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village. These pattas were granted under the Scheme provided for in the Rules referred to in previous paragraphs, since they were found to be occupants of parts of Jagir lands, they were granted pattas. A serious objection is raised as to the proof of these pattas on the ground that the persons in whose favour they were granted were not examined. While in some cases, the pattedars are alive, in other cases they are no more. These pattas are of the year 1947. Presumption provided for under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act gets attracted to these documents. The objection raised by the petitioners is that the presumption can operate only when the documents emanate from the proper custody. This submission proceeds on the basis that a document can be said to be in proper custody only if it is with the persons who are parties to it. In this regard, it has to be noted that though the custody of document with the party to, or beneficiary under it, is natural and proper, with the emergence of transactions or change of circumstances the documents may have to pass on to the party who are not parties to it. For example, a sale deed between A and B may be said to be in the proper custody of the party viz. B. Where, however, the land is subsequently sold to in turn, has sold it to D, the document, being the source is expected in the ordinary course of things to pass on to the subsequent purchasers viz. , C and D. Though they are not parties to the document, their custody of the document cannot said to be not proper. ( 60 ) IN the instant case, after Veera Swamy another were granted pattas in the year 1947, they have sold the land in favour of Societies or individual purchasers and thereby ceased to hold any right title or interest in such lands. All the original pattas were handed over to the purchasers. Some of them are placed before this Court from such purchasers. All the original pattas were handed over to the purchasers. Some of them are placed before this Court from such purchasers. Therefore, explanation to Section 90 of the Evidence Act squarely applies and thereby the presumption provided for under that years old, these documents do not need any further proof. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that the Court shall regard such documents as having been proved, unless they are disproved. The necessity for this Court to call the parties to prove them further did not arise because, the subsequent events have corroborated the same. pattas referred to above are hold to be genuine and proved, the persons claiming right through the same acquire title to the land covered by such pattas. The respondents have filed the sale deeds through which the lands were purchased by the Societies and the individual members. They have also placed before this Court, ample evidence in the form of Setwar, Faisal Patti, Jamabandi, tax receipts and proceedings before various authorities etc. All these documents establish the title and possession of the respective persons in whose favour the proceedings or the documents came to be issued. The possession of the land covered by such documents in favour of the persons mentioned therein remains un-challenged. The respondents are able to place a chain of events without any break, from the time of grant of pattas till the date of dispossession or threat to their possession. Even assuming that any of the proceedings at some stage or the other do not conform to the provisions of law for conferment of title, the possession of the various individuals or Societies deserves to be tacked in the context of adverse possession. The nature of possession pleaded by the respondents is as of their right and adverse to the petitioners, assuming but not accepting that there is any defect in their little. Therefore, even otherwise, their possession has become adverse to the parties to the suit, through whom the petitioners are claiming right to the said properly. Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the respondents. ( 62 ) ISSUE No. 8: the petitioners contend that the claim of the respondents is through the Government or Jagir Administrator, and that their applications are not maintainable. Hence, these issues are answered in favour of the respondents. ( 62 ) ISSUE No. 8: the petitioners contend that the claim of the respondents is through the Government or Jagir Administrator, and that their applications are not maintainable. They plead that an application under Rule 97 of Order XXI C. P. C. , can be filed by, or against the persons, who are not parties to the decree, and the one under Rule 99 of Order XXI C. P. C. can be filed only by those who are not parties to the decree. This contention was in fact, accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in Original side Appeals, after the first round of remand, and the said order was set aside by the Supreme Court. ( 63 ) THE respondents consistently pleaded that the pattas granted in favour of their predecessors in title, were neither by the Government, nor by the jagir administrator, but much before they came in to picture. There is no controversy that the lands are covered by the Jagir Regulation. If the grants of pattas in favour of the predecessors in title of the respondents were subsequent to the transfer of jagirs in favour of Government by operation of Jagir Regulation, it would have been possible for the petitioners to argue that the respondents herein stood impliedly represented by defendants 43 and 53 and thereby preliminary decree in the suit is binding on them. It has already come on record that the pattas received in the evidence were granted in the year 1947, much before the Jagir Regulation came to be made. Further, the grant of patta was in compliance with the statutory rules framed under Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. Therefore, the persons who were granted patta acquired the title to the land, independent of the operation of jagir Regulation. In fact, it is other way round, namely, that the cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit was the promulgation of Jagir Regulation and in the absence of the said Regulation, the occasion to file the suit did not arise. Therefore, issue No. 8 is answered in favour of the respondents, and against the petitioners. ( 64 ) ADDITIONAL ISSUE No. 1: now, remains the additional issue No. 1, i. e. , Whether the alleged delivery of possession of 17. 4. Therefore, issue No. 8 is answered in favour of the respondents, and against the petitioners. ( 64 ) ADDITIONAL ISSUE No. 1: now, remains the additional issue No. 1, i. e. , Whether the alleged delivery of possession of 17. 4. 1996 is not valid, legal and has no legal effect, since the final decree has not been engrossed on proper stamp paper, and property has not been divided by metes and bounds. This issue almost stands answered in view of the discussion undertaken in relation to application No. 994 of 1995. It has already been pointed out that unless a final decree, drawn on adequate stamps, exists, no execution can take place; and that such a decree does not exist in this suit. It was not even pleaded by the petitioners that the said item of property has been allotted to them, or their assignors by undertaking the process of dividing all the suit schedule properties by metes and bounds. Further, the procedure adopted by the petitioners, in seeking delivery of possession, is unknown to law. Basically, in a suit for partition, the question of third party being dispossessed, in course of execution of a final decree does not arise. ( 65 ) EVEN assuming that there exists a valid and executable decree in favour of the petitioners and the possession is sought to be recovered from the parties to the suit, an application has to be filed under Order XXI C. P. C. and steps have to be taken under Rules 35 or 36 thereof. If there is any resistance from the third parties, an application was required to be made under Rule 97 C. P. C. The necessary orders are required to be passed by the executing Court itself. Section 38 C. P. C. , ordains that the decree may be executed by the Court, which passed it. If the decree is required to be executed by a different Court, it has to be transferred to such Court under Section 39 C. P. C. In that event, the Court to which the decree is transferred, shall possess all the powers of an executing Court, and it has to take necessary steps to execute the decree, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Order XXI C. P. C. The question of the Court, which passed the decree, directing another Court to take any particular step, does not arise. Such a course in alien to C. P. C. ( 66 ) IT is relevant to state one important face. Application No. 963 of 1995, similar to the one in Application No. 994 of 1995 was filed by some other parties. These applications were also ordered on 28-12-1995. While the petitioners herein filed E. P. No. 3 of 1996, those in 993 of 1995 filed E. P. No. 4 of 1996. Just as the respondents herein filed application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI C. P. C. in E. P. No. 3 of 1996, some of the effected parties filed similar application in E. P. No. 4 of 1996. The District Court refused to entertain them on the ground that it has neither passed the decree nor it is an executing Court. The respondents and the objectors in E. P. No. 4 of 1996 filed Original side appeals before a Bench of this Court. The Division Bench held that the applications were maintainable. Civil Appeal Nos. 5609 to 5614 of 1997 were filed before the Supreme Court. Through a common order, dated 14. 8. 1997, the Supreme Court remanded applications filed in E. P. No. 4 of 1996 to the District Court, whereas the applications filed in E. P. No. 3 of 1996 was directed to be dealt with by this Court. ( 67 ) THE applications filed in E. P. No. 4 of 1996 are still being dealt with by the District Court. One of the contentions raised by the objectors was that the E. P. could not have been filed in the absence of a final decree. Faced with this strange and peculiar situation, recently, the petitioners in application no. 963/1995 filed an application before this Court with a prayer to pass final decree. The question as to whether the prayer in that application can be granted or not, is a different aspect, which needs to be dealt with on a consideration of the same. The fact remains that the issuance of delivery warrant issued in E. P. No. 3 of 1996, or the steps taken for taking delivery of possession on 14. 7. 1996 are clearly outside the scope of the procedure prescribed under C. P. C. , and the preliminary decree passed in C. S. No. 14 of 1958. The fact remains that the issuance of delivery warrant issued in E. P. No. 3 of 1996, or the steps taken for taking delivery of possession on 14. 7. 1996 are clearly outside the scope of the procedure prescribed under C. P. C. , and the preliminary decree passed in C. S. No. 14 of 1958. Therefore, filing of E. P. No. 3 of 1996 and the possession delivered therein are contrary to law. ( 68 ) FOR the foregoing reasons: (a) Application No. 994 of 1995 is dismissed. (b) Application Nos. 585 and 708 of 2002 and 1318 to 1320 of 2003 are allowed. (c) The petitioners pleaded throughout that the land in question was vacant. It has already been found that the filing of E. P. in the Court of District Judge, Ranga Reddy District and the various steps taken therein are contrary to law. Hence, the alleged delivery of possession in favour of the petitioners, is held to be symbolic. (d) The respondents are found to be holding title and possession of the lands covered by the respective sale deeds in their favour. Inasmuch as the delivery of possession was only symbolic, that too as regards vacant land, it shall be open to them to remain in possession of the said land. The petitioners do not have any right, title and interest in respect of the land, which constituted the subject matter of E. P. No. 3 of 1996. (e) In case there is any resistance from the petitioners as to the right of the respondents to remain in possession of the land, the District Court, Ranga Reddy shall direct re-delivery of possession of such land to the respondents, if an application is filed for this purpose. (f) It shall be open to the petitioners to take such steps as are open to them in law, in relation to the assignment of rights in their favour. There shall be no order as to costs.