Judgment Kiran Anand Lall, J. 1. The appellant-husband sought a decree of divorce against respondent No. 1-wife, by filing a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short "the Act"), on two grounds, firstly, that she voluntarily had sexual intercourse with Jang Singh respondent No. 2 and secondly, that she had treated him with cruelty. At a later stage, he, however, amended his petition and pleaded the ground of desertion also on 26.9.1987. 2. The marriage of parties had taken place on 17.2.1982 at Village Dhanaula and they resided together till the end of January, 1985. The appellant once opened the box of respondent No. 1 wherein he found the photograph of respondent No. 2. He became suspicious. So, in order to seek clarification in this regard, he and his father went to Village Dhanaula. Whey they were passing from near a "baithak" which was near the house of one Shri Amarjit Singh Jatana, Advocate, they saw, through the window of the baithak, that the two respondents were indulging in the act of sexual intercourse. On being challenged by them, the respondents put on clothes and tried to run away but they were caught by the appellant and his father and were given beating. Thereafter, respondent No. 1, allegedly, entered into a conspiracy with respondent No. 3 to eliminate the appellant, and in pursuance of that conspiracy, she mixed powder of bones in eatables and served the same to him. She also got her abortion done without his knowledge. 3. The respondent-wife having denied all the said averments, parties went to trial on the following issues:- "1) Whether respondent No. 1 Baljit Kaur had voluntarily sexual inter-course with Jang Singh, co-respondent? OPP 2) Whether respondent "No. 1 has treated the petitioner with cruelty, as alleged? OPP 3) Whether the petitioner has got no cause of action? OPP 4) Whether the petition is not maintainable,as alleged in Para No. 2 of the objections? OPP 4-A) Whether Baljit Kaur respondent has deserted the petitioner since January, 1985 for a period of more than two years? If so, its effect? OPP 5. Relief." 4. Issue No. 4-A had been added later on, after the petition was amended and it was pleaded that the appellant was entitled to divorce, even on the ground of desertion which,according to him, had accrued to him, during pendency of the case. 5. If so, its effect? OPP 5. Relief." 4. Issue No. 4-A had been added later on, after the petition was amended and it was pleaded that the appellant was entitled to divorce, even on the ground of desertion which,according to him, had accrued to him, during pendency of the case. 5. Trial Court decided all the issues against the appellant and dismissed the petition. He, therefore, came up in appeal to this Court. 6. The ground of desertion, as stated above, had not been taken up in the original petition, as the same was not available to the appellant at that time. As per his own case, the required statutory period of two years of desertion, had not expired when the petition was filed. The Court had, however, wrongly permitted him to amend his petition for pleading the ground of desertion. But, the fact that he was allowed to do so, could not entitle him to succeed in getting divorce on the ground of desertion, and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court to this effect is perfectly correct. 7. Then, in support of the plea that the wife-respondent was seen having sexual intercourse with Jang Singh respondent, learned counsel could point out, only the solitary statement of the appellant himself, as PW1. In so far as the statement of PW4 Harbhajan Kaur, who is mother of the appellant, is concerned, her testimony to the effect that the appellant and his father had seen the wife-respondent having intercourse with Jang Singh, is clearly here-say evidence, and as such, it was rightly not relied upon by the trial Court, and disbelieved. One of the factors which weighed with the trial court in disbelieving it, was that even after having seen the wife-respondent indulging in the offending act with Jang Singh respondent, he and his father did not raise any alarm. They also did not get any case registered against Jang Singh respondent. They, in fact, did not bring the matter to the notice of any other person or authority including the panchayat. No month or date on which the respondents had been caught in the said posture, was even disclosed. In fact, during arguments, the learned counsel was not in a position to point out any satisfactory evidence in support of the allegation that the wife-respondent had been found having intercourse with Jang Singh respondent. No month or date on which the respondents had been caught in the said posture, was even disclosed. In fact, during arguments, the learned counsel was not in a position to point out any satisfactory evidence in support of the allegation that the wife-respondent had been found having intercourse with Jang Singh respondent. As such, no interference is called for with the finding of the trial court recorded against the appellant even in this regard. 8. On the ground of cruelty, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the testimony of the appellant himself and PW-Harnek Singh. According to them, the wife-respondent had mixed bone-powder in eatables and served the same to the appellant. However, they did not disclose any date, month or year in which such an act was committed by her. In fact, no such particulars find mention in the petition even, and in the absence thereof, the plea is, in fact, not even required to be considered seriously. Even otherwise, if there had been any truth in this plea, the natural conduct of the appellant would have been to have brought the alleged cruel act of the wife-respondent, to the notice of police, village panchayat, or, in any case, her parents. But, nothing of this type is said to have been done by him or by some body else on his behalf. In so far as PW Harnek Singh is concerned, he is a relation of the appellant and as such, an interested witness, also. The trial court had, thus, rightly held that the appellant has failed to prove the ground of cruelty also. 9. There is, thus, no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving parties to bear their own costs.