Steeloflex Engineers v. UCO Bank, B. T. M. Sarani Brabourne Road
2004-03-03
A.K.PATNAIK, M.M.DAS
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT A. K. PATNAIK, J. — The opp. party-UCO Bank filed an appli¬cation under the Recovery of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short “the Act”) numbered as O. A. No. 215 of 2001 in the Debts Recovery Tribunal Cuttack (in short “the Tribunal”) for recovery of outstanding dues against the three petitioners. The case of the opp. party-Bank before the Tribunal was that the bank sanctioned a cash credit limit of Rs. 17 lakhs and bill purchase limit of Rs. 10 lakhs and Bank guaran¬tee limit of Rs. 50 lakhs in favour of the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 executed letters of guarantee for the cash credit limit of Rs. 17 lakhs and bill purchase limit of Rs. 10 lakhs. On behalf of the petitioner No. 1, the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 also executed a letter of hypothecation of goods for Rs. 17 lakhs and letter of hypothecation of movable plant and machin¬ery for Rs. 77 lakhs and an agreement for bill purchase of Rs. 10 lakhs, and total sum of Rs. 46,02,380.56 p. is due and payable by the petitioners to the Bank in the disputed accounts. In the said Original Application, the opp. party-Bank also filed an interim application praying for an order restraining the petitioner No.3 from alienating/disposing of the properties mentioned in the schedule of the said application. The petitioners filed an objec¬tion to the said application before the Tribunal stating, inter alia, that the valuation of the assets of the factory of the petitioner No. 1works out to Rs. 1.4 crores after disposal of the old and unusable articles and such valuation is to the knowledge of the opp. party-Bank. In the said objection the petitioners contended that the opp. party-Bank should not be encouraged by the Tribunal by passing an interim order as prayed for and the interim application should be rejected in limine and the peti¬tioners be granted leave for taking joint steps for negotiation with prospective buyers to sell away the present assets of the factory of the petitioner No. 1. The Tribunal after considering the contentions of the parties, passed orders on 3.4.2002 re¬straining the petitioners by way of the injunction from disposing of or alienating the properties mentioned in the schedule to the interim application.
The Tribunal after considering the contentions of the parties, passed orders on 3.4.2002 re¬straining the petitioners by way of the injunction from disposing of or alienating the properties mentioned in the schedule to the interim application. In the said order dated 3.4.2002, however, the Tribunal clarified that the order will not restrain the petitioner from finding prospective purchasers and taking them to the Bank to liquidate their dues and to move the Tribunal if any such agreement is arrived at by both the parties for necessary orders. Aggrieved by the said order dated 3.4.2002 of the Tribu¬nal, the petitioners have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. R. B. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petition¬ers submitted that the properties listed in the schedule to the interim application filed before the Tribunal belonged to the petitioner No.3 and the Tribunal should not have passed an order restraining the petitioner No. 3 from disposing of or alienating the said properties when the valuation of the plaint and machin¬ery of the factory which have been hypothecated in favour of the Bank by the petitioner No. 1 is more than Rs. 1.4 crores. 3. Dr. Dash, learned counsel for the opp. party-Bank, on the other hand, submitted that under Section 19(12) of the Act sufficient powers are vested in the Tribunal to pass an interim order restraining the defendant such as the petitioner No. 3 from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to her and therefore there is no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. She further submitted that as per the inspection report available in the Bank most of the machinery in the factory shed are not avail¬able and for this reason, there is an apprehension that the hypothecated plant and machinery in the factory shed of the petitioner No. 1, even if sold, will not fetch the amount claimed before the Tribunal by the Bank. She cited the decision of the Supreme Court in II (2001) BC 642 (SC) (Punjab) National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others) in which the Supreme Court has held that the High Court ought not to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in view of the alternative remedy of appeal available under Section 20 of the Act against an order of the Tribunal.
She also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, AIR 2003 SC 1561. 4. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that where a statutory right to file an appeal on limited grounds under Section 143(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 has been provided for to the insurer, it is not open to High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a challenge to an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the grounds other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In this case, the case of the petitioner is that the Tribunal has not exercised the power under Section 19 (12) of the Act in a fair and reasonable manner inasmuch as the hypothecated properties which are given as secu¬rity to the Bank towards the different limits sanctioned by the Bank are much more than the claim of the Bank before the Tribunal and in such a situation the Tribunal should not have passed an order restraining the petitioner No. 3 from transferring, alien¬ating or disposing of her personal properties which have neither been mortgaged nor hypothecated to the Bank. 5. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and others (supra) the Supreme Court has held that when an appeal is avail¬able under Section 20 of the Act against an order passed by the Tribunal, the High Court ought not to exercise the jurisdiction for entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Con¬stitution against the order of the Tribunal. But it is well settled that mere provision of alternative remedy in a statute against the order does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but the High Court may choose in appropriate cases not to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 as a self restraint if an alternative remedy is available under the statute. 6. In the present case, the power conferred on the Tribu¬nal for passing an interim order is in Sub-section (12) of Sec¬tion 19 of the Act, which is quoted herein below.
6. In the present case, the power conferred on the Tribu¬nal for passing an interim order is in Sub-section (12) of Sec¬tion 19 of the Act, which is quoted herein below. “The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment) against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of,any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal”. It would be clear from the aforesaid provision in Sub-section (12) of Section 19 of the Act that the Tribunal may make an interim order against the defendant to debar him from transfer¬ring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. In the present case, we find that an absolute restraint has been imposed by the impugned order of the Tribunal prohibiting the petitioner No.3 from disposing of or alienating the properties mentioned in the Schedule to the interim applica¬tion leaving no scope for the petitioner No. 3 to apply to the Tribunal for permission to dispose of any of her properties. The case of the opp. party-Bank before the Tribunal is not that any of the properties of the petitioner No. 3 have been specifically hypothecated and mortgaged to the opp. party-Bank. The case of the opp. party Bank is that the factory shed plant and machinery and other properties of the petitioner No.1-Company have been hyphothecated in favour of the opp. party-Bank and only if the value of such properties specifically hypothecated in favour of the opp. party-Bank is insufficient to meet the claim of the Bank before the Tribunal, the Bank will have the right to proceed against the properties of the petition¬er No. 3 who is a guarantor for the claim of the Bank. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the petitioner No. 3 may file an application before the Tribunal for permission to transfer, alienate or dispose of any of her proper¬ties listed in the schedule to the interim application and if such an application is filed before the Tribunal, the same shall be considered on its own merits.
For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the petitioner No. 3 may file an application before the Tribunal for permission to transfer, alienate or dispose of any of her proper¬ties listed in the schedule to the interim application and if such an application is filed before the Tribunal, the same shall be considered on its own merits. The Tribunal will also consider such application obviously taking into consideration the value of the properties and assets of the petitioner No. 1 Company hypothecated to the Bank and the claim of the Bank with interest and if the Tribunal is satisfied that the assets and properties of the petitioner No. 1 - Company hypothecated to the Bank are sufficient to meet the claim of the Bank with interest it may consider granting permission to the petitioner No. 3 to sell any of her specific properties. The impugned order of the Tribunal dated 3.4.2002 stands modified accordingly and the writ petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid direction. The records of O.A. No. 215 of 2001 be sent back to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Cuttack along with the copy of this order forthwith. 8. It is made clear that it will be open for the Tribunal to make valuation of the assets and properties of the petitioner No. 1- Company if such an application is filed before the Tribu¬nal by any of the parties. The parties will appear before the Tribunal on 24.3.2004 when the Tribunal may either take up the matter or fix up some other date. M. M. DAS, J. I agree. Petition disposed of.