Judgment :- R. Balasubramanian, J. Against the decree in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987, passed by the VIth Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai, which was against the plaintiffs in that suit, the plaintiffs are before this Court in A.S. No: 802 of 1991. The defendants in the above referred to suit filed O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 on the file of the VIth Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai, for recovery of possession. In that suit, the plaintiffs in the earlier suit along with one Jayaraman were the defendants. In that suit, a decree as prayed for was passed. It must be noticed here that both the suits were disposed of by a common judgment. Against the decree for possession, an appeal was filed before the lower appellate Court and on a transfer application filed by the judgment debtor in the suit for possession, the appeal filed before the lower appellate Court was transferred to the file of this Court and stands re-numbered as Transfer Appeal No: 819 of 1992. Since both the suits were tried together; common evidence was let in and were disposed of by a common judgment, we are also inclined to dispose of both the appeals by our common judgment. 2. We will summarize hereunder the pleadings in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987: The plaintiffs originally filed a suit for bare injunction. On the defence taken by the defendants asserting title in themselves, plaint was amended to include the declaratory relief of title based on adverse possession. The allegations in the plaint as amended and referred to above are as follows : " The first plaintiff has put up a permanent structure on the suit land for residential purpose and she is living in that house with the second plaintiff – her son and her daughter-in-law Chandra; Jayaraman is another son of the first plaintiff and he is living abroad. His family also live in the same house with the first plaintiff. The second plaintiff is having a cycle shop in the front portion of the suit property. The old door number of the suit premises is No: 3, Razak Garden and its new door number is 60. The Deputy Tahsildar issued a "No Objection Certificate" dated 13.04.1984 in favour of the second plaintiff to enable him to get electricity service connection to the premises. The old door number of the suit premises is No: 3, Razak Garden and its new door number is 60. The Deputy Tahsildar issued a "No Objection Certificate" dated 13.04.1984 in favour of the second plaintiff to enable him to get electricity service connection to the premises. Accordingly, electricity service connection was provided by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in the name of the second plaintiff. The first plaintiff had paid urban land tax for the land in question for faslis 1373 to 1380. The plaintiffs are in possession and occupation of the suit property for well over thirty years. The defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit property. However, using their influence and with the help of unruly elements, they tried to dispossess the plaintiffs at about 6.00 p.m. on 15.09.1987. The second plaintiff went to the police station and lodged a complaint who advised him to move the Civil Court. Hence, the suit for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession of the property and for declaration of title based on adverse possession." The defendants filed a common written statement contending in substance as follows : " The plaintiffs have no right whatsoever in the suit property. The first defendant purchased the suit property of an extent of 2394 sq. ft. from Umta Begum under a registered sale deed dated 20.01.1961 registered as document No: 101 / 1961. Thereafter she was in possession and enjoyment of that vacant land. Then, she wanted to put up a construction on the said land for which she had applied to the Corporation at Chennai for a sanctioned plan and that Corporation had, in fact, by its proceedings dated 16.07.1981 in reference No: BA 494/81 and P.P. No. 554/81 granted the necessary sanction and plan. She had also paid development charges on 16.07.1981 for getting the planning permission. Necessary license fee was also paid by her. When she was about to start the construction the first defendant's husband and the father of the other defendants suffered a paralytic stroke. Therefore, the family was in a distress at that time and thinking that it is inauspicious to put up a pucca construction, they did not proceed further except putting a small thatched hut with a fond hope that they can put up a pucca construction later on after the first defendant's husband recovered from his ailment. Therefore, the family was in a distress at that time and thinking that it is inauspicious to put up a pucca construction, they did not proceed further except putting a small thatched hut with a fond hope that they can put up a pucca construction later on after the first defendant's husband recovered from his ailment. At that time, Jayaraman, the first plaintiff's eldest son and the second plaintiff's elder brother (second defendant in O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 – emphasis supplied by this Court) approached the defendants seeking permission to live in the thatched super structure on a leave and license basis. The parties are distantly related to each other. Jayaraman also assured at that time that he would vacate the premises whenever the defendants wanted him to do so. By that time, the health condition of the first defendant's husband became precarious and he ultimately died in May 1982. As the family was frustrated and grief-stricken at that time, they allowed Jayaraman to occupy the premises. Patta for the land in question had been issued on 25.07.1983 to the defendants. The plaintiffs were never in enjoyment of the suit premises prior to the permission granted by the defendants. The property was let out only to Jayaraman, the elder son of the first plaintiff. The plaintiffs were never in possession prior to 1982. They have not put up any construction as claimed by them. They are only in permissive occupation of the suit property under the first defendant's leave and license. The defendants wanted Jayaraman to vacate the suit premises. Thereafter the plaintiffs paid the urban land tax just to show that they have some right over the property. The second plaintiff is running a cycle shop with the leave and license of the first defendant. Providing service connection to the suit property would not alter the rights of the defendants. In any event, that was done without the defendants' knowledge and permission. Jayaraman had written letters dated 8.10.1986 and 14.03.1987 to the first defendant stating that he will personally come over to Chennai (he was abroad at that time) and settle the matter. Providing service connection to the suit property would not alter the rights of the defendants. In any event, that was done without the defendants' knowledge and permission. Jayaraman had written letters dated 8.10.1986 and 14.03.1987 to the first defendant stating that he will personally come over to Chennai (he was abroad at that time) and settle the matter. The defendants did not try to dispossess the plaintiffs as alleged by them but on the other hand the defendants only wanted them to vacate and even on a prior occasion they informed the plaintiffs to vacate as otherwise the defendants would resort to legal action. Therefore, the plaintiffs have neither title nor possession on their own and hence, the suit must be dismissed." 3. An additional written statement was filed by the defendants attacking the case of the plaintiffs on adverse possession. They also defended that a person claiming adverse possession must have asserted hostile title against the real owner and that is absent in this case. It is their further defence in the additional written statement that such an adverse possession should be continuous, open and hostile over the period of limitation to the knowledge of the true owner and that is also wanting in this case. According to them, mere possession alone over the property, however long it may be, without asserting any title in themselves and hostile to the knowledge of the true owners, cannot give a cause of action to claim title based on such possession. There is no allegation in the plaint as to on what basis and in what mode the plaintiffs perfected title by adverse possession. 4. On the pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues : a. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration of title as prayed for ? b. Whether the plaintiffs have title to the property ? c. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for injunction ? and d. To what other reliefs the parties are entitled to ? 5. The case of the plaintiffs in O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 is summarised hereunder : " The first plaintiff purchased the vacant land in question from one Uumta Begum under a registered sale deed dated 20.01.1961 and thereafter she was in possession of the property. and d. To what other reliefs the parties are entitled to ? 5. The case of the plaintiffs in O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 is summarised hereunder : " The first plaintiff purchased the vacant land in question from one Uumta Begum under a registered sale deed dated 20.01.1961 and thereafter she was in possession of the property. When she was about to put up a construction after getting planning permission, her husband fell ill which postponed the commencement of the construction and it was thought that it was a bad omen. They were under the impression that after the first plaintiff's husband recovered from his ailment, they can go ahead with the construction. At that moment of turmoil in the family, the second defendant approached the first plaintiff and her husband for permission to live in the suit property with an assurance to vacate whenever the first plaintiff wanted him to do so. Out of faith and sympathy and in the background of the relationship between the parties, the first plaintiff let out the hut and ground to the second defendant with a condition that he shall vacate whenever the first plaintiff wanted him to do so. The first plaintiff's husband died on 3.5.1982. The first plaintiff allowed the second defendant to continue to be in occupation of the property as the members of the plaintiff's family were grief-stricken. They were also not in a mood to go ahead with any construction at that time. The first plaintiff alone is the absolute owner of the suit property. After normality prevailed in the plaintiffs family, the first plaintiff requested the defendants to vacate the suit property based on the solemn promise made by the second defendant earlier. The second defendant had gone abroad and therefore, defendants 1 and 3 were requested to hand over possession. Plaintiffs also wrote letters to the second defendant. The second defendant sent his replies dated 8.10.1986 and 14.03.1987 stating that he will come over to Chennai on getting leave and then settle the matter amicably. The first plaintiff believed that representation and waited in good faith. However, when the request to vacate was renewed again, the defendants filed O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 [referred to earlier]. A notice dated 28.11.1987 was given by the plaintiffs revoking the leave and license. The defendants sent a reply dated 24.12.1987 taking untenable stands. The first plaintiff believed that representation and waited in good faith. However, when the request to vacate was renewed again, the defendants filed O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 [referred to earlier]. A notice dated 28.11.1987 was given by the plaintiffs revoking the leave and license. The defendants sent a reply dated 24.12.1987 taking untenable stands. Therefore, the suit for possession with past mesne profits quantified at Rs.600/- and for future damages at Rs.100/- from the date of suit till the date of possession." The first defendant filed a written statement taking a stand more or less on the same lines as she took in the plaint filed by them earlier. They denied that their possession is permissive. 6. The learned trial Judge on these pleadings framed the following issues: a. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree of declaration of their title and for recovery of possession? and b. To what relief the parties are entitled to? 7. The second plaintiff in the earlier suit examined himself as P.W.1 besides examining another witness as P.W.2. On their side, 30 exhibits have come to be marked as A.1 to A.30. The defendants, who are the plaintiffs in the later suit, examined the fourth defendant as D.W.1 besides examining two more witnesses on their side as D.Ws. 2 and 3. 25 exhibits have come to be marked on their side as B.1 to B.25. The learned Trial Judge took issues 1 to 3 in the earlier suit and issue No. 1 in the later suit for consideration first. After analysis of the entire materials brought to his notice, the learned trial Judge answered all the issues in the earlier suit against the plaintiffs therein and answered issue No:1 in the later suit in favour of the plaintiffs therein. Issue No: 4 in the earlier suit and issue No: 2 in the later suit were also considered together and the learned trial Judge found that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit are not entitled to any relief at all and that the plaintiffs in the later suit are entitled to a decree for possession; for past mesne profits as quantified and relegated the enquiry regarding future mesne profits to a later stage. On such analysis O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 came to be dismissed with costs and O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 came to be decreed as prayed for with costs and granting a month's time from that date for delivery of possession. As already stated, these two judgments are in challenge before this Court in the two appeals filed by the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the judgment debtors in the later suit. 8. Mr. S. Sundara Gopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in both the appeals would submit that there are documentary evidence to show that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have been in possession of the property in their own right over a period of thirty years or so, which exceeds the period of twelve years, and that would be enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession. The documentary evidence are in the nature of school certificates; electricity service connection provided to the suit property; voter's list, marriage invitation, receipts showing payment of urban land tax and so on and so forth. It is his further submission that the case of the plaintiffs in the earlier suit as spoken to by P.W.1 stands fully corroborated by the oral evidence of P.W.2. These materials undoubtedly show the long, continuous, hostile possession of the plaintiffs of the suit property to the whole of the world and during that time, the defendants in the earlier suit have not exercised any right of ownership over the property and, therefore, by such failure, assuming they have any right over the property in question, it stands extinguished by operation of law. The case of the defendants of leave and license is not established at all in a manner known to law and, therefore it must be disbelieved. The defendants in the earlier suit are not consistent in their stand as to the nature of occupation of the suit properties by the plaintiffs. According to him, in one breadth they say it is "leave and license" and in another breadth they say it was "let out". The word "let out" and the words "leave and license" carry two different meanings and, therefore, it must be taken serious note of in disbelieving the case of the defendants in the earlier suit. According to him, in one breadth they say it is "leave and license" and in another breadth they say it was "let out". The word "let out" and the words "leave and license" carry two different meanings and, therefore, it must be taken serious note of in disbelieving the case of the defendants in the earlier suit. Therefore, his submission is that the decree in the earlier suit must be reversed in favour of the plaintiffs therein and the decree in the later suit must also be reversed in favour of the defendants therein. 9. Mr. V.K. Muthusamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants in the earlier suit and plaintiffs in the later suit would submit that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have not established their possession at all prior to 1981; that their possession commenced only from the year 1981 under the leave and license granted by the first defendant in the earlier suit and her husband; the suit itself came to be filed within six years thereafter and therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be contended that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have perfected their title by adverse possession. Alternatively, the learned Senior counsel would contend that assuming the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have been in possession of the property from the year 1961 yet, mere possession as such alone, however lengthy the period of such possession may be, cannot amount to that possession being treated as adverse possession. It is a well settled position in law that a claim based on adverse possession commences from the day the party claiming such a right starts enjoying the property as his own; treats as his own and continues to enjoy it without interruption for a period exceeding a period of 12 years, which alone may give a cause of action to base a right on a plea of adverse possession. In this case, except a marriage invitation or a school record here and there, there is no other documentary evidence, except the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, to show that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit were in possession even prior to the leave granted by the first defendant in the earlier suit. In this case, except a marriage invitation or a school record here and there, there is no other documentary evidence, except the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, to show that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit were in possession even prior to the leave granted by the first defendant in the earlier suit. Assuming they had been in possession for a long period, in any event there was a disruption to that continued possession if the "leave and license" granted by the defendants in the earlier suit is accepted and unless it is shown that from that period, again for a period of 12 years or more, the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have asserted title on their own and treating their possession hostile to the knowledge of the true owner, the Court would not be in a position to hold that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit have perfected title by adverse possession. The learned Senior counsel would submit that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit had not made out a case based on adverse possession. As far as the plaintiffs in the later suit, the learned senior counsel would submit that the property in question stands purchased by the first plaintiff in that suit under a registered sale deed of the year 1961. In the absence of any title deed in favour of the defendants in that suit which are anterior to that sale deed and their plea being only on adverse possession and if it is found against, as has been done by the learned trial Judge, then, a decree must follow in the suit for title filed by the plaintiffs in the later suit. In this context, we want to point out that Mr.S.Sundara Gopal the learned counsel appearing for appellants in both the appeals would submit that the identity of the property involved in both the suits are totally different. In other words, according to him, the property purchased by the plaintiffs in the suit under sale deed in the year 1961 is totally different from the property in which the plaintiffs in the earlier suit are claiming title, based on adverse possession. This argument is met by Mr. In other words, according to him, the property purchased by the plaintiffs in the suit under sale deed in the year 1961 is totally different from the property in which the plaintiffs in the earlier suit are claiming title, based on adverse possession. This argument is met by Mr. V.K. Muthusamy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents in these two appeals, by stating that the description of the property in the later suit filed by the plaintiffs is based on the description of the property as given in the schedule to the title deed which is of the year 1961. After 1961, by the time the suits came to be filed, different persons would have become owners of the adjoining lands. The description of the property given by the plaintiffs in the earlier suit is not supported by any documentary evidence. It is his further submission that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the defendants in the later suit now only disputes the identity of the property concerned in both the suits and therefore, it would not be possible for this Court to allow such an argument to be raised before this Court for the first time since any decision on the identity of the property requires evidence. 10. In our considered opinion the following issues alone arise for consideration in this appeal : a. Whether the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the defendants in the later suit have perfected their title by adverse possession? b. Whether the defendants in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 (Plaintiffs in O.S. No: 6876 of 1988) had established their title based on purchase? c. Is the property forming subject matter of both the suits are one and same? and d. To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled to? 11. It should not take much of our time to answer issue No: 'C' framed by us. The plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the defendants in the later suit had not disputed the identity of the property forming the subject matter of both the suits at any stage before the lower Court till they filed the appeal before this Court. In other words, only in the memorandum of appeal filed here, a ground had been taken regarding the identity of the property. In other words, only in the memorandum of appeal filed here, a ground had been taken regarding the identity of the property. No evidence of any nature was let in before the Court below and, therefore, the Court below had no occasion to frame any issue on this. Even otherwise we find, on a perusal of the plaint in the later suit, that the description of the property given therein tallies with the description of the property given in Ex.B.1, a registered sale deed dated 20.01.1961 standing in the name of the first plaintiff. We also just had a look at the description of the property as shown in the schedule to both the suits. The southern boundary is admittedly shown as a road. In the later suit, the eastern boundary is shown as the road and the west by land belonging to Umta Begum (vendor under Ex.P.1) and on the north by Anser Basha's land. In the earlier suit, the north is shown as land belonging to Meenakshi Ammal; east as land belonging to Subramaniya Mudaliar and on the west by land belonging to Hayat Basha. The possibility of Meenakshi Ammal, Subramaniya Mudaliar and Hayat Basha, during a long lapse of time, conveying their properties in favour of third parties cannot stand totally ruled out. Even in the plaint filed in the later suit, the eastern boundary is shown as 40" feet road now known as Razack Garden Street. Therefore, unless a plea is raised on the identity of the property and correspondingly an issue is framed thereon, which alone would have enabled the parties to let in evidence regarding the identity of the parties, it would not be possible for this Court, at this stage, to decide this issue. It may also be noticed here that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the defendants in the later suit did not dispute the purchase made by the first defendant in the earlier suit under Ex.B.1. Having regard to the above facts, we are of the considered opinion that the stand taken before this Court for the first time on the identity of the property do not deserve any attention at all and the plaintiffs shall not be allowed to raise the same for the first time here since any decision on that controversy has to necessarily depend upon evidence. Accordingly, issue No: 'C' framed by us is answered holding that there is no dispute regarding the identity of the property concerned in both the suits and they are one and the same. 12. Issues 'a' and 'b' framed by us can be considered together since a discussion of one issue is likely to overlap the discussion on the other issue. In analysing both the issues, we have to necessarily apply our mind, to start with, on the pleadings of the respective parties. In the suit based on adverse possession, the plaintiffs, except stating that they have been in occupation of the suit property for well over 30 years, did not specifically state from what date or from which year they came to occupy the premises and against whose interests. There is not even an allegation in their plaint that such possession was continuous; in exercise of their own rights; hostile; open and to the knowledge of the true owners. We have already noted that the plaintiffs in the earlier suit did not even dispute the purchase made by the defendants under the sale deed of the year 1961. Originally, the suit was filed for a bare injunction and the plaint came to be amended by filing I.A. No: 20141 of 1987 in which an order was passed on 28.02.1989. By the amendment, only one paragraph, as Para 7a, was brought in and the said paragraph reads hereunder : " The plaintiffs have derived title to the suit property by adverse possession." Therefore, it is clear that there is no allegation in the plaint originally filed and in the amended plaint that the plaintiffs' possession of the suit property is continuous; uninterrupted; in exercise of their own right; hostile and open to the knowledge of the true owners. The defence, as pleaded, in short is as follows : "During April/May 1981, the first defendant took steps to obtain a sanctioned plan as well as a building permit to put up super structure in the land which was purchased as a vacant land; the planning authorities had sanctioned the necessary plan and granted the permit; when they were about to execute the sanctioned plan, the first defendant's husband suffered a paralytic stroke and therefore, taking it as not a good sign, they postponed the construction in accordance with the plan but, instead put up a small hut; the parties to the suits are relatives and at that time the second defendant in the later suit (the eldest son of the first plaintiff in the earlier suit) approached the first defendant for permission to live in that house, taking stock of her family situation at that time and out of sympathy, the first defendant in the earlier suit allowed the second defendant in the later suit to occupy the property on a "leave and license" basis; her husband died in May 1982 and as the family continued to be grief-stricken, she allowed Jayaraman to continue to live in the premises; Jayaraman, even at the earliest occasion, assured that as and when a request is made he would vacate; after recovering from the shock the family suffered, the first defendant in the earlier suit requested the plaintiffs in the earlier suit to vacate; Jayaraman was abroad even at that time and therefore, letters were written to him as well as to his mother and his other brother; Jayaraman responded by two letters one in 8.10.1986 and the other in 14.03.1987 promising to come down to Chennai and settle the issue and since nothing happened, they started defending the suit and filed their suit for possession as well". We have extracted above, the sum and substance of the pleadings of the parties before the Court below in both the suits. We have extracted above, the sum and substance of the pleadings of the parties before the Court below in both the suits. In other words, the plaintiffs in the earlier suit, who initially wanted only a decree for injunction, later on amended the plaint to include the declaratory relief of title based on adverse possession while the contesting defendants in that suit and the plaintiffs in the later suit stated that the occupation of the plaintiffs in the former suit was only permissive and that permission having been withdrawn, their title to the suit property must be declared, to be followed by a decree for possession. 13. It is a well settled position in law that mere pleadings alone is not evidence and that any plea taken by the parties to the suit on the existence of a fact must be established by way of evidence before Court. Common evidence was let in, in both the suits by recording evidence in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987. Therefore, hereafter in this judgment we will refer to the parties in the same rank in which they were arrayed in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 namely as the plaintiffs and the defendants. P.W.1 is the second plaintiff. Common evidence was let in, in both the suits by recording evidence in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987. Therefore, hereafter in this judgment we will refer to the parties in the same rank in which they were arrayed in O.S. No: 8013 of 1987 namely as the plaintiffs and the defendants. P.W.1 is the second plaintiff. He would state as follows in his evidence in chief: " Old door number of the property in question is No: 3 and the new door number is 60; his brother Jayaraman is employed in Muscut; the plaintiffs' occupation is not permissive and that they had been living there from 1962; their living and possession is known to everybody in that area; their father died in the year 1971; they were occupying another place in the same area in a nearby place from where his father was asked to vacate in the year 1962; accordingly, they occupied another vacant site (stated to be the suit property) in which his father had put up a house; that is the suit property; Razak garden (suit property) area was previously known as Saanarpalayam; he studied in a Corporation School at Arumbakkam and at that time he was residing only in the suit property; Ex.A.4 is the marriage invitation of his brother Jayaraman which took place in the year 1975; Jayaraman was blessed with a second daughter in the year 1979 and Ex.A.5 is the birth extract; that child was born when the child's mother was living in the suit house; the elder daughter of Jayaraman was staying in the suit property and studying in a school; they are living in the suit property treating it as their own and neighbours know about that; he did not know about the purchase of the property by the defendants; his father is related to the first defendant's husband (the husband of the first defendant's name is given as Loganathan); Loganathan had not come to his house; he does not know where they live; they have not gone to the house of Loganathan for any social visits; his father died in the year 1971 and the first defendant and her husband Loganathan did not come for that; in the year 1981 Jayaraman was not in Chennai; therefore, he could not have asked for permission to live in the suit property from the first defendant; Jayaraman studied upto second class; he does not know to write; but, however he would only put his signature in tamil and he does not know whether Jayaraman had written any letters to the defendants." P.W.2 is aged about 50 on the day when he gave evidence in Court. He would state that, he is a resident of Door No: 2, Razack Garden since 1967 and he has seen the plaintiffs living in the house opposite to his house from the year 1967. 14. On the side of the defendants, the 4th defendant had examined himself as D.W.1 giving evidence strictly in accordance with the defence taken in the written statement by them namely Jayaraman approaching the first defendant for permission to stay; such permission having been granted; plans for construction having been applied and obtained; his father falling ill and ultimately dying; their attempts to vacate the plaintiffs from the suit premises and Jayaraman writing two letters viz. Exs.B.21 and B.22 to his mother. He would also state that on the date of his giving evidence, his mother was aged about 65 years and that she had lost not only her eye sight but also the hearing capacity. D.W. 2 is the son of the vendor under Ex.B.1 and he has attested the said document. He had been examined to prove the execution of Ex.B.1 and the description of the property conveyed thereunder. D.W.3 had been examined and he claims to have assisted the defendants in getting the plan. 15. On the evidence referred to above, the question that falls for our decision is as to what is the period of occupation of the plaintiffs in the suit property; from when the said occupation commenced; if so, was it, continuous and uninterrupted and under what authority the plaintiffs were in such possession and by such possession, have the plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession; whether the defendants in the suit have made out a case for declaration of their title by purchase? 16. We have already referred to the pleadings and the oral evidence of the parties concerned. The case of the defendants is that plaintiffs' occupation in the suit property commenced by way of permissive occupation from the year 1981 onwards. It is no doubt true that in one breadth the defendants would state that it was on "leave and license" basis while in the other breadth they would state that it was "let out" to Jayaraman. An argument was advanced by Mr.S. Sundara Gopal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on this different expressions used by the defendants to contend that if it is a case of "let out" then the Rent Control Act alone would apply. An argument was advanced by Mr.S. Sundara Gopal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on this different expressions used by the defendants to contend that if it is a case of "let out" then the Rent Control Act alone would apply. The defendants themselves are not sure as to whether the permissive occupation of the plaintiffs is in the nature of a tenancy or in the nature of a license and, therefore, this must be taken note of by this Court to disbelieve the case of the defendants brought out before the Court below and reiterated here. In our considered opinion, the expression used by the defendants in their written statement as "let out" and "leave and license" would not alter the situation in this case in favour of the plaintiffs. Either of the expression did not amount to the defendants admitting that the plaintiffs are staying in the suit property in their own right and not under the authority of the defendants. The only one conclusion that could be arrived at in understanding the expressions referred to above is that the plaintiffs are permitted to stay in the suit property and it cannot be anything else. The difference in the expressions namely between "let out" and "leave and license" really do not loom large in our mind in this case to decide the rights of the parties and accordingly we reject the argument advanced in this regard by Mr.S. Sundara Gopal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs. 17. To show that the plaintiffs are in occupation of the property from 1961 onwards, and in any event prior to 1981, plaintiffs relied upon certain documents namely exhibits A.1, A.3, A.2, A.7, A.11 to A.13, A.28 and A.30. Other documents are subsequent to the year 1981 in which year only the defendants claim to have permitted the plaintiffs to occupy and, therefore, much may not turn out on appreciating those documents to decide as to whether what is the right or the authority which the plaintiffs had prior to that date. It must be noticed here that in the cause of action paragraph filed in the earlier suit, it is stated that the plaintiffs came to occupy the suit property in the year 1955 while the evidence is that for the first time they came to occupy the property some time in the year 1961 or so. It must be noticed here that in the cause of action paragraph filed in the earlier suit, it is stated that the plaintiffs came to occupy the suit property in the year 1955 while the evidence is that for the first time they came to occupy the property some time in the year 1961 or so. There is no dispute that the area where the suit property is situated is called as Razack Garden. P.W.1 admitted in his evidence in cross that Razack garden is a large area. Now, we applied our mind to the documents referred to above to find out as to whether those documents show the plaintiffs' independent right over the suit property prior to 1981. The death extract Ex.A.1 relating to Ellappa Naicker, husband of the first plaintiff, would show his address as Hut, Razak Garden, Arumbakkam. He died in the year 1971. The plaintiffs would state in their oral evidence that door numbers were first allotted for the houses in the year 1969. If that is so, the house in which Ellappa Naicker lived and died should have a door number. But surprisingly, we do not find any door number in Ex A.1 and in it the description of the property is found stated as a 'hut'. The plaint allegation is that the first plaintiff had constructed some permanent structure in the suit land for residential purpose. There is no material to prove those allegations as to when the construction was put up, who had put up, etc. Whatever it is, we leave it at this stage by stating that in Ex.A.1, the death extract of Ellappa Naicker which is shown to have been issued on 03.09.1987, the description of the property is given as a hut in Razak Garden without any door number. Ex.A.3 which is stated to be the record sheet of P.W.1 which shows that his father was a resident of Saanarpalayam (Razak Garden). This record shows that P.W.1 joined the school on 26.06.1962 and left the school in the year 1966-67. Once again, we find that in this certificate there is no reference to any door number of the house in which Ellappa Naicker namely father of P.W.1, was shown to be residing. This document itself had been obtained on 28.01.1990 and the endorsement appears to have been made by different hands in different inks. Once again, we find that in this certificate there is no reference to any door number of the house in which Ellappa Naicker namely father of P.W.1, was shown to be residing. This document itself had been obtained on 28.01.1990 and the endorsement appears to have been made by different hands in different inks. No doubt it is a original document but, the best way to prove this document is by examining the authorities who had made the entries in that document. None connected with this document had been examined. Therefore, in our considered opinion, Exs. A.1 and A.3 do not, prima facie, improve the case of the plaintiffs that they have been living in the suit property from the year 1961. 18. Ex.A.5 is the birth extract of a female child shown to have born to Jayaraman and Vijayalakshmi. Vijayalakshmi is the sister-in-law of P.W.1 and she is very much available in the city. She has not chosen to get into the box and prove that document. Only through P.W.1 this document had come to be marked and in his evidence P.W.1 would state that the address in which the child is shown to have been born on 7.11.1979 to Jayaraman and Vijayalakshmi is given as the suit property. For the reasons stated above namely neither the father nor the mother having been examined to prove the birth of the child covered under Ex.A.5, we are not in a position to give much evidentiary value to that document. This document had been obtained only in the year 1987, though it gives an extract of what is available in the records. 19. The next document is Ex.A.6 and this document is obtained after the suit namely 13.09.1990 giving the details which are available already on record. This is a transfer certificate given by a school and this shows that the address in which the student was staying is the suit property. The date of joining of the school is given as 26.06.1981 and the date of leaving is given as 25.04.1983. The address given therein as that of the suit property appears to be an interlineation between two columns. The date of joining of the school is given as 26.06.1981 and the date of leaving is given as 25.04.1983. The address given therein as that of the suit property appears to be an interlineation between two columns. If the authority which issued the certificate had been brought before the Court, the defendants would have been in a position to cross examine the authority as to whether the address given in the certificate is the address which stand reflected in the original records maintained in the school. That opportunity had been denied to the defendants. 20. Ex.A.7 is the identity card given by a political party on 19.03.1980 in the name of P.W.1 and it gives the address of P.W.1 as the suit property. Once again we will have to reject this document for the simple reason that there is nothing to indicate on what basis the authority which issued the identity card had come to know that the address mentioned therein is the address in which P.W.1 was residing. In our opinion, those particulars could have been provided to the authority, which issued the identity card, only by P.W.1 and, therefore, in the absence of any corroborating material to show that the P.W.1 was in fact living in the suit property even in the year 1980, much importance cannot be given to Ex.A.7 and we accordingly agree with the learned trial Judge not to rely upon Ex.A.7 aa a legal material to be taken into account in favour of the plaintiffs to come to the conclusion about their continued and hostile possession of the suit property. Ex.A.12 is the 'pawn bill' in the name of P.W.1. It gives the address of the pawner as the suit property and it is dated 15.05.1980. This detail in Ex.A.12 could have also been furnished only by P.W.1. Next comes, Ex.A.13 a letter dated 23.11.1987 given by the alleged employer of Jayaraman, the elder brother of P.W.1. The author of this letter had not been examined. This document is definitely after suit. This letter discloses that Jayaraman residing at No: 3 Razack Garden, Arumbakkam, worked in that company from 1968 to December 1976. From this letter, it is not possible to hold that Jayaraman was residing at No: 3, Razack Garden, Arumbakkam, between 1968 and 1976. The author of this letter had not been examined. This document is definitely after suit. This letter discloses that Jayaraman residing at No: 3 Razack Garden, Arumbakkam, worked in that company from 1968 to December 1976. From this letter, it is not possible to hold that Jayaraman was residing at No: 3, Razack Garden, Arumbakkam, between 1968 and 1976. This letter could have been given by the employer only on an information furnished by P.W.1 to the said employer who would have simply given the address as given by P.W.1. Therefore, Ex.A.13 also may not be of any valuable use at all to be taken into account in favour of the plaintiffs. Then, we have a crucial document namely a public document marked on the side of the plaintiffs as Ex.A.29. This is an extract from the Electorals Rolls for the year 1975 issued by the Electoral Registration Officer and Revenue Officer, Corporation of Madras, which is dated 18.3.1991. This shows that in the Electorals Rolls prepared in the year 1975 in Door No: 3A Razack Garden Street, Jayaraman and Kuppammal were residing and their names were enumerated as voters from that address. P.W.1, in his evidence in re-examination recorded on 3.4.1991, would admit that his mother was Solammal @ Kuppammal. Therefore, Ex.A.29 unerringly points out that in the Electoral Rolls prepared in the year 1975 for Anna Nagar Assembly Constituency Jayaraman and Kuppammal were enumerated as voters living in Door No: 3 A, Razack Garden Street. The consistent case of the plaintiffs is that the door number of the suit premises is old door No: 3 and new door No: 60. D.W.2, who is the son of the vendor under Ex.B.1 and who had attested Ex.B.1 had stated in his evidence in cross that he voted in the election held in the year 1975 and that the old door number for his house is 3A and new door number 60 is not corresponding to that old door number. The plaintiff in his evidence as P.W.1 would only state that mentioning of the door number as 3-A in Ex.A.29 is a mistake. The plaintiff in his evidence as P.W.1 would only state that mentioning of the door number as 3-A in Ex.A.29 is a mistake. It is not for him to give an explanation for that and in our opinion it is only the authority which issued the certificate who can get into the box and state that the correct door number is 3 and it is wrongly mentioned as door number 3-A. This document namely Ex.A.29 cuts the case of the plaintiffs to the ground that they have been living in the suit property right from 1961 till the date of the filing of the suit with the old door number being 3 with corresponding new door number as 60. Ex.A.30 is the extract from the Electorals Rools for the year 1984 prepared for Anna Nagar Assembly Constituency and that shows P.W.1, his mother, his elder brother Jayaraman and his elder brother's wife Vijayalakshmi have been enumerated as voters from door No: 60 Razack Garden Street, which relates to the suit property. It must be noticed that this enumeration of voters is for the assembly elections held in the year 1984 and the defendants' would state that by way of permissive occupation the plaintiffs came to occupy the suit premises in the year 1981. Thus, on their own showing it is clear that till about 1975 plaintiffs would not have lived at old Door No: 3 corresponding to new door No: 60 (suit property) but only elsewhere and only after the grant of 'leave and license' in the year 1981, the plaintiffs could have come to occupy the suit premises. In view of our evaluation of Exs.A.28 and 30 in arriving at the conclusion as referred to above, we are not much impressed with Ex.A.4 the marriage invitation printed for the marriage of Jayaraman, the elder brother of P.W.1. No doubt it is mentioned therein that bride groom's address is No: 3, Razack Garden Street. This marriage invitation runs contra to the public record namely Ex.A.29. Therefore, we have the least hesitation to hold that Ex.A.4 has no evidentiary value. Therefore, it is clear in our mind that the plaintiffs could not have been in occupation of the suit property till their names were enumerated in the voters list in the Electorals Rools prepared in the year 1984 for the Anna Nagar Assembly Constituency. Therefore, we have the least hesitation to hold that Ex.A.4 has no evidentiary value. Therefore, it is clear in our mind that the plaintiffs could not have been in occupation of the suit property till their names were enumerated in the voters list in the Electorals Rools prepared in the year 1984 for the Anna Nagar Assembly Constituency. Ex.A.30 is in full support to the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs in the suit came to occupy the premises only during the year 1981 on a leave and license basis. 21. The defendants relies upon Exs. B. 21 and 22 in support of their case that the plaintiffs' occupation was only on leave and license basis. We have already noted earlier the case of the defendants that on the approach made by Jayaraman, the elder brother of P.W.1 their family was allowed to live on leave and license basis. The case of the defendants is that after their family recovered from the disastrous death of the breadwinner of their family, they decided to proceed with the construction and therefore, they requested the plaintiffs to vacate. As the plaintiffs did not vacate they wrote letters to them as well as to the second defendant in the later suit. It is their case that Jayaraman sent two letters Exs. B. 21 and B.22 the first one dated 8.10.1986 and the second one dated 14.3.1987. When the signatures in these two letters were put to P.W.1 in his evidence in cross, he would deny that it is his brother's signature. Ex.B.22 is not only the letter dated 14.3.1987 but the cover in which it has been sent is also enclosed. We saw the enclosure. Its affixed with a stamp issued by Sultanate of Oman and it has come in Air Mail. The postal seal shows that it was posted at Salalah. Therefore, it is not possible to doubt Ex.B.22 at all. The cover in which Ex.B.21 had been sent is not filed. Since the plaintiff in his evidence in cross disowns his brother's signature under Ex.B.21 and B.22, we just had a look at the vakalat signed by the second defendant in the later suit. It is better we leave it as it is without stating anything further. In this context, we have to take into account Ex.A.11, the receipt for payment of Urban Land Tax for faslis 1373 to 1380. It is better we leave it as it is without stating anything further. In this context, we have to take into account Ex.A.11, the receipt for payment of Urban Land Tax for faslis 1373 to 1380. P.W.1 who had disowned his brother's signature in Exs. B.21 and B.22 when confronted with the signature found in Ex.A.11 (the signature is shown to be that of E. Jayaraman – elder brother of P.W.1) would admit that "it contains the signature as that of Jayaraman and however, it is not his brother's signature". A perusal of the signature in Ex.A.11 and the signature in Exs. B.21 and B.22 leave no room at all to doubt that the same person had signed in all the three documents. A reading of Exs. B.21 and B.22 make it abundantly clear that Jayaraman had addressed his aunt, namely the first defendant, that he had been put on notice about the various problems prevailing in Chennai and that as soon as he gets leave, he will come down to Chennai and settle the matter amicably. Ex.B.22 is dated 14.3.1987 and Ex.A.11 had come to be issued on 10.08.1987 that is, five months after Ex.B.22. Therefore, it is clear that Jayaraman had come down to India and during his stay Urban Land Tax was paid by him and he received the copy of the receipt and yet, he did not choose to settle the matter as promised by him in his letters Exs.B.21 and B.22. It is no doubt true that D.W.1 had admitted that in Ex.B.21 there is no assertion whatsoever that the settlement offered by Jayaraman is with reference to the dispute regarding the suit property. But, what is the dispute that is in the mind of Jayaraman, which he wanted to settle, is definitely within his knowledge and should be within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The case of the defendants is that the dispute is with reference to the house only and that is the dispute which Jayaraman wanted to settle when he comes down to Chennai. The plaintiffs have not examined Jayaraman at all. There is nothing before the Court to show that there is any other dispute prevailing between the two families except the dispute regarding the house in question. Therefore, going by the pleadings; evidence; probability and the contents of Exs. The plaintiffs have not examined Jayaraman at all. There is nothing before the Court to show that there is any other dispute prevailing between the two families except the dispute regarding the house in question. Therefore, going by the pleadings; evidence; probability and the contents of Exs. B.21 and B.22, we are inclined to hold that under Exs.B.21 and B.22 Jayaraman would have had in his mind only the dispute regarding the suit property alone as the dispute to be solved by him on reaching Chennai and since it is not resolved, the parties have come before Court. 22. It is a well settled position in law that when a person pleads title based on adverse possession, he must establish "animus possidendi". This legal expression had been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments to have a meaning, namely that such possession must be with conscious exercise of independent rights of their own, continuous, uninterrupted, open, hostile and to the knowledge of the true owner. Relying upon a judgment of this Court reported in 2004 (3) L.W. 273 (K.Krishnan and another vs. S. Mari Naicker and another), the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that such adverse possession need not be to the knowledge of the true owner. The learned Judge in that case had followed another reported judgment of this Court reported in 2000 (3) M.L.J. 589 wherein it was held that " it was not necessary that adverse possession should be brought to the knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed". In our opinion, there are atleast two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which says that exercise of such right based on adverse possession must be to the knowledge of the true owner. In our opinion, there are atleast two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which says that exercise of such right based on adverse possession must be to the knowledge of the true owner. In 2003 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4501 (Deva vs. Sajjan Kumar) it was held as follows: " Mere long possession of defendant for a period of more than 12 years without intention to possess the suit land adversely to the title of the plaintiff and to latter's knowledge cannot result in acquisition of title by the defendant to the encroached suit land." There is an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 (1) C.T.C. 241 (Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) vs. Arvind Kumar) wherein it had been held that the person claiming title of adverse possession should plead and prove by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner and it is an essential one to convert a permissive possession into an adverse possession. It is also held therein that mere possession irrespective of length of time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. The learned counsel for the appellant cited a judgment reported in 2004 (3) L.W. 301 (Vasantiben P. Nayak & Others vs. Somnath M. Nayak and Others) wherein also the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had upheld the position in law that adverse possession must be to the knowledge of the real owner. In this case, we searched in vain to find out, assuming that the plaintiffs have been in continuous possession for more than the statutory period, as to whether the plaintiffs have been in such continuous possession extinguishing the title of the real owner to the knowledge of the said real owner. The second plaintiff as P.W.1 in his evidence had categorically admitted that he did not even know about the purchase of the property by the first defendant. If it is so, it cuts the case of the plaintiffs to the ground level. In other words, unless the plaintiffs are aware that the defendants had become the owner of the property, there is no question of the plaintiffs exercising any right in destruction to the legal right of the first defendant – a purchaser who had purchased in the year 1961. In other words, unless the plaintiffs are aware that the defendants had become the owner of the property, there is no question of the plaintiffs exercising any right in destruction to the legal right of the first defendant – a purchaser who had purchased in the year 1961. The plaintiffs did not claim that they have prescribed title by adverse possession even against the predecessor in interest of the first defendant. P.W.1 had admitted that there are no social visits between the two families and if it is so, there is no question of the defendants having any knowledge prior to 1981 about the plaintiffs' occupying the suit property – exercising rights on their own in destruction of the legal rights that flows to the first defendant under Ex.B.1. Assuming for a minute without conceding that the plaintiffs have been in possession from the year 1962 yet, in our considered opinion, once the 'leave and license' pleaded and established by the defendants is accepted, then the continuous running of time based on such adverse possession gets disrupted. We have already held from the evidence of P.W.1 that it is clear that the plaintiffs did not even know about the purchase of the property by the first defendant. Therefore, treating their occupation is permissive from the year 1981, unless it is shown that the plaintiffs have been in continuous and hostile possession to the knowledge of the true owners for 12 years thereafter, the plaintiffs cannot succeed since admittedly, the suit had come to be filed within six years from the date of such possession claimed by the defendants which case is accepted by us. 23. The learned trial Judge, in appreciating the evidence, had taken a view against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants which cannot be said to be totally unreasonable or perverse. We see, therefore, no reason at all to take a different view than the one taken by the learned trial Judge. 24. In the light of the above referred to discussions, we find that there is no illegality in the judgment under challenge and accordingly, we sustain the same. Both the appeals are dismissed, however without any orders as to the costs. 25. 24. In the light of the above referred to discussions, we find that there is no illegality in the judgment under challenge and accordingly, we sustain the same. Both the appeals are dismissed, however without any orders as to the costs. 25. Mr.S. Sundaragopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that having regard to his clients' possession atleast from 1981 by way of permissive occupation, his client can be permitted to live there for some more time i.e. his client can be given some time to deliver vacant possession since if immediately they are to be disturbed, the whole family would be affected and the education of the school going children would also be affected. We see some reasonableness in the submission made by Mr. S. Sundaragopal. We are also aware that getting an alternate accommodation in the city is not that easy. Accordingly, we are inclined to give time to the judgment debtor in O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 on the file of the VIth Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai, till 30th April 2005 to quit and deliver vacant possession to the decree holders therein on condition that the third defendant in that suit – Singaram/ judgment debtor files an affidavit of undertaking before this Court, after serving a copy of the same to the counsel for the respondents herein, undertaking to vacate from the property forming the subject matter of O.S. No: 6876 of 1988 within the time fixed by this Court, on or before 8.10.2004. If there is any failure in filing the affidavit of undertaking, then the decree becomes executable immediately without any further reference to the Court.