JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9.8.2002 refusing to restore the regular first appeal No. 2 6/1998 for non-compliance of the pre-emptory order dated 17.1.2001. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to the instant appeal are that the respondent M/s. M.S. Construction filed a suit for recovery of Rs.42,000/- with interest thereto. The trial Court decreed the suit by judgment dated 25.7.1998. The State preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree which came to be admitted by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 2.11.1998. The notice of the stay application was issued to the respondent in view of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 5 CPC. Consequently, the money decree was not stayed. However, the learned Single Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the appellants as well as respondent and considering, a strong prima facie, by well reasoned order dated 15.7.1999 stayed the execution of decree till the pendency of the appeal. 3. Cyclo-style order wherein the blanks have been filled in was passed s on 17.1.2001 by the learned Single Judge which reads as follows: "Mr. N.M. Lodha for the appellant. Notice u/R. 181 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules was exhibited way back on 8.10.1999. Despite taking opportunity, list of documents as well as initial charges have not been filed as yet as per office report o dated 15.1.2001. Two weeks time is granted to do the needful, failing which the appeal will stand automatically dismissed without reference to the Court." 4. As the list of documents was not filed, the appeal came to be dismissed by the order of the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) dated 7.3.2001 15 which reads as follows: "None is present. Compliance of Hon'ble Court's order dated 17.1.2001 has not been made. Hence the case stands dismissed." 5. The appellant filed an application for restoration of the appeal alongwith an application Ws. 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay. The application came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 9.8.2002. 6. The preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent as to the maintainability of the subject appeal. The appellant filed an application for restoration of the appeal alongwith an application Ws. 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay. The application came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 9.8.2002. 6. The preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent as to the maintainability of the subject appeal. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the instant appeal being against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the subject appeal under section 18 is not maintainable. More particularly, in view of the amended provisions of Section 100-A CPC, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in UCO Bank & Anr. v. Roopa Ram, reported in 2003(2) RLR 770 wherein it is held that substitution of Section 100-A of CPC does not permit the Division Bench to entertain special appeal against the judgment and decree of the Single Judge rendered in first appeal after the cut off date i.e. 1.7.2002. 7. In the instant case the impugned order has been passed on 9.8.2002,clearly after the cut off date. In our view, the contention deserves to be rejected. Section 100-A prohibits a further appeal where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by the Single Judge of the High Court. The restoration proceedings are independent proceedings. as such, they are being separately registered and dealt with. Limitation is also provided for filing a restoration application. Thus, an order passed on a restoration application cannot be said to be an order arising from an original or appellate decree. Thus, in our considered view, the special appeal against the order dismissing an application for restoration of independent proceedings is maintainable. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel is rejected. 8. The learned Single Judge refused to condone the lapse on the part of the appellants for not complying with the order, considering that an engagement of a lawyer by the State is their internal matter and it is not for the Court to keep a continuous vigil as to who is the latest counsel for a so particular litigant. The Court observed as follows: "If the lawyer has faltered in discharge of his duties by not putting appearance. The Court observed as follows: "If the lawyer has faltered in discharge of his duties by not putting appearance. or by not keeping track of the matter, it is always open for the applicant to take appropriate action for reimbursement of the loss suffered by the client." 9. The learned Single Judge has further observed as follows: "So far as the Court is concerned, according to provisions of Order 3, Rule 4 (2) the engagement of Shri Lodha is deemed to be in force as it has not been determined with leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, and filed in Court, and the proceedings obviously had not ended so far as regards that client. In that view of the matter, there is hardly any sufficient ground for non-compliance of the order." 10. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the learned Single Judge. The Courts are required to adopt more justice oriented operation. A Division Bench of this Court dealing with the identical situation while setting aside an order refusing to restore the first appeal, in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd., Jodhpur v. M/s. Modi Thread Mills, Jodhpur, reported in RLW 2003(4) Rajasthan 2192 observed as follows: "A little more sensitive approach is required to be adopted by the Courts in process of dispensation of justice. It is not at all desirable to drive out a party out of Court by way of punishment for whatever reason. It will also not be fair to attribute every thing to the lawyers for any sort of fault. There are defects in the system for which entire legal profession is responsible which include the judges and lawyers both. While the legislature has provided a provision for dismissal of a proceeding for default, it has also provided provision for restoration. It will be travesty of justice if the Court fails to exercise the power in restoring the proceedings except in rare and for exceptional reasons. We may remind an age old well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which it exists. It has always been anxiety of the Court to decide an issue on merit instead of driving out a party from the Court for one or the other technical reason. We may remind an age old well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which it exists. It has always been anxiety of the Court to decide an issue on merit instead of driving out a party from the Court for one or the other technical reason. Even if the party was remiss in complying with the directions of the Court the appeal could have been restored on payment of cost. Refusal to restore an appeal is bound to result in meritorious matter being thrown out and the cause of justice will be defeated." 11. In the instant case the order-sheet dated 17.1.2001 shows that in cylo-style order the name of the counsel has been inserted in the blanks kept open. Similarly, the other blanks have been filled up by giving the dates. It is averred that the order dated 17.1.2001 was passed in absence of the counsel for the respondent. The deponent namely Shri Amar Singh Ghotia, Executive Engineer, P.H.E.D., Distt. Rural Division-II, Bikaner came to know of this fact when his clerk Chaukharam went to find out the status of the departmental cases on 11.1.2002. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Sh. Amar Singh Ghotia made on oath. The insistence of an affidavit of Chaukharam is not required for corroboration, as there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the Executive Engineer made on oath. Even if, there is slightest possibility that the order might have been passed in absence of the lawyer, it should be considered a good ground for restoration. The Court would be jealous to see a person going out of the Court, with so heavy heart that he was turned out from the Court without hearing his case on merits. 12. Having considered the material on record, it is considered expedient in the interest of justice that the order dated 9.8.2002 is quashed and set aside and the first appeal is restored to its original number. It may further be stated that there is no need of preparation of paper book when a case is to be heard by the learned Single Judge. This aspect was also required to be considered by the learned Single Judge, while passing an pre-emptory order for non-compliance of filing of list of documents and depositing of initial charges. It may further be stated that there is no need of preparation of paper book when a case is to be heard by the learned Single Judge. This aspect was also required to be considered by the learned Single Judge, while passing an pre-emptory order for non-compliance of filing of list of documents and depositing of initial charges. It may further be noticed that it was and State appeal and initial charges were not required to be deposited. It appears that since, it was a cyclo-style order inadvertently a direction with respect to depositing of initial charges crept in. 13. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 9.8.2002 rejecting the restoration application is set aside. The application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay is allowed for the 15 reasons stated in the application. The restoration application is allowed. The civil regular first appeal No. 226/1998 is restored to its original number. As the first appeal has been restored, the interim order automatically stands restored. *******