BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the appeals are decided by this common judgment. CCCA No. 46 of 1997: appellant is the plaintiff who filed a suit being O. S. No. 454 of 1989 which was dismissed by the Trial Court on 28. 10. 1996. The suit was laid for recovery of rs. 7,66,920-31 ps towards principal and rs. 6,91,488. 29 ps towards surcharge on the delayed payments with future interest at the rate of 33% p. a. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff asserted in the plaint that the plaintiffs firm was carrying on business as stockists, suppliers and commission agents of iron steel, hardware and pipes etc. The plaintiff and the Defendant no. 1 entered into an understanding which was reduced into writing on 31. 8. 1985 agreeing that the plaintiff shall supply steel block tubes of ISI standard to the defendants work site. Pursuant to the said understanding the defendants from time to time placed orders with the plaintiff and the plaintiff supplied the materials under delivery challans. Subsequently the agreement entered into between the parties was altered and the material was delivered to the defendants at the places desired by them and all the material supplied by the plaintiff were used by the defendants. By letter dated 9. 6. 1986 the defendants raised a dispute regarding the rates of goods. There was correspondence between the parties. On all occasions the plaintiff demanded settlement of outstanding dues, but the defendants continuously postponed the same on one pretext or the other. But on continuous persuation, the liability of 1st defendant was admitted and the plaintiff was authorized to collect the payments from the debtors of the defendant. The defendant, on 30. 9. 1986, addressed letters to his debtors directing them to pay the outstanding dues to the plaintiff. On 2. 12. 1986 the defendant also addressed a letter to M/s. Magna Hardtemp Ltd. And magna Fourdriner Ltd. directing them to pay their outstanding dues to the plaintiffs. But in spite of attempts the plaintiff failed to collect the outstanding dues from the debtors of defendant. On 29. 12. 1986 the plaintiff informed the position to defendants and got issued a legal notice on 19. 8. 1988 calling upon the defendants to make payment of the dues. The defendants in reply denied the liability. Therefore the suit was filed. On 29. 12. 1986 the plaintiff informed the position to defendants and got issued a legal notice on 19. 8. 1988 calling upon the defendants to make payment of the dues. The defendants in reply denied the liability. Therefore the suit was filed. ( 3 ) THE defendants in their written statement denied their liability to pay the suit amount. It was contended that the 2nd defendant was the proprietor of 1st defendant, Prasad Reddy, the brother of 2nd defendant was looking after the affairs of the defendant as a General Power of attorney holder. The plaintiff agreed to collect certain dues from third parties on behalf of Prasad Reddy amounting to rs. 6,45,000/- and obtained authorization, as such the plaintiff was estopped from claiming the amounts from the defendants. The plaintiff was not entitled to claim any surcharge. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings the following issues were framed by the Trial court: (1) Whether the suit is not maintainable in law? (2) Whether the defendants had no direct dealing with the plaintiff ? (3) Whether the transactions with the defendants and Sri Prasad constructions is inseparable? (4) Whether there is a binding and enforceable agreement between plaintiff and defendants that plaintiff should recover dues from the debtors of defendants under an authorization? (5) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the suit amount in view of the authorizations given by the defendants to collect dues from their debtors? (6) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit claim? (8) To what relief ? ( 5 ) ISSUES 2 and 3 were taken up together by the Trial Court and the Trial court found that though the 2nd defendant was the proprietor of the 1st defendant, prasad Reddy was looking after the affairs of 1st defendant and he has direct dealings and the defendants had not any dealings, but Prasad Reddy was acting on behalf of 2nd defendant. Prasad Reddy was examined as D. W. I. He stated in his examination-in-chief that the 2nd defendant was his brother. He was carrying on business in the name of 1st defendant. He himself was 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 452 of 1989. He was doing business in the name of Prasad Constructions. He was a gpa holder for 1st defendant. He had dealings with the plaintiff. He was carrying on business in the name of 1st defendant. He himself was 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 452 of 1989. He was doing business in the name of Prasad Constructions. He was a gpa holder for 1st defendant. He had dealings with the plaintiff. In the first instance he met the plaintiff for supply of steel on behalf of 1st defendant. There was an agreement between him and the plaintiff for supply of goods. The agreement was executed on 31. 8. 1985 which was ex. Al. The rate agreed was Rs. 9,100/- per metric tone. So in view of his clear statement, there is no doubt that Prasad reddy was acting on behalf of the defendants. He was only the witness examined by the defendants. ( 6 ) ON Issue No. 6 i. e. , whether the suit was barred by limitation, the Trial court held that the suit was filed for recovery of money on the basis of invoices which were marked as Exs. A3 to A27. According to the plaintiff, these invoices found part of a single contract and therefore the entire suit amount was to be treated as arising out of a single transaction in pursuance of the agreement Ex. Al. The defendants, however, submitted that, the suit was not filed on the basis of accounts, but it had been filed on the basis of invoices and the time for filing of the suit had to be calculated from the date of invoices individually and Exs. A3 to A23 were not within three years. It was contended that the amounts covered by Exs. A3 to A23 were barred by limitation. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the plaintif/appellant Mr. Vilas V. Afzul purkar, however, submits that the suit was not properly framed, but that should not non-suit the plaintiff. In this connection he refers to the pleas of the defendants in their written statement. In Para-4 of the written statement it is stated:"the amount claimed in the suit is incorrect and baseless. It is boosted by the plaintiff. The account extract filed by the plaintiff is incorrect and incomplete and the plaintiff is not entitled to separate the supplies made under the four bills, dated 10. 12. 1985, 7. 1. 1986,19. 3. 1986 and 21. 3. 1986 respectively. It is boosted by the plaintiff. The account extract filed by the plaintiff is incorrect and incomplete and the plaintiff is not entitled to separate the supplies made under the four bills, dated 10. 12. 1985, 7. 1. 1986,19. 3. 1986 and 21. 3. 1986 respectively. The plaintiff has charged excess amount in the bills and the rates mentioned in the bills are far in excess than the rates agreed upon between the second defendant and plaintiff, which fact was made known to the plaintiff in the letters dated 9. 6. 1986,3. 7. 1986,4. 7. 1987 and 17. 8. 1987 written by the second defendant. . . . . . . . . . " ( 8 ) HE submits that the defendants on their own accepted and asserted that the plaintiff was not entitled to separate the supplies made under four bills, therefore it should be taken as one transaction. In our view, the plaintiff cannot rest his case on the written statement filed by he defendants. The onus is on him to show that the suit filed by him was within limitation and in the plaint he has specifically mentioned the different dates and the bills and according to the plaintiff, the cause of action for filing the suit arose on 31. 8. 1985 when the plaintiff and the defendant agreed through a written understanding for supply and receipt of material, on all dates when supplies made by the plaintiff and received by the defendant, on all dates when the amount became due and payable to the plaintiff, on 19. 9. 1988 when reply was issued on behalf of the defendant, on 18. 10. 1988 when the plaintiff got a rejoinder issued and finally on 31. 10. 1988 when the defendant got a reply issued denying its liability. Obviously the invoices Exs. A3 to A23 did not form part of a single transaction and therefore the suit was not within limitation in terms of Article 14 of the Limitation Act. Under Article 14 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation is three years and the period starts from the date of delivery of the goods for recovery of price of goods sold and delivered where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon and under Article 15 the limitation runs from the date when the period of credit expires where there is a fixed period of credit. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Vilas, learned Counsel wants this Court to believe that although the suit was not correctly framed, the defendants cannot non-suit the plaintiff, as it is a suit based on accounts. Only P. W. I was examined as a witness. No book of accounts was produced before the Court and only invoices were produced before the Court. Therefore this argument has to fail. We agree with the Trial Court that the amounts covered by Exs. A3 to a23 were barred by limitation and the suit with regard to only a sum of Rs. 3,58,008. 18 ps was within time. ( 10 ) ISSUES 4, 5 and 7 relating to assignment of debts to third parties were also decided against the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the debts were acknowledged and assigned to third parties. In this connection the evidence of P. W. 1 and D. W. 1 has to be considered. The plaintiff who appeared as a witness submitted that after initial denial of the liability, the defendants authorized him to collect the dues from their debtors viz. , Bhupendra bheda, Ketan M. Parekh and others. He was able to collect Rs. 90,000/- which was appropriated towards surcharge for delayed payment. He demanded for payment of balance, but there was no progress. Ex. A30 was the office copy of letter dated 29. 12. 1986 and a reply Ex. B31 was given to this letter on 18. 1. 1987. Ex. A32 was the office copy of another letter and Ex. B33 was the reply to this letter. Ex. A38 was the letter written by the defendants to the plaintiffs. It reads: "we are in receipt of your letter and accordingly we are hereby authorizing you to receive the sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh and thirty thousand only) given to mr. Bhoopandra Mehtaji Bhada, as hand loan by D. D. No. 0057629/ dated 17. 8. 1984 and Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) given to Mr. Ketan M. Parekh as hand loan by D. D. No. 0934853/206/84, dated 17. 8. 1984 of Oriental Bank of Commerce, hyderabad. I request you to receive the amount from them under advise to us and the same adjusted against the payment due from us in respect of steel materials supplied to us. " ( 11 ) THIS letter was written on 29. 9. 8. 1984 of Oriental Bank of Commerce, hyderabad. I request you to receive the amount from them under advise to us and the same adjusted against the payment due from us in respect of steel materials supplied to us. " ( 11 ) THIS letter was written on 29. 9. 1986. It appears that in response to this letter, a reply was given by the plaintiff under Ex. A39, which reads: "we understand that two parties - namely mr. Bhoopandra Mehtaji Bhada and Mr. Ketun M. Parekh of Bombay have availed hand loan of Rs. 1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh and thirty thousand only) and Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) respectively as per D. Nos. 0057629/025/84 and 0934853/ 206/84, dated 17. 8. 1984 from Oriental Bank of commerce, Hyderabad. We request you to authorize me to collect the above dues from them on your behalf which when realized will be adjusted against our pending steel bills. I shall be highly thankful if you can issue me the authorization to collect the money from these two parties. " ( 12 ) THEN Ex. A40 letter was again written by the plaintiff which reads as under:"we understand from your Mr. Surendra reddy that you have to receive payments from Magna Fourdrinier. We agree to try and collect the same from magna Fourdrinier Ltd. , and the same when received shall be adjusted against the amount due from you for supplies made to you. " ( 13 ) THEN by a letter dated 7. 12. 1986 ex. A41 the plaintiff demanded M/s. Magna fourdrinier Ltd. to make payment of Rs. 2. 35 lakhs. Similar letter dated 7. 12. 1986 Ex. A42 was written to M/s. Magna Hardtemp Ltd. by the plaintiff demanding payment of rs. 2. 50 lakhs. Thus many letters were exchanged and the plaintiff asked the defendants by a letter dated 25. 2. 1987 ex. A45 that if they did not accept the liability of Rs. 7,66,920. 31 ps, they should give their own accounts as to what was the liability. Thereafter another letter dated 19. 6. 1987 was sent by the plaintiff to the defendants. It states inter alia: meanwhile you were very kind enough to issue us authority letter in the name of your creditors for a sum of Rs. 6. 45 lakhs of rupees. 31 ps, they should give their own accounts as to what was the liability. Thereafter another letter dated 19. 6. 1987 was sent by the plaintiff to the defendants. It states inter alia: meanwhile you were very kind enough to issue us authority letter in the name of your creditors for a sum of Rs. 6. 45 lakhs of rupees. As you were in a very tight position at that time and could not make the payment direct to us. Despite our best efforts, we wasted a huge amount, as well as our time, but without result. As we don t have the direct legal right over your creditors. We are now facing a mental agony, torture, as well as heavy losses in our business commitments, due to non-co-operative attitude of your office. Personally you have already made false promises with the undersign whenever he visited your Hyderabad and madras offices and on various telephonic talks. We are ready for further negotiations in this matter and hope that your personal intervention will give fruitful results. " ( 14 ) ANOTHER letter dated 4. 8. 1987 ex. A48 was given by the plaintiff to the defendants. In this letter description of accounts was given by the plaintiff. Again in a letter dated 30. 9. 1987 Ex. A51, the plaintiff wrote inter alia,". . . . . . . . . . . . . SOME of your parties have refused to pay any amount stating that there was nothing due and payable to you as shown in authorization. Since only Rs. 60,000/- has been received on your authorization, you still have to make the payment of our dues. The demand for excess payment of rs. 17,975. 11 is not just and bona fide and we request you to pay the same. " ( 15 ) NOW in the light of this correspondence, it has to be seen whether there was any assignment and if there was assignment, what was the effect. The argument made at the bar by the learned counsel for the defendants/respondents is that clearly there were authorization letters given to the plaintiff to collect debts from third parties. Even the plaintiff in his examination-in-chief had accepted that he received some amounts on account of those authorizations. The argument made at the bar by the learned counsel for the defendants/respondents is that clearly there were authorization letters given to the plaintiff to collect debts from third parties. Even the plaintiff in his examination-in-chief had accepted that he received some amounts on account of those authorizations. If he was not able o collect the amounts from the third parties, he should have returned the authorization letters and claimed the dues from the defendants, if any, but plaintiff neither returned the original authorization letters nor offered any explanation about the original authorization letters issued in his favour to collect amounts from M/s. Magna Fourdrinier Ltd. , and m/s. Magna Hardtemp Ltd. These third parties were related to the plaintiff and the plaintiff obtained authorization letters on his own to collect amounts nearly rs. 6. 5 lakhs from third parties and it was the duty of the plaintiff to keep the defendants informed about the progress made in collecting the dues in pursuance of the authorization letters. It is also submitted that since the plaintiff was closely related to third parties, therefore he offered to collect debts on behalf of the defendants from those third parties. It is also submitted that on account of non-return of the authorization letters, the defendants lost the right to collect those debts from their debtors and those debts became time-barred. ( 16 ) NOW in the light of these arguments and evidence, the learned Counsels have made reference to certain judgments. It is also submitted that on account of non-return of the authorization letters, the defendants lost the right to collect those debts from their debtors and those debts became time-barred. ( 16 ) NOW in the light of these arguments and evidence, the learned Counsels have made reference to certain judgments. Before coming to those judgments, it would be necessary to reproduce Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act:"section 130 Transfer of actionable claim : (1) The transfer of an actionable claim whether with or without consideration shall be effected only by the execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his duly authorised agent, shall be complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon all the rights and remedies of the transferor, whether by way of damages or otherwise, shall vest in the transferee, whether such notice of the transfer as is hereinafter provided be given or not: Provided that every dealing with the debt or other actionable claim by the debtor or other person from or against whom the transferor would, but for such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, have been entitled to recover or enforce such debt or other actionable claim, shall (save where the debtor or other person is a party to the transfer or has received express notice thereof as hereinafter provided) be valid as against such transfer. (2) The transferee of an actionable claim may, upon the execution of such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, sue or institute proceedings for the same in his own name without obtaining the transferor s consent to such suit or proceedings, and without making him a party thereto. Exception. Nothing in this section applies to the transfer of a marine or fire policy of insurance or affects the provisions of Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938 ). " ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel for the defendants/respondents have referred to the judgments reported in Seetharama ayyar and another v. Narayanaswami pillai and another, AIR 1919 Mad. 1076, mohanlal Malpani v. The Loan Company of Assam Ltd. , Shillong, AIR 1960 Assam 191, V. S. Venkata Subbiah Chetty v. A. Subba Naidu and others, AIR 1916 Mad. 242, Moideensa Rowthen and another v. Mahammad Kasim Rowthen and others, air 1916 Mad. 248 and Muthukrishna aiyar and others v. Vera Raghava Aiyar and others, AIR 1915 Mad. 1031. 1076, mohanlal Malpani v. The Loan Company of Assam Ltd. , Shillong, AIR 1960 Assam 191, V. S. Venkata Subbiah Chetty v. A. Subba Naidu and others, AIR 1916 Mad. 242, Moideensa Rowthen and another v. Mahammad Kasim Rowthen and others, air 1916 Mad. 248 and Muthukrishna aiyar and others v. Vera Raghava Aiyar and others, AIR 1915 Mad. 1031. The principles laid down in these judgments can be found in a judgment of the Madras high Court reported in Muthukrishna Aiyar and others v. Vera Raghava Aiyar and others (supra) which was decided by a Full bench. It held:"the rights of the transferor being vested in the transferee by the express words of the section (Section 130 of the Transfer of property Act), the transferee is the only party entitled to sue, and this being so, he is, I think, accountable to the transferor for having allowed the remedy to become time barred. " ( 18 ) SIMILARLY in V. S. Venkata Subbiah chetty v. A. Subba Naidu and others (supra) it was held:"it is to be observed that by Section 132 of the Transfer of Property Act, the assignee. prima facie takes subject to all existing equities. It is the duty of the assignee to ascertain the extent of the existing equities (vide Mangles v. Dixon (1852) 3 H. L. C. 702) and where there is an existing right, the onus will be upon the assignee to show affirmatively that the assignment to him was free of it. " ( 19 ) IN a judgment reported in Kisen gopal Bogree v. L. J. Bavin, AIR 1926 cal. 447, while tracing the history of the assignments and interpreting Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Calcutta high Court came to the conclusion:"from this it was established in practice that credits might be transferred, given, sold or disposed of by any other title, and it was not even necessary that the act which contains the transfer should express the mandate in which, as has been explained, the transfer consisted. In order to constitute an assignment of a debt or other chose in action in equity no particular form is necessary. In order to constitute an assignment of a debt or other chose in action in equity no particular form is necessary. An assignment of a chose in action must be made by writing under the indian Law, signed by either the transferor or his duly authorized agent, but, as stated above, no particular form of words seems to be necessary provided that the words used are sufficiently indicative of the transferor s intention to assign the chose in action. As was observed by Lord Maenaghten in brandts v. Dunlop Rubber Co. , (1905) A. C. 454: "it may be addressed to the debtor. It may be couched in the language of command. It may be a courteous request. It may assume the form of mere permission. The language is immaterial if the meaning is plain. All that is necessary is that the debtor should be given to understand that the debt has been made over by the creditor to some third person" and order for payment of money is, however, not the same thing as an assignment of the debt, but a direction in writing to pay the amount due on an instrument endorsed on such instrument by the payee thereof coupled with the delivery of the instrument so endorsed to the person to whom payment is directed is a valid assignment within the meaning of Section 130: See Rama lyen v. Venkatachellam, (1906) 30 Mad. 75. Therefore the test is in a case like this whether or not the right of the seller of the goods to the price of the same has been transferred to a third party by an effectual assignment that the assignee becomes entitled as of right to the payment. Now I have given to the words used in the present instance by the Company my most careful consideration and I am of opinion that they do not amount to anything more than a mere order for the payment of money due by Messrs. Kilbum and Co. In my judgment the words used do not amount to an assignment within the meaning of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. Kilbum and Co. In my judgment the words used do not amount to an assignment within the meaning of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. " ( 20 ) THEREFORE the assignment was complete in this case, even that is the case of the plaintiff and once the assignment was complete, the liability of the defendants stood extinguished and if the plaintiff had any claim, it was against third parties. Therefore we do not find merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. CCCA No. 47 of 1997: ( 21 ) ON the question of assignment what we have held in the above appeal applies to this appeal as well. Since the amounts due have been assigned, the remedy of the plaintiff was against the third parties and not against the present defendants. Therefore this appeal is also dismissed. CMP No. 4658 of 1997: ( 22 ) IN view of our findings on question of assignment, this application made for additional evidence is not necessary. It is accordingly dismissed. ( 23 ) IN the result, both the appeals and cmp are dismissed. No costs.