ORDER 1. AGGRIEVED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER PASSED BY THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI WHEREIN THE DIVISION BENCH, WHILE REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE SINGLE TUDGE, HAS GRANTED LEAVE TO THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFFS TO INSTITUTE A SUIT UNDER SECTION 92 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPC), AGAINST THE APPELLANTS, THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS HAVE COME UP IN APPEAL. 2. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT I, NAMELY, "ALL INDIA WOMENS CONFERENCE" (FOR SHORT "AIWC") IS A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, 1860. AIWC WAS FOUNDED IN THE YEAR 1930 TO ACTIVELY WORK IN THE GENERAL PROGRESS, UPLIFTMENT AND WELFARE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. A PIECE OF LAND AT BHAGWAN DAS ROAD, NEW DELHI MEASURING A LITTLE MORE THAN THREE ACRES WAS ACQUIRED BY THE SOCIETY FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH A PERPETUAL LEASE DEED DATED 22-10-1962 AT A NOMINAL PRICE. THE LAND WAS GIVEN TO THE SOCIETY BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR SETTING UP A MEMORIAL TO SAROJINI NAIDU AND MARGRET COUSINS. HUGE CONSTRUCTION NOW STANDS ON THIS PROPERTY, PART OF WHICH HAS BEEN RENTED OUT TO AGHA KHAN FOUNDATION, SYNDICATE BANK, CANARA BANK AND M/S DALAL CONSULTANTS AND ENGINEERS PVT. LTD. IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT AIWC HAS ABOUT 500 BRANCHES WITH MORE THAN 1 LAKH MEMBERS SPREAD OVER THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. ITS HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED AT 6, BHAGWAN DAS ROAD, NEW DELHI. 3. AIWC CONSTITUTED A TRUST IN THE YEAR 1975 WITH THE OBJECT TO CARRY OUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MULTI-STOREYED BUILDING ON THE PLOT OF LAND ALLOTTED TO AIWC; TO ESTABLISH A MEMORIAL, AN AUDITORIUM TO HOLD WOMENS MEETINGS, INTERNATIONAL HOSTEL FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AND LIBRARY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, OR ANY REQUISITE FACILITIES/AMENITIES AND CONVENIENCES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. UNDER CLAUSE 5, THE TRUSTEES WERE TO GET AND COLLECT THE INCOME AND RENT OF THE SAID BUILDING AND THE INCOME, RENT, INTEREST AND DIVIDEND OF THE TRUST FUND FROM TIME TO TIME AND TO PAY THEREFROM ALL COSTS, CHARGES AND EXPENSES RELATING TO MANAGEMENT, PRESERVATION, UPKEEP AND MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING AND FACILITIES MENTIONED ABOVE. 4. DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS 2 AND 3, NAMELY, SHOBHANA RANADE, DR. APARNA BASU ARE THE FORMER HONORARY PRESIDENT, FORMER HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENT RESPECTIVELY AND RESPONDENT 4 DR. KALAVATI TRIPATHI IS THE FORMER HONORARY TREASURER OF AIWC, WHEREAS RESPONDENT 5 DR. LAKSHMI RAGHURAMIAH (DECEASED), WAS THE MANAGING TRUSTEE OF AIWC TRUST. 5.
4. DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS 2 AND 3, NAMELY, SHOBHANA RANADE, DR. APARNA BASU ARE THE FORMER HONORARY PRESIDENT, FORMER HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENT RESPECTIVELY AND RESPONDENT 4 DR. KALAVATI TRIPATHI IS THE FORMER HONORARY TREASURER OF AIWC, WHEREAS RESPONDENT 5 DR. LAKSHMI RAGHURAMIAH (DECEASED), WAS THE MANAGING TRUSTEE OF AIWC TRUST. 5. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2, NAMELY, SARLA SHAH AND USHA BHOWMIK RESPECTIVELY, ARE THE TWO MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY FROM MAHARASHTRA BRANCH. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 3 (KRISHNA GUPTA) CLAIMS HERSELF TO BE A MEMBER FROM THE DELHI BRANCH. 6. THE RESPONDENTS FILED AN APPLICATION IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI, SEEKING LEAVE OF THE COURT TO INSTITUTE A SUIT UNDER SECTION 92 CPC AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS ALLEGING, INTER ALIA, THAT THERE WAS MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INCOME OF THE TRUST AND THE RENT REALISED WAS NOT BEING CREDITED TO THE TRUST ACCOUNT, CLAIMING THE FOLLOWING RELIEFS: "(I) TO DECLARE THAT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 5 OF THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, 1860, INCOME ARISING FROM THE AIWC ESTATE AND DONATION RECEIVED SHALL VEST IN THE TRUSTEES AS PROVIDED IN THE TRUST DEED OF 1975 READ WITH ARTICLE 18 OF THE AIWC CONSTITUTION; AND THEY ALONE ARE COMPETENT TO EXECUTE THE LEASE AND OTHER DEEDS FOR THE USE AND OCCUPATION OF THE AIWC ESTATE; (II) TO DECLARE THAT THE TRUSTEES ALONE ARE ENTITLED (TO) RECEIVE THE RENTS, ARREARS, PAYMENT AND INCOME ARISING FROM AIWC ESTATE; (III) TO PASS SUCH OTHER AND FURTHER ORDERS AS THIS HONBLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT AND PROPER." 7. THE AFORESAID APPLICATION CAME UP FOR HEARING BEFORE THE COURT ON 8-5- 1994, WHICH WAS ALLOWED EX PARTE. 8. AFTER THE SERVICE ON THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS, AN APPLICATION WAS MOVED BY THEM FOR RECALL OF THE GRANT OF LEAVE TO FILE THE SUIT UNDER SECTION 92 CPC AND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE SUIT. THE SAID APPLICATION CAME UP FOR HEARING BEFORE THE SINGLE JUDGE TRYING THE SUIT. 9. THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RELIEFS SOUGHT FOR IN THE SUIT DID NOT FALL UNDER SECTION 92 CPC. IT WAS HELD: "THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE INSTANT SUIT HAVE NOT CLAIMED ANY OF THE RELIEFS WHICH CAN BE SOUGHT UNDER SECTION 92 OF THE CODE. THEY HAVE SIMPLY SOUGHT A DECLARATION THAT AIWC ESTATE VESTS IN THE TRUSTEES AND THEY ALONE ARE COMPETENT TO EXECUTE THE LEASE AND OTHER DEEDS. THEY ALONE ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AND REALISE THE RENTS, ARREARS, PAYMENTS, ETC.
THEY HAVE SIMPLY SOUGHT A DECLARATION THAT AIWC ESTATE VESTS IN THE TRUSTEES AND THEY ALONE ARE COMPETENT TO EXECUTE THE LEASE AND OTHER DEEDS. THEY ALONE ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AND REALISE THE RENTS, ARREARS, PAYMENTS, ETC. FROM THE PROPERTY. READING OF THE ENTIRE PLAINT GIVES A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT COME TO THE COURT FOR VINDICATION OF ANY PUBLIC RIGHT BUT FOR THE PERSONAL RIGHTS OF SOMEONE ELSE, NAMELY, DEFENDANT 5. AVERMENTS MADE IN PARAS 19 TO 23 OF THE PLAINT ARE AMPLE ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF COMING TO THE COURT FOR VINDICATION OF THE PERSONAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT 5 MORE PARTICULARLY THE AVERMENTS MADE IN PARA 23 OF THE PLAINT WHEREIN IT IS CLAIMED THAT DEFENDANT 5 BESIDES TWO OTHERS BEING THE CREATORS OF THE CORPUS OF THE ESTATE ARE THE LIFE TRUSTEES AS TO RIGHT." 10. AGGRIEVED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE THE PLAINTIFF RESPONDENTS FILED THE APPEAL BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH WHICH HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF BY THE IMPUGNED ORDER. 11. THE DIVISION BENCH SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE AVERMENTS MADE IN THE PLAINT AND THE DOCUMENTS BROUGHT ON THE RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SUIT RELATED TO A TRUST CREATED FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE OF CHARITABLE NATURE. IN THE PLAINT THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS OF BREACH OF TRUST BY THE TRUSTEES AND THAT IT WAS A CASE WHERE DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT WERE REQUIRED TO BE ISSUED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST. IT WAS HELD THAT THE LEAVE TO INSTITUTE THE SUIT UNDER SECTION 92 CPC WAS RIGHTLY GRANTED AND THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE HAD ERRED IN REVOKING THE LEAVE SO GRANTED. 12. LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN HEARD AT LENGTH. 13. ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF SUBMISSIONS TOUCHING THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE WERE MADE BEFORE US DURING THE COURSE OF HEARING BUT WE REFRAIN FROM RECORDING THE FINDINGS THEREON, LEST IT MAY PREJUDICE EITHER OF THE PARTIES IN THE SUIT PROCEEDINGS. SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT WE AGREE WITH THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE DIVISION BENCH.
13. ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF SUBMISSIONS TOUCHING THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE WERE MADE BEFORE US DURING THE COURSE OF HEARING BUT WE REFRAIN FROM RECORDING THE FINDINGS THEREON, LEST IT MAY PREJUDICE EITHER OF THE PARTIES IN THE SUIT PROCEEDINGS. SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT WE AGREE WITH THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE DIVISION BENCH. WE HAVE SATISFIED OURSELVES AFTER GOING THROUGH THE AVERMENTS MADE IN THE PLAINT AND THE DOCUMENTS PLACED ON THE RECORD THAT ALL THE INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 92 CPC ARE SATISFIED, NAMELY, THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC TRUST, ALLEGATIONS OF BREACH OF TRUST AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST. 14. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, WE DO NOT FIND ANY MERIT IN THIS APPEAL AND THE SAME IS DISMISSED WITH NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. ALL CONTENTIONS ARE LEFT OPEN. 15. IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS STAND DISMISSED AT THIS STAGE, RESERVING LIBERTY WITH THE PARTIES TO RAISE THE POINTS TAKEN IN THESE APPLICATIONS IN THE SUIT. 16. SINCE THE SUIT WAS FILED IN THE YEAR 1994 AND IS STILL AT THE INITIAL STAGE, WE WOULD REQUEST THE TRIAL COURT TO PROCEED WITH THE SUIT ON PRIORITY BASIS AND TRY TO DISPOSE OF IT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. 17. REGISTRY IS DIRECTED TO TRANSMIT THE ORIGINAL RECORD FORTHWITH TO THE HIGH COURT. IN CASE THE JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT SUIT IS NO LONGER WITH THE HIGH COURT, THE HIGH COURT IS REQUESTED TO ASSIGN THE CASE TO A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.