JUDGMENT - GOKHALE H.L., J.:—This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the notice dated 26th February, 1997 issued by respondent No. 1, who is Assistant Director of Town Planning, Kalyan Municipal Corporation. The notice is issued under section 51 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 ("MRTP Act" for short). The notice informs the petitioner that she had applied for development of the concerned parcel of land on 24th July, 1992. That time she had not furnished necessary papers of ownership concerning the property. The notice alleges that she has not produced the correct papers and obtained the permission to construct as per the earlier order of the respondent No. 1 dated 24th August, 1992. That permission was being cancelled under section 51(1) of the MRTP Act. The notice calls upon the petitioner to remove the construction, failing which the Municipal Corporation will remove it. A question is raised in this petition with respect to the powers which are available to respondent No. 1 under the said section and whether the impugned action was called for and justified. The petition was admitted on 5th August, 1997 and interim relief has been granted in terms of prayer (d) which has been running throughout the pendency of this petition which restrains the respondents from in any manner demolishing the building which was under construction at that point of time. 2.Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has drawn our attention to the facts leading to the petition. The petitioner was granted the building permission on the concerned plot of land which she claims to be having House No. 81/2. The permission was granted on 24th August, 1992. Thereafter the construction started much later, i.e. on 25th March, 1996. Respondent No. 3 herein filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 211 of 1996 in the Court of Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kalyan seeking a declaration that he was the owner of House No. 81 and sought injunction. It is material to note that the suit was not filed against the petitioner but was filed against her husband, son and daughter. In that suit, an order of status quo was passed on 1st April, 1996. However, again it is material to note that it was concerning House No. 81 in Ali No. 59 of gaothan area of Kalyan. It is material to note that the suit was not filed against the petitioner but was filed against her husband, son and daughter. In that suit, an order of status quo was passed on 1st April, 1996. However, again it is material to note that it was concerning House No. 81 in Ali No. 59 of gaothan area of Kalyan. Against that order, an appeal was preferred. That came to be dismissed on 9th May, 1997. Respondent No. 5 thereafter filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Civil Procedure Code complaining that there was a breach of the order of status quo. That application came to be rejected by an order passed on 28th April, 1998. In para 9 of that order, the learned Judge recorded that the contention of the defendant in that suit, i.e. the petitioner herein, was that her construction was on House Plot No. 81/2 and not upon House Plot No. 81. The plaintiff, respondent No. 3 herein, himself had filed a copy of extract of title. It showed that House No. 81 was having a different map from that of House No. 81/2. The learned Judge recorded that these are two separate properties. That being the position, the learned Judge rejected the application alleging breach of the order of status quo. 3.This order was challenged in a civil revision application to the High Court and the High Court dismissed the civil revision application by an order passed on 24th June, 1998. In para 8 of the order passed by the High Court, again it was noted that House No. 81 was different from House No. 81/2 and these are two separate properties. An S.L.P. was preferred against this order and that also came to be dismissed on 17th August, 1998. 4.It is material to note that respondent No. 2 filed another Special Civil Suit No. 486 of 1996 in the same Court. This was for injunction only and now this time it was against the petitioner. It sought to restrain her from carrying on any further construction. An application was filed for temporary injunction therein and that whatever construction was done be removed. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane rejected that application by his order passed on 20th July, 1996. An appeal was filed against that order being A.O. No. 976 of 1996. It sought to restrain her from carrying on any further construction. An application was filed for temporary injunction therein and that whatever construction was done be removed. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane rejected that application by his order passed on 20th July, 1996. An appeal was filed against that order being A.O. No. 976 of 1996. That appeal also came to be dismissed on 21st August, 1996. An S.L.P. was filed against that order and that also subsequently came to be dismissed on 15th March, 1997. 5.Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that initially a suit for declaration was filed claiming ownership of the property which was not filed against the petitioner but against her husband, son and daughter. Subsequently a suit for injunction was filed against her wherein an injunction was sought and that has come to be declined. Both these suits are substantive suits where rights of parties are being agitated and they are pending in competent Court. In the meanwhile, contemporaneously sometime from 1996 onwards, the respondent No. 1 started correspondence contending that the petitioners permission for developing the concerned property was unjustified and it led to the impugned order which was passed on 26th February, 1997 and which was passed invoking section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Mr. Apte submitted that section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act has a particular scope and the section cannot be used in a dispute between the parties where there is a dispute on title. Section 51(1), which is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:-- "51. Mr. Apte submitted that section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act has a particular scope and the section cannot be used in a dispute between the parties where there is a dispute on title. Section 51(1), which is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:-- "51. (1) If it appears to a Planning Authority that it is expedient, having regard to the Development plan prepared or under preparation that any permission to develop land granted or deemed to be granted under this Act or any other law, should be revoked or modified, the Planning Authority may, after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard against such revocation or modification, by order, revoke or modify the permission to such extent as appears to it to be necessary: Provided that-- (a) where the development relates to the carrying out of any building or other operation, no such order shall affect such of the operations as have been previously carried out; or shall be passed after these operations have substantially progressed or have been completed; (b) where the development relates to a change of use of land, no such order shall be passed at any time after the change has taken place." Mr. Apte, therefore, submitted that this notice has to be set aside and parties as well as respondent No. 1 ought to wait until the decision of the competent Court. 6.Mr. Adik, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 3, submitted that there was no such property, as claimed by the petitioner, bearing House No. 81/2. He referred to the other provisions such as sections 43 and 44 of the M.R.T.P. Act. However, the fact remains that as far as the construction of the petitioner is concerned, she has specifically claimed to be owner of House No. 81/2. With respect to this house, development permission has been granted by the Municipal Corporation. It is much after the property is developed at that point of time, the Municipal Corporation has issued a notice under section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act contending that the petitioner has not given the correct facts of ownership and has misled the Corporation. In this view of the matter, whether these are two separate parcels of land or they are one etc. are the questions which would be decided by a competent Civil Court wherein two suits between the parties are pending. Therefore, this submission of Mr. In this view of the matter, whether these are two separate parcels of land or they are one etc. are the questions which would be decided by a competent Civil Court wherein two suits between the parties are pending. Therefore, this submission of Mr. Adik cannot be permitted to be utilised by the Municipal Corporation to justify the notice under section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act. 7.Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, referred us to section 258 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 ("B.P.M.C. Act" for short) which gives the power to the Commissioner to cancel the permission on the ground of material misrepresentation by an applicant who is commencing the work regarding development of a building. Now what is material is that the impugned notice is not one given under section 258 of the B.P.M.C. Act. It is a notice given under section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Section 51 deals with the question as to whether the concerned development is in accordance with the Development Plan and, if it is not so, the Planning Authority has the power to revoke the permission. It is not the case of the respondents in any way that this development is in an area which is not meant for residential development or anything of the kind. It is a gaothan area. The building is nearly complete. Some 28 families are staying there. If at all Municipal Corporation wanted to rely upon section 258 of the B.P.M.C. Act, then it was a different situation. That is not the case herein. It is a notice issued under section 51 of the M.R.T.P. Act and it is clear that it is issued not for the purpose for which such notice contemplated nor is it one under section 258 of the B.P.M.C. Act. It is obviously for extraneous purpose. 8.In the circumstances, the petition must succeed. Accordingly we make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition and the notice dated 26th February, 1997 will stand quashed and set aside. 9.By way of abundant caution, we make it clear that we have not made any observation with respect to the rights of the parties over the concerned housing plot/plots. That will be decided in substantive suits. 10.Rule is made absolute as above. 11.Mr. Lobo instructing Mr. 9.By way of abundant caution, we make it clear that we have not made any observation with respect to the rights of the parties over the concerned housing plot/plots. That will be decided in substantive suits. 10.Rule is made absolute as above. 11.Mr. Lobo instructing Mr. Adik for respondent No. 3 makes a request that the hearing of Suit No. 486 of 1996 (now numbered as Suit No. 1752 of 1996) pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kalyan be expedited. Mr. Apte has no objection. Respondent No. 3 will apply to the concerned Judge for taking up the suit for early hearing and the learned Judge will take up the suit for hearing earlier. Petition allowed. -----