JUDGMENT 1. - The facts in brief leading to this appeal are that; the petitioner since deceased Shenker Dan was appointed on ad hoc basis as Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer by promotion from the post of Sales Tax Inspector in 1978. After the petitioner was given ad hoc promotion in 1978, the petitioner's case was not considered by the D.P.C. against the vacancies of your 1977-1978 and 1983-1984 inter alia on the ground that the petitioner has not passed the departmental examinations. Aggrieved with the non-consideration, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Rajasthan Ci it Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur alleging that the basic premise that he has not competed departmental examination is erroneous. He averred that he has passed all the 7 papers after appearing in the departmental examination held in 1968, 1981 and 1982 and, therefore, he contended that he should be considered to have been selected against the vacancies in the year 1978 on the post of ACTO. 2. After filing of the appeal, as a result of non- consideration by D.P.C. the petitioner was ordered to be reverted and the petitioner moved an application before the Tribunal for staying the order of reversion dated 12.12.1983. The Tribunal vide its order dated 14.3.1987 dismissed the appeal by holding that the petitioner became eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer on 1.4.1983 and could be considered for vacancies falling thereafter. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal, due to the finding of the Tribunal, the petitioner acquired eligibility for consideration of promotion and was not reverted to the post of Inspector and was allowed to continue as ACTO on ad hoc temporary basis until the date of his retirement dated 30th Jan., 1995. 3. The happening that led to the retirement are that on 3rd Jan., 1995, the petitioner sought voluntary retirement from service w.e.f. 23rd. Jan., 1995 by seeking relaxation in the rule for the notice of requisite period. The respondents accepted that voluntary retirement option submitted by the petitioner as ad hoc ACTO by order dated 30th Jan., 1995. It further appears that by another order dated 30th Jan., 1995, the petitioner was sought to be reverted to the post of Inspector in pursuance of order dated 12.12.1983 effecting his retire benefits on his voluntary retirement which option he submitted as ACTO and not as Inspector. 4. It further appears that by another order dated 30th Jan., 1995, the petitioner was sought to be reverted to the post of Inspector in pursuance of order dated 12.12.1983 effecting his retire benefits on his voluntary retirement which option he submitted as ACTO and not as Inspector. 4. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner filed the writ petition No. 490/1995 with the following prayer : "(a) for quashing Annexure A/2 to the extent of injury causing to the petitioner vide pare No. 3; (a1) the order Annexure 2-A may also be quashed and set aside; (b) for directing the respondents to grant the petitioner his pension and gratuity, G.P.F. on the basis of the post held by him at the time of retirement. (c) In case of success of the petition, all consequential benefits should be allowed to the petitioner." 5. During the pendency of the writ petition, Shankar Dan died. When this fact was brought to the notice of the Court, the learned Single Judge vide judgment under appeal dismissed the writ petition by holding that the right to sue did not survive to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Shankar Dan when they moved an application for substitution of their names in place of petitioner. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as having abated. Hence, this appeal. 6. At the outset, it may be stated that the question about the right to sue in case like this is no more res integre and has been given a quietus by a recent decision of the Supreme court that where the consequence of order passed in favour of the deceased incumbent results in alteration of his remuneration, the right to receive remuneration survives to the legal representatives and consequently, the petitioner's petition cannot be dismissed as having abated for want of surviving of Hs. In fact, in the present case, the right to receive pension does not end with the death of petitioner Shankar Dan but his widow is entitled to receive family pension and, therefore, the right to receive pension on the basis of pension allowable to deceased retired Government employee when he was alive goes to his widow. Therefore, the judgment under appeal dismissing the writ petition on account of death of petitioner Shenker Dan as having abated cannot be sustained. 7. Therefore, the judgment under appeal dismissing the writ petition on account of death of petitioner Shenker Dan as having abated cannot be sustained. 7. In these circumstances, ordinarily we would have remitted the case back to the learned Single Judge to decide the writ petition on merit afresh but looking to the fact that the petitioner raised claim to the retiral benefits after he retired in 1995 and matter concerns the legal representatives, at the request of learned counsel for the parties, we deem it just and proper to decide the merit of the claim of the appellants to retiral benefits on merit. 8. From the narration of facts, it is apparent that the deceased petitioner held the post of ACTO since 1978 till he retired on 30th Jan., 1995. On submission of voluntary retirement request vide letter dated 3rd Jan., 1995, the order of retirement and order of reversal has been communicated on the same date. Apparently, it does not stand to reason that when the petitioner had submitted his voluntary retirement option as an ACTO and he was continuing as ACTO since 1978, (all the privileges were over for the respondents to make an order of reversion giving effect to an order passed on 12.12.1983). On the date while accepting the application for voluntary retirement, the respondents cannot say that notwithstanding the petitioner was found to be not eligible for consideration against the vacancies from 1971 to 1983 but as per the finding of the Tribunal itself, the petitioner has acquired eligibility for being considered for the post of ACTO in 1983 and the petitioner was discharging the functions of ACTO thereafter under the orders of the State Government and obviously against the vacancies available. In these circumstances. continuation of the petitioner as ACTO notwithstanding he dismissal of his appeal by the Tribunal cannot be attributed to any misrepresentation or fault on the part of the petitioner. It is for the reasons hat the Department needed adequate number of revenue officers and the petitioner being eligible to hold the post has been allowed to continue as ACTO, permitting the respondents to reduce the petitioner in rank by reverting him simultaneously with the acceptance of the offer for voluntary retirement on the same date appears on the face of record to be highly unreasonable and arbitrary only to deprive the petitioner of his legitimate retiral benefits. 9. 9. It may be noticed that the petitioner has made an application for voluntary retirement on 3rd Jan., 1995 while holding the post of ACTO and drawing the salary as such. To the legitimate expectation of the petitioner when he submitted voluntary retirement option to seek retiral benefits on that premises, he has also requested the respondents to waive notice period for effecting the voluntary retirement and asked for voluntary retirement w.e.f. 23rd Jan., 1995 and the respondents have clarified when they made an order dated 30th Jan., 1995 accepting the voluntary retirement option but much prior to the expiry of statutory notice period. In these circumstances, ordinarily it is conveyed that the respondent had waived the requirement of minimum notice period for becoming the voluntary retirement operative. The voluntary retirement has been accepted before the expiry of minimum period with immediate effect on 30th Jan., 1995. Once that option is accepted, it was not permissible to revert him to the post of Inspector, as if the respondents purported to give effect to the order dated 12.12.1983. Moreover, as we have noticed above the option of the petitioner for voluntary retirement which emanates from the letter dated 3rd Jan., 1995 was on the legitimate expectation of getting retiral benefits as ACTO. On that premises, the respondents, while accepting the offer but simultaneously reducing his status and salary, obviously did not act in the manner of a fair employer when it was open for the respondent to have rejected the application. In our opinion, the acceptance of application for voluntary retirement could have given room to challenge the action of reversion. 10. Apparently, the entire exercise to make an order of reversion on 30th Jan., 1995 and accepting his offer for voluntary retirement simultaneously was for reducing his retiral benefits. it is not in dispute that the voluntary retirement of petitioner become effective on 30.1.1995, if the petitioner was to take joining time on the new post to which he was reverted to, he could have taken that only after 30th January, 1995 but after 30th Jan., 1995 he ceased to be in employment as a result of the acceptance of voluntary retirement option. 11. The order of reversion could not have become effective simultaneously. 11. The order of reversion could not have become effective simultaneously. Even if the petitioner was to be reverted with immediate effect, he had worked as ACTO up to 30.1.1995 and was entitled to and paid remuneration of the post of ACTO. The petitioner's retiral benefits have to be counted on the basis of his last drawn remuneration w.e.f. 31.1.1995. Thus, looking from any angle, we are of the opinion that the action of the respondents in issuing the order dated 30th Jan., 1995 reverting the petitioner on the post of Sales Tax Inspector at the time of acceptance of his option was not justified and was in clear violation of the principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution and any order which is arbitrary whether administrative or quasi judicial results in infringing of fundamental rights of equality cannot be sustained. 12. According the appeal is allowed, the judgment under appeal is set aside. As a result of aforesaid discussion the writ petition is also allowed, the impugned order dated 30th Jan., 1995 reverting the petitioner to the post of Sales Tax Inspector simultaneously with the acceptance of his offer for voluntary retirement with effect from the same date is quashed and it is directed that the respondents shall determine the retiral benefits of the petitioner on the basis of his last pay drawn as ACTO until 30th Jan., 1995 and arrears, if any, found due on that basis may be released to the legal heirs of the deceased petitioner so also the pension if any payable to the respondent No. 2 Padam-Kanwar widow of late Shri Shankar Dan may be determined and released to her on that premises w.e.f. the date of death of deceased petitioner. The directions be carried out within a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ or production of certified copy of the order, whichever is earlier.There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal - Order of Reduction in Rank Set Aside. *******