( 1 ) COMMON Order: c. M. P. Nos. 18125/2003 and 18126/2003 were filed praying for the relief of temporary injunction and for suspension of Judgment and decree made in A. S. No. 77/2001 and likewise C. M. P. No. 18127/2003 and 18128/2003 were filed in S. A. No. 406/2003 praying for temporary injunction and suspension of Judgment and decree made in A. S. No. 78/2001 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy. Similar applications C. M. P. Nos. 8754 and 8755 of 2003 in S. A. No. 406/2003 were filed which were dismissed on 1-5-2003. ( 2 ) THE legal representatives of Sri G. Hanumantha Rao are prosecuting these litigations at present. The said G. Hanumantha Rao filed O. S. No. 166/95 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge. Hyderabad West and South, Ranga Reddy District for the relief of perpetual injunction. The respondent in these applications filed O. S. No. 12/98 on the file of the self same Court for the relief of specific performance and also for perpetual injunction. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Hyderabad West and South, Ranga Reddy, tried both the suits together and decreed O. S. No. 166/95 and dismissed O. S. No. 12/98 and aggrieved by the same, the respondent herein filed A. S. No. 77/2001 and A. S. No. 78/2001 as against those Judgments and decrees respectively and Appeals were allowed. During the pendency of these Appeals, the said G. Hanumantha Rao died and the legal representatives were brought on record. Aggrieved by the said Judgments and decrees made by the appellate Court reversing the Judgments and decrees made by the trial Court, the said legal representatives of the deceased G. Hanumantha Rao preferred S. A. No. 405/2003 and S. A. No. 406/2003 and no doubt these Second Appeals were admitted. Similar applications referred to supra were filed which were dismissed and again these applications are proved praying for the self same reliefs. ( 3 ) SRI Narsing Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners in fact had touched the merits and demerits of the matter to prima facie show that the petitioners are having a strong prima facie case and balance of convenience also is in their favour and if status quo is not maintained during the pendency of these Second Appeals, the petitioners would be put to serious loss. The learned Counsel also would maintain that having admitted the Second Appeals, interim relief was refused without recording any reason and in the light of the subsequent events which had been well explained in para-15 of the affidavit filed in support of these applications, definitely these applications are maintainable. The Counsel also would maintain that the question of applicability of principle of res judicata would not arise at all in matters of this nature since these are all interlocutory orders which would be made to preserve status quo during the pendency of a particular litigation. The learned Counsel also had explained several factual aspects and ultimately had concluded that in the facts and circumstances of the case the reliefs prayed for are to be granted in the interest of justice of maintain status quo. Reliance also was place on MADAN LAL Vs. BADRI NARAYAN AIR 1988 Rajasthan 61. ( 4 ) PER contra Sri Venugopal Rao, the learned Counsel representing the respondent had taken this Court through several details which had been narrated in the common counter affidavit filed opposing these applications and had maintained that the reliefs prayed for in these applications are virtually the same reliefs which had been prayed for in the prior applications and in fact the prior applications also were heard and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that these are not fit matters where any interim orders can be granted and ultimately had dismissed the said applications. Hence moving the present applications with similar reliefs would be definitely abuse of process of law. The Counsel also would maintain that in the light of the dismissal of the applications, the respondent is definitely entitled to protect the property and the respondent is doing nothing more than protecting the property and this cannot be made a ground for getting interim relief on the ground of changed circumstances. The learned Counsel also had meticulously taken this Court through the contents of the affidavits filed in support of the prior applications and the affidavits filed in support of the present applications and had contended that except that the respondent is making an attempt to alter the features nothing more had been stated and virtually the contents of both the affidavits are one and the same. The Counsel would maintain that definitely this would not amount to changed circumstances. The Counsel would maintain that definitely this would not amount to changed circumstances. The learned Counsel also would maintain that even otherwise in view of the limitations in granting temporary injunction at the instance of a defendant, definitely the relief prayed for in C. M. P. No. 18127/2003 cannot be granted since such application itself is not maintainable at the instance of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant in the said suit. ( 5 ) HEARD both the Counsel. Several of the factual details which had been narrated in the affidavits filed in support of the applications and the counter affidavits need not be repeated again. Suffice to state that the reliefs prayed for in the prior applications and the present applications virtually are one and the same. In C. M. P. No. 18125/2003 in S. A. No. 405/203 and in C. M. P. No. 18127/2003 in S. A. No. 406/203, the relief prayed for reads as hereunder: for the reasons stated in the annexed affidavit the petitioners herein pray that the Honble Court may be pleased to grant injunction against the respondent restraining him from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the land consisting of 3 acres 30 guntas in Sy. No. 66/2 of Raidurg village, Pan maktha, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga reddy District, pending disposal of the Second Appeal and be pleased to grant such further and necessary orders as the Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. ( 6 ) IN C. M. P. No. 18127/2003 in S. A. No. 406/203, the legal representatives of the defendant in the suit are praying for temporary injunction and the relief of this nature cannot be granted at the instance of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant. In J. SAMBAMURTHY Vs. Ch. SRINIVASA RAO 1987 (2) ALT 630 after referring to an earlier decision in D. RAMA NAIDU Vs. D. C. VENKATA SUBBA NAIDU 1971 AIHC 272 a learned Judge of this Court observed paras 15 and 16 as hereunder: the object behind sub-clause (1) of Rule 1 of Order 39 appears to me to be to preserve the property intact and not allow in to be damaged or wasted or alienated or sold by any party, be he the plaintiff or the defendant, pending suit. For that purpose, an injunction could even be granted in favour of defendant and against the plaintiff. In fact, if such a relief is granted under clause (a) it would equally sub-serve the ultimate relief that may be granted in the suit in favour even of the plaintiff or even in case the suit is dismissed so that the defendant is, left where he is so far as the property is concerned. ( 7 ) BUT to grant a positive relief in the manner mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 1 of Order 39, C. P. C. in favour of defendant is permissible only if a relief of a similar nature could be granted in favour of the defendant in the main suit or original petition. If the defendant is not entitled to any such relief in the main suit against the plaintiff-he not having filed any counter claim or asked for any set-off, the defendant could not ask for any interim relief of a similar nature. That is my opinion, is the reason why the defendant cannot invoke the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 C. P. C. for getting a temporary injunction against the plaintiff in circumstances other than those covered by clause (a) of Rule 1 Order 39, C. P. C. the inherent power of the Court which would be invoked for sub-serving the ultimate relief to be granted in the main suit or proceeding, cannot be invoked by a defendant who could not be grant any positive relief in the main suit or proceeding except in cases where a counter claim or set-off is claimed. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that Section 151 C. P. C. could still be invoked by the defendants in cases not covered by clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39, C. P. C. is therefore not correct. ( 8 ) IN COLLISON Vs. WARREN (1901) 1 Ch. 812 after referring to the earlier decisions. Buckley, J observed: the question is this whether the defendant can move for an injunction against the plaintiff without filing a counter-claim or issuing a writ in a cross-action. In my opinion, he can in some cases, but only in cases where the defendants claim to relief arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action, or is incidental to it. ( 9 ) IN SUGANDA BAI Vs. In my opinion, he can in some cases, but only in cases where the defendants claim to relief arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action, or is incidental to it. ( 9 ) IN SUGANDA BAI Vs. SULU BAI AIR 1975 Karnataka 137 it was held that a defendant can move for a temporary injunction against the plaintiff without filing a counter claim only when and where the relief claimed arises out of plaintiffs cause of action or is incidental to it. In DILIP KUMAR Vs. S. CH. R. S. VAKIL 1972 ALL. L. J. 379 it was held that temporary injunction can be granted by a Court in suitable cases under its inherent power for the ends of justice in favour of defendants and as against the plaintiff. In VINCENT Vs. AISUMMA AIR 1989 Kerala 81 it was held: order 39 Rule 1 indicates that in a suit an order of injunction can be passed either against the defendant or against the plaintiff. O. 39, R. 1 (b) and (c) refer to orders of injunction passed against the defendants whereas O. 39 R. 1 (a) does not confine to applications filed by the plaintiffs alone. The words by any party to the suit therein are sufficient enough to indicate that the legislature intended such orders to be passed even on applications by defendants. That apart, there is no prohibition in the Rules under O. 39 against defendant making an application for injunction. Hence, there is nothing wrong in assuming that O. 39, R. 1 affords scope for passing orders of injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, on application filed by the defendant also it is no doubt true that in certain circumstances the defendant in a suit also may be entitled to move an application for temporary injunction. But, in the light of the relief prayed for in the present application, I am of the considered opinion that the legal representatives of the deceased defendant cannot pray for such relief in a Second Appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for the relief of specific performance and perpetual injunction. The exercise of inherent power cannot be stretched too far so as to engulf a matter of this nature. ( 10 ) BE that it may, the fact similar applications were moved and had been dismissed is not in controversy. The exercise of inherent power cannot be stretched too far so as to engulf a matter of this nature. ( 10 ) BE that it may, the fact similar applications were moved and had been dismissed is not in controversy. The relevant portion at para 15 in the affidavits filed in support of C. M. P. No. 18125/2003 and C. M. P. No. 18127/2003 reads as hereunder: i respectfully submit that the respondent with an intention to encroach on the land brought about half a dozen labourers to drill and break the big granite stone lying on the main road side. The petitioner has immediately informed the police station Raidurg and the Police Raidurg police station has visited the spot and driven out the labourers from there. This incident has happened on 14-6-2003. The respondent again on 16-6-2003 brought few labourers to do the same job of drilling and breaking the stones and wanted to enter the land. Since I have already posted my men on the land they prevented the persons from doing anything on the land and they went away. Again on 17-6-2003 the respondent with some labourers came to the spot to enter the land stating that they came only to clean the land and to remove the grass. This matter was again brought to the notice of the Serilingamapally Mandal Revenue Officer and on our complaint the M. R. O. along with his staff came to the spot and the implements which the people brought were taken away and warned the people not to come to the land again. I suspect that the respondent is bent upon creating trouble on the land and he is trying to encroach on the land in spite of being prevented time and again for the last three days. It is only at the intervention of the local police and the concerned M. R. O. I could physically prevent them from encroaching upon the land. It is also not possible for me to sit at the land every day to prevent such activities of encroachment. Under the circumstances it is just and necessary that the Honble Court may be pleased to grant injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the land consisting of 3 acres 30 guntas as in Sy. Under the circumstances it is just and necessary that the Honble Court may be pleased to grant injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the land consisting of 3 acres 30 guntas as in Sy. No. 66/2 of village Raidurg (Panmaktha), Serilingamapally Mandal, Ranga Reddy district pending disposal of the second appeal and be pleased to pass such further and necessary orders as the Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. ( 11 ) THESE events narrated definitely cannot be said to be the changed circumstances by virtue of which the relief prayed for temporary injunction can be granted. In the decision referred (1) supra, it was held: to the second application for issue of temporary injunction under O. 39 Rr. 1 and 2, there is no bar under the principles of res judicata for its consideration, but the same can be considered only when the petitioner shows that such consideration is necessary in view of new facts and new situation and circumstances that have taken place subsequently. Interlocutory orders like temporary injunctions are meant only to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings and do not decide the controversy in issue on merits. Such orders are therefore capable of being altered or varied, but only on proof of new facts or new situation, which may have emerged subsequently. ( 12 ) IN ARJUN SINGH Vs. MOHINDRA KUMAR AIR 1964 S. C. 993 The apex Court held: interlocutory orders was of various kinds: some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders as based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of, the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under O. IX R. 7, Civil P. C. would be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate Court. In that sense, the refusal of the Court to permit the defendant to set the clock back does not attain finality. But though the same Court is not finally bound by that order that order at later stages. So as to preclude is being reconsidered and even if the rule is res judicata does not apply it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. Thus if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application of any rule of res judicata, but would be rejected on the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that the no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principal of res judicata is applicable to the decision on particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issue, whereas in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the Court would be competent, nay would be bound to take those into account and make an order comfortably to the facts freshly brought before the Court. ( 13 ) THERE cannot be any controversy that if there are changed circumstances, applications praying for interim relief again can definitely be moved despite the fact that the prior applications were dismissed. However, on a careful scrutiny of all the facts and circumstances and also the affidavits filed in support of the applications which were already dismissed and the affidavits filed in the present applications, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that the petitioners definitely are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in these applications. Where a learned Judge had refused similar reliefs, the same cannot be granted by this Court in these applications and definitely the remedy is elsewhere. Non-recording of reasons by the learned Judge also cannot be assailed as a ground to maintain subsequent applications praying for the same reliefs. It is no doubt true that the principle of res judicata is not operative in relation to such interlocutory orders, but definitely this would amount to abuse of process of law which is impermissible. Non-recording of reasons by the learned Judge also cannot be assailed as a ground to maintain subsequent applications praying for the same reliefs. It is no doubt true that the principle of res judicata is not operative in relation to such interlocutory orders, but definitely this would amount to abuse of process of law which is impermissible. It is needless to say that any alterations would be subject to the result of the Second Appeals only and hence this Court does not see any exceptional reasons to exercise the discretion of granting the reliefs prayed for in the present applications, especially in the light of the prior orders already made by this Court. Hence, viewed from any angle, these applications deserve dismissal at the hands of this Court and accordingly these Civil Miscellaneous Petitions shall stand dismissed. ( 14 ) BOTH the Counsel had brought to the notice of this Court that these Second Appeals require an early disposal and in view of the said request, let office list these matters for final hearing at the top of the list on 26/4/2004.