Judgment Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. 1. In these petitions except C.W.P. No. 15952 of 2004, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the orders passed by Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioners-cum-Revisional Authorities, Karnal, Faridabad, Gurgaon and Panipat under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Sales Tax Act) and the demand notices issued by the concerned Excise Authorities for recovery of tax on Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and/or Beer sold by the petitioners during the year 1998-99. In C.W.P. No. 15952 of 2004, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 21.9.1999, 13.6.2000 and 19.2.2004 passed by Excise and Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority, Yamuna Nagar, Joint Excise and taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Ambala and Sales Tax Tribunal, Haryana (for short, the Tribunal) respectively in the matter of levy of tax on the sale of liquor made during 1998-99 and notice dated 6.10.2004 issued for recovery of the tax due. 2. For the sake of convenience, we have taken the facts from C.W.P. No. 11493 of 2003. The petitioner is a private hotel situated in the State of Haryana having four-star certification from the Department of Tourism, Government of India. In the year 1998, the petitioner obtained L-4/L-5 Licence under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, as applicable to the State of Haryana for sale of IMFL, in the bars run by it. During the assessment year 1998-99, the petitioner sold IMFL worth Rs. 33,71,417/- but did not pay the tax in accordance with the provisions contained in Sector 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (for short the Act). By the order dated 10.4.2000, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal, while accepting the petitioners claim for deduction of Rs. 31,51,317/- on account of tax free sale of IMFL, determined its liability of tax and penalty to the tune of Rs. 7,079/-. After two years and about nine months, Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (ST)-cum-Revisional authority, Karnal issued notice dated 16.1.2003 to the petitioner under Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act proposing to revise the assessment made by the Assessing Authority and levy tax on the sale of IMFL made during 1998-99. 7,079/-. After two years and about nine months, Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (ST)-cum-Revisional authority, Karnal issued notice dated 16.1.2003 to the petitioner under Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act proposing to revise the assessment made by the Assessing Authority and levy tax on the sale of IMFL made during 1998-99. The petitioner contested the notice and pleaded that in view of the stay granted by the High Court in C.W.P. No. 4870 of 2002 - Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd. v. State of Haryana, and order dated 30.4.2003 passed in C.W.P. No. 6512 of 2003 - Hotel and Restaurant Association of Haryana v. The State of Haryana, proceeding initiated under Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act may be kept pending till the individual hotelier files the writ petition in the High Court. The Revisional Authority did not accept the petitioners plea and passed order dated 28.1.2003 (Annexure P-10 with the writ petition) requiring it to pay tax at the rate of 20% on IMFL sold during 1998-99 and accordingly, created demand of Rs. 6,30,263/-. 3. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Revisional Authority on the ground of discrimination by alleging that while sale of IMFL and Beer made by the Haryana Tourism Corporation Limited (for short, the Corporation) has been exempted from tax, similar benefit has not been extended to it. It has also invoked the doctrine of promissory equitable estoppel by asserting that after having induced the hoteliers not to collect tax on the sale of IMFL, during 1998-99, the State Government is estopped from creating demand on the basis of Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C read with Section 16-A of the Act. In support of this plea, the petitioner has relied on memo No. 945/S.T.I. dated 1.4.1998 sent by Prohibition, Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana (respondent No. 3) to the Managing Director of the Corporation. 4. The stand taken by the respondents is that in terms of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C and Section 27(3) read with Entry 24-A of Schedule B, the petitioner is liable to pay tax on the sale of IMFL: and no discrimination has been practised in the matter of levy of tax under the Act. 4. The stand taken by the respondents is that in terms of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C and Section 27(3) read with Entry 24-A of Schedule B, the petitioner is liable to pay tax on the sale of IMFL: and no discrimination has been practised in the matter of levy of tax under the Act. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been averred that the decision taken in the meeting convened by Chief Secretary, Haryana on 9.10.2002 to write off the tax liability of the Corporation cannot be made basis for raising the plea of discrimination because it is purely an inter-departmental matter and the petitioner cannot wriggle out of its obligation to pay tax in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The respondents have controverted the petitioners plea of estoppel by asserting that memo dated 1.4.1998 had been issued by respondent No. 3 to the Managing Director of the Corporation due to inadvertence and this was rectified vide letter dated 9.3.1999 issued to all Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioners in the State. According to them, there is no provision in the Act under which respondent No. 3 can grant exemption to any dealer from payment of tax and as such, the petitioner cannot rely on the contents of memo dated 1.4.1998 for claiming exemption. 5. In other writ petitions except C.W.P. No. 15952 of 2004, the petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the revisional authorities on similar grounds. 6. The facts of C.W.P. No. 15952 of 2004 show that by an order dated 31.1.2000 (Annexure P-3 in the writ petition), Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Yamuna Nagar held the petitioner liable to pay tax on the sale of IMFL and Beer amounting to Rs. 13,04,925/- and created a demand of Rs. 2,60,985/-. The appeal filed against that order was dismissed by Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Ambala vide order dated 13.6.2000 (Annexure P-4 with the writ petition). 13,04,925/- and created a demand of Rs. 2,60,985/-. The appeal filed against that order was dismissed by Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Ambala vide order dated 13.6.2000 (Annexure P-4 with the writ petition). Further appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 19.2.2004 (Annexure P5 with the writ petition) by making the following observations:- "Addition of Clause (iv) by notification SO 52/HA 20 73/S 63/96 dated 12.4.1996 in item 2 in schedules in entry 2 after Clause (iii) does not admit of any ambiguity that foreign liquor/Indian Made Foreign Liquor is exigible to sales tax at the stage of sale by an L-4/L-5 licensee. How could circulars issued by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner take away the clear and unambiguous character of this notification? No circular contrary to this notification could be binding on the taxing authorities in the State of Haryana. Taxing authorities in the State of Haryana were bound to give effect to the notification issued by the rule making authority. Even otherwise, vide its circular dated 9.3.1999 the department had clarified to its officers that in view of the 1996 amendment L-4/L-5 licensees were bound to pay tax at the prescribed rate. Imposition of Excise duty on liquor or Indian Made Foreign Liquor or Beer had nothing to do with the imposition of sales tax as excise duty is levied under Section 31 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 on liquor manufactured in distillery at the time when at leaves the distillery, while sales-tax is levied under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 when sales are made. In view of what we have said above, we are of the opinion that the authorities below justifiably held the dealer liable to pay sales-tax on the sale of liquor and beer in its Bar and Restaurant when food and liquor served in the Bar and Restaurant was exigible to sales tax. Liquor and Beer also became exigible to sales-tax as they became part of food which was being served in the same premises. Appeal fails and is dismissed." 7. From the pleadings of the parties, the following questions arise for determination in these petitions:- (1) Whether the decision of the State Government/competent authority to levy tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold by the petitioners during 1998-99 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India? Appeal fails and is dismissed." 7. From the pleadings of the parties, the following questions arise for determination in these petitions:- (1) Whether the decision of the State Government/competent authority to levy tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold by the petitioners during 1998-99 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India? (2) Whether memo dated 1.4.1998 written by respondent No. 3 to the Managing Director of the Corporation amounted to an inducement to other L-4/L-5 licences including the petitioners not to pay tax on the sale of IMFL and/or Beer on which excise duty had been paid at the prescribed rate and, therefore, the respondents are estopped from charging sales-tax at the rate of 20% on IMFL/Beer sold in the assessment year 1998-99? Re: Question No. 1 8 Mrs. Lisa Gill argued that levy of tax on IMFL/Beer sold by the petitioners should be declared as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because tax liability created against the Corporation which also holds L-4/L-5 licence has been written off by the State Government. She submitted that the petitioners and the Corporation are identically situated in the matter of sale of IMFL and/or Beer and argued that in the back-drop of the decision taken by the State Government to write off the liability created by the Excise Authorities against the Corporation, the petitioners are also entitled to exemption from payment of tax on IMFL sold during 1998-99. Shri Ashok Aggarwal, learned Advocate General, Haryana argued that the plea of discrimination is not available to the petitioners because the Government has not exempted the Corporation from levy of sales tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold during 1998-99. Shri Aggarwal also made a statement that the State government has not waived the tax imposed on the Corporation and if any decision is taken in future to grant exemption to the Corporation from levy of sales-tax, then similar benefit will be extended to the petitioners. He, however, emphasised that the petitioners cannot rely on the decision taken in the meeting held on 9.10.2002 under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to write off sales-tax liability of the Corporation because that is an internal matter of the departments of the Government and no right, much less vested right, can be claimed by the petitioners to seek similar write off. 9. 9. In our opinion, there is no merit in the petitioners plea of discrimination and there is no valid ground to direct the State Government to exempt them from payment of sales tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold during 1998-99. Section 16-A, 27(3), Entry 24-A of Schedule B and Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C of the Act, which are relevant to the decision of this issue, read as under:- "Sections 16-A and 27(3) and Entry 24-A of Schedule B and Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C of the Sales tax Act. 16-A. Tax on goods specified in Schedule C. Tax in case of goods specified in Schedule C shall be leviable and payable on the sale and purchase thereof at the stage and subject to the conditions indicated in the said Schedule. 27. Taxable turnover:- (1) and (2) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the taxable turnover of any dealer for any period on or after the first day of April, 1982, shall not include his turnover during that period in respect of any sale or purchase of foreign liquor (Indian Made Foreign Liquor and foreign liquor) at any stage other than that specified in Schedule C. Provided he furnishes a certificate or declaration in such form as may be prescribed. SCHEDULE-B (See Sections 6 and 15) Sr. Description of Goods Conditions of Exceptions No. 1 to 24 xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx 24A. Sale of foreign liquor (Indian made Foreign Except when sold by a Liquor or Foreign Liquor) on which State L-4/L-5 Licensee. excise duty has been paid at the rate of fixed for the year or on which sales tax has been paid at the time of purchase thereof inside State and postal stationery.SCHEDULE-C (See Sections 16-A) Sr.No. Description of Goods Stage of levy of tax 1. xx xx xx xx xx 2. (i) to (iii) xx xx xx xx (iv) Foreign liquor/Indian made At the stage of sale by foreign liquor L-4/L-5 licensee. Aconjoint reading of Sections 16-A and 27(3) of the Sales Tax Act shows that the sale or purchase of the goods specified in Schedule C are liable to be taxed at the stage and subject to the conditions contained therein. Aconjoint reading of Sections 16-A and 27(3) of the Sales Tax Act shows that the sale or purchase of the goods specified in Schedule C are liable to be taxed at the stage and subject to the conditions contained therein. In terms of Section 27(3), the sale or purchase of IMFL is exempt from levy of tax subject to the furnishing of certificate or declaration by the dealer in the prescribed form. However, exemption clause is not applicable to the sale of IMFL by L-4/L-5 licensee. It is, thus, clear that all transactions involving sale or purchase of IMFL are liable to sale-tax at the prescribed rates. Therefore, it must be held that the petitioners, who are L-4/L-5 licensees and are not covered by the exemption clause contained in Section 27(3), are required to pay sales-tax at the prescribed rate in terms of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C and the Revisional Authorities did not commit any illegality by nullifying the orders passed by the Assessing Authorities (except in C.W.P. 15952 of 2004), who had accepted the petitioners plea for deduction in lieu of the alleged tax free sales. In our considered view, the orders passed by the Assessing Authorities were clearly contrary to the mandate of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C of the Act and the same were rightly revised by the Revisional Authorities. 10. Before parting with this aspect of the case, we may notice some provisions of the Act, other than Section 27(3) which is applicable only to IMFL, under which the State government can grant exemption from payment of sale tax. Section 13 of the Sales Tax Act empowers the State Government to exempt any class of co-operative societies/tiny industrial units or persons from payment of sale-tax on the purchase or sale of any goods subject to the conditions which may be specified in the notification to be issued for grant of exemption. Section 13-A empowers the State Government to exempt from levy of tax any class of goods in respect of the transactions covered under sub-clauses (ii) and (iv) of Clause (j) and Sub-clause (ii) and (iv) of Clause (1) of Section 2 subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification issued for the purpose. Section 13-A empowers the State Government to exempt from levy of tax any class of goods in respect of the transactions covered under sub-clauses (ii) and (iv) of Clause (j) and Sub-clause (ii) and (iv) of Clause (1) of Section 2 subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification issued for the purpose. Section 13-B empowers the State Government to exempt certain clauses of industries from the payment of tax for such period and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. 11. The petitioners have neither pleaded that their case .is covered by Sections 13, 13-A or 13-B nor any evidence has been produced before the Court to show that they are otherwise entitled to claim exemption from payment of Sales Tax on IMFL sold in 1998-99. Not only this, during the course of hearing, their counsel could not draw our attention to any provisions of the Sale Tax Act under which the State Government can exempt the sale of IMFL by L-4/L-5 licensees. Rather, the sole argument advanced by her was that the petitioners are entitled to exemption because the State Government had decided to write off the tax liability created against the Corporation. In our opinion, in the absence of any statutory provision, the Court cannot compel the State Government to exempt the sales made by the petitioners during 1998-99 from payment of tax ignoring the mandate of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C and the plea of discrimination raised by them cannot be entertained simply because the Government has taken a decision to write off the liability of the Corporation. Such decision is purely an internal matter of the Government and no right, much less a legal right, can be claimed by the petitioners either to seek exemption from payment of tax or claim a mandamus directing the Government to write off their tax liability as well. Re: Question No. 2 12. Mrs. Lisa Gill submitted that even if the Court does not accept the petitioners plea of discrimination, it should invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel and restrain the respondents from making recovery of tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold during 1998-99 because the petitioners did not collect tax in view of memo dated 1.4.1998 sent by respondent No. 3 to the Managing Director of the Corporation. She emphasised that the subsequent clarification issued vide letter dated 9.3.1999 cannot be operated to the prejudice of the petitioners because by virtue of memo dated 1.4.1998, they had been induced not to collect tax on IMFL etc. sold to the customers during 1998-99. In support of this argument, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Indra Industries, (2000)9 S.C.C. 66 and State of Punjab v. Nestle India Limited, (2004)6 S.C.C. 765. 13. Shri Ashok Aggarwal, learned Advocate General, Haryana argued that the petitioners cannot seek enforcement of memo dated 1.4.1998 issued by respondent No. 3 because the same was contrary to the mandate of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C. He submitted that the State Government had not taken any decision to exempt IMFL Beer sold during 1998-99 by L-4/L-5 licensees from levy of tax and argued that in the absence of appropriate decision by the competent authority, the petitioners cannot seek a direction to the respondents not to recover the sales-tax in accordance with the statutory provisions. Shri Aggarwal further submitted that memo dated 1.4.1998 issued by respondent No. 3 cannot be construed as a promise made or inducement given by the State Government to the petitioners not to collect tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold to the costumers because the same was not even addressed to them. He emphasised that the petitioners have not placed any material on the record of the writ petitions to show that they had not collected sales-tax on IMFL sold to the consumers during 1998-99 and argued that even if, they had done so, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in their case because respondent No. 3 is not empowered under the Act to take any decision in the matter of levy of sales-tax or grant of exemption. 14. We have given serious throught to the respective arguments. 14. We have given serious throught to the respective arguments. The principle underlying the doctrine of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his words or conduct made to other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relation or affect a legal relationship to arise in future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied to the Government and the argument based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Thus, where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee and in fact, the promisee relying on it alters its position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee. However, in such matters the doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts of the case, it would be inequitable to bind the Governments to the promise made by it, the Court would not raised an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Likewise, in the cases in which Government changes its policy in larger interest and establishes before the court that it would be against the public interest to enforce the promisee, the Court may relieve the Government of its obligation to fulfil the promise. A promise made or assurance given by the public authorities/functionaries of the Government cannot be enforced by the Court if the same is found to be contrary to the mandate of law - Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of U.P., (1979)2 S.C.C. 409; Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, (1994)4 S.C.C. 104; Kanishka Trading Co. A promise made or assurance given by the public authorities/functionaries of the Government cannot be enforced by the Court if the same is found to be contrary to the mandate of law - Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of U.P., (1979)2 S.C.C. 409; Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, (1994)4 S.C.C. 104; Kanishka Trading Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 874; (1995)1 S.C.C. 274; Shabi Construction Company v. City and Industrial Development Corporation, (1995)4 S.C.C. 301; I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paper Boards v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P., (1996)6 S.C.C. 634; Union Territory, Chandigarh Admn. v. Managing Society, Goswami, G.D.S.D.C., (1996-3)113 P.L.R. 685 (S.C.); Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt. Ltd. Meerut v. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1997)7 S.C.C. 251; Union of India v. Ganesh Rice Mills, (1998)9 S.C.C. 630; Union of India v. Rakesh Kumar, (2001)4 S.C.C. 309; Sharma Transport represented by D.P. Sharma v. Government of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322;(2002)2 S.C.C. 188; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2004)6 S.C.C. 765. 15. In Nestle India Limited v. State of Punjab, (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 367, a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (G.S. Singhvi, J.) was a member applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel and quashed the levy of purchase tax on milk for the assessment year 1996-97. The facts of that case were that on 26.2.1996, the then Chief Minister of Punjab, while addressing the dairy farmers at a Stage Level functions, declared that the State Government had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk products. Thereafter, the Finance Minister of the State, while presenting the budget for the year 1996-97, announced that purchase tax on the milk and milk products will be abolished. Immediately, thereafter, the Financial Commissioner sent memo dated 26.4.1996 to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner conveying the Governments decision to grant exemption from levy of purchase tax on milk. He also directed that instructions be issued to the concerned officers in the field to implement the decision of the Government. This was followed by circular dated 18.5.1996 issued by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner to all the Deputy and Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioners and Deputy Directors (Enforcement) to make assessment keeping in view the decision of the State Government. On 27.6.1996, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister which was attended by the Finance Minister, the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and various Financial Commissioners. On 27.6.1996, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister which was attended by the Finance Minister, the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and various Financial Commissioners. In that meeting, the decision to abolish purchase tax on milk was reiterated and it was decided that a formal notification be issued in a day or two. On 18.7.1996/24.7.1996, the Finance Minister made an announcement that with a view to encourage the milk producers and for granting relief to the common people, traders and industrialists, the Government has abolished tax on milk. The Finance Department formally approved the proposal of the Administrative Department to abolish purchase tax on milk and the Council of Ministers gave its formal approval to the decision in the meeting held on 21.8.1996. In furtherance of these decisions, Sales Tax authorities did not collect tax and accepted the returns filed by the writ petitioners. Later on, the Excise and Taxation Officers issued notices to the petitioners to pay tax on milk purchased during the assessment year 1996-97. In the backdrop of these facts, this Court held that the State Government was bound by its promise/representation made to the writ petitioners to abolish purchase tax on milk and that non-issuance of a formal notification was inconsequential. The appeal filed by the State of Punjab against the order of the High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to a large number of judicial precedents on the subject and held:- "In view of the Sections 6(2), 31, 30 and 30-A of the Punjab GST Act, 1948, the State Government had the power to exempt or abolish milk as a taxable commodity. There was nothing in law which prohibited it from doing so. The representation to exempt milk was made by persons who had the power to implement the representation. Of course, the Government cannot rely on a representation made without complying with the procedure prescribed by the relevant statue, but a citizen may and can compel the Government to do so if the factors necessary for founding a plea of promissory estoppel are established. Such a proposition would not "fall foul of our constitutional scheme and public interest". Of course, the Government cannot rely on a representation made without complying with the procedure prescribed by the relevant statue, but a citizen may and can compel the Government to do so if the factors necessary for founding a plea of promissory estoppel are established. Such a proposition would not "fall foul of our constitutional scheme and public interest". xx xx xx xx xx The appellant State Government has not been able to establish any overriding public interest which would make it inequitable to enforce the estoppel against it. The representation was made by the highest authorities including the finance Minister in his Budget speech after considering the financial implications of the grant of the exemption to milk. It was found that the over all benefit to the States economy and the public would be greater if the exemption were allowed. The respondents have passed on the benefit of that exemption by providing various facilities and concessions for the upliftment of the milk producers. This has not been denied. It would, in the circumstances, be inequitable to allow the State Government now to resile from its decision to exempt milk and demand purchase tax with retrospective effect from 1.4.1996 as the respondents cannot in any event readjust the expenditure already made. The High Court was also right when it held that the operation of the estoppel would come to an end with the 1997 decision of the Cabinet." The Supreme Court also noticed the limitations of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. These are:- "(1) Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. But it is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held hound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. (2) No representation can be enforced which is prohibited by law in the sense that the person or authority making the representation or promise must have the power to carry out the promise. If the power is there, then subject to the preconditions and limitations noted earlier, it must be exercised. (2) No representation can be enforced which is prohibited by law in the sense that the person or authority making the representation or promise must have the power to carry out the promise. If the power is there, then subject to the preconditions and limitations noted earlier, it must be exercised. Thus, if the statute does not contain a provision enabling the Government to grant exemption, it would not be possible to enforce the representation against the Government, because the Government cannot be compelled to act contrary to the statute. But if the statute confers power on the Government to grant the exemption, the Government can legitimately be held bound by its promise to exempt the promisee from payment of sales tax." 16. In our opinion the aforementioned decision does not support the cause of the petitioners and the doctrine in promissory/equitable estoppel cannot be invoked in their case for restraining the respondents from making recovery of sales tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold during 1998-99 because - (1) memo dated 1.4.1998 sent by Prohibition, Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana to the Managing Director of the Corporation cannot be treated as a promise made to the petitioners that no tax would be levied on the sale of IMFL by L-4/L-5 licensees. The petitioners have not placed on record any material to show that memo dated 1.4.1998 was conveyed to them and that by treating it as a representation made by the State Government, they had not collected sales tax on IMFL sold to customers; (2) there is no provision in the Act under which respondent No. 3 can grant exemption to any kind of goods or industry from levy of sales-tax. Sections 13, 13-A and 13-B which provide for exemption postulate issuance of a notification by the State Government and not by the Prohibition, Excise and Taxation Commissioner. Under the Rules of Business framed by the Governor of Haryana in exercise of power conferred upon him under Article 166(2) and (3) of the Constitution of India, no department can take a decision or pass an order which affects on the finances of the State without previous consultation with the Finance Department. For the sake of reference, Rule 7 of the Business Rules is reproduced below:- "7. For the sake of reference, Rule 7 of the Business Rules is reproduced below:- "7. (1) No department shall without previous consultation with the Finance Department, authorise any orders (other than orders pursuant to any general delegation made by the Finance Department) which:- (a) either immediately or by their repercussion will affect the finances of the State or which, in particular - (i) involve any grant of land or assignment of revenue or concession, grant lease or licence of mineral or forest rights or a right to water, power to any easement or privilege in respect of such concession; or (ii) in anyway involve any relinquishment of revenue; or (b) relate to the number of grading or cadre of posts or the emoluments or other conditions of service or posts. (2) No proposal which requires the previous consultation of the Finance Department under this rule, but in which the Finance Department has not concurred may be proceeded with unless a decision to that effect has been taken by the Council. (3) No reappropriation shall be made by any Department other than the Finance Department, except in accordance with such general delegation as the Finance Department may have made. (4) Except to the extent that power may have been delegated to the Departments under rules approved by the Finance Department, every order of an administrative department conveying a sanction to be enforced in audit shall be communicated to the audit authorities by the Finance Department. (5) Nothing in this rule shall be construed as authorising any department, including the Finance Department, to make re-appropriation from one grant specified in the Appropriation Act to another such grant." The petitioners have not placed any document before the Court to show that respondent No. 3 had issued memo dated 1.4.1998 after consulting the Finance Department or that it was preceded by a decision taken by the Counsel of Ministers to grant exemption to the sale of IMFL by L-4/L-5 licensees. Thus, the action of respondent No. 3 to issue memo dated 1.4.1998 even to the Managing Director of the Corporation was clearly an unauthorised act. Thus, the action of respondent No. 3 to issue memo dated 1.4.1998 even to the Managing Director of the Corporation was clearly an unauthorised act. In any case, the same cannot be made basis for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel to relieve the petitioners of their obligation to pay tax in accordance with the provisions of law because it was clearly against the mandate of Section 16-A read with Entry 2(iv) of Schedule C and Section 27(3) read with Entry 24-A of Schedule B of the Act. 17 The judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Indra Industries (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In that case, it was held that the interpretation placed on law by a taxing authority in its circular is binding on that authority till the circular remains operative and it cannot raise a contrary plea before the Court. In the judgment, there is no discussion on the issue of promissory estoppel. Therefore, that decision cannot be made basis for granting relief to the petitioners. 18. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the State Government had not made any promise to the petitioners to exempt the sale of IMFL and/or Beer or levy of tax under the Act and the orders passed by the Revisional Authorities in C.W.P. Nos. 11493, 15324 and 174203 of 2003 and 14816, 14818 and 14843 of 2004 do not suffer from any jurisdictional error or other legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Likewise, orders dated 21.9.1999, 13.6.2000 and 19.2.2004 passed by the Assessing Authority, Appellate Authority and the Tribunal in C.W.P. No. 15952 of 2004 do not suffer from any patent illegality requiring interference by this Court. Consequently, a writ in the nature of mandamus cannot be issued restraining the respondents from making recovery of sales-tax on IMFL and/or Beer sold by the petitioners in 1998-99. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed.