Judgment K.C. Sharma, J.-This Criminal Appeal under Section 374, CrPC arises out of the Judgment and order dated 01.06.2000 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kota, thereby convicting accused appellant Paras for offence under Sections 302 and 452, IPC and sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default thereof , to further undergo 2 years rigorous imprisonment on the first count and to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default thereof , to further undergo 3 months rigorous imprisonment on the second count. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. 2. According to the prosecution case, on 15.04.1998 at about 8.00 p.m., appellant reached the house of deceased Gita Bai. PW. 1 Monu, her son aged about 8-9 years was sleeping on the cot. The appellant caught hold of her and took her to Chappar, where he poured kerosene and set her on fire. Her cries attracted the attention of PW. 5 Bhura, PW. 7 Ramnath, PW. 10 Mansha Ram and other residents of the village, who extinguished the fire and immediately took Gita Bai to the police station, where she lodged an oral report, Exhibit. P-6. 3. On the next day i.e., on 16.04.1998, PW. 6 Virendra Singh, Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Kota recorded the dying declaration (Exhibit. P-3) of deceased in MBS Hospital Kota, wherein she deposed that on 15.04.1998 at 8.00 p.m. while she was at home and her son was sleeping, her neighbour Paras Ram broke open the back door, entered in the house and caught hold of her. When she cried, the accused picked up the kerosene cane lying nearby and forcibly took her to the Chapper, Chapper, where he poured kerosene on her and set fire and then he escaped from the back door. 4. The police registered a case for offence under Sections 324, 457, 436 and 307, IPC and proceeded with the investigation. On 11.05.1998, deceased Gita Bai succumbed to the burn injuries and accordingly the investigating agency added Section 302, IPC. 5. Having completed investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation and placed before it, framed charges against the accused appellant and for offence under Sections 302, 436 and 457, IPC. 6. 5. Having completed investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation and placed before it, framed charges against the accused appellant and for offence under Sections 302, 436 and 457, IPC. 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and got exhibited some documents. After the prosecution evidence was over, the accused was examined under Section 313, CrPC. The accused did not examine any witness in his defence. 7. At the conclusion of trial, the learned Sessions Judge, vide his Judgment under appeal, found the appellant guilty of having committing house trespass and for causing death of deceased and accordingly convicted and sentenced him in the manner stated hereinabove. Hence, this appeal against conviction. 8. We have heard learned Counsel for the accused appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor and have gone through the impugned Judgment , evidence and material on record. 9. In assailing the conviction of accused appellant, the first argument advanced by Mrs. Kamla Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant was that the dying declaration of the deceased cannot be taken to be a legal document, inasmuch as the doctor who certified the fitness of state of mind to make declaration of the victim has not been examined. In such circumstances, the dying declaration, Exhibit. P-3 cannot be made basis of conviction. In support of his argument, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Smt. Chhawari vs. State of Rajasthan, 1996 CrLR 16 (Raj), Laxmi vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2001 SC 2383 and Raja Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, 2000 CrLR 153 (SC). 10. We have given our anxious consideration to the above argument and have gone through the case laws cited at the bar. PW. 6 Virendra Singh Mahlawat, Judicial Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased has deposed that before recording the statement of victim he obtained certificate from the doctor on duty. It is true that doctor who certified the fitness of the victim has not been examined in evidence. The question which now emerges for adjudication is that what would be the effect of not examining the doctor. It is true that doctor who certified the fitness of the victim has not been examined in evidence. The question which now emerges for adjudication is that what would be the effect of not examining the doctor. Dealing with similar question, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shanmugam vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 (10) SCC 4 , held that the mere fact that the doctor, in whose presence Exhibit P-16 was recorded, was not examined does not affect the evidentiary value to be attached to the dying declaration. In Sohan Lal vs. State of Punjab, 2003 (11) SCC 534 , dying declaration of victim Kamlesh Rani was recorded by Naib Tahsildar. In this case the doctor who certified the fitness of the victim was not examined in evidence. After elaborate reappraisal of the evidence, their Lordships held:- “We are satisfied that the dying declaration (Exhibit. PN) was made by the deceased Kamlesh Rani and that there is no need to discard the evidence of PW. 6 that when she made the dying declaration she was in a fit mental condition to do so and was fully conscious of what she was saying. Irrespective of whether the endorsement of Dr. Dua upon Exhibit PM/1 has been proved in accordance with law or not, we find no reason to discard the dying declaration (Exhibit PN). 11. In P.V. Radha Krishna vs. State of Karnataka, 2003 (6) SCC 443 , their Lordships of the Apex Court considering various earlier Judgment s held as under:-“. . . The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a produce of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 12. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 12. Their Lordships then summed up and quoted the principles laid down in several Judgment s, governing dying declaration which may be quoted below :- .(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration; .(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration, and (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. 13. Their Lordships have also observed about the importance to be attached to the statement of a person on the deathbed in the following terms:-“This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and screen when he is dying that the grave position in which he is so placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence.” 14. Testing the case on the touch stone of the principles annunciated and the law laid down by the Apex Court, we have to analyse the evidence in respect of dying declaration. PW . 6 Virendra Singh Mahlawat, Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement of victim has categorically stated that at the time of recording her statement, the duty doctor was present in the burn ward of M.B.S. Hospital, Kota and he certified that the victim was in a position to make her statement. PW . 6 Virendra Singh Mahlawat, Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement of victim has categorically stated that at the time of recording her statement, the duty doctor was present in the burn ward of M.B.S. Hospital, Kota and he certified that the victim was in a position to make her statement. The doctor made an endorsement to this effect at place A to B on Exhibit. P-3. A glance at the dying declaration, Exhibit P-3 makes is evident that the Judicial Magistrate having satisfied that victim was in a fit state of mind to make statement, recorded her statement in the form of question-answer. In reply to question No. 2, the victim replied that on the day of incident at 8.00 p.m., appellant Paras Ram broke upon the back door, entered into her house and caught hold of her. When she raised an alarm, he lifted the kerosene cane lying there and took her to the Chapper where he poured kerosene, set her on fire and ran away from the back door. The incident occurred on 15.04.1998 at 8.00 p.m. Soon after the incident the villagers took her to the police station, where deceased Gita Bai lodged the report. A combined reading of the FIR, Exhibit. P-6 and the dying declaration, Exhibit P-3 would make it abundantly clear that she has stated before the Judicial Magistrate exactly similar to what she stated before the police. A glance at the statement of Judicial Magistrate shows that no suggestion whatsoever was put to him whether at the time of recording declaration, the victim was not in a fit state of mind. It can, therefore, be said that the Judicial Magistrate having obtained certificate of the duty doctor as regards fit state of mind of the victim to make her statement, recorded her statement and we see no reason to disbelieve his testimony. A perusal of the Judgment under appeal makes it clear that the trial Court after careful scrutiny of dying declaration, Exhibit. P-3 based its conviction on the basis of dying declaration. From the evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that declaration of the victim was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. She has given the same statement as was given by her to the police. P-3 based its conviction on the basis of dying declaration. From the evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that declaration of the victim was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. She has given the same statement as was given by her to the police. She had ample opportunity to observe and identify the accused and at the time of declaration, she was in a fit state to make statement. We are satisfied that what is stated in dying declaration Exhibit. P-3 is the unalloyed truth and hence it is absolutely safe to act upon it. In this view of the matter, non examination of doctor who certified the fitness of the victim cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case. All the three conditions enumerated herein above, in our considered view, stand fully satisfied. The case laws cited by the Counsel for the appellant are of no help to the appellant as the facts involved in the cases cited at the bar are entirely distinguished with those involved in the case at hand. 15. Referring the injuries of the accused as mentioned in the injury report, Exhibit. D-1 and the arrest memo Exhibit P-1 learned Counsel contended that while recording dying declaration, the victim has not explained the injuries sustained by the accused and, therefore, the dying declaration could not have been relied upon. 16. As regards the above argument, suffice it to observe that simply because the victim in her dying declaration did not make any reference to the injuries sustained by the appellant, the dying declaration cannot be accepted. We are fortified in our view by a decision of the Apex Court Shanumugam vs. State of Tamil Nadu (Supra), wherein their Lordships have held that mere fact that the victim did not make any reference to the injuries received by the accused is not a ground that merits rejection of dying declaration, specially when in the present case the victim could not have had an opportunity to observe the lip injury, if any, received by the accused. 17. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that appellant has been falsely involved in the present case. She vehemently submitted that in fact the appellant tried to save the victim and in the process he himself got burn injuries as is evident from his injury report Exhibit. D-1. 17. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that appellant has been falsely involved in the present case. She vehemently submitted that in fact the appellant tried to save the victim and in the process he himself got burn injuries as is evident from his injury report Exhibit. D-1. She further argued that the prosecution has utterly failed to show any motive that accused set the victim on fire. 18. We have considered the above argument. As regards the injuries having been received by the appellant, it may be stated that accused in his examination under Section 313, CrPC, has not stated a single word that he made efforts to save the victim while she was set on fire and in that process he got burn injuries. That apart, from a perusal of the statements of prosecution witnesses, namely PW. 2 Purshottam, PW. 7 Ramnath, PW. 10 Mansha Ram and PW. 11 Mool Chand who reached the place of incident soon after the incident no suggestion was put to them whether they saw the appellant making efforts to save the victim. Undoubtedly, PW. 5 Bhura has stated that having seen the victim while setting on fire, he called the appellant and the appellant in turn reached the spot and tried to save the victim and in the process he received injuries. This witness has been declared hostile. He is a real brother of appellant and the possibility of his being making a false statement with a view to save his brother cannot at all be ruled out. 19. The arrest memo Exhibit P-1 dated 01.05.1998 and the injury report Exhibit D-1 indicate the presence of burn injuries on the person of appellant. However, a glance at the report Exhibit D-1 we do not find any burn injury on the palm surface, which could suggest that appellant in fact tried to save the victim. Three injuries mentioned in the report Exhibit D-1 are suggestive of the fact that after the victim was set on fire, she tried to catch the appellant, may be with the hope that good sense may prevail and he could help her. It is not sufficient to say that accused has been falsely implicated. The accused must built up a case for false implication. It is not sufficient to say that accused has been falsely implicated. The accused must built up a case for false implication. We are fortified in our view by the decisions of the Apex Court in Rizan vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2003 (2) SCC 661 , Sucha Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, 2003 (7) SCC 643 and Ruli Ram & Anr. vs. State of Haryana, 2002 (7) SCC 691 . The observation in Ruli Rams case (Supra) may be quoted below:- “When a plea of false implication is advanced by the accused, foundation for the same has to be established. We do not find any reason to differ from the Court below on the factual aspect”. 20. To prove the plea of false implication, the burden lies on the accused. As already stated above, when a plea of false implication is advanced by the accused, foundation for the same has to be established. The accused has not been able to establish the foundation for his false implication. What stands proved from the prosecution evidence is that immediately after setting the victim on fire, the appellant ran away. Even PW . 2 Purushottam has very categorically deposed that appellant was not seen in the village immediately after the incident for sufficiently long time. Had he been fare enough on his part, he would have taken the victim to hospital for treatment. 21. Now we advert to the motive behind commission of crime. Mrs. Kamla Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the prosecution has failed to prove any motive on the part of the accused appellant to commit crime. In our considered view, taking into consideration, the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the absence of any evidence on the point of motive cannot have any such impact so as to discard the other reliable evidence available on record which unerringly establishes the guilt of the accused. In Yunis vs. State of M.P., 2003 (1) SCC 425 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, considering the effect of prosecution having failed to establish motive, held as under:- “The prosecution in the present case has failed to prove the motive. Failure to prove motive for crime in our view is of no consequence. The role of the accused persons in the crime stands clearly established. The ocular evidence is very clear and convincing in this case. Failure to prove motive for crime in our view is of no consequence. The role of the accused persons in the crime stands clearly established. The ocular evidence is very clear and convincing in this case. The illegal acts of the accused persons have resulted in the death of a young boy of 18 years. It is settled law that establishment of motive is not a sine qua non for proving the prosecution case. For all these reasons, we find no merits in these appeals.” 22. Again in Om Prakash vs. State of Uttaranchal, 2003 (1) SCC 648 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under:-“. . . The accused would have been aggrieved for one or all of these reasons. We are not concerned with the sufficiency or otherwise of the motive which would have prompted the appellant to commit the crime. The correctness of conviction cannot be tested on the touchstone of lack of sufficient motive, if the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Such evidence is available in abundant measure in the instant case. 23. The incident took place on 15.04.1998, while the accused was arrested on 01.05.1998. As such he remained absconded for 15 days. The prosecution witnesses have categorically deposed that after the incident, the appellant was not seen in the village. The accused has not been able to offer any explanation as to why he left the village immediately after the incident. The fact that appellant remained absconded immediate after the incident for about 15 days is also a link evidence so as to connect the appellant with the commission of crime. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that absconding cannot be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence. In support of her argument, learned Counsel has relied upon Matru vs. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050 , Rehman vs. State of U.P., 1972 CrLJ 23 (SC) and Keshri Ram vs. State, 1972 RLW 401. We have respectfully gone through the case laws. It is true that absconding is no doubt a relevant piece of evidence to be considered alongwith other evidence and it cannot certainly be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence. We have respectfully gone through the case laws. It is true that absconding is no doubt a relevant piece of evidence to be considered alongwith other evidence and it cannot certainly be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence. However, it can certainly be taken to be the link evidence and it has to be borne in mind that the appellant absconded for 15 days and there was no apparent explanation for such delay. We find support from Om Prakash vs. State of Uttaranchal (Supra). 24. Learned Counsel further argued that the victim had become unconscious after the incident and her thumb impression on the report was obtained in her unconscious condition. She further argued that one more report was written at the place of incident itself which has been suppressed by the prosecution. In this connection, learned Counsel has referred the statement of PW. 2 Purushottam, wherein the witness in his cross-examination has deposed that Gita Bai was maoning because of pain and was not properly speaking. The report was written in the village and the thumb impression of Gita Bai was obtained on the report. Learned Counsel has also referred the statement of PW. 7 Ramnath, who has deposed that she became unconscious as a result of burn injuries and was not speaking. According to him oral report was made at the police station and the thumb impression of the victim was obtained on the report while she was unconscious. 25. We have given our anxious consideration to the above argument and have scrutinized the evidence in this regard. A glance at the FIR, Exhibit P-6 shows that PW.2 Purushottam, PW. 10 Mansha Ram and PW. 11 Mool Chand had brought the victim to the police station and as such it is crystal clear that PW. 7 Ramnath was not at all present with the victim and, therefore, his statement that Gita was unconscious is of no consequence. PW. 9 Mahaveer Prasad, SHO, police station, Khatoli before whom the report was submitted has categorically stated that Gita lodged the report and Mansha Ram, Mool Chand, and Purshottam had brought her to the Police Station. A perusal of the order sheet dated 06.03.2000 shows that Public Prosecutor stated before the Court that nothing was to be questioned to PW. 9 Mahaveer Prasad. A perusal of the order sheet dated 06.03.2000 shows that Public Prosecutor stated before the Court that nothing was to be questioned to PW. 9 Mahaveer Prasad. Likewise, the defence Counsel made a statement that he does not want to cross-examine this witness. Evidently thus, no suggestion was put to Mahavir Prasad whether victim Gita was unconscious at the time when she was brought to police station, lodged the report and obtained her thumb impression. Be that as it may, the dying declaration of the victim was recorded on the next day of incident and, therefore, it cannot at all be said that she was unconscious even at the time when her dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate on the next day of incident. 26. It has also been contended that presence of PW. 1 Monu S/o deceased Gita Devi at the time and place of incident has not been proved. He was introduced in the dying declaration of the victim and was accordingly examined in evidence. Referring the statement of Monu, learned Counsel argued that he himself has contradicted on the point whether he saw the accused appellant setting her mother on fire. 27. As regards the above argument, suffice it to say that even if the statement of PW. 1 is ignored keeping in view the contradiction pointed out by the learned Counsel, then too the genesis of the prosecution case cannot be doubted as PW. 2 Purushottam has very categorically deposed that he immediately reached the place of incident and victim informed him that accused Paras Ram has set her on fire. That apart, the FIR was lodged with promptness. The police station is at a distance of about 13 Kms. from the place of incident and while covering this distance within 3 hours, the FIR was lodged and in our view, lodging of FIR with promptness completely rules out the possibility of there being any concoction or false implication. In this view of the matter, the contradiction in the statement of PW. 1 Monu is not of much consequence. 28. Lastly, Mrs. Jain contended that in the totality of circumstances it cannot be said that the appellant intended to cause the death of victim and as such it was not a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder. In this view of the matter, the contradiction in the statement of PW. 1 Monu is not of much consequence. 28. Lastly, Mrs. Jain contended that in the totality of circumstances it cannot be said that the appellant intended to cause the death of victim and as such it was not a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder. She argued that appellant did not intend to kill Gita Devi and she died after 25 days of incident because of infection developed on the burns. In these circumstances, learned Counsel argued that the offence deserves to be brought down from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and that conviction deserves to be altered from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part II, IPC. In support of his argument, learned Counsel has relied upon Kalu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, 2000 (10) SCC 324 and Mohan Das vs. State of Rajasthan, 2002 (1) CrLR 759 (Raj). 29. We have pondered over the argument advanced before us and have gone through the case laws cited at the bar. Both the authorities cited before us are of no help to the appellant because the facts of both the cases are entirely different than those involved in the case at hand. In the first case, the Apex Court concluded and altered the offence from Sections 302 to 304 Part II, IPC on the ground that accused altered his senses and accordingly brought water in an efforts to rescue her. The Apex Court held that all that the accused though of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situa