P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri Challa Dhanamjaya, counsel representing the appellant-complainant and sri C. Praveen Kumar, counsel representing the respondent-accused. ( 2 ) THIS Criminal appeal is filed, as against an order of acquittal recorded in c. C. No. 183 of 1997 on the file of the Court of viii Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, by judgment dated 13-1-1999. ( 3 ) SRI Challa Dhanamjaya, the learned counsel representing the appellant- complainant, would submit that the learned magistrate on appreciation of the material available on record, while answering the principal question, arrived at a conclusion that there was dishonour of cheque, but, however while answering the second crucial question, came to the conclusion that the complaint was filed on 12-5-1997, which is beyond the period of 30 days, and hence, the same is not maintainable. Hence, the learned counsel would contend that the principal question was answered infavour of the appellant-complainant, in view of the fact that the computation of period of limitation of 30 days is incorrect calculation, the reason is that on 10-5-1997 and 11-5-1997 the Court was closed being public holidays and hence, on the next day of reopening, the complaint was represented, the same was presented within the time as specified by the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Act" for the purpose of convenience ). The learned counsel also would submit that the mode of computation of period of limitation, the date of arising of the cause of action and the applicability of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 9 thereof, had been well discussed in the case of Saketh India India ltd. and others v. India Securities Ltd. Hence, the learned counsel would conclude that in the light of the clear finding recorded by the learned Magistrate on the principal question, the acquittal may have to be set aside and the respondent-accused has to be convicted. ( 4 ) PER contra Sri C. Praveen Kumar, the learned counsel representing the respondent- accused would contend that elaborate submissions were made by the respondent- accused even before the learned Magistrate and in fact, written arguments also had been submitted, but, however, all the questions which had been raised had not been considered in the proper perspective by the learned Magistrate. The learned counsel also would submit that P. W. 1 admitted that on 20-3-1997 notice was issued by P. W. 1 and the dishonour memo is dated 4-3-1997, the date of cheque is 18-10-1996. In view of the same, it cannot be said that the statutory period had been complied with and valid notice was given in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel also further contend that P. W. 1 is a stranger as far as M/s. V. K. T. Corporation is concerned i. e. , complainant and hence, he has no locus sfandi at all to present the complaint. There is no authorization or no material had been produced by P. W. 1 to connect himself with the complainant. The learned counsel also would further contend that absolutely there is no material relevant to satisfy the ingredient, legally enforceable debt. The learned counsel also pointed out to the evidence of P. W. 1 and would submit that on the strength of such evidence, who had deposed about the failure on the part of the accused to deliver the possession of the land, which was leased out under the agreement and taking advance of rs. 60,000/-, and in the absence of any other evidence, it cannot be said that the ingredient of legally enforceable debt had been satisfied. ( 5 ) THE learned Additional Public prosecutor Sri Mohd. Osman Shaheed, however, would contend that as far as the power of the appellate Court is concerned, though acquittal had been recorded by the learned Magistrate, the whole evidence may have to be appreciated and both the negative and positive findings can be considered and the appellate Court may independently arrive at a conclusion whether the evidence was properly appreciated by the Court below. ( 6 ) THE complainant-M/s. V. K. T. Corporation represented by its proprietor, no doubt in controversy, filed the complaint to the effect that the accused, by concealing the fact that he had no right in the land leased out to the complainant, entered into an agreement by taking advance of Rs. ( 6 ) THE complainant-M/s. V. K. T. Corporation represented by its proprietor, no doubt in controversy, filed the complaint to the effect that the accused, by concealing the fact that he had no right in the land leased out to the complainant, entered into an agreement by taking advance of Rs. 60,000/- and the complainant was obstructed by the Steel plant Authorities when he was taking possession of the land and for which the complainant demanded the accused for refund of the advance amount paid by it and hence, the accused issued a crossed cheque payable on the Bank of Baroda, Aseelametta branch on 18-10-1996 for an amount of rs. 50,000/-, which was presented by the complainant in Canara Bank, Chattivanipalem on 22-10-1996. Due to insufficient of funds, again the complainant presented the same cheque on 4-3-1997 at the request of the accused in the same bank, but, it was unpaid and returned on 5-3-1997 due to "insufficient funds. " The complainant issued a registered notice through his counsel dated 19-3-1997, but it was received by the accused on 27-3-1997 and failed to arrange the funds. Hence he filed the complaint. ( 7 ) P. W. 1, who represents M/s. V. K. T. Corporation and also P. W. 2-Manager of canara Bank, Chettivanipalem were examined. Exs. P-1 to Ex. P-6 were marked. Ex. P-1 is the Cheque, Ex. P-2 is return memo, ex. P-3 is also return memo. Ex. P-4 is the office copy of the legal notice. Ex. P-5 is the postal acknowledgment and Ex. P-6 is the postal receipt. ( 8 ) IT is no doubt true that as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant- complainant that on the principal question the findings had been recorded in favour of the complainant, but, however while deciding the second crucial question at Paragraph nos. 14 and 15, a finding had been recorded that inasmuch as the complaint was not filed with in 30 days and was filed on 12-5-1997 only, the same is not maintainable. This is an appeal filed as against an order of acquittal. It is no doubttrue that certain positive findings had been recorded by the learned Magistrate in favour of the complainant and specifically, a negative finding had been recorded relating to the computation of the period of 30 days. This is an appeal filed as against an order of acquittal. It is no doubttrue that certain positive findings had been recorded by the learned Magistrate in favour of the complainant and specifically, a negative finding had been recorded relating to the computation of the period of 30 days. A further finding had been recorded that 10-5-97 and 11-5-97 being public holidays, the specific stand taken by the complainant that on the next day i. e. , 12-5-97, complaint was presented, which is within time. Strong reliance was placed on the decision (1st cited) in this regard. However, this view expressed by the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained for the reason that when the time expires on a public holiday, the complaint can be presented on the next day, there may not be any doubt or controversy relating to this principle, in the light of the fundamental principles well settled under the Limitation act and also the General Clauses Act as well. However, on a careful scrutiny of the evidence of P. W. 1, which is doubtful whether he is the proper or authorized person to represent the m/s. V. K. T. Corporation and in the light of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, no other independent evidence had been let in relating to the aspect of legally enforceable debt. No doubt presumption under Section 139 of the act is available in favour of the complainant. Submissions at length were made by the counsel representing the respondent- accused on the ground that there is no valid notice. In the light of the evidence of P. W. 1 and also the dishonour memo dated 4-3-1997, on appreciation of evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that in view of the fact that several contentions, which had been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-accused, also had not been well considered and also in view of the fact of wrong computation of the period of 30 days, the learned Magistrate recorded a finding that the complaint is not maintainable. ( 9 ) THE impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back for the purpose of affording an opportunity to the both parties to let in further evidence on all the aspects, which had been canvassed by the learned counsel representing the respective parties. ( 9 ) THE impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back for the purpose of affording an opportunity to the both parties to let in further evidence on all the aspects, which had been canvassed by the learned counsel representing the respective parties. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.