Judgment Virender Singh, J. 1. Puran Singh and Baljit Singh respondent No. 1 and 2 (herein) were booked in a case FIR No. 123 dated 15.5.1984 registered at police station city Malout under Sections 379/411/403/408/467/468/471/420 IPC. They were charged by the trial Court for the aforesaid offences. However, vide judgment dated 13.6.1989 of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class they were convicted only under Section 411 IPC and were acquitted for charges under the remaining Sections. They were sentenced to undergo RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default of payment of which to suffer further RI for 3 months each. Aggrieved by the said judgment, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed an appeal before the Court of Session, which was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridkot vide judgment dated 10.1.1991. It was, however, observed by the Appellate Court that the currency notes, which were recovered from their possession, be returned to them. 2. It needs to the mentioned here that against the acquittal of respondents No. 1 and 2, the State of Punjab (respondent No. 3) has not preferred any appeal. This fact is otherwise confirmed by the learned State Counsel. 3. The Punjab Tube-Well Corporation Ltd. has filed the instant appeal through its Divisional Engineer under Section 454 of Criminal Procedure Code with a short prayer that the order regarding return of the amount of Rs. 60,000/- to respondents No. 1 and 2 is not sustainable. So far as their acquittal is concerned, the appellant has not shown any grouse. 4. I have heard Mr. Amit Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Surinder Garg, counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mrs. Sunita Kaushal, AAG, Punjab representing respondent No. 3. With their assistance, I have gone through the entire record minutely. 5. The case of the prosecution in brief is that a cheque No PWD 820361 dated 18.4.1984 amounting to Rs. 54,700/-, which was encashed by Punjab National Bank, was in fact no issued by concerned official of the appellant (Corporation). On scrutiny, it was found that the said cheque along with its counterfoil was missing from the cheque book and ultimately respondents No. 1 and 2 were booked in this case alleging that they had the hand in it and the aforesaid amount was encashed from the Bank. 6.
On scrutiny, it was found that the said cheque along with its counterfoil was missing from the cheque book and ultimately respondents No. 1 and 2 were booked in this case alleging that they had the hand in it and the aforesaid amount was encashed from the Bank. 6. As admitted by the learned counsel for both the sides, respondents No. 1 and 2 got anticipatory bail and during investigation Puran Singh respondent suffered a disclosure statement that he had kept Rs. 44,700/- in a concealed place and could get the same recovered. In pursuance of the said disclosure statement, he got recovered the said amount. Similarly a sum of Rs. 10,000/- were got recovered by Baljit Singh respondent. 7. The defence plea taken up by both the respondents was that the amount recovered from them was a crude padding by the prosecution agency and it had nothing to do with the allegations of the case. The amount, which is allegedly shown to have been recovered from them, was actually kept by them for purchase of some land. 8. The learned appellate Court, while acquitting respondents No. 1 and 2 of the charge under Section 411 IPC has disbelieved the recovery part, observing that the currency notes which were allegedly recovered from the possession of these respondents be returned to them. 9. Mr. Amit Singh contends that the appellate Court has hastened to acquit respondents No. 1 and 2 of the charge of Section 411 IPC though there was cogent evidence against both of them. He then contends that the trial Court has specifically directed that the amount of Rs. 54,700/- shall be returned to the department of Punjab Tube-Well Corporation and that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not only erred in acquitting them but has illegally directed the return of the aforesaid amount to them. The main grouse of the learned counsel is that before passing this order, the learned appellate Court should have at least given notice to the complainant (i.e. appellant-herein) and only after affording an opportunity of being heard, the order of return of the said amount should have been passed but since no such opportunity has been given, the impugned order for return of the amount to the acquitted respondents is not sustainable in the eye of the law and the same deserves to be set-aside. 10.
10. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Garg submits that the conviction of respondents No. 1 and 2 was under Section 411 IPC only and they were not convicted for the other offences for which they were charged and the learned appellate Court by giving cogent reasons has concluded that the said charge is not established. Mr. Garg then contends that the recovery of the aforesaid amount from both the respondents has also been disbelieved by the lower appellate Court and, therefore, a specific direction has been issued for return of the said amount, which deserves to be upheld. He further contends that both these respondents have otherwise been exonerated in the departmental enquiry vide office order Annexure RI (taken on record vide my separate order of even date). He then contends that they are even being promoted. 11. After hearing the rival contentions of both the sides and perusing the records, I am of the considered view that there is no substance in the instant appeal. 12. So far as acquittal of respondents No. 1 and 2 of the charge under Section 411 IPC is concerned, admittedly the State of Punjab has not preferred any appeal against it. In this eventuality, the learned counsel for the appellant cannot assail the impugned judgment of acquittal on merits. Even otherwise, an acquittal already earned by respondents No. 1 and 2 certainly cannot be disturbed in the instant appeal. In the circumstances, the present appeal has to be seen only with regard to the order of return of the amount to respondents No. 1 and 2. 13. It is the case of the prosecution that the amount, which has been ordered to the returned to the respondents was allegedly recovered from them in pursuance of their disclosure statements made during investigation. The recovery part has disbelieved by the lower appellate Court on merits. The same cannot be re-agitated in the instant appeal. I otherwise do not find any manifest illegality in the impugned judgment of acquittal. The findings returned by the first appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of entire evidence. Once the case of prosecution has been disbelieved in toto, in my view respondents No. 1 and 2 were entitled to the amount, which was allegedly recovered from them during investigation of the case.
The findings returned by the first appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of entire evidence. Once the case of prosecution has been disbelieved in toto, in my view respondents No. 1 and 2 were entitled to the amount, which was allegedly recovered from them during investigation of the case. Even otherwise, they have come up with a specific defence that they were in possession of the said amount but for some other purpose. Whatever may be the defence, the fact remains that the respondents, who have since been acquitted, had claimed the said amount. In this eventuality, while acquitting them, the lower appellate Court was left with no option except to return the said amount to them only. Had the State any grouse against the said acquittal, an appeal could be filed. Admittedly, the said course has not been adopted. Even the complainant has not knocked the doors of this Court by filing a revision, praying for re-appreciation of the entire evidence. 14. Otherwise also, Puran Singh respondent No. 1, who was Clerk in the appellant/Corporation and Baljit Singh respondent No. 2, who was a Patwari, have since been exonerated of the charge in the departmental enquiry. As stated by Mr. Garg at the Bar and not controverted, they have been promoted even. In view of the foregoing discussion, nothing survives in the present appeal, which is consequently dismissed.