JUDGMENT : 1. - This is the second appeal by the defendant-tenant against the judgment and decree dated 20.5.2004 whereby learned Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur City, Jaipur affirmed the judgment and decree of eviction dated 10.8.2001 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur. 2. Both the plaintiffs-husband and wife filed a civil suit on 21.11.1996 for eviction with averment that the suit house No. B-3, Mahaveer Udyan Path, Ljaj Nagar, Jaipur was let out to the defendant on 1.12.1983 by the original landlord Dr. Satish Chandra. The monthly rent agreed upon is Rs.2,000/-. Dr. Satish Chandra had instituted a civil suit for arrears of rent and eviction which 10 is pending in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. During the pendency of that civil suit this house was purchased by the plaintiffs vide registered sale deed dated 16.6.1993. Eviction was sought on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs. 3. The defendant vide written statement having admitted himself to be 15 the tenant pleaded that monthly rent was Rs.1,000/-. While denying the ground of eviction, it was pleaded that the plaintiffs carry on business of purchase and sale of immovable properties, hence they do not require the suit premises. 4. On the basis of the pleadings, issues were framed. Evidence was 20 recorded. The trial Court vide judgment dated 10.8.2001 while deciding the issues Nos. 1 to 3 relating to reasonable and bona fide requirement, comparative hardship and partial eviction in favour of the plaintiffs decreed the suit for eviction. First appeal preferred by the defendant-tenant was also dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 20.5.2004. 5. Section 100 CPC provides that where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in second appeal, it shall formulate such question and the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. 6. With regard to the powers of the High Court in second appeals u/s. CPC Mr. Surana placed reliance upon Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 120 , Bandar Singh & Ors. v. Nihal Singh & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 161 , Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (Dead) by LRs. v. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (Dead) & Ors., 2002(2) U.J. 1191 (SC) and State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (Dead) through his Lrs., 2000(2) U.J. 931 (SC) . In Mst. v. Nihal Singh & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 161 , Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (Dead) by LRs. v. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (Dead) & Ors., 2002(2) U.J. 1191 (SC) and State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (Dead) through his Lrs., 2000(2) U.J. 931 (SC) . In Mst. Kamla v. Badri Narain, 1953 RLW 512 it was held by this Court that a First Appellate Court does not exist simply for the dittoing of the judgment of the first Court when it wants to uphold the decree of that Court. On the other hand, Mr. Kasliwal placed reliance upon Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) SCC 134 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal just because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. In view of the judgments cited hereinabove, the settled legal position is that where the decision of the lower Court is based on no evidence, is contrary to the evidence on record, the findings of the Courts below are based on misinterpretation of the documents, the High Court may interfere in second appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal's case (supra), held that the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal just because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. 7. in view of the above legal position the submission on merits are taken up. Mr. Surana learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff No. 2 Smt. Manjari Pandit was examined as PW1. Her statement remained incomplete, even though the Courts below considered her statement. Placing reliance upon Neminath Appayya Hanamannanavar v. Jamboorao Satappa Kocheri, AIR 1966 Mysore 154 and Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayan, AIR 1989 SC 1141 , it was argued that this case should be sent back to the trial Court for completion of her statement, else this statement cannot be read in evidence and this is the first substantial question of law. On the other hand, Mr. Kasliwal learned counsel submitted that PW1 was cross-examined in detail on various dates and no prayer was made on behalf of the appellant-defendant before the trial Court to recall PW-1 for further cross-examination, rather in the memo of the first appeal one of the objections was that the trial Court did not properly consider the statement of PW-1. He placed reliance upon Diwan Singh & Ors. He placed reliance upon Diwan Singh & Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Lahore 561 . 8. In Neminath Appayya Hanamannanavar's case (supra), the statement of one witness was recorded at a stage when the defendant had not appeared before the Court and therefore, had no opportunity to test the evidence given by the witness by cross-examination, it was held that no reliance can be placed upon such statement. In Gopal Saran's case (supra) the evidence of the plaintiff in examination-in-chief was recorded. After 45 recording the evidence, the trial Court recorded that the counsel for the defendant was absent and thereupon closed the evidence. The District Judge in appeal remanded the case to the trial Court and directed the plaintiff to appear before the Court and to subject himself to cross-examination. In spite of several opportunities the plaintiff did not appear before the Court and so submit himself to cross-examination. In view of these facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would not be safe to rely on the examination-in-chief recorded which was not subjected to cross-examination. Diwan Singh's case (supra) was a criminal case. The trial Court under section 540 of old Cr.P.C. summoned one witness. His statement was recorded by the Magistrate and the defence had cross-examined him for nearly two days and thereafter he had to leave under circumstances over which the Magistrate or the petitioners had no control. In view of these facts, it was held that unfinished testimony is admissible as witness was cross-examined substantially. In the instant case, PW-1 Smt. Manjari Pandit appeared as a witness on 20.5.1998. Her examination-in-chief was complete on that day. On account of absence of the defendant, the evidence was closed and the case was fixed for final submissions. Thereafter, on application of the defendant the trial Court allowed cross-examination. After nine adjournments, ,)W-1 was cross-examined for the first time on 1.12.1999. On account of incomplete cross-examination, she was cross-examined on 22.2.1999, 1.4.1999, 1.5.1999 and 29.5.1999. On 29.5.1999 an application under Order 13, Rule 2 CPC was moved on behalf of the defendant. on 12.7.1999 while allowing this application, another plaintiff-Nikhil Pandit's examination-in-chief was recorded. Cross-examination was deferred on application of the defendant. Thereafter, PW-2 Nikhil Pandit was cross-examined and the plaintiffs examined PW-3 Jagdish Chandra Sharma on 1.12.1999 and closed their evidence. The statement of the defendant was recorded on 7.5.2000. on 12.7.1999 while allowing this application, another plaintiff-Nikhil Pandit's examination-in-chief was recorded. Cross-examination was deferred on application of the defendant. Thereafter, PW-2 Nikhil Pandit was cross-examined and the plaintiffs examined PW-3 Jagdish Chandra Sharma on 1.12.1999 and closed their evidence. The statement of the defendant was recorded on 7.5.2000. He 20 examined DW2 Rakesh Gupta, DW3 Kishan Lal Verma and DW4 Govind Narain Agarwal. Evidence of the defendant was complete on 18.5.2001. The statement of PW1 is in 23 closely hand-written pages. Out of 23 pages examination-in-chief is only in two pages. A perusal of the cross-examination goes to show that she has been cross-examined quite in detail on the issues 25 framed by the trial Court and thus it is a clear case of substantial cross-examination. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that she was lastly cross-examined on 29.5.1999 and the evidence of the defendant was closed on 18.5.2001 and the trial Court delivered its judgment on 10.8.2001. No prayer whatsoever was made on behalf of the defendant to recall PW-1 for 30 further cross-examination. Rather in para of the memo of the first appeal, an objection has been raised that the trial Court did not consider the cross-examination part of her statement. In view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, both the judgments relied upon by Mr. Surana are not applicable in the instant case. Even otherwise, the plaintiff No. 1 Nikhil Pandithas also been examined as PW-2. The oral testimony of both the plaintiffs is the same. Therefore, there is no illegality in relying upon the unfinished statement of PW- 1 Smt. Manjari Pandit in the facts of the instant case. 9. Next submission made by Mr. Surana is that the Courts below did not take into consideration certain documents which are Ex.A/1 to Ex.A/9 and had these documents been considered, the decision on the issue of reasonable and bona fide requirement would have been different. Per contra, it was contended by Mr. Kasliwal that the two Courts below considered the entire material evidence and the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal just because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. 10. Ex.A/1 is true copy of the registered safe deed dated 26.3.1999. Per contra, it was contended by Mr. Kasliwal that the two Courts below considered the entire material evidence and the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal just because another view is possible on appreciation of evidence. 10. Ex.A/1 is true copy of the registered safe deed dated 26.3.1999. At pilge 5 of Ex.A/1 it is mentioned that the confirming party i.e. the plaintiffs purchased this flat No. 101 in Kamal Apartments, Jaipur vide agreement dated 26.8.1991 and it was sold to one Suresh Kumar Bajaj vide this sale deed. According to Mr. Surana, these facts have been suppressed by the plaintiffs about availability of the alternate residential flat, at the time of filing this suit and even the sale price paid by Suresh Kumar Bajaj has not been mentioned in this document and thus the evidence that this flat was first sold to Suresh Kumar Bajaj vide agreement dated 17.8.1995 and later on the sale deed was registered on 26.3.1999 is not reliable. As per Mr. Kasliwal, these facts were admitted in the written statement, hence no question of suppression of these facts arises at all. 11. I have considered the above submissions. In Para 3 of the written statement it is admitted that the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC in the civil suit filed by the earlier landlord Dr. Satish Chandra and in that to application it was averred that they purchased the flat No. 101 in Kamal Apartments and subsequently sold that fiat to Suresh Bajaj on 17.8.1995 at higher price. It was also pleaded that the flat No. 101 was quite suitable for the residence of the plaintiffs but they sold this flat for profit. Thus, in view of the said admissions in the written statement, no case of suppression of any 15 material fact is made out in the instant case. The present suit was filed in November, 1996 and it is an admitted case of the defendant himself that this flat No. 101 was sold by the plaintiffs on 17.8.1995. These facts were disclosed by the plaintiffs in application filed W Order 6, Rule 17 CPC much prior to institution of the present suit. Next document is Ex.A/2 which is copy of the registered sale deed of the suit house. According to Mr. These facts were disclosed by the plaintiffs in application filed W Order 6, Rule 17 CPC much prior to institution of the present suit. Next document is Ex.A/2 which is copy of the registered sale deed of the suit house. According to Mr. Surana the suit for eviction filed by original landlord was pending and during the pendency of that suit the plaintiffs purchased this property not with an intent to reside therein, rather with an intent to sell it at higher price as the plaintiffs were already residing in their own residential house situated at Vinoba Marg, 25 C-scheme, Jaipur. In support of this contention he placed reliance upon Ex.A/4 to Ex.A/9. Ex.A/4 contains the particulars of appointment of directors of TGS & Tours & Travels Pvt. Ltd. Smt. Sumitra-mother of the plaintiff No.1 and the plaintiff No. 1 Nikhil Pandit and one Rashmi Agarwal have been shown as directors of this company in April, 1990. Ex.A/5 and Ex.A/6 both of 30 5.4.1990 respectively are the documents of Memorandum and Articles of association of this company. In Ex.A/9 the plaintiff Smt. Manjari has been shown as a director of this company w.e.f. 30.9.1992. Usual residential address of the plaintiffs mentioned in these documents is at Vinoba Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur. Ex.A/7 dated 20.1.1994 is the copy of the deed of hypothecation executed by this company and Ex.A/8 is copy of the form No. 18 relating to charge of situation of the registered office of this company. Mr. Kasliwal learned counsel for the respondents contended that the residential house situated at Vinoba Marg. C-Scheme, Jaipur belongs to Smt. Sumitra Pandit and on account of strained relations between the plaintiffs and Smt. Sumitra Pandit, they left this in the year 1992 and started living in rented flat No. 101 and thereafter in flat No. 202, Kamal Apartment on monthly rent Rs.4,000/- and presently they are paying Rs.5,000/- as monthly rent. 12. I have taken into consideration these documents. In my opinion, these documents have no adverse bearing on the merits of the decision of the Courts below. At the most, it can be said on the basis of Ex.A/4, Ex.A/5, Ex.A/6 & Ex.A/9 that the plaintiff's residence upto to the year 1992 was at C-Scheme, Jaipur. This house belongs to Smt. Sumitra Pandit-mother of the plaintiff No. 1. In my opinion, these documents have no adverse bearing on the merits of the decision of the Courts below. At the most, it can be said on the basis of Ex.A/4, Ex.A/5, Ex.A/6 & Ex.A/9 that the plaintiff's residence upto to the year 1992 was at C-Scheme, Jaipur. This house belongs to Smt. Sumitra Pandit-mother of the plaintiff No. 1. Two Courts below gave concurrent finding that relations of the plaintiffs became strained with Smt. Sumitra in the year 1991 and they left this so house thereafter and they are living in rented premises much before filing this suit. There is no reason to interfere with this concurrent finding of the Courts below which is based upon material evidence on record-oral as well as documentary evidence in the form of rent agreements. rent receipts, telephone bills etc. including one letter Ex.16 dated 14.11.1997 sent by the defendant himself to the plaintiff at the address of flat No. 202. Kamal Apartments. In view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, no contrary view can be taken on the basis of these documents. 13. Next submission made by learned counsel Mr. Surana is that the Courts below did not consider the oral as well as documentary evidence in a proper manner and thus the findings of the Courts below are perverse, that it as a case of mere wish and not of genuine requirement as the plaintiff-Nikhil has one plot No. 46 of 306 sq. yds. of a housing society. Mr. 10 Surana placed reliance upon Vijay Kapoor v. Maya Ram, herein the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that in a suit for eviction if the andlord did not disclose full accommodation available with him, the petition s liable to be dismissed only on this ground. In the instant case, as discussed hereinabove no case is made out that the plaintiffs-landlords did lot disclose the alternative accommodation available to them. In Rajender Kumar v. Jamna Das Kotewala, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere wish or desire by the landlord as opposed to need or equirement does not entitle him to seek eviction. In Kempaiah v. Lingaiah & Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 718 similar view was taken that mere wish of the landlord is not sufficient and the element of need must be proved. In Kempaiah v. Lingaiah & Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 718 similar view was taken that mere wish of the landlord is not sufficient and the element of need must be proved. Similar view was taken in Kishan Chand v. Jagdish Pershad & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 151 and Shantilal Thakordas & Crs. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, AIR 1976 SC 2858 . In V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 432 while dealing with the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the object of Section 14(6) is to prevent the transfers by the landlords as a device to enable the purchasers to evict the tenant from the premises let out to them. 14. As per Mr. Kasliwal it is correct to say that this plot was purchased the name of plaintiff-Nikhil when he was minor, by his mother, but in the ear 1989 his sister Smt. Amita became widow and she started living with their mother and thereafter, his mother obtained the papers of this plot from him for transfer of this plot in that name and to this effect a news item was also got published at the instance of the plaintiff-Nikhil and thus this plot belongs to his mother and she is in possession thereof. It was also contended that finding of reasonable and bona fide requirement is finding of fact and since the finding of reasonable and bona fide requirement is finding of fact and since the finding is concurrent, no substantial question of law is made out. Reliance is placed upon Har Narain Daga v. Heeralal & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 41 wherein it was held that the finding on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord is essentially a finding of fact. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 it was held that with regard to suitability of the premises, the landlord is the best judge and has complete freedom in the matter. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 it was held that test to determine the bona fide requirement of the landlord is objective determination by the Court. Where on the facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the tenanted premises can said to be natural, real, sincere and honest, the need is bona fide. 15. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 it was held that test to determine the bona fide requirement of the landlord is objective determination by the Court. Where on the facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the tenanted premises can said to be natural, real, sincere and honest, the need is bona fide. 15. Upon a careful consideration of the submission in the light of the judgments relied upon it comes up that the requirement of the landlord must be more than mere a wish or desire and the landlord must prove his requirement to be reasonable and bona fide. In the instant case both the Courts below arrived at concurrent findings on the issues of reasonable and bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. These findings are based on evidence and cannot be said to be perverse. The concurrent finding of the Courts below on an appreciation of evidence that the landlord requires the suit house reasonable and bona fide is a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact and it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal as it has not been shown that in reaching such a finding a to mistake of law has been committed by the Courts below or this finding is based on no evidence or is such as no reasonable man can reach it. 16. Consequently, this second appeal alongwith stay application is dismissed at the admission stage. No order as to costs. Records of the Courts below be sent back without delay.Second Appeal Dismissed. *******