ORDER 1. LEAVE GRANTED. 2. THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM TO BE THE EMPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANT. ON THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COURT CLAIMING TO BE THE DIRECT EMPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANT, PROCEEDINGS WERE INITIATED UNDER THE MAHARASHTRA RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNIONS AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES ACT, 1971. THE INDUSTRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE AS CLAIMED BY THEM. THE RESPONDENTS PREFERRED A WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HIGH COURT. THE HIGH COURT QUASHED THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT AND DECLARED THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE THE EMPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANT AND ENTITLED TO ALL BENEFITS, ETC., AS CLAIMED FOR BY THEM AND ALSO TO PAY ALL ARREARS OF WAGES AND BENEFITS, ETC. ON SUCH BASIS. THE DIVISION BENCH ALLOWED THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE. THE DIVISION BENCH DIRECTED THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO REFER THE DISPUTES RAISED BY RESPONDENT 1 TO THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. THE PARTIES AGREED THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS WOULD BE TREATED AS THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM AND THE WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE COMPLAINT MADE BY THE APPELLANT WOULD BE TREATED AS ITS AFFIDAVIT-IN-REPLY TO THE CLAIM STATEMENT. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE EVIDENCE LED BY THE PARTIES IN THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE READ AS EVIDENCE IN THE REFERENCE. HOWEVER, THE PARTIES WERE GIVEN THE LIBERTY TO LEAD FURTHER EVIDENCE, IF THEY WERE SO ADVISED. PENDING DETERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE BY THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BY WAY OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, THE DIVISION BENCH HAD DIRECTED THAT THE DIRECTION ISSUED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE TO CONTINUE SUBJECT TO THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE REFERENCE AND FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR WEEKS THEREAFTER. ALL CONTENTIONS WERE LEFT OPEN TO BE ADJUDICATED UPON BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THE APPELLANT CHALLENGED THE DIRECTION OF THE DIVISION BENCH TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAD DIRECTED THE REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 AND ALSO WITH REGARD TO THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE DIVISION BENCH. ALL CONTENTIONS WERE LEFT OPEN TO BE ADJUDICATED UPON BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THE APPELLANT CHALLENGED THE DIRECTION OF THE DIVISION BENCH TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAD DIRECTED THE REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 AND ALSO WITH REGARD TO THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE DIVISION BENCH. WE SEE NO REASON TO INTERFERE WITH THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE HEARING BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL HAS BEEN PROCEEDED WITH OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AND THE ORDER UNDER APPEAL HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT WORKED ITSELF OUT. ALL QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE PRESENT APPEAL ARE LEFT OPEN. WE MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ANY OBSERVATION OF THE VARIOUS FORA IN THE EARLIER ROUND OF THE PROCEEDINGS WILL NOT IN ANY WAY INFLUENCE THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL TO DISPOSE OF AND DEAL WITH THE REFERENCE IN SUCH MANNER AS IT MAY THINK FIT. 3. THE APPEAL IS DISPOSED OF ACCORDINGLY. THERE SHALL BE NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.