JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - This is a petition for quashing orders dated 21.11.2002 (Annexure P-2) and 7.5.2004 (Annexure P-8) passed by Chief Settlement Commissioner, Rehabilitation, Haryana (respondent No. 2) and Commissioner and Secretary, Rehabilitation, Haryana (respondent No. 1) respectively under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (for short, the Act). 2. Shri Pannu Ram (father of petitioner No. 1 - Prem Kumari) son of Asa Nand is said to have abandoned land in Village Kalolkhan, Tehsil Sangar, District Dera Gazikhan, (now a part of Pakistan). He was allotted two standard acres (9-1/4 units) land in Village Uchhat, Tehsil Mohindergarh, District Narnaul on 25.10.1949 in lieu of the land allegedly left by him in Pakistan. However, the allotment was cancelled on 16.6.1951 because he did not take possession within the time specified in the allotment letter. After 9 years, Shri Pannu Ram filed an application purporting to be the application for exchange of land, but the same was rejected by the competent authority vide order dated 16.9.1960. Shri Pannu Ram died in 1969. After about 31 years of the allotment of land to Shri Pannu Ram and 14 years of his death, petitioner No. 1 filed a revision petition on 27.8.1982 through Shri C.L. Ghai, Advocate. Subsequently, Shri Ghai filed application dated 9.5.1985 for withdrawal of the revision petition. The same was accepted by the concerned authority on 2.9.1985. In the meanwhile, Shri C.L. Ghai filed another revision petition dated 13.6.1985 on the same facts which was disposed of by respondent No. 2 vide his order dated 23.6.1986 (Annexure P-7), the relevant extract of which is reproduced below : "Smt. Prem Kumari filed a revision petition through Shri C.L. Ghai on 27.8.1982 challenging some order about the allotment of land. Subsequently, Shri Ghai counsel for the petitioner filed an application dated 9.5.1985 for withdrawal of the revision petition. No proceedings were initially taken on the said application. Meantime, Shri Ghai filed another revision petition dated 13.6.1985 on the same facts. On this petition also, no action was taken as the counsel requested for adjournment to file some documents and copy of the order appealed against. In the meantime, the earlier petition, namely, filed on 27.8.1982 was dismissed as withdrawn on 2.9.1985. Meantime, Shri Ghai filed another revision petition dated 13.6.1985 on the same facts. On this petition also, no action was taken as the counsel requested for adjournment to file some documents and copy of the order appealed against. In the meantime, the earlier petition, namely, filed on 27.8.1982 was dismissed as withdrawn on 2.9.1985. In fact, the order dated 2.9.1985 was applicable to all the proceedings whatever were in existence on that day, namely, revision petition filed by the petitioner on 13.6.1985 also. In view of this position, no action can now be taken on any revision petition filed earlier to 2.9.1985. The subsequent revision petition dated 13.6.1985 is, therefore, filed. The petitioner can file yet another revision petition if so advised at any stage." 3. Although, respondent No. 2 gave liberty to petition No. 1 to file another revision petition, she did not do so. Instead, she filed an application before the Assistant Registrar in 1991 for allotment of alternative land by asserting that possession of the land allotted in 1949 had not been given to Shri Pannu Ram. The Section Officer-cum-Managing Officer called for the status report regarding the land allotted to Shri Pannu Ram in Village Uchhat from Naib Tehsildar (Sales), Rewari. The latter submitted incomplete/interim reports dated 19.6.1991, 1.8.1991 and 19.8.1991. However, without verifying the records and without even adverting to the question of his competence to pass such an order, the Section Officer-cum-Managing Officer passed order dated 31.10.1991 for allotment of an alternative area of two standard acres (9-1/4 units) to petitioner No. 1 in Village Uchhat, Tehsil Narnaul or in a nearby village. After 3 years, Shri Harbhajan Singh, who is a known purchaser of the claims of displaced persons in District Karnal and in whose favour the legal representatives of late Shri Pannu Ram are said to have executed power of attorney, manipulated the transfer of the claim of petitioner No. 1 from Rewari Sale Unit to Karnal Sale Unit. Shri Harbhajan Singh then filed an application before Tehsildar (Sales), Karnal on 1.1.1995 for allotment of land in Villages Beed Rayat Khana, Makhala and Garhpur Khalsa, District Karnal. After few days, Tehsildar (Sales), Karnal allotted 52 kanals 16 marlas of land in Village Beer Rayat Khana, 4 kanals in Village Makhala, 8 kanals in Village Garhpur Khalsa in his favour against the total claim of 2 standard acres (9- 1/4 units). 4. After few days, Tehsildar (Sales), Karnal allotted 52 kanals 16 marlas of land in Village Beer Rayat Khana, 4 kanals in Village Makhala, 8 kanals in Village Garhpur Khalsa in his favour against the total claim of 2 standard acres (9- 1/4 units). 4. On receipt of complaints that a big racket was operating in Karnal in the matter of allotment of land to the displaced persons, respondent No. 2 sent for the records of various cases. On going through the records, he felt prima facie satisfied that allotments of various parcels of land had been procured by adopting deceitful means. He then treated the complaint as suo motu reference under Section 24 of the Act and issued notices to the resident petitioners, Shri Harbhajan Singh and Sahib Lal son of Ranga Singh, respondent of Camp Yamuna Nagar, District Yamuna Nagar, who too was said to be general attorney of the petitioners at the time of allotment of the land in question. Some of the petitioners refused to accept notice. Shri Harbhajan Singh appeared through Shri Kulwinder Pal Singh Advocate. Later on, Shri Sanjeev Gupta Advocate appeared on behalf of Shri Harbhajan Singh. Shri H.C. Ahuja, Advocate appeared on behalf of one Shri Parbhu Ram. Respondent No. 2, after scanning the entire record, made the following observations : "From a bare perusal of the record, it has been revealed that four parcha claim of the said allottee. In respect of land of Jhok-Baran/H.B. No. 67 (Pakistan), the allottee had claimed 1 standard acres 1-3/4 units land and he was allotted land in Village Bargaron to the tune of 0 standard acres 13- 1/2 units which was cancelled on 5.6.51. This allotment was made under "Reserve Category". Further, the allottee also claimed land in respect of the land left by him in three other villages, namely, Khol Kalan/72, Matai/63 and Thalpandi/70. No land was found in Village Matai. The claim of Village Khol Kalan/72 and Thalpandi/70 was consolidated in one Parcha claim to the tune of 3 standard acres 6-1/2 units and after, cut land to the tune of 2 standard acres 9-1/4 unit was allotted in Village Uchhat. There is a note on the consolidated Parcha claim of these villages that certain land had been mortgaged by the allottee in Pakistan. There is a note on the consolidated Parcha claim of these villages that certain land had been mortgaged by the allottee in Pakistan. This allotment of village Uchit was cancelled on 16.6.51 by the Resettlement Officer and a note to the same effect was also recorded on the Parchi allotment. Thereafter, no appeal or revision was made by the original allottee or his legal heirs for setting aside the said order of cancellation of allotment. However, it was only on 18.4.1991 that the alleged LRs of the allottee made an application for alternative allotment which was allowed by Shri Rajinder Krishan, Section Officer-cum- Managing Officer and U.O. No. 14822-24/S.O./MO dated 12.11.1991 was issued for providing alternative allotment of land to the extent of 2 standard acres 9- 1/4 units to the Tehsildar (Sales), Rewari. Later on, this U.O. was transferred to the Sales Unit, Karnal and the Tehsildar (Sales)-cum M.O. Karnal made the allotment of the land in question by assessing the value of land at lower rate, allotted excess land even beyond the said entitlement. It would be pertinent to mention here that the said U.O. was issued in 1991 and from 1991 to 1994 no allotment was made in this case. But suddenly on 20.10.1994, the alleged LRs of the allottee appointed Shri Harbhajan Singh son of Shri Har Dayal Singh and Sahib Lal son of Ranga Singh as their attorneys. Immediately thereafter on 27.10.1994, the case was transferred from Sales Unit Rewari to Sales Unit Karnal and Shri Harbhajan Singh attorney made application to the Tehsildar (Sales) Karnal for allotment of land on 16.1.1995 and the allotment was made on 18.1.1995. He allotted the land which was neither available for allotment being "Gair Mumkin" and "Banjar Qadim" nor was properly assessed." 5. He allotted the land which was neither available for allotment being "Gair Mumkin" and "Banjar Qadim" nor was properly assessed." 5. Respondent No. 2 then traced the history of the decision taken by the Government to allot land to the displaced persons, the policy decisions taken from time to time which were notified through press notes, the provisions contained in the Act and observed as under : "However, after coming into force of the said Act, to be eligible for allotment of land or payment of compensation, a person has to fulfil the following conditions : (a) He must be a displaced persons as defined under Section 2(b) of the said Act; (b) He must have a verified claim as defined under Section 2(e) of the said Act. (c) He must have made an application in the prescribed form to the Settlement Officer (Sales) concerned within the prescribed period along with the relevant documents as prescribed under Section 4 and Rules 3 and 4. And only thereafter, his entitlement for allotment of land or payment of compensation can be determined by Settlement Commissioner under Section 7 read with Rule 15. In nutshell, after coming into force of the said Act, there were five categories of displaced persons : (a) The first category was of those displaced persons who were allotted land under the quasi permanent scheme and were holding possession of the land on the date of vesting of said land to the Central Government under Section 12 of the Act. These persons were allotted to get transferred the said land in their names in lieu of compensation to be paid to them under Section 10 of the said Act. (b) The second category was of those displaced persons who were allotted land under the quasi permanent scheme of allotment but did not take possession thereof or were ceasing to hold the possession of the land so allotted on the relevant date either due to cancellation or otherwise. Such persons were not entitled to protection under Section 10 of the Act as held by Honble High Court in the case Gopal Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, 1961(63) PLR 762. (c) The third category was of those displaced persons in whose favour orders of allotment were made by the Custodian or rehabilitation authorities under the quasi permanent scheme but no land was allotted. (c) The third category was of those displaced persons in whose favour orders of allotment were made by the Custodian or rehabilitation authorities under the quasi permanent scheme but no land was allotted. Since no land was allotted to them and they were, therefore, not holding the possession of any land as on the date of acquisition, therefore, they are also not entitled for protection under Section 10 of the said Act. (d) The fourth category was of those displaced persons who filed claim under the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 and their claims were duly verified by the competent authorities, but no orders of allotment were passed in their favour under the statements of conditions issued by custodian vide notification dated 8th July, 1949. (e) The fifth category was of those displaced persons, who did not file any claim under the provisions of East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 upto 31st May, 1953, hence had no "verified claim" as defined under Section 2(e) of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, therefore, not entitled to claim compensation under the Act. However, such cases were rare as if any one had land in Pakistan and it was duly recorded in the revenue record received from Pakistan, land was reserved for allotment to them under "Reserve Category". 6. While dealing with the case of Shri Pannu Ram, respondent No. 2 made a reference to the record produced before him and observed : "The original allottee died in the year 1969. The alleged legal heirs made the application in the year 1991 after a lapse of nearly 40 years when the original allotment was cancelled, along with certain unattested and unsigned copies of the applications allegedly made by Sh. Punnu Ram in the year 1967. In fact the allotment made at village Uchit was rightly cancelled in terms of the conditions of allotment as neither the allottee was entitled to the said allotment nor the possession of the allotted land was taken and if at all, he was entitled for the same, then none prevented him or his LRs to get another allotment in lieu thereof under the then existing statement of conditions but he/they were required to make an application to the competent authority. No such action was taken by him/them. No such action was taken by him/them. However, on the day when the Displaced Persons (C&R) Act, 1954 came into operation and the entire evacuee lands had been acquired by the Central Government, said Punnu Ram had no allotment under the said statement of conditions referred to above and in any case was not in possession of such an allotment of land. Section 10 of the ibid Act of 1954, protected only those allottees who had been given the allotment of land under the statement of conditions dated 8th July, 1949 and were in possession of the same. Admittedly, at the time of enforcement of the Act of 1954 said Punnu Ram was not in possession of any allotted land and, therefore, his case is not covered under Section 10 of the said Act. After coming into force of the said Act, the original displaced persons had another chance to file his claim for allotment of land under Section 4 of the said Act read with Rules 3 & 4 and Rule 67-A of the Rules made thereunder within the prescribed period i.e. upto 31.12.1963 as he had a verified claim as defined under Section 2(e) of the said Act. No such application was made either by the original allottee or his legal heirs upto 31.12.1963 except the one made in the year 1991 and that too not to the competent authority. There is no hardship involved in this case. The original allotment was made as far back as 1949-50 and was cancelled in the year 1951. The Central Government took over the evacuee lands in the year 1954 and thereafter the left over evacuee properties were transferred to the State Government by the Central Government on payment under a Package Deal in the year 1961. Between 1954 and 1991 nearly 37 years have elapsed and if a claimant or his legal heirs was not anxious for one reason or other to get an allotment or an alternative allotment in lieu of the earlier allotment which had been cancelled, the Rehabilitation authorities could not and cannot continue ad finitum for the benefit of such a person. Between 1954 and 1991 nearly 37 years have elapsed and if a claimant or his legal heirs was not anxious for one reason or other to get an allotment or an alternative allotment in lieu of the earlier allotment which had been cancelled, the Rehabilitation authorities could not and cannot continue ad finitum for the benefit of such a person. It would have been a different thing if an application had been made in time and the same remained pending either before the original authority who had to make/pass the order or before the appellate authority or revisional authority, but in the instant case said Shri Punnu Ram did not bother till his death and thereafter his legal heirs, the present respondent, to take any step. For the reasons given above, I feel that the application made by the alleged legal representatives of said Shri Punnu Ram for alternative allotment of land should have been rejected by the Assistant Registrar-cum-Managing Officer/Section Officer-cum-Managing officer and, therefore, the orders passed by the Section Officer-cum-M.O. are not illegal but beyond his jurisdiction and void ab initio and deserve to be set aside on the basis of the legal position stated above. I am, therefore, in full agreement with the contention of the learned DA that the application dated 18.4.1991 was not legally sustainable and the legal heirs of the original allottee were not entitled for any alternative allotment of land. The Honble High Court while deciding 8 Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 2500, 2501 and 3409 of 1971 in which the same common points of law were involved, had taken the same view that allottee who did not take possession of the allotted land before coming into force of the Displaced Persons (C&R) Act, 1954, is not entitled for any allotment of land after the expiry of statutory period for making application i.e. 31.12.1963. These writ petitions were disposed of by the Honble High Court vide its order dated 15.1.1973. The facts of the cases involved in these writ petitions and in this case are almost identical and the same common points of law are involved. Therefore, the law laid down by the Honble High Court in this case is fully applicable in this case. The wrongful acts of the officers/officials are not binding on the Govt. and only those orders/acts are binding on the Govt. Therefore, the law laid down by the Honble High Court in this case is fully applicable in this case. The wrongful acts of the officers/officials are not binding on the Govt. and only those orders/acts are binding on the Govt. which are strictly made in accordance with law and had been issued by the competent authority as held by Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 1285. In this case, neither the orders were passed by a competent authority nor actions/orders were bona fide, therefore, these are void orders which can be set aside or can be ignored at any time as held in 1976 PLJ 480." 7. Respondent No. 2 also held that the land allotted to petitioner No. 1 and others did not form part of compensation pool and, therefore, the same was not available for allotment; that the Tehsildar (Sales) was not competent to determine the value of the land, inasmuch as, this power vested in the Settlement Commissioner under Section 20(1)(C) of the Act and Rule 50 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (for short the Rules); that the Tehsildar (Sales) could not have assessed the Chahi land at the rate of Barani by treating its as Chahi Mustar and that there was unwholly (unholy ?) alliance between Tehsildar (Sales), Karnal and Shri Harbhajan Singh. Accordingly, he set aside order dated 31.10.1991 passed by the Section Officer-cum-Managing Officer and subsequent allotment of land made in Villages Beer Rayat Khana, Makhala and Garhpur Khalsa, District Karnal in 1995. 8. The petitioners challenged the order of respondent No. 2 by filing revision petition under Section 33 of the Act which was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide his order dated 7.5.2004 (Annexure P-8). The reasons assigned by respondent No. 1 for declining to entertain the claim of the petitioners are : "(1) The alleged application made in the year 1960 was for exchange of land which was rejected as is clear from the orders on the application dated 16.9.1960 itself. (ii) That the petitioner did not challenge the rejection of 16.9.1960 before the competent authority. The subsequent application of 1967 was time barred as per Rule 67-A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. (ii) That the petitioner did not challenge the rejection of 16.9.1960 before the competent authority. The subsequent application of 1967 was time barred as per Rule 67-A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. (iii) That no notification of the Government has been placed on record according to which Section Officer-cum-Managing Officer was competent to function as Assistant Registrar as the application was addressed to Assistant Registrar (Headquarters). (iv) That the claim is not covered with the definition of verified claim as after allotment he did not manage the land. In such situation his claim stands forfeited as per Rule 61 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. (v) That his application made in 1991 before A.R. for alternative allotment was time barred and it was wrongly entertained by Section Officer- cum-Managing Officer vide his order dated 31.10.1991. These wrong orders have rightly been set aside by learned Chief Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 21.11.2002. (vi) That judgment in the case of Guranditta 1992 PLJ 603 is now not relevant in view of the latest law laid down by the Honble High Court in C.W.P. No. 160 of 1986 decided on 7.5.2003 as reported in 2004(1) RCR Civil 95." 9. Respondent No. 1 also expressed his agreement with respondent No. 2 that large number of allotments had been made between 1994 and 1996 which required to be probed by Vigilance Department. 10. Shri S.N. Saini argued that the impugned orders should be declared nullity and quashed because the petitioners were not given effective opportunity to represent their cause, inasmuch as, respondent No. 2 did not adjourn the hearing to enable their Advocate to appear and argue the case. Shri Saini lamented that respondent No. 1 did not supply translation of the documents which had direct bearing on the claim of the petitioners and arbitrarily dismissed the revision petition. He further argued that Rule 67-A of the Rules is not applicable to the case of the petitioners and, therefore, the application made by them could not have been dismissed as barred by time. He further argued that Rule 67-A of the Rules is not applicable to the case of the petitioners and, therefore, the application made by them could not have been dismissed as barred by time. Shri Saini referred to order dated 22.8.1988 passed by this Court in LPA No. 27 of 1987 and order dated 27.8.1998 passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1464 of 1990 - The Financial Commissioner Revenue and others v. Dalip Singh Naik and argued that the claim of the petitioners could not have been rejected on the ground that petitioner No. 1 had submitted application after 31.12.1963. He further argued that existence of a verified claim is not a sine qua non for allotment of land to a displaced person and the application made by the petitioners could not have been rejected because Shri Pannu Ram had, in fact, been allotted land in 1949 as a displaced person. He further argued that dismissal of the revision petitions filed by petitioner No. 1 in 1982 and 1985 did not adversely affect the rights of the petitioners to claim allotment of alternative land in lieu of the land allotted to Shri Pannu Ram in the year 1949 which was cancelled in 1951. 11. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel, but have not felt persuaded to agree with him. A reading of order Annexure P-2 makes it clear that the petitioners were duly served with notice of the suo motu reference. Some of them were represented through their Advocates. Shri Kulwinder Pal Singh and Shri Sanjeev Gupta, Advocates had appeared on behalf of the holder of power of attorney of the petitioners and argued the case before respondent No. 1. Therefore, at this stage, it is not possible to entertain the complaint of the petitioners that they were not given effective opportunity to represent their cause. 12. The so-called non-supply of the translation of documents by respondent No. 1 to the counsel for the petitioners is also inconsequential and this cannot be made a ground to nullify order Annexure P-8 because the counsel for the petitioners had been given opportunity to inspect the records. 13. 12. The so-called non-supply of the translation of documents by respondent No. 1 to the counsel for the petitioners is also inconsequential and this cannot be made a ground to nullify order Annexure P-8 because the counsel for the petitioners had been given opportunity to inspect the records. 13. We are further of the view that the petitioners were not entitled to allotment of alternative land and the application made by them in the year 1991 was rightly rejected by respondent No. 2 because - (a) the application was not supported by duly verified claim and no other evidence was produced by the petitioners to show that late Shri Pannu Ram had left land in Pakistan; (b) In L.P.A. No. 102 of 1966 - Hari Chand v. Union of India and another, decided on 3.3.1970, a Division Bench approved the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the appellant was not entitled to allotment of land as displaced person because he did not possess any verified claim and observed : "This Act provides for the lodging of the claims by the refugee land-holders, their registration by the Land Claims Officer and investigation there into by the authority. Section 4 of the said Act provides that a refugee may submit to the Registering Officer on the prescribed form duly supported by an affidavit an application for the registration of claim in respect of his land abandoned by him. Detailed rules have been framed under the Act providing for the manner and the mode of submission of such applications. Rules 2 and 3 of the said Rules provide that the claim application shall be made in the form given in Appendix A thereto and further that such claim applications shall be duly presented to the Registering Officer. It was further provided that in case of a minor, application for claims shall be submitted in the aforesaid manner by his next friend or his guardian. Significantly, the appellant did not at any stage move under the above said provisions to get his claim duly registered and verified. It is conceded that instead of complying with the statutory requirements of the abovesaid provisions, he merely approached the Managing Officer who in the context of the fact that he did not possess any verified claim refused him any relief. This order was rightly upheld by the higher authorities. It is conceded that instead of complying with the statutory requirements of the abovesaid provisions, he merely approached the Managing Officer who in the context of the fact that he did not possess any verified claim refused him any relief. This order was rightly upheld by the higher authorities. It is significant to note that under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, the jurisdiction to grant compensation by the authorities thereunder arises qua displaced persons who are verified claimants. In the absence of this pre-requisite qualification the appellant was thus patently ineligible to claim compensation under the provisions of the 1954 Act." A similar view was expressed in Shiv Devi v. Central Government, C.W.P. No. 1239 of 1972, decided on 15.7.1973. In that case, a Division Bench held that a displaced person, who comes forward for obtaining allotment in lieu of land abandoned in Pakistan must fulfil two requirements. Firstly, he should hold a verified claim and secondly, he should have made an application for allotment to satisfy wholly or partially unsatisfied claim before 31st December, 1963 as envisaged under Rule 67-A of the Rules and if either of the two conditions is not satisfied, then he/she cannot claim allotment of land in lieu of abandoned land in Pakistan. In Dalip Singh Naik v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and others, 1987 RRR 40 (P&H) and Gurinditta v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) and Secretary to Government, Punjab, 1992(2) RCJ 478 (P&H), two Single Benches accepted the claim of the petitioners because they had produced revenue records showing that they had left land in Pakistan. The LPA filed by the State against the order passed in Dalip Singh Naiks case (supra) was summarily dismissed by the Division Bench and the SLP filed against the order of the Division Bench was dismissed by the Supreme Court in August 27, 1998 by passing the following order : "Having gone through the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court which has given complete details of the controversy and to which the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal has given its approval, in limine, we find that justice was on the side of the respondent and it had to be given to him in substantial measure. We, thus, find no ground to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed. We, thus, find no ground to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed. No costs." In Sat Parkash and another v. Union of India and others, 2004(1) RCR(Civil) 95 (P&H), one of us (G.S. Singhvi, J.) considered the apparent conflict between the judgments of the Division Benches in Hari Chands case (supra) and Shiv Devis case (supra) on the one hand and of the Single Benches in Dalip Singh Naiks case (supra) and Gurindittas case (supra) on the other hand and observed as under : "In my opinion, the orders passed in Dalip Singh Naiks case (supra) and Gurindittas case (supra) cannot be made basis for granting relief to the petitioners because the view expressed by the learned Single Judges on the interpretation of the provisions of the 1948 and 1954 Acts runs contrary to the one expressed by the Division Bench in Shiv Devis case (supra) and Hari Chands case (supra) and in view of the law laid down by the Division Benches, it must be held that the existence of a verified claim and submission of application by the claimant before the appointed dated i.e. 31st December, 1963 constitutes a condition precedent to the allotment of land to the displaced person." In the present case, as mentioned above, the petitioners have not produced any evidence regarding existence of verified claim or other revenue records to support the claim of Shri Pannu Ram for allotment of the land under the Act; (b) before this Court also, no evidence has been produced in the form of revenue records to show that Shri Pannu Ram had left land in Pakistan and, therefore, he fell within the category of displaced persons; (c) no explanation was given by the petitioners as to why late Shri Pannu Ram did not pursue his claim for allotment of alternative site after the application for exchange was rejected in 1960 and why petitioner No. 1 got dismissed the revision petitions filed by her in the years 1982 and 1985; (d) after the rejection of his application for exchange of land Shri Pannu Ram did not make any application for allotment of land till his death in the year 1969 and no explanation was given by the petitioners or at least petitioner No. 1 as to why she did not file application till 1991; (e) the action taken by the Section Officer-cum-Managing Officer to entertain the claim made by the petitioners in the year 1991 and to order allotment of land was clearly without jurisdiction because he was not competent to entertain such application; and (f) the transfer of claim from Rewari Sale Unit to Karnal Sale Unit in the year 1994 did not have any legal sanction and we do not find any justification to upset the concurrent finding recorded by respondent Nos. 2 and 1 and this was manipulated by Shri Harbhajan Singh in connivance with the officers at Karnal. 14. The argument of Shri S.N. Saini that the application filed by the petitioners could not have been dismissed with reference to the period prescribed under Rule 67-A of the Rules sounds attractive, but in the peculiar facts of this case, we are not inclined to accept the same because, as mentioned above, Shri Pannu Ram neither had any verified claim nor any evidence was produced before the concerned authority and none has been produced by this Court to show that he had left land in Pakistan. 15. Before concluding, we deem it proper to mention that the scope of High Courts jurisdiction in such matters is very limited. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Courts power to issue the writ of certiorari and laid down the following propositions :- "A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can, similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or requestioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court." 16. In Shaikh Mahammad Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab and others, AIR 1970 SC 61, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the power of the High Court under Article 226 to re-appreciate the evidence produced before the trial Judge, held as under :- "Where the evidence adduced before the trial Judge was not so immaculate that another Judge might not have taken a different view, it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial Judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227." 17. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227." 17. In Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and another, AIR 1984 SC 976, a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court qua the award passed by the Tribunal under the Act and held as under : "The High Court is undisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it." 18. In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others, JT 1999(6) SC 507, the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by this Court dismissing the writ petition filed against the order of the petitioners removal from the office of the President of Municipal Committee. Some of the observations made in that decision, which are worth noticing are as under :- "The Court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the enquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the enquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The enquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings." The view taken in Sayed Yakoobs case (supra) has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar and another v. Ist ADJ Varanasi and others, JT 2002(8) SC 69. 19. Shahnawaz Akhtar and another v. Ist ADJ Varanasi and others, JT 2002(8) SC 69. 19. The principles which can be deduced from the aforementioned decisions are : (a) A writ of certiorari can be issued only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court or where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly i.e. it decides a question without giving an opportunity of hearing to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the principles of natural justice or where the order/award is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. (b) The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and not appellate one. (c) The finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, on appreciation of evidence, cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. (d) No strait-jacket formula can be evolved for deciding whether the impugned judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law and each case has to be decided on its own facts, but broadly speaking, an error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or award under challenge along with the documents relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced before the lower Court or Tribunal, cannot be regarded as an error of law for the purpose of issuing a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact can be regarded as vitiated by an error of law if the High Court finds that inferior Court/Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same has influenced its decision. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence will be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for issuing a writ of certiorari. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence will be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for issuing a writ of certiorari. (e) The mere possibility of forming a different opinion on re- appreciation of evidence produced by the parties is not sufficient for issuance of a writ of certiorari. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the afore-mentioned cases and the discussion made in the earlier part of this order, we hold that the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Order accordingly. Petition dismissed.