JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner preferred the present writ petition under Article 226 1 and 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the validity and propriety of the order dated 11.2.1987 passed by the Secretary, the Tonk Zile Sahakari Shoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., Tonk, under the orders of its Administrator whereby a punishment of reversion was imposed upon the petitioner exercising the s powers provided under Rule 19(2) of the Rajasthan Civil Services ;Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,:958. The facts giving rise to present petition are stated in succeeding pares. 2. A memorandum under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services I:Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 10 the Rules of 1958) dated 26.11.1986 was served upon the petitioner along with the statement of allegation. By the memorandum Annex. 1, two allegations were levelled against the petitioner. The memorandum referred above is on record, however, the statement of allegation is not annexed with the memorandum. Be that as it may, the petitioner submitted an application dated 9.12.1986 whereby he demanded certain information's from the disciplinary authority to give an effective reply to the allegations levelled against him. It is pertinent to note here that while submitting the application dated 26.11.1986 the petitioner in quite unambiguous terms denied the allegations levelled against him. The petitioner termed the allegations as contrary to the facts and baseless. The relevant portion of the application dated 26.11.1986 wherein the petitioner denied the allegations is reproduced below: " vki }kjk mDr vkjksi i= esa esjh izxfr ds tks vkadMs+ fn[kyk;s x;s gSa os xyr gSa ,oa vki }kjk yxk;s x;s vkjksi rF;ghu ,oa vk/kkjghu gSaA vr% eq>s ekU; ugha gSaA " 3. The Secretary of the respondent Bank by a communication dated 2.1.1987 communicated the petitioner that the information's sought by him are not relevant and therefore, he instructed the petitioner to submit a statement of defence within a period of 10 days thereafter. The petitioner by an another communication dated 9.1.1987 reiterated his request to supply the information demanded by him by the application Annex. 2. The petitioner after submission of the communication dated 9.1.1987 proceeded on medical leave for a period commencing from 20.1.1987 to 4.3.1987. The medical leave for the period referred above was sanctioned by the Secretary of the respondent Bank as it is evident from the order placed on record as Annex. 5. 4. 2. The petitioner after submission of the communication dated 9.1.1987 proceeded on medical leave for a period commencing from 20.1.1987 to 4.3.1987. The medical leave for the period referred above was sanctioned by the Secretary of the respondent Bank as it is evident from the order placed on record as Annex. 5. 4. The petitioner while undergoing medical leave received the order impugned Annex. 6 dated 11.2.1987. The disciplinary authority imposed a 2s punishment of reversion upon the petitioner by resorting the powers provided under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. It is pertinent to note here that the powers provided under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 are special powers whereby regular inquiry provided under rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 can be dispensed with. Rule 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958 is in consonance with the provisions of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The disciplinary authority while resorting to powers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 averred that the delinquent employee was creating hurdles in holding regular inquiry under rule 16 of the rules of 1958. According to the disciplinary authority the petitioner failed to submit reply to the charge-sheet within the period stipulated and therefore, he was not co-operating in smooth holding of disciplinary proceedings. 5. The petitioner being aggrieved by order Annex. 6 dated 11.2.1987 preferred a review petition before the Administrator of the Society on 10.8.1987. The review petition preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Administrator of the respondent bank under the order dated 19.5.1995, however, copy of the same was not supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner subsequently made numerous requests to the competent authorities of the bank to supply him a copy of the order dated 19.5.1995 but of no consequence. Hence he preferred the present writ petition before this court assailing the validity and propriety of the order dated 11.2.1987 (Annex. 5). 6. This court by order dated 22.7.1996 pleased to issue show-cause notice to the respondents as to why the writ petition be not admitted and in response to show-cause notice a reply to the writ petition was filed by the respondents. The writ petition by an order dated 15.1.2004 was admitted for so hearing. 5). 6. This court by order dated 22.7.1996 pleased to issue show-cause notice to the respondents as to why the writ petition be not admitted and in response to show-cause notice a reply to the writ petition was filed by the respondents. The writ petition by an order dated 15.1.2004 was admitted for so hearing. According to the reply filed on behalf of the respondents the powers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 were adopted as the petitioner was not co-operating in holding of disciplinary proceedings. The respondents beside giving reply on merits also raised certain preliminary objections with regard to maintainability of the writ petition. The first preliminary objection of the respondents is that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as the respondent bank is neither State nor its instrumentality or agency as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of part Ill of the Constitution. The second preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent Bank is that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed being suffered by the delay and latches on behalf of the petitioner. A rejoinder to the writ petition was tiled on behalf of the petitioner. 7. The petitioner by submitting a rejoinder reiterated the averments contained in the writ petition and emphasised that the Government is having a deep and pervasive financial and administrative control over the respondent hank and therefore, the same is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner in its rejoinder also stated that there was no delay on his part as immediately after receiving the order passed by the disciplinary authority he preferred a review petition which was kept pending by the respondent Bank for years together and the same was decide.d by the order dated 19.5.1995, copy of which was not supplied to him by the respondents. In the back-around stated above 120 consider it appropriate to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondent Bank before coming to merits of the dispute. 8. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent bank with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the respondent bank on the count that the same is not an agency or instrumentality of the State is no more res-integra. 8. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent bank with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the respondent bank on the count that the same is not an agency or instrumentality of the State is no more res-integra. The question with regard to status of a Land Development Bank came up before this court in the case of Pukh Raj Choudhary v. Pali Zile Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., Pall & Anr. bearing SBCWP No. 3928/2001 decided on 27.11.2002 . In the aforesaid matter the learned Single bench of this court in quite unambiguous terms held that the Land Development Bank is an instrumentality of the State and therefore is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the judgment referred above is worth to he reproduced:- "In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey and others, (1999) 1 SCC 741 , I do not find any force in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents because of the reason that a bare perusal of the bye-laws, copy of which has been made available to the court by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is clear that the governing body of the respondents is constituted under clause 25 of the bye-laws wherein there may he six members from the category-A, out of which three are required to be nominated by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies and one is required to be invited by the Bank from the Rajasthan State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., Jaipur and one from Nabard who have no right to vote. The governing body will consist of ⅓rd members from the weaker section which shall consist of one member from the Schedule Caste, one from the Schedule Tribe and one from other weaker section and, In case there is some vacancy for each weaker section, the State Government and Registrar, Co-operative Society, can nominate the members for the governing body. Not only this but very many provisions are already in the bye-laws of the respondent Co-operative Bank which show that the State Government has controlling powers of administration of the respondent Co-operative Bank. Not only this but very many provisions are already in the bye-laws of the respondent Co-operative Bank which show that the State Government has controlling powers of administration of the respondent Co-operative Bank. It is also not in dispute that the disciplinary actions for the employees of the respondent Co-operative Bank are to be taken as provided-under the Service Rules governing the Government employees. Therefore, it is clear from the facts of the case that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the above referred case covers the present controversy and there is no force in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and the same is hereby rejected." 9. It is relevant to note that the constitution and bye-laws of the present respondent Bank are of the same nature as to the Pali Zila Rhoomi Vikas Sahakari Bank Ltd. In view whatever stated above, in my opinion, the preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the count that the respondent bank is neither State nor its instrumentality or agency, is having no merit and therefore, deserves to be over-ruled. 10. The second preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents with regard to delay and latches in filing the writ petition is also not having any merit. The order impugned Annex. 6 was passed by the disciplinary authority on 11.2.1987. The petitioner preferred a review petition before the competent authority on 19th August 1987. The review petition preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the competent authority of the bank under an order dated 19.5.1995. The petitioner thereafter submitted number of representations to the respondents to supply him a copy of the order dated 19.5.1995 but of no consequence. The petitioner in these circumstances presented the writ petition on 29.2.1996. As such there is no delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition. Accordingly the preliminary objection with regard to delay in filing the writ petition is also over-ruled. 11. The petitioner in these circumstances presented the writ petition on 29.2.1996. As such there is no delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition. Accordingly the preliminary objection with regard to delay in filing the writ petition is also over-ruled. 11. Coming to the merits of the dispute the main contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the disciplinary authority has resorted to the powers under Article 19 of the Rules of 1958 only to avoid the holding of regular inquiry as provided under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 According to the petitioner there was no just and valid reason to resort the powers under rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. Before proceeding further it is relevant to note that the respondent bank with a view to regulate discipline among its employees adopted the rules of 1958. Under the rules of 1958 a regular procedure for holding disciplinary proceedings is provided under rule 16. eto According to the rule 16(2) of the Rules of 1958 the disciplinary authority is required to frame a definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with the statement of allegations are required to be communicated in writing to the employee and the employee thereafter is required to submit an explanation within the period specified by the disciplinary authority. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 provides that the Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify. Sub-rule 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 provides that on receipt of written statement of defence, or if no such so statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted. The narration of the provisions referred above clearly shows that the Government servant is having a statutory right to seek necessary information and inspect the record to file an effective statement in his defence. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 15 provides a valuable right to an employee in this regard. In the present case the petitioner by the communication Annex. 2 dated 26.11.1986 infect exercised his right to seek necessary information from the employer to submit an effective statement of defence. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 15 provides a valuable right to an employee in this regard. In the present case the petitioner by the communication Annex. 2 dated 26.11.1986 infect exercised his right to seek necessary information from the employer to submit an effective statement of defence. It is worthwhile to note here even at the cost of repetition that in the communication dated 26.11:1986 itself the petitioner in quite unambiguous terms denied the allegations. After denial of the allegations it was open for the respondents in accordance with sub-rule 4 of the Rules of 1958 to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. It is to surprising that the respondent bank instead of appointing an Enquiring Authority choose to resort the special powers prescribed under rule 19 of the rules of 1958. The special powers under rule 19 of the rules of 1058 are extra ordinary powers which are required to be exercised in extra ordinary circumstances. 1 would like to reproduce rule 19 of the rules of 1958 being 95 necessary for adjudication of the present controversy. "Rule 19. Special procedure in certain cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18- (i) where a penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on tee ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge: or (ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules, or (iii) where the Governor is satisfied that the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure. The Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is so necessary.'' 12. From perusal of the provisions of rule i9 it is apparent that these extra ordinary powers can be exercised in special circumstances when it is not. reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed under rule 16 of the rules of 1958. In the present case the respondent Bank has resorted to clause 2 of rule 19 by holding that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry against the petitioner. reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed under rule 16 of the rules of 1958. In the present case the respondent Bank has resorted to clause 2 of rule 19 by holding that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry against the petitioner. The question before this court is whether the respondent bank was right in resorting the powers under clause 2 of rule 19 of the rules of 1958 by dispensing with regular procedure for inquiry provided under rule 16 of the rules of 1958. As stated in preceding pares the petitioner immediately after receiving the memorandum under rule 16 of the rules of 1958 submitted an application to the 'respondent bank making a request to supply him certain information's which were necessary to submit an effective statement of defence which were in opinion of the petitioner required to submit effective defence statement. The petitioner in that application also denied the allegations levelled against him in quite unambiguous terms. It was open for the respondents even at that stage to proceed with regular enquiry against the petitioner. The respondent bank instead of doing so choose to resort the powers under rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1958. so Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, reported in 1985 SC page 1416 , has given guidelines in this regard. I would like to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment referred above which clearly prescribes the circumstances in which special powers to dispense with the regular proceedings can be exercised: "(Para 130) the condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable". According to the Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning "possible to practice. done or accomplished: feasible". Further, words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning "possible to practice. done or accomplished: feasible". Further, words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the Government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held, it would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its powers of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty." 13. From minute disection of the facts of present case it is apparent that there was no circumstance available to respondents to dispense with regular enquiry as provided under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 and to exercise the powers under Rule 19(11) of the Rules of 1958. 14. The disciplinary authority resorted to the powers under rule 19(11) of the Rules of 1958 only to avoid the holding of disciplinary inquiry as prescribed under rule 16 of the rules of 1958. The petitioner by no stretch of s imagination can be blamed for creating hurdles in holding of inquiry. The stand taken by the respondents on face appears to be baseless and without any reason. In view of it the order impugned Annex. 6 deserves to be quashed and set-aside. 15. The writ petition, therefore, is accordingly allowed. The order impugned Annex. 6 is quashed and set-aside and the petitioner is declared entitled for all the consequential benefits.Writ Petition Allowed - Impugning Order Set Aside, Petitioner Entitled to all Consequential Benefits. *******