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2004 DIGILAW 1357 (MAD)

S. Rajagopal v. Chairman and Managing Director & Others

2004-10-18

A.K.RAJAN

body2004
Judgment :- The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the impugned order. Petitioner was working as Scale-III Officer in Indian Bank. Certain charges were framed against him and an enquiry was conducted. In the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found that the petitioner pleaded guilty of the charges. Based on that admission of guilt, a finding was given that all the charges have been proved. Therefore an order of dismissal has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was filed and the same was dismissed. Still aggrieved, the petitioner filed a review application and the same was also dismissed and hence this writ petition. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per the regulations of the Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, and Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) (Amendment) Regulation, 1985, regulation 6 provides for Procedure for imposing major penalties, and the relevant clause reads as under, "6(4) On receipt of the written statement of the officer employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, an enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary Authority itself, or if it considers it necessary so to do appoint under sub-regulation (2) an Inquiring Authority for the purpose: Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an inquiry in respect of the articles of charge admitted by the officer employee in his written statement but shall be necessary to record its findings on each such charge." The proviso makes it clear that when the person admits the charges in the written statement, it may not be necessary to hold enquiry, but at the same time, the Enquiry Officer should record his finding on each of the charges. But in this case, the Enquiry Officer has not given any findings and he has only found all the charges proved since the Officer pleaded guilty. His order reads as follow, "In view of the charge-sheeted officer's pleading guilty to all the charges alleged against him in the charge-sheet No.356:95:VG dated 07.02.95, I hold him "guilty" of the charges alleged in the charge sheet." 3. His order reads as follow, "In view of the charge-sheeted officer's pleading guilty to all the charges alleged against him in the charge-sheet No.356:95:VG dated 07.02.95, I hold him "guilty" of the charges alleged in the charge sheet." 3. As per Regulation 6(8)(c), the inquiring authority shall ask the officer employee whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the inquiring Authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the officer employee concerned thereon. Thereafter, the inquiring Authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the officer employee concerned pleads guilty. 4. This is the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer in this case. Therefore, there is no violation of the regulations prescribed. That apart, the enquiry officer finding has been communicated to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority has given a finding with respect to each of the charges. Therefore, even the regulations relating to the proviso 6 (4) has also been complied with. The disciplinary authority has given his finding on both charges. Therefore, there is no irregularity or illegality in the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority. 5. Learned Counsel Mr. Veeraraghavan, appearing for the petitioner has further submitted that in the written statement, he has made it clear that the bills purchased has been duly reported to the A.E.U-1 and also shown in the B.S. Return and hence, the action of purchasing such instruments exceeding his powers were in no matter withheld by him from the knowledge of the higher authorities. Therefore, no dishonesty can be attributed to the petitioner in the bill purchased. Further, this petitioner has acted only in the interest of the Bank and in order to increase the volume of business and in fact he has stated that he has increased the volume of the business from Rs.2 lakhs to Rs.5 crores during his tenure. Therefore, may be due to over enthusiasm in getting more business, he has acted and therefore, it cannot be said that he is guilty of misappropriation or exceeding the powers vested on him dishonestly. Therefore, may be due to over enthusiasm in getting more business, he has acted and therefore, it cannot be said that he is guilty of misappropriation or exceeding the powers vested on him dishonestly. Therefore, it is the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the act complained of and hence, the punishment has to be set aside. 6. Mrs. Rita Chandrasekaran learned counsel appearing for the Bank referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY-CUM-REGIONAL MANAGER AND OTHERS - Vs. - NIKUNJA BIHARIPATNAIK (1996) 9 S.C.C. 69 ) wherein the Supreme Court has held that, " In acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in the instant case, there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit, they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgment". 7. Relying the above said judgment, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that this punishment cannot be said to be excessive or shocking the judicial conscience. She also referred another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK AND OTHERS – Vs. - P.C. KAKKAR (AIR 2003, S.C. 1571) wherein, the Supreme Court has held that, "It is not for the Court to interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards". The Supreme Court also held that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be said to be shocking the judicial conscience. 8. The Supreme Court also held that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be said to be shocking the judicial conscience. 8. Considering the fact that this petitioner was Scale III officer who had put in more than 23 years of unblemished service and his past records does not show any misconduct on his part, this Court is of the opinion that he has acted in good faith to increase the volume of the business. While doing so, it appears that, he has acted due to over enthusiasm and on the hope that purchase of bills, which is permissible under the Banking activities, would bring profit to the bank. It is also to be remembered that all the officers are empowered to purchase bills. Though he has exceeded his limit, he had informed the same to his higher authorities immediately and it was not objected to by them immediately or any point of time before the charges were framed. Therefore, it is deemed to have been accepted by the higher authorities. In those circumstances, when a person has acted in a bonafide impression and while taking a decision, if he has committed a mistake, his action can only be termed as an action taken in the interest of the Bank i.e. for the purpose of increasing the business of the bank. 9. Bearing this in view, when this case is considered, the punishment imposed on the petitioner appears to be grossly disproportionate to the acts of the petitioner. The fact that a suit had been filed to recover the amount does not alter the situation. It is also stated that title deeds have been hypothecated with the Bank. Therefore, ultimately the entire amount is likely to be recovered. In those circumstances, this Court is of the view that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner is shocking to the conscience of the Court. Therefore, the punishment of dismissal is set aside. It is also stated that title deeds have been hypothecated with the Bank. Therefore, ultimately the entire amount is likely to be recovered. In those circumstances, this Court is of the view that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner is shocking to the conscience of the Court. Therefore, the punishment of dismissal is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority to consider the punishment that is to be imposed on the petitioner for the misconduct alleged and pass orders afresh within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Till such time, the petitioner is not entitled to either reinstatement or back wages. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.