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2004 DIGILAW 136 (GAU)

State of Tripura v. Chandan @ Chandanmoy Dasgupta

2004-02-23

I.A.ANSARI, TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2004
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 15.11.2002, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 546/ 2001. 2. Heard Mr. T.K. Roy, learned Advocate General, Tripura, assisted by Mr. T.D. Majumdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. We also have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The facts and circumstances leading to the filing of this writ appeal may be briefly stated. The respondents were originally employed as Industrial workers under the Industries Department. They had obtained completed vocational training for 2 years and obtained National Certificate from the Industrial Training Institute before entering into the said employment and each of them possessed the minimum qualification of Class VIII. According to the respondents, they were allowed to enjoy the pay scale of Rs. 170-210/- per mensem, while workers having the same qualification working in other Departments, such as, Public Health Engineering, Government Press under the Printing and Stationary Department were given the higher pay scale of Rs. 240-440. Aggrieved by the alleged discriminatory treatment, they approached the Government for redressal of the grievances. When the State Government did not take any action to that end, they filed a writ petition being Civil Rule No. 38 of 1983 for directing the State Government to make a reference of the said industrial dispute. This Court by the order dated 14.8.1986 directed the State Government to consider and decide whether the matter should be referred to the appropriate authority within a period of 21 days. 4. It would appear that when the State Government did not act upon the said direction, the respondents, again, approached this Court for some directions to the respondents for referring the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute. By the judgment and order dated 3.12.1986, in Civil Rule No. 325 of 1989, this Court directed the State Government to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 5. In compliance with the aforesaid direction and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section10(1)(d) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State Government issued the order, dated 17.1.1998, referring the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7(1)(a) of the said Act. 5. In compliance with the aforesaid direction and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section10(1)(d) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State Government issued the order, dated 17.1.1998, referring the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7(1)(a) of the said Act. The said reference may be reproduced herein below :- "Whether Sri Chandan Dasgupta and 16 others, ITI trained Industrial workers of Government Production Unit, Industrial Estate, Arundhuti Nagar, Govt. of Tripura are entitled to their wages in the scale of pay of Rs. 240-440 with admissible allowance w.e.f. 1st April, 1979 ?" 6. Thereafter, the Industrial Tribunal proceeded with the reference. Both the parties appeared before the Industrial Tribunal and gave their respective pleadings and also adduced their respective evidences. The learned Tribunal after taking evidence and after hearing the parties answered the reference by holding that the respondents should get their wages in the pay scale of Rs. 240-440 With admissible allowances with effect from 1.4.1979 and subsequent corresponding revised pay scale of the aforesaid scale made from time to time. 7. Aggrieved by the said award, the State-appellants filed the writ petition before this Court in Writ Petition No. 546/2001. The learned Single Judge by the impugned Judgment and Order dismissed the writ petition holding that the Tribunal answered the reference correctly. The learned Single Judge, however, directed that the addition "and subsequent corresponding revised pay scale of the aforesaid scale made time to time" be deleted from the award since that was not the matter of reference. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Order, the State-appellants have, now, approached this Court by way of this appeal. 9. Mr. T.K. Roy, learned Advocate General for the appellants, submits that the findings of the learned Single Judge are perverse insofar as he equated the posts held by the respondents with the posts held by other employees of the other Departments. He also contends that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the material facts that the respondents were inducted in the created pay scale on the basis of the arrangement arrived at a sitting, on 25.5.1979, with the representatives of the Workers' Association and the Government. He also contends that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the material facts that the respondents were inducted in the created pay scale on the basis of the arrangement arrived at a sitting, on 25.5.1979, with the representatives of the Workers' Association and the Government. It is also contended by the learned Advocate General that the learned Single Judge completely ignored the glaring illegality, gross perversity and non-application of mind by the Tribunal in ignoring the basic fact of entry of the worker in the regular service on the basis of the agreement with the Workers' Association and the Government. It is also contended by the learned Advocate General that the learned Tribunal did not have any evidence to conclude that the respondents and the other set of employees are similarly situated and/or performed similar nature of work or discharged similar duties. Lastly, it is argued that the Government cannot be saddled with heavy financial burden resulting from the award of the learned Tribunal, for, the relevant factors necessary for parity of wages were not at all taken into account by the learned Tribunal. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the respondents, submits that the impugned judgment and order need not be interfered with inasmuch as no serious infirmity can be pointed out by the State-appellants. The learned senior counsel argues that the learned Single Judge correctly held that there was no illegality or irrationality or procedural impropriety in the award passed by the learned Tribunal. 10. It appears from the impugned judgment and order that the learned Single Judge has minutely gone through the findings of the learned Tribunal. He also found that the learned Tribunal had examined one witness for each side and that it was after perusing the recorded evidence that the learned Tribunal found the I.T.I. trained incumbents employed in other departments under the State-appellants, who were similarly situated with the respondents, have been allowed the pay scale of Rs. 240-440. It was on the basis of those findings that the learned Tribunal took the view that the petitioners being equally situated were found entitled to the identical pay scale of Rs. 240-440 with effect from 1.4.1979, which finding could not be faulted with by the learned Single Judge. 11. The scope of interference of a writ Court in the award passed by the Industrial Tribunals well settled by now. 240-440 with effect from 1.4.1979, which finding could not be faulted with by the learned Single Judge. 11. The scope of interference of a writ Court in the award passed by the Industrial Tribunals well settled by now. In a catena of decisions rendered by the Apex Court beginning with D.C. Workers Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, reported in it has been held that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, on a question of fact, which it has jurisdiction to determine, cannot be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless, at least, it is shown to be fully unsupported by evidence. It is not for the High Court to consider whether the evidence is sufficient or insufficient, which justifies the particular award. Once there is some evidence and there are some circumstances, which support the finding of the Tribunal, the High Court would not interfere with the finding. It is also held that where there are two possible views, a writ Court could not interfere, because that would amount to substituting its own view of the matter for the decision of the Tribunal, which is not wrong. It is against the backdrop of this settled law that the impugned judgment and order has to be examined. 12. The learned Tribunal, as observed earlier, has based its conclusion amongst others, on the deposition made by the respondent No. 11. The respondent No. 11, in his evidence, categorically asserted that the employees performing the same duties of the appellants were given the pay scale of Rs. 240-440. In his cross-examination, though this respondent admitted that the nature of work being discharged by persons, who were claimed to be similarly situated, was not same, one cannot ignore the fact that this witness also asserted that the respondents performed duties in sphere of production, the other industrial workers with whom parity of pay scale was sought for, performed maintenance works and that the works which the respondents were performing are more important than the works of the said industrial workers in the sphere of maintenance, who have been given higher pay scale. Keeping this evidence in mind, it cannot be said that the findings of the learned Tribunal are based on no evidence. The State-appellants had all the opportunity to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut those statement of the respondents, but they failed to do so. Keeping this evidence in mind, it cannot be said that the findings of the learned Tribunal are based on no evidence. The State-appellants had all the opportunity to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut those statement of the respondents, but they failed to do so. In the absence of adequate rebuttal by the State-appellants, the learned Tribunal has rightly decided that the respondents and those set of employees, who are engaged in the maintenance unit, belong to the same class and are similarly situated so as to entitle them the equal pay scale. 13. The learned Advocate General had laid stress on the fact that the pay scale of the respondents was made on the basis of the agreement with the Workers' Association and the Government and that the learned Tribunal did not take into consideration this material fact. But this factual allegation is totally denied by the respondents. In spite of this denial, the State-appellants failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that the respondents were parties to the said agreement. In view of this, we find that the learned Tribunal is right in not taking into account this aspect of the matter. Lastly, the learned Advocate General has strenuously argued that the award of the learned Tribunal, if implemented, will have a cascading effect on the State finance. In this case, the respondents have made out a case for entitlement of pay scale of Rs. 240-440. In the face of such findings, the argument of financial constraint cannot defeat the legitimate dues of the employees concerned, after all, it is the obligation of the State to fulfil the lawful demand of the employees. 14. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions of the rival parties, we are of the considered view that no case is made out by the State-applicants for our interference in the impugned judgment and order. 15. In the result, the writ appeal is hereby dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. I.A. Ansari, J. 16. 15. In the result, the writ appeal is hereby dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. I.A. Ansari, J. 16. While completely agreeing with the conclusions reached by my learned brother, Vaiphei, J, I deem it necessary to point out that even if the nature of work between the respondents and those, with whom the respondents claimed parity of pay scale, were, as contended before us and as revealed from the materials on record, different in nature, the fact remains that both these groups were equally qualified; while one group, which the respondents represent, work in the production section as electricians, the other group work as electricians in the maintenance section. Coupled with these facts, the pre-dominant factor is that the uncontroverted and unchallenged evidence of the respondents was that the functions, which they discharged in the production unit, was more important than those, who worked in the maintenance section. Even if the nature of work between the two groups was dis-similar, the fact that the respondents discharged, admittedly, more important functions, it will be defiance of logic to decline to give to the persons, who discharge more important functions, such as the respondents, a scale of pay, which, if not more, be at least, the same as the other group, which consists of workers in the maintenance section, avail and enjoy. For instance, work of a superior will be definitely different in nature than the work of his junior, but if the work of the superior is more important than that of his junior, then, there is no reason why the superior should not receive, if not more, at least, the pay scale, which his junior receives. To a pointed query made by this Court as to why, when the respondents are, admittedly, discharging functions more important than those, who receive the pay scale of Rs. 240-440, the respondents be not allowed, if not more, at least, the pay scale of Rs. 240-440, the learned Advocate General could offer no satisfactory reason and rested by merely reiterating and emphasising that since the nature of work between the two groups, in question, is not alike, same pay scale cannot be granted. 240-440, the respondents be not allowed, if not more, at least, the pay scale of Rs. 240-440, the learned Advocate General could offer no satisfactory reason and rested by merely reiterating and emphasising that since the nature of work between the two groups, in question, is not alike, same pay scale cannot be granted. Situated thus, there can be no escape from the conclusion that in the face of the evidence on record, it was reasonably possible to take the view that the respondents were entitled to receive, at least, the pay scale, which they had sought for. Since the learned Tribunal has reached the same conclusion, though on different considerations, yet in view of the fact that the finding, eventually, reached is correct, the same cannot, in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, be interfered with. 17. In the above view of the matter, the findings of the learned Tribunal cannot, in my firm view, be interfered with.