ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD counsel for the petitioner and Sri V. S. Mishra appearing for the respondents. ( 2 ) BY this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 11th June, 2004 passed by respondent No. 1. ( 3 ) PETITIONER filed an appeal under Section 127 of Electricity Act, 2003 challenging the assessment order. An order has been issued by appellate authority that appeal of the petitioner be considered only when the petitioner makes deposit of 1/3rd of the amount demanded by the assessment order as provided under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. The said order has been challenged in this writ petition. Challenge has also been made to the provisions of section 127 (2) of the Electricity Act. Section 127 (2) of the Electricity Act provides that no appeal against assessment order shall be entertained unless an amount equal to one-third of the assessed amount is deposited. Section 127 (2) is quoted below: "127. Appeal to appellate authority.- (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) No appeal against an order of assessment under Sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless an amount equal one-third of the assessed amount is deposited in cash or by way of bank draft with the licensee and documentary evidence of such deposit has been enclosed along with the appeal" ( 4 ) I have considered the submissions and perused the record. ( 5 ) THE impugned order only communicates the requirement of deposit of 1/3rd amount as provided by Section 127 (2) of Electricity Act. There is no error in the impugned order. Impugned order has been issued in accordance with the provisions of Electricity Act. ( 6 ) IN support of his submissions challenging Section 127 (2) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment reported in JT 2004 (4) SC 308; Mardia Chemicals ltd. etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. Impugned order has been issued in accordance with the provisions of Electricity Act. ( 6 ) IN support of his submissions challenging Section 127 (2) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment reported in JT 2004 (4) SC 308; Mardia Chemicals ltd. etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. The counsel submitted that in the said judgment the apex Court has held the provisions of Section 17 of Securitisation of Reconstruction of Financial assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 which also required deposit of 75% of amount, as oppressive, onerous and arbitrary against all the canons of reasonableness. ( 7 ) I have considered the submissions and perused the record. ( 8 ) PROVISIONS of Securitisation of Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of security Interest Act, 2002 and the scheme under the Act is under different background. The apex Court in the said judgment, in paragraphs 59 and 60, has taken the view that proceeding under Section 17 is, in fact, original proceeding in lieu of civil suit and the requirement of pre-deposit of any amount at the first instance of proceeding is not to be found in any of the decisions. Further the deposit of 75% of the demand at the initial proceeding itself sounds unreasonable and oppressive more particularly when the secured assets/the management thereof along with the right to transfer such interest has been taken over by the secured creditor or in some cases property is also sold. Paragraphs 59 and 60 of the said judgment is extracted below:" 59. We may like to observe that proceedings under Section 17 of the Act, in fact, are not appellate proceedings. It seems to be a misnomer. In fact, it is the initial action which is brought before a Forum as prescribed under the Act, raising grievance against the action or measures taken by one of the parties to the contract. It is the stage of initial proceeding like filing a suit in civil court. As a matter of fact, proceedings under Section 17 of the Act are in lieu of a civil suit which remedy is ordinarily available but for the bar under Section 34 of the Act in the present case. We may refer to a decision of this Court in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Ors. As a matter of fact, proceedings under Section 17 of the Act are in lieu of a civil suit which remedy is ordinarily available but for the bar under Section 34 of the Act in the present case. We may refer to a decision of this Court in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Ors. where in respect of original and appellate proceedings a distinction has been drawn as follows :-". . . . . . . . There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of civil nature and unless ones choice, it is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. " 60. The requirement of pre-deposit of any amount at the first instance of proceedings is not to be found in any of the decisions cited on behalf of the respondent. All these cases relate to appeals. The amount of deposit of 75% of the demand at the initial proceeding itself sounds unreasonable and oppressive, more particularly when the secured assets/the management thereof along with the right to transfer such interest has been taken over by the secured creditor or in some cases property is also sold. Requirement of deposit of such a heavy amount on basis of one-sided claim alone cannot be said to be a reasonable condition at the first instance itself before start of adjudication of the dispute. Merely giving power to the Tribunal to waive or reduce the amount, does not cure the inherent infirmity leaving one-sidedly in favour of the party, who, so far has alone been the party to decide the amount and the fact of default and classifying the dues as NPAs without participation/association of the borrower in the process. Such an onerous and oppressive condition should not be left operative in expectation of reasonable exercise of discretion by the concerned authority. Such an onerous and oppressive condition should not be left operative in expectation of reasonable exercise of discretion by the concerned authority. Placed in a situation as indicated above, where it may not be possible for the borrower to raise any amount to make the deposit, his secured assets having already been taken possession of or sold, such a rider to approach the tribunal at the first instance of proceedings, captioned as appeal, renders the remedy illusory and nugatory. " ( 9 ) THE present case is on entirely different footings. The petitioner has electric connection, which is being continuously used. The assessment is made on the basis of electricity consumed by him. The respondents have to generate the electricity to ensure regular future supply of the electricity and the amount assessed is claimed to be actual user amount of the electricity and deposit in the above background of 1/3rd of the amount is neither oppressive nor onerous. The judgment of the apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra) is not attracted in the facts of the present case. The deposit under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is of 75% whereas in the Electricity Act, 2003 deposit of 1/3rd is to be made. Deposit of 1/3rd amount before hearing of the appeal in various other provisions has been upheld by the apex Court. The apex Court in Shyam Kishore and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi; 1993 (1) S. C. C. 22 has upheld the provisions requiring pre-deposit in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supplement SC 574 also the provisions requiring pre-deposit has been upheld. ( 10 ) IN above view of the matter, the provisions of Section 127 (2) cannot be held to be unconstitutional nor there is any error in the impugned order. ( 11 ) THE writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed summarily. . .