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2004 DIGILAW 137 (RAJ)

Daulat Kanwar v. State of Raj.

2004-01-28

RAJESH BALIA

body2004
Honble BALIA, J.–I have heard learned counsel for the parties. (2). The petition concerns the determination of ceiling area in the case of late Shri Inder Singh, the erstwhile Jagirdar of Jagir Dugari, which is in District Bundi. The determination of ceiling has taken place under Chapter IIIB of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 [in short ``the Act of 1955]. The Jagir was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 [hereinafter referred to as ``the Act of 1952] much before the provisions of Chapter IIIB were inserted in the Act of 1955. (3). Briefly the relevant salient features of the Scheme of Chapter IIIB may be noticed at the outset. (4). Under Section 30E, it was ordained that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever, land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or acquire, by purchase, gift, assignment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the extent of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him. That different dates may be so notified for different areas of the State. (5). In pursuance of this provision, 1.4.66 was the date notified by the State Government for the purposes of operation of Sec. 30E. In respect of Inder Singh also 1.4.66 became the relevant date for determining the lands held by him and also to determine to what extent he could hold the law w.e.f. 1.4.66 and to what extent lands held by him on 1.4.66 were surplus. Exhypothesi, he could not hold the land in excess of ceiling area provided u/s. 30C w.e.f. 1.4.66 for his family. (6). U/s. 30C, it was envisaged that the ceiling area for a family consisting of five or less than five members shall be 30 standard acres of land. If the members of the family exceed five, for each additional member, five standard acres more could be held, but in any case, not exceeding 60 standard acres could be held by any family. (7). Thus, the family was the primary unit for determination of ceilings and holdings as on 1.4.66. If the members of the family exceed five, for each additional member, five standard acres more could be held, but in any case, not exceeding 60 standard acres could be held by any family. (7). Thus, the family was the primary unit for determination of ceilings and holdings as on 1.4.66. Section 30B defined for the purposes of Chapter IIIB, the terms `family and `person both. The `family was to mean a family consisting of husband and wife, their children and grand-children being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent and `person in the case of an individual shall include `the family of such individual. Thus, the provisions of Chapter IIIB unfold the family as a unit for the purpose of determination of ceiling area which it could hold, after 1.4.66. (8). One significant principle, which was also ordained for determining the ceiling area in terms of standard acres is that the money value of the produce of well-irrigated (chahi) land shall be taken as being equivalent to the money value of the produce of an equal area of unirrigated (barani) land. (9). The other criterion, which were to go into consideration in determining the standard acres as per the prescribed scheme was also stated in Explanation appended to Section 30C. (10). Sub-section (2) of Section 30E made it poignantly clear, requiring any person, who on such date, that is to say the date notified under sub-section (1), is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling as may be applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause (b) of sub-section (1) was required to surrender such excess land within six months from the date notified by the State Govt. u/s. 30E or from the date when after notified date, the possession of holdings by a person exceeded the ceiling area applicable in his case. (11). Where a person fails to surrender the excess land held by him as on 1.4.66 or in case of fresh acquisition after 1.4.66 as per sub-section (2) of Section 30E, he is deemed to be a trespasser in respect of such excess holding and was liable to be ejected by having recourse to Section 183 if he fails to surrender the excess land held by him as on 1.4.66 in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 30E. (12). (12). With these precincts, I may notice relevant chronology of events. (13). According to the petitioners, as on 1.4.66 the members of the family of Inder Singh, who was then alive, were five viz. Inder Singh, his wife Chandra Kanwar, his son Mahendra Singh and Daulat Kanwar wife of Mahendra Singh and Rajendra Singh, son of Mahendra Singh and grand-son of Inder Singh. Inder Singh had died on 14.12.67 and his wife Chandra Kanwar died on 24.2.69. As Inder Singh had not filed, in his life time, any return about the land held by him and by members of his family as on 1.4.66, notwithstanding the aforesaid provision referred to above, a notice was issued calling upon his heir Mahendra Singh to file a return of the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. In response thereto, Mahendra Singh filed a declaration on 5.3.70 along with his objection. (14). Along with return, no claim of excluding any land on the basis of any transfers made by the holder of the land was made. However, on 18.12.70, a supplementary declaration was filed by Mahendra Singh giving reference to 23 sale deeds comprising 487.9 bighas. All the sale deeds were registered on 18.7.70 and exclusion was claimed that the said land was subject matter of 23 transfers. Another application was moved by Mahendra Singh stating that his son Rajendra Singh has filed a suit on 11.5.71 in the Court of SDO, Nainwa for partition which was decreed by agreement on 15.10.71. According to which 76.9 bighas of land was given to Rajendra Singh by way of partition. A claim was made that this land ought not to be included in the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. It was also urged in that connection that relations between Mahendra Singh and his wife were strained and as such Rajendra Singh was living with his maternal uncle at Bikaner and all the expenses were borne by his maternal uncle and therefore, Rajendra Singh was not dependent on his father, Mahendra Singh, therefore, lands held by Rajendra Singh on partition cannot be included in the holdings of Mahendra Singh and his family. (15). (15). The Assistant Collector, [the Competent Authority] vide his order dated 31.7.71 held that for the purpose of ceiling, the family in question would include Mahendra Singh and his wife Daulat Kanwar and his son Rajendra Singh and they had in their possession 1079 standard acres. In accordance with the ceiling law, only 30 standard acres of land was allowed by the Assistant Collector to be retained by Mahendra Singh. (16). Against the order of the Assistant Collector, Mahendra Singh preferred an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority. The State also preferred cross objection both as to number of members of family as on 1.4.66 and exclusion of certain holdings from computation of holdings as on 1.4.66. (17). Mahendra Singh died during the pendency of appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority. The Competent Authority (i) did not recognize the sales made by Mahendra Singh vide 23 sale deeds registered on 18.7.70 as it fell beyond 31.12.1969 the last date upto which the transfers made on certain conditions could have been recognised under Section 30DD of the Act of 1955. (ii) The claim of Mahendra Singh that Rajendra Singh be not treated as member of the family and the lands allotted to him as per decree of partition, be not included in his holdings was also not accepted. (iii) The claim was laid about exclusion of 24 bighas 12 biswas of land which was purchased by Prem Shanker on 6.6.72 by a registered sale deed from the Government. The substantive part of the consideration [more than 75%] has flown from Mahendra Singh and the land was in possession of Mahendra Singh and he was to deliver the possession to Prem Shanker only on the reimbursement of money paid by Mahendra Singh as part of consideration. Therefore, it was considered to be land of the holder and not of Prem Shanker until he pays the balance price to Mahendra Singh. (iv) The claim of exclusion of land forming part of tank Kanak Sagar was included in the holdings subject to decision of the Board of Revenue where a dispute about ownership of holdings of land was pending. The erstwhile holder of Jagir Inder Singh has laid a claim for declaration of Kanak Sagar as his private property under Sec. 23 of the Act of 1952 and the Jagir Commissioner has rejected that claim. The erstwhile holder of Jagir Inder Singh has laid a claim for declaration of Kanak Sagar as his private property under Sec. 23 of the Act of 1952 and the Jagir Commissioner has rejected that claim. At the time of determination of ceiling area, the appeal filed by the holder was pending before the Board of Revenue. (18). The appeal filed by Mahendra Singh since deceased was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. But, the cross- objection filed by the State in respect of exclusion of land situated in Khasra No. 515 and 516 ad measuring 11 Bigha and 18 Biswa of land, was accepted by the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the number of members of family was held to be 5 as on 1.4.66 and not 3 as claimed by Mahendra Singh by excluding the wife and son of Mahendra Singh on the basis of strained relations with his wife and their living separate. (19). Aggrieved with the order of Revenue Appellate Authority dated 11.9.75, a revision was preferred before the Board of Revenue. (20). Before the Board of Revenue, the following contentions were raised:- [i] That the land which had gone in the share of Rajendra Singh as per partition decree passed in 1971 ought to be excluded from the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. [ii] That on the death of Mahendra Singh in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, both the petitioners viz. Daulat Kanwar and Rajendra Singh should have been subjected to separate proceedings under the Ceiling Act, by dropping the proceedings against the deceased holder, on the principle that land vest in the State only on the date possession is taken by the State and prior to that it continues to be vested in the holder and passes on the heirs of holder on his demise. The reliance was placed in Chet Singh (decd.) & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1973 P & H 55. [iii] The parcels of land transferred through 23 sale deeds registered on 18.7.70 ought to have been excluded because the agreement to sell has been entered before 31.12.69 and on registration of sale deed, the operative date of transaction relates back to the date of agreement as per Sec. 47 of the Registration Act. [iii] The parcels of land transferred through 23 sale deeds registered on 18.7.70 ought to have been excluded because the agreement to sell has been entered before 31.12.69 and on registration of sale deed, the operative date of transaction relates back to the date of agreement as per Sec. 47 of the Registration Act. [iv] That the lands purchased by Prem Shankar on 6.6.72 through the Government ought to have been excluded by the Competent Authority from the lands held by Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. [v] That 262 Bighas of land of Peta Talab [Tank Bed] held in village Dungari, the cultivation of which could be possible only when there was no rain or very little rain, cannot be treated as land, nor any khatedari rights could accrue in the land of Tank Bed, ought not to be included in the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66 and; [vi] lastly claim was made for exclusion of 3234 Bighas, 11 Biswas of land of Kanak Sagar. (21). The Board of Revenue did not sustain any of the contentions raised by the petitioners before it except regarding 24 bighas 12 biswas of land purchased by Prem Shanker through Government on 6.6.72. (22). The Board of Revenue found that as on 1.4.66, no partition took place between Rajendra Singh and his father; and Rajendra Singh was a minor as on 1.4.66, therefore, he could not be held to be independent of the family on that date About the transfer, it was pointed out that all transfers having been completed after 31/12/1969 through sale deeds registered on 18.7.70, the same cannot be taken into consideration. About the Peta Talab, the land situated in village Dugari,, it was opined by the Board of Revenue that continuous or regular cultivation or cultivation dependent on the rain is not a criterion for determination of holdings as land stood in the name of petitioners as on 1.4.66 was liable to be included in the holdings of the holder as on 1.4.66. The claim of the petitioners for excluding land of Kanak Sagar was also rejected on the ground that it was entered as Khudkhast land in the name of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. The claim of the petitioners for excluding land of Kanak Sagar was also rejected on the ground that it was entered as Khudkhast land in the name of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. So far as the contention about treating the two petitioners as independent units for the purpose of determining ceiling case after initiating fresh proceedings on the demise of Mahendra Singh, the Board held that the relevant date for considering ceiling proceedings was 1.4.66. On that date both Inder Singh and Chandra Kanwar were alive and were Khatedar tenants of land in question. The proceedings are taken keeping in view as per situation prevailing on 1.4.66, on which date the family of holder was not entitled to more land than 30 standard acres. It cannot be gainsaid that subsequent demise would not alter the position and it was also opined that on Inder Singhs demise or Mahendra Singhs demise, heirs too were not entitled to inherit anything more than 30 standard acres, which alone could be held by Inder Singh in accordance with law on 1.4.66 and will be available for inheritance. (23). With the aforesaid conclusions, revision petition was partly allowed in respect of land purchased by Prem Shankar and all the other claims were rejected. (24). Hence, this petition. (25). Apart from raising arguments that have been made before the Board of Revenue, two new contentions were sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners before me in these proceedings. (26). Firstly, it was contended that jagir lands being ancestral property and Inder Singh and Mahendra Singh being coparceners, their shares ought not to have been clubbed and matter should have been decided by considering the property to be ancestral. Mahendra Singh and Rajendra Singh having their shares in the property in their own right their dependency ought to have been determined on that basis and by not considering this aspect, the entire proceedings stand vitiated. In this connection, he placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Gopal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1). (27). This contention cannot be sustained. Whether any property is ancestral property forming part of coparcenary or not is essentially a question of fact and not a matter of presumption at the threshold. There cannot be any presumption that the family held any joint property in which coparcener has interest by birth. (27). This contention cannot be sustained. Whether any property is ancestral property forming part of coparcenary or not is essentially a question of fact and not a matter of presumption at the threshold. There cannot be any presumption that the family held any joint property in which coparcener has interest by birth. In this connection, reference may be made to the principles noticed by Mulla in his treatise on Hindu Law, 16th Edition. In Para 212 (2) it says that `the joint and undivided family is the normal condition of Hindu society. An undivided Hindu Family is ordinarily joint, not only in estate but also in food and worship. The existence of joint estate is not an essential requisite to constitute a joint family and family which does not own any property may nevertheless be joint. (28). In other words, there may be presumption about existence of joint family, but there cannot be any presumption about existence of any joint property. It has to be pleaded and proved like any other fact. (29). In coming to conclusion on the basis of facts in the case of Gopal Singhs case [1983 RLW 475], (supra), reliance was placed on principle, which was enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Raj Kumar Rukmini Raman Brahma (2), that if the holder of an impartible has got the estate as an ancestral estate and succeeded to it by the rule of primogeniture, it would still form part of the joint estate of the Hindu undivided family. For this purpose, the reliance was also placed on a bench decision of this Court in Thakur Gopal Singh Badnor vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Rajasthan, Jaipur (3). (30). The principles, which have been enunciated in the two cases cited above are that merely because the property owned by a Hindu is impartible estate it does not loose its character as a joint property if it is otherwise ancestral and devolved by survivorship on death of last holder. Notwithstanding it does not have two of the four essential characters to constitute an ancestral property where the property is inherited as an ancestral estate and succeeded to by rule of primogeniture. In an impartible estate two features, which are absent, are right of the junior members to claim partition and the right to restrain alienations made by the head of the family except for necessity. In an impartible estate two features, which are absent, are right of the junior members to claim partition and the right to restrain alienations made by the head of the family except for necessity. So also right of male member of family in the property by birth, which is incompatible with impartibility of estate by the very nature of the impartible estate, is also absent. However, right to succeed by survivorship do exist and so also right of junior members to maintenance do exist and by reference to these right that the property though impartible has in the eye of law, to be regarded as joint family property. (31). In State of U.P. vs. Rajkumar Rukmini Raman (supra), the Court said: ``An estate which is impartible by custom cannot be said to be the separate or exclusive property of the holder of the estate. If the holder has got the estate as an ancestral estate and has succeeded to it by primogeniture it will be part of the joint estate of undivided. Hindu family. (32). Similarly, in Th. Gopal Singh of Badnore vs. CWT (1973 WLN 14), (supra), the Division Bench of this Court noticed the facts on which the aforesaid principle was applied, compensation in respect of Jagir was not included in wealth tax return of individual and it was contended that Jagir was ancestral property and it pertained to Hindu undivided family. The contention was not accepted by W.T.O. in view of the fact that the rule of primogeniture was applicable, it was absolute property of the holder. It was also held by W.T.O. that with each succession, Jagir was a fresh grant. There was no dispute that Jagir was held by the family for 14 generations. With these facts, the aforesaid principle was applied. (33). The another principle, which is more important is that on resumption of Jagir if the impartible character of the resumed property is lost because the characteristic of impartibility comes to an end but it does not loose its character as joint property. An impartible estate, which was ancestral joint property in the hands of the holder, has lost its character of impartability on account of resumption of jagir, the holdings allowed to be retained would still bear the character of a joint family property. An impartible estate, which was ancestral joint property in the hands of the holder, has lost its character of impartability on account of resumption of jagir, the holdings allowed to be retained would still bear the character of a joint family property. It has also been held that in relation to the land allotted to the Jagirdar or the compensation paid for resumption of jagir, also bears the same character of jointness as the original estate had. (34). It is on the said premise, on the specific question to that effect having been raised before the ceiling authorities, holdings were held to be ancestral property but the claim was denied solely on the ground that the property being impartible in nature and subject to succession by rule of primogeniture, cannot be a property of joint family in which other members can have a share. (35). In a recent Bench decision of this Court in Rao Narain Singh vs. Commissioner of Income tax (4), after reviewing a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and Privy Council and of this Court, the Court said:- ``It is well settled that an estate which is impartible by custom cannot be said to be separate or exclusive property of the holder of the estate, if the holder has got the estate as an ancestral estate and he has succeeded to it by primogeniture. It will still be part of a joint estate of an undivided family. In the ordinary case of joint estate of an undivided family. In the ordinary case of joint estate of an HUF, members of the family canclaim four rights: (1) the right of partition; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity; (3) the right of maintenance; and (4) the right of survivorship. It is obvious from the very nature of property which is impartible that first of these rights cannot exist so long as the property remain impartible, second is also compatible with the custom of impartibility. The right of maintenance and the right of survivorship still remain and it is by reference to these rights that the property though impartible in the eye of law to be regarded as joint family property. (36). The key factor noticed by the Court was if the holder has got the estate as an ancestral estate and he has succeeded to it by primogeniture. (36). The key factor noticed by the Court was if the holder has got the estate as an ancestral estate and he has succeeded to it by primogeniture. (37). It was a case in which the property had come to the holder at least after 12 successions. (38). In the present case, no such foundation was laid before the Ceiling Authorities at any time including before the Board of Revenue that land in question was ever held by Inder Singh as ancestral property. This being essentially a question of fact, cannot be raised for the first time while challenging the order of the subordinate courts or Tribunals for seeking writ of certiorari. (39). Similarly, another question, which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was objection about inclusion of the land described as `Peta Talab at village Dugari in determining total holdings on the ground that it is neither a `land as defined under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, nor he could acquire khatedari rights in respect of it. It was also urged that `Peta Talab has not been included specifically while determining the computation of standard acres in the schedule annexed to rules framed under Chapter IIIB, hence the land at `Tank Bed is not includible in holdings at all. (40). In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that this is a pure question of law and on reading of definition of land u/s. 5(24) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the provisions of Section 16(ii) prohibiting the acquisition of khatedari rights in the tank bed area, it cannot be considered to be a part of the holdings of the holder. (41). This contention, apart from being not raised before the Ceiling Authorities, is devoid of any merit. (42). Under Section 30E, the subject matter of ceiling provision is not confined to the interest of khatedar tenant or khatedari rights or holdings of any particular nature, but it is wide enough to cover `the holdings under any tenure. The emphasis is restriction on continued `holding of land under any tenure. The provision is a non-obstante clause mandating that `no person shall continue to hold or retain in his possession or capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him. The emphasis is restriction on continued `holding of land under any tenure. The provision is a non-obstante clause mandating that `no person shall continue to hold or retain in his possession or capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him. Under Section 14 of the Act of 1955, there are four classes of tenants namely; khatedar tenants, Maliks, Tenants of Khudkasht and Gair Khatedar tenants. These are different type of tenures. What is prohibited under Section 16(ii) is that the khatedari rights shall not accrue in pasture land or land used for casual or occasional cultivation in the bed of river or tank. Mere exclusion of accrual of khatedari rights on the use of land in the bed of river or tank for cultivation does not exclude a person from acquiring rights under lesser tenure e.g. gair khatedari rights in the land held by him for the purpose of cultivation situated in the bed of tank or river. (43). The definition of `land is also wide enough to cover any land which is subjected to cultivation. (44). Section 5(24) of the Act of 1955 reads as under: (24) ``land shall mean land which is let or held for agriculture purposes or for purposes subservient thereto or as grove land or for pasturage, including land occupied by houses or enclosures situated on a holding, or land covered with water which may be used for the purpose of irrigation or growing singhara or other similar produce but excluding abadi land; it shall include benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. (45). Obviously, as per the aforesaid definition the land used for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto, comes within the purview of the term `land irrespective of the fact whether it is used frequently or infrequently. (46). It is an admitted position by the petitioners that the land in question in respect of which contention has been raised, is used for cultivation by him, albeit only during the period when there was rain scarcity. (46). It is an admitted position by the petitioners that the land in question in respect of which contention has been raised, is used for cultivation by him, albeit only during the period when there was rain scarcity. It is significant to notice that even the land which remains covered with water, if it is used for the purpose of irrigation or for growing singhara, or for similar purpose, still falls within the definition of land in respect of which one or other tenure rights could be acquired under the Tenancy Act. Separate rules have been framed providing for allotment of land at Tank Bed. (47). The definition of holdings as given in the Tenancy Act also makes it clear that it refers not to particular type of tenure but reference is to any parcel of land which could be held, on lease, engagement or grant or in the absence of such lease, engagement or grant under any tenure. (48). The definition of `holding u/s. 5(17) states that `holdings shall mean a parcel or parcels of land `held under any tenure. Apart from this land held under any lease engagement or grant is also included in the definition of `holdings. (49). Therefore, viewed from any angle, the bed of the tank held by the petitioners for cultivation and in respect of which his name is entered in the land records as tenant, even if he cannot acquire khatedari rights in that land, it shall be considered holdings of land by him for the purpose of agriculture purposes and fall within the province Station 30E and cannot be excluded from computation of holdings. (50). In view of this conclusion, it must be held that the conclusion reached by the Board of Revenue rejecting the contention of the petitioner about 262 bighas of land of Peta Talab in village Dugari, does not suffer from any error much less an error apparent on the face of record, which can be interfered with in this petition. (51). Regarding other issues I may address first to the question about claim of the petitioners to separate entity after demise of the holder after 1.4.66 on the premise of decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court. (52). The statutory provisions in this regard as envisaged in Chapter IIIB of the Act of 1955 which governs the cases in Rajasthan must be alluded to. (52). The statutory provisions in this regard as envisaged in Chapter IIIB of the Act of 1955 which governs the cases in Rajasthan must be alluded to. Attention of the Court was invited to the provisions of Section 30E and to which reference has been made at the opening of discussion of the present petition. It is not apposite to notice Section 30E on the basis of which this claim has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it reads as under: 30-E. Maximum land that can be held and restriction on future acquisition.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf- (a) continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or (b) acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage, assignment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest, anyland so as to effect an increase in the extent of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him: Provided that different dates may be so notified for different areas of the State. (2) Every person, who on such date, is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause (b) of sub-section (1), shall, within six months of such date or within three months of such acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate: Provided that if any person holding or acquiring land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him holds land in more than one Tehsil he shall have the option to choose which of the lands held by him in different Tehsils should be surrendered so as to leave with him the land upto the ceiling area applicable to him: Provided further that the option afforded by the foregoing provisions shall be subject to the limitation that, where the person surrendering excess land under this sub-section holds, lands of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, the unencumbered lands shall, so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands. (3) Any person failing intentionally to make a report or to surrender land as required by sub-section (2) shall, on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (4) Without prejudice and in addition to such conviction and fine the person retaining possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him shall be deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from such excess land and to pay penalty in accordance with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183. Provided that the lands, from which a person shall be so ejected shall as far as may be un-encumbered lands. (5) All lands coming to the State Government by surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under sub-section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumbrances. (6) Nothing contained in this section shall operate as against the transfer to the extent his transfer are recognised under section 30-DD. (53). (5) All lands coming to the State Government by surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under sub-section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumbrances. (6) Nothing contained in this section shall operate as against the transfer to the extent his transfer are recognised under section 30-DD. (53). The scheme of the provisions is very clear that as on the relevant date i.e. 1.4.66 or even any time thereafter any person having holding in his possession under any tenure, he is prohibited to hold any land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him with effect from the date i.e. 1.4.66 or thereafter when the total holdings exceed ceiling limit applicable to him, as a result of later acquisition. Exhypothesi that position is not postponed to a later date, notwithstanding it may take time before it is determined how much land he held on the relevant date, and how much land he could hold on that date as per ceiling limit applicable to him and identification of land to be surrendered or from which he is to be ejected. Procedure for making such determination has been provided under the statute and rules framed thereunder. (54). The principle, which is well settled in the matter of levy and collection of tax can be recalled. In the matter of levy and collection of tax, the propositions are well-settled that liability to tax exhypothesi stands determined as on the date taxing event takes place, it is not postponed. However, actual determination and collection is postponed to a future date until assessment proceedings are completed by computing the tax and demand is quantified. (55). Likewise sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) if read together makes it abundantly clear that determination of the land held in excess of the ceiling area as on the date notified, that exhypothesi stands determined on 1.4.66, in the case of a person holding land on 1.4.66. Under sub-section (2), it is mandate of the law that everyone who on such date is in possession of land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him, has to make a report about such possession and to surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within whose local limits, jurisdiction of such land is situated. (56). (56). This is so also where a person acquires the land subsequently to notified date which makes his possession in excess of ceiling area applicable to him. He too has to make such application within six months of acquisition and is required to surrender the excess land held by him to the State and place at the disposal of the Tehsildar. (57). Expression `such date referred to in sub-section (2) is directly related to the date referred in sub-section (1), that is to say, the date notified by the State Govt., from which date a person cannot hold or continue to hold or retain in his possession the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. (58). There is no dispute that the lands in question were held by Inder Singh, Ex-Jagirdar on 1.4.66, who was alive on 1.4.66. Therefore, exhypothesi, it was determined on 1.4.66 how much land Inder Singh could hold as on 1.4.66 and he was required to surrender the surplus land within six months to State Government. U/s. 30E(3) it is also made clear the consequence of non- compliance with sub-section (2). In such event, holder of land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him is deemed to be a trespasser in respect of surplus lands in his possession. (59). Inder Singh died on 14.12.67 and his wife died on 24.2.69. Both were alive on 1.4.66. Therefore, family of Inder Singh as constituting on 1.4.66 would be a unit in respect of which the ceiling area in the case of holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66 was to be determined. That being position on death of holder land available for devolution on his heirs on his death could not be more than the land which could be hold by him as on 1.4.66. (60). If he could not hold the land in excess of ceiling on 1.4.66 and was required to surrender the excess land within six months from the date, non-surrender will make him trespasser in respect of surplus land. Merely because the holder of the land as on 1.4.66 had died thereafter after six months of relevant date without making declaration and without surrendering the land held by him in surplus of the ceiling area applicable to him, cannot make any difference to render the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30E ineffect. (61). Merely because the holder of the land as on 1.4.66 had died thereafter after six months of relevant date without making declaration and without surrendering the land held by him in surplus of the ceiling area applicable to him, cannot make any difference to render the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30E ineffect. (61). The proposition was also not infact in issue before the Ceiling Authorities. The separate unit was claimed only for Rajendra Singh vis a vis Mahendra Singh because of partition suit, which was filed by Rajendra Singh on 11.5.71 after Mahendra Singh has submitted return of his holdings. A compromise decree was passed on 15.10.71 giving away about 76 bighas 9 biswas of land to Rajendra Singh. But no claim was ever raised at any stage, until during heard of present petitioner that the lands in the hands of Inder Singh were ancestral in which Rajendra Singh and Mahendra Singh were co-parceners with Inder Singh and had an interest by birth in such lands. Therefore, the question of exclusion of any land on the basis of independent share of Mahendra Singh and Rajendra Singh as on 1.4.66 had not arisen for consideration. (62). It is significant to notice that separate unit was not claimed by the petitioners on the basis of jointness of the property in the hands of Inder Singh, but on the basis of succession to Mahendra Singh claim was made to separate unit for his widow Daulat Kanwar and son Rajendra Singh. (63). In the aforesaid state of affairs, there is no room for sustaining the new contention. (64). The only contention before subordinate Tribunals was that the wife of Mahendra Singh and Rajendra Singh should be allowed separate unit by initiating separate proceedings under the ceiling law on death of Mahendra Singh. The basis for this contention was that since the land does not vest in the State Government until actual possession is taken by the State at the end of proceedings under ceiling law. Until that time entire land continue to vest in the holder for the time being and on his death the lands vest in his heirs as per law of inheritance governing the deceased holder. In such event with death of the holder of land for the time being the pending proceedings against such deceased person lapse and be closed. Until that time entire land continue to vest in the holder for the time being and on his death the lands vest in his heirs as per law of inheritance governing the deceased holder. In such event with death of the holder of land for the time being the pending proceedings against such deceased person lapse and be closed. New proceedings need be initiated against successors in whom the land vest, if such successors are found to hold lands in excess of ceiling limit applicable to them. (65). This question was raised before the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as before the Ceiling Authority as well as before the Ceiling Authorities on the basis of provisions enacted in Sec. 30E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. However, the contention was rightly rejected by the authorities by holding that provisions in Rajasthan Act were different than the provisions considered in the case of Punjab and Haryana High Court relied on by the petitioners. (66). In this connection, the significant provision in the scheme of Section 30E of the Act of 1955 is sub-section (3) is to be noticed, which says a person who fails to surrender the land which is liable to be surrendered, under sub-section (2), he is deemed to be a trespassers in respect of excess land held by him and he is liable to be ejected therefrom in accordance with the provisions of Section 183 of the Act. (67). From the perusal of the decision in Chet Singhs case (supra), there is no clue as to what were the provisions under consideration before the Punjab and Haryana High Court about determination of ceiling case in respect of any holder and whether there were any such similar provision whereunder the holder was required to surrender the excess land by himself within the period specified in the statute and on failure to do so the holder was to be considered a trespasser in Pepsu Tenancy and Agriculture Lands Act with which the Punjab and Haryana High Court was concerned. (68). A person who is holding surplus land as on 1.4.66 dies after two years without making declaration and without surrendering the excess land notwithstanding he is deemed to be trespasser on the expiry of six months. (68). A person who is holding surplus land as on 1.4.66 dies after two years without making declaration and without surrendering the excess land notwithstanding he is deemed to be trespasser on the expiry of six months. In the face of provisions made in Sec. 30E put forward by the petitioner, acceptance of proposition put forward by the petitioners will obliterate the obligations u/s. 30E and make the provisions wholly unworkable if in the case of death of a person who had become a trespasser during his life time his status as trespasser was automatically to come to an end, notwithstanding the holder was not competent to pass a valid title to anyone during his life time, will pass an estate free from such encumbrance of his heirs. (69). In these circumstances, the ratio in Chet Singhs case (supra), cannot be imported and applied on its face value in the present case. The claim to the exclusion of land which has been allotted to Rajendra Singh by way of a compromise decree dated 15.10.71, in my opinion, does not survive for further consideration as position on 1.4.66 would not be altered by subsequent claim made by Rajendra Singh against his father Mahendra Singh who had succeeded to Inder Singh only in 1967 when last holder Inder Singh had died and who got a compromise decree only in 1971. (70). Otherwise also, I am in agreement with the findings by the authorities under the Ceiling Act that the partition proceedings have been initiated by Rajendra Singh malafide to avoid applicability of ceiling law to the land in question. It is to be seen that after submitting return on 4.3.70, transfers have been transacted by Mahendra Singh by sale deeds registered on 18.7.70 and only thereafter, a suit was filed in May, 1971 for partition by Rajendra Singh, minor son of Mahendra Singh. The relations between Mahendra Singh and his wife were stated to be strained and compromise is entered into within five months of filing of the suit without demur. Therefore, the plausible inference has been drawn by the competent authority that decree appears to have been obtained with intent to defeat and avoid the application of ceiling law in respect of such land. (71). Therefore, the plausible inference has been drawn by the competent authority that decree appears to have been obtained with intent to defeat and avoid the application of ceiling law in respect of such land. (71). Be that as it may, in view of the provisions of statute to which reference has been made above, the partition, suit even if held to be genuine, cannot affect the determination of ceiling limit and total holdings in the hands of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. (72). The next contention, which has been raised before me is about recognition of transactions evidenced by the sale deeds registered on 18.7.70 solely on the ground that on registration, it relates back to the date on which the agreement to sale was made and possession was delivered to the transferrer. Such dates are stated to be prior to 31.12.69, which could be recognised under the provisions of Sec. 30DD of the Act of 1955 on fulfilment of certain criterions. (73). The contention is not well founded. On registration, the date of sale deed does not relate back to date the agreement to sale but relate to date of execution of the deed as per Sec. 47 of the Registration Act. The Registration Act also provides the time limit within which executed deed has to be presented for registration and in no circumstance it can be presented for registration after four months of execution. (74). Section 23 of the Registration Act envisages that no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution. There is no material on record to show that the sale deed registered on 18.7.70 were executed prior to 31.12.69 so as to examine the issue further about its effect on ceiling proceedings. Suffice it to say that until registration takes place, sale is not complete. (75). Since there is no evidence that the transfers took place prior to 31.12.69, the question does not arise to find out whether such sales could be recognised u/s. 30DD of the Act of 1955, since transfer made after 31.12.69 cannot be recognised in absolute. No interference in this regard is also called for. (76). The last question which survives for consideration is about exclusion of land of Kanak Sagar Tank. No interference in this regard is also called for. (76). The last question which survives for consideration is about exclusion of land of Kanak Sagar Tank. I have noticed above that the competent authority has only protectively included this land in the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66 subject to the matter that was pending before the Board of Revenue. To recaptulate Inder Singh had claimed Kanak Sagar to be private property u/s. 23(1)(d) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952. Such claim was rejected by Jagir Commissioner in 1966 and said order was in challenge before Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue finally held by order dated 30.7.82 that it cannot be private property of ex-Jagirdar on resumption of Jagir but if he was cultivating any part of the land of Tank Bed, he could be declared khudkasht in respect of said part of the land. On a remand by order of the Board of Revenue, in the first instance, it was found by the Jagir Commissioner that no part of Kanak Sagar Tank Bed was in personal cultivation of the Jagirdar, therefore, he did not acquire any right in Tank Bed either. The said finding was affirmed by the Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated 30.7.82, and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3916/2001, Rajendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. filed against that order has also been dismissed by this Court on 27.1.2004 which was slated to be heard alongwith this petition. (77). In view thereof, the land which was neither held to be part of private property on resumption of Jagir nor it was held to be in personal cultivation as a part of Khudkast and no claim of erstwhile Jagirdar survives in respect to that land. The Kanak Sagar Tank vested in the State Government on resumption of Jagir. That being so any part of Kanak Sagar Bed could not have been subjected to the ceiling proceedings as holding of the Ex- Jagirdar as well as on the basis of claim led by him which has not been sustained. In that view of the matter, in respect of land at Tank Bed of Kanak Sagar it is held that unless the land in question viz. In that view of the matter, in respect of land at Tank Bed of Kanak Sagar it is held that unless the land in question viz. Kanak Sagar Tank is held to be Khudkast of the petitioner in any proceedings, that may be pursued by the petitioner in that regard the same, cannot be included in the holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66. (78). Since the contingency subject to which the land of Kanak Sagar Tank was included in the holdings of Inder Singh has happened as aforesaid. To that extent the computation need be ultimately modified. However, it may be noticed that it may not really affect the final outcome. If Kanak Sagar Tank Bed to any extent is held to be of Inder Singh, the land is to be included in computation of holdings of Inder Singh as on 1.4.66, which shall result in more surplus land in the hands of his successors. In case it becomes final that no part of Kanak Sagar Tank Bed ever vested in Inder Singh on resumption of his jagir and it vested in State, the vesting of such land in State shall remain unaffected and does not affect petitioners also, as the land is otherwise not theirs. (79). Accordingly, this petition stands disposed off in terms of the findings reached above. There shall be no order as to costs.