JUDGMENT : S.N. Srivastava, J. Petition on hand has been instituted assailing the judgment of Board of Revenue dated 21st October, 1994 by which second appeal was allowed and the decree of the trial court decreeing the suit for declaration u/s 229B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act filed by Vendees of Ram Ghulam was affirmed. 2. In the instant case, causative factor of dispute is the land in dispute owned by Ram Ghulam who was issueless. He was issueless and transferred his rights through sale deed to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 sons of his own brother namely Sharda and annoyed by this act of Har Saran, the petitioner who also happens to be his real brother, kicked up dispute about validity of sale deed and subsequently, his rights as bhumidhars to execute the sale deed. 3. The facts beyond the pale of dispute are that Ram Ghulam was the sirdar of the disputed plot i.e., plot No. 113 admeasuring 5-5-0. He deposited twenty times of land revenue for grant of bhumidhari rights on 28.11.1973 attended with an application as envisaged in Section 134 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and the same day he executed a registered sale deed in favour of plaintiffs who are arrayed as respondent Nos. 3 and 4 thereby transferring the land in suit in their favour. The defendant- petitioner, the own brother of Ram Ghulam preferred objection to the aforesaid application, which ended up in being rejected on 10.1.1974. A revision preferred against the said order was rejected on 30th April, 1974. The matter was then taken up to Board of Revenue at the instance of defendants. By efflux of time the order granting bhumidhari sanad, attained finality in the wake of rejection of objection. During the pendency of the case arising out of bhumidhari sanad, an amendment came to be Incorporated in Section 137 uide U, P. Act No. 8 of 1977. As a consequence of amendment aforestated coming into force, all proceedings ended up in abatement. It should also be noticed that Rani Ghulam had died intestate and his hetrs obtained bhumidhari certificate in their favour after his death. The plaintiff-vendees Instituted a suit for declaration of their rights on the basis of sale deed executed in their favour by Ram Ghulam. It should also be noticed that Rani Ghulam had died intestate and his hetrs obtained bhumidhari certificate in their favour after his death. The plaintiff-vendees Instituted a suit for declaration of their rights on the basis of sale deed executed in their favour by Ram Ghulam. The trial court decreed the suit holding that on the date of deposit of 20 times of land revenue along with an application, Ram Ghulam had attained the status of bhumidhar and he rightly transferred property in favour of plaintiffs and the persons who objected to the application for grant of bhumidhari sanad could not stake claim to any right. In appeal, the decree of trial court was reversed but in second appeal, the decree was affirmed and vendees were pronounced bhumidhars. It is in the above backdrop that the order passed by Board of Revenue has been impugned in the present petition. 4. With the above short prelude, I now proceed to give an exhaustive glimpse of the contentions raised across the bar. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed a question giving it the veneer of legal significance that Ram Ghulam had not been able to get bhumidhari certificate during his life time and he died as sirdar and as such the registered sale deed executed in favour of plaintiffs would operate in void and would not confer any right on plaintiffs and the Board of Revenue wrongly decreed the suit. He further canvassed that after death of Ram Ghulam the bhumidhari sanad was issued in the name of defendant petitioner and hence, his rights would not stand eclipsed on the basis of sale deed executed by Ram Ghulam while he was merely a sirdar and that a sirdar had no right to execute sale deed of any land and by this reckoning, the sale deed was void and was not capable of conferring any right in favour of plaintiffs. In order to prop up his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Apex( Court in Deo Nandan and another v. Ram Saran and Ors. 2003 (3) AWC 1344 (SC) and also a decision of learned single Judge of this Court in Bharat Singh and another v. Smt. Bhudevi and another 1987 RD 23. The learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of learned single Judge In Ramdeo and another v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow and Ors. 2003 (3) AWC 1344 (SC) and also a decision of learned single Judge of this Court in Bharat Singh and another v. Smt. Bhudevi and another 1987 RD 23. The learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of learned single Judge In Ramdeo and another v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow and Ors. 1968 RD 99 and also in Ram Sabodh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, V.P. 1982 ALJ 1253. 5. Per contra, Sri B. B. Paul, learned counsel representing opposite parties contended that application to grant bhumidhari rights on deposit of 20 times of land revenue was made on 29th November, 1973 and objection filed against the said application having been rejected, the final orders were passed granting bhumidhari sanad. He further submitted that once the order to grant bhumidhari sanad was passed on the application of Ram Ghulam, It will relate back to the date of application and by this reckoning, Ram Ghulam shall be deemed to be Bhumidhar on the date of execution of sale deed. He further submitted that the sale deed executed in favour of vendees was rightly executed and defendant whose objections having been rejected, could derive no right as entire rights devolved on plaintiffs on the basis of registered sale deed aforestated. It was further submitted that though orders were passed to grant bhumidhari rights, the matter went up to the Board of Revenue and during pendency of the case, Ram Ghulam died and therefore, the death of Ram Ghulam will not impinge upon the rights of Vendees. 6. Having considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the issue canvassed in this petition stands clinched by a decision of the Apex Court in Deo Nandan and Anr. v. Ram Saran and others (supra). Relevant portion of paragraph 9 of this decision being germane to the controversy involved in this petition is excerpted below for ready reference. "When a certificate is issued u/s 137, it in fact recognises the position as on the date when the application was made and the payment contemplated u/s 134 (1) was deposited. The certificates, in other words, will have a retrospective effect and would relate back to the date of the application. There was nothing to prevent the revenue authorities from allowing the application filed u/s 134 (1) on the day when it was presented. The certificates, in other words, will have a retrospective effect and would relate back to the date of the application. There was nothing to prevent the revenue authorities from allowing the application filed u/s 134 (1) on the day when it was presented. The underlying intention of the Legislature, therefore, clearly is that as and when the said application is accepted and order is passed u/s 137, it must relate back to the date when the application was filed..........." Though this case has been pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner to prop up his contentions, the ratio flowing from this decision squarely applies to the controversy involved in this case but with a difference i.e., it does not lend cogency to the case and contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. Reverting to the present case, it is noticeable that an order was already passed in favour of Ram Ghulam on 10th January, 1974 (Annexure-C.A. 1 to the counter: affidavit) by which the competent authority u/s 134 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act,- recorded a categorical finding that Ram Ghulam was not of unsound mind and he was within his senses and he, within his own rights, moved application for grant of bhumidhari sanad who was an exclusive tenure holder. It was further held that objection of defendant Hari Saran was not maintainable and was liable to be rejected. It was further observed that 18th January, 1974 was the date fixed for further orders and in view of this order, further order required to be passed was a simple act of preparation of bhumidhari sanad but the order was challenged in appeal and thereafter in revision and therefore the bhumidhari sanad could not be actually issued in the name of Ram Ghulam. It is worth noticing that Hari Saran who preferred objection against grant of bhumidhari sanad to Ram Ghulam, filed another application that Ram Ghulam was dead and he being the proximate heir to the deceased under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act bhumidhar sanad could be issued in his name Considering the entire perspective discussed above, I feel called to observe that even if bhumidhari sanad was issued in the name of heirs of Ram Ghulam, it will not impinge upon the right of Ram Ghulam on the date of execution of sale deed to transfer property inasmuch as on his application the order to grant bhumidhari sanad was issued. As the heirs stepped into the shoes of original tenure holder, by any reckoning, they cannot claim their independent right. In this connection, certain significant features germane to the controversy should be noticed that Sharda Prasad, nephew of Ram Ghulam arrayed as respondent No. 5 in the instant petition and his sons entered the arena as his heirs and legal representatives. Ram Ghulam died on 10.6,1974 and heirs and legal representatives moved application for their impleadment in place of Ram Ghulam. Revision by petitioner Hari Saran against the order dated 10th June, 1974 claiming independent rights had already been dismissed on 30.4.1974. In this perspective, it Is explicit that though initially orders were passed on 10.1.1974 rejecting objection and holding Ram Ghulam as exclusive tenure holder entitled to file applications, the orders were passed ultimately on application of Ram Ghulam, in the name of his heirs on 22.3.1976. The proceeding ultimately abated due to Amendment by Act No. 8 of 1977 coming to operation thereby elevating the status of all sirdars to bhumidhars. In this light, the question arises whether a legal representative or heir could claim his independent right contrary to the pleading or interest of the owner. This matter intruded upon the attention of this Court in several pronouncements. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court in New Okhla Industrial v. Pooran Singh 2004 (2) ESC 1112 was seized of this aspect though in different context and relying upon a number of decisions cited across the bar as discussed in para 15 of the decision laid down that it is the rights and liabilities of original party that have to be considered and not of those of legal representatives. All that legal representatives can take up suit at stage it was left, when original party died and to continue It likewise that defendant is entitled to raise against legal representatives any defence other than those which he could raise against deceased. The Division Bench further went on to observe that "when a person dies, right of substitution is not on the basis of succession, but a person, who Is competent to represent the estate of a deceased party and has no interest adverse to the deceased's estate will be permitted to be substituted as his legal representative. In a decision in Ram Ugrah Ojha and Another Vs. Ganesh Singh, AIR 1940 All 99 , proposition laid down is "legal representative is added only to decide the rights and liabilities of original party and not of legal representatives themselves. Legal representatives cannot assert his own individual or hostile title in suit. Again In a decision in AIR 1929 Oudh 353, Division Bench observed that according to the definition, it includes a person, who in law represents estate of deceased person. Definition in this Court denotes that those class of persons on whom the status of a representative is fastened by reason of death, whose estate they are held to represent. In the perspective of what has been discussed above, it would follow that heirs and legal representatives have no Independent rights nor can have any interest adverse to the deceased. 7. As a mater of fact, the heirs would derive whatever be their rights, flowing from Ram Ghulam and since Ram Ghulam had already executed a sale deed, and the order of grant of bhumidhari sanad had already been passed, it will relate back to the date on which the application was filed and 20 times of land revenue was deposited as observed in the decision of the Apex Court referred to supra. 8. In the light of the above, I have also taken into reckoning the other decisions cited across the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner. None of the decisions cited by the learned counsel give prop to his failing case and I do not consider it apt to swell the judgment by dwelling upon such decisions at length. 9. In the above conspectus and considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in its decision in Deo Nandan and Anr. None of the decisions cited by the learned counsel give prop to his failing case and I do not consider it apt to swell the judgment by dwelling upon such decisions at length. 9. In the above conspectus and considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in its decision in Deo Nandan and Anr. v. Ram Saran and others (supra), the view is irresistible that Ram Ghulam had already acquired rights of bhumidhar on the date of execution of sale deed in favour of plaintiffs and the defendant-petitioner, who staked claim to the rights as heirs of Ram Ghulam is estopped from negating the right of Ram Ghulam to execute sale deed on the relevant date on which the sale deed was executed. In the instant case, there is no denying of the fact that Ram Ghulam had executed sale deed transferring property in favour of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and it having been held that aforestated Ram Ghulam had acquired bhumidhari rights on the date on which he executed the sale deed, the property in question devolved upon transferees i.e., the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who claimed rights with all transmission of rights and obligations and the petitioner cannot be permitted to put forth alluringly his claim to negate the rights and obligations devolved upon the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on the basis of sale deed executed by Ram Ghulam as bhumidhar. The Board of Revenue rightly held that transferee is entitled to get benefits of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and this view receives reinforcement from a decision of three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Ram Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 162 , the substance of which may be excerpted below : "Though a sirdar used to acquire bhumidhari rights not on the date of depositing the prescribed amount but only on the date of issuance of bhumidhari certificate, where he effected sale of the land in respect of which the amount was deposited, on the very day of the deposit, thus making an erroneous representation that he was authorised to sell the land, Section 43 of the T. P. Act clearly" applied and the vendee was entitled to the benefit thereof. As a consequence, the vendor's son who filed a suit to have the sale set aside on the ground that the vendor had no right to effect they sale was liable to be non-suited as he could not claim to be a bona fide transferee in good faith." 10. It is indeed intriguing that Hari Saran who initially preferred objection stating that his brother Ram Ghulam was non-compose mentis and was incapable of filing application for grant of bhumidhari sanad after depositing 20 times of land revenue, took somersault and switched gear to claim his independent rights as heirs of Ram Ghulam on the basis of bhumidhari sanad issued after the death of Ram Ghulam. It should be noticed with concern as to what amount of ingenuity is exercised by the near and dear ones to pronounce his own kith and kin as insane ostensibly with the object of grabbing his property without twinging his pachydermic conscience. It has been rightly said that a man is not likely to follow the moral principles unless he believes in superior sanctions than all earthly laws and even the promptings of his conscience. In my considered view. It is nothing but a dishonest and disingenuous act on the part of the petitioner to grab the property on one pretext or the other and such acts must be abhorred in the strongest words. The trial court, as well as Board of Revenue rightly addressed themselves to every aspect of the matter and decreed the suit accordingly. 11. As a result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, the Court is inclined to impose costs which I stipulate at Rs. 10,000.