C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) PRIVATE complaint filed by the 2nd respondent against the petitioners and 3rd respondent alleging that in view of the matrimonial disputes between his brother- in-law and his wife i. e. , 1st petitioner, 1st petitioner filed a criminal case against his brother-in-law, parents-in-law and others which ended in their acquittal. Hence 1st petitioner and her relatives bore against his in-laws and trespassed into the house of his in-laws at 8. 00 a. m. , on 15-1-1999 and started abusing them in a filthy language, when he along with his wife was in his in-laws house for Pongal festival and when his mother-in- law questioned their behaviour, 1st petitioner beat his mother-in-law and on hearing her shouts he and his wife rushed to her rescue whereupon 1st petitioner and 3rd respondent caught hold of his wife and beat her indiscriminately and when he tried to stop them, 2nd petitioner dragged him out of the house and pushed him on a scooter with a great force, due to which he received incised wound and so, he went to the Police Station and gave a report but the police did not choose to take action, was referred by the learned Magistrate to police for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr. PC, who after investigation sent a final report that it is a non-cognizable case. On a protest petition filed by the 2nd respondent the learned Magistrate recorded his sworn statement and the statements of the witnesses examined by him and took cognizance of the case under Section 352 read with section 34 IPC as CC. No. 1203 of 2000 against the petitioners and the 3rd respondent but dismissed the complaint for offences under Sections 290, 324, 447 and 506 IPC. This petition is filed by the petitioners to quash the proceedings in the said CC against them.
No. 1203 of 2000 against the petitioners and the 3rd respondent but dismissed the complaint for offences under Sections 290, 324, 447 and 506 IPC. This petition is filed by the petitioners to quash the proceedings in the said CC against them. ( 2 ) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since 1st petitioner admittedly is the wife of the brother-in-law of the 2nd respondent, and since the incident alleged took place in the house of the in-laws of the 2nd respondent, who admittedly also are the in-laws of the 1st petitioner, entry of the 1st petitioner and her relatives into the house of her in-laws cannot be trespass, and so it is clear that the complaint is mala fide and is intended to spite the petitioners since 1st petitioner filed a case under Section 498-A IPC against her husband and her in-laws. It is his contention that since the police, after thorough investigation, found that there was only hot exchange of words, it cannot be said that there was any offence, and in any event since offence under Section 352 IPC is punishable with imprisonment for three months or fine which may extend to rs. 500/- or with both, and since the offence alleged is said to have been committed on 15-1-1999, and since the cognizance of the offence was taken on 3-10-2000 i. e. , more than one year from the date of commission of the alleged offence, when as per Section 468 (2) (b) Cr. PC, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year is one year, proceedings against the petitioners are clearly barred by time and hence are liable to be quashed. He relied on State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 , in support of his contention.
PC, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year is one year, proceedings against the petitioners are clearly barred by time and hence are liable to be quashed. He relied on State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 , in support of his contention. ( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for 2nd respondent is that since the complaint was filed within the time, and since the police did not state that the offence alleged was not committed, but stated that there was hot exchange of words, and in any event since 2nd respondent is not responsible for the delay caused by the Court taking cognizance of the offence, question of quashing the proceedings on the ground of limitation does not arise in view of the ratio in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt, AIR 2000 SC 297 . ( 4 ) IT is unnecessary for me to go into the question whether a daughter-in-law can trespass into and indulge in the acts alleged in the complaint against her or not, for disposal of this petition, because even according to the investigation conducted by the police, incident did take place in the house of the in-laws of the 1 st petitioner and since the learned Magistrate did not take cognizance of the case under Section 447 ipc and took cognizance of the case only under Section 352 read with Section 34 IPC. In view thereof the only point for consideration is whether the complaint is liable to be quashed on the ground of limitation? ( 5 ) THE incident allegedly took place on 15-1-1999 at about 8. 30 a. m. , 2nd respondent filed the complaint in the Court on 21-1-1999, alleging that police have not taken action against the petitioners on the basis of the complaint given by him immediately after the incident. That 2nd respondent gave a report to police immediately after the incident cannot be doubted because in the final report submitted by him, the Investigating Officer stated that a G. D. entry was made regarding the report given by the 2nd respondent.
That 2nd respondent gave a report to police immediately after the incident cannot be doubted because in the final report submitted by him, the Investigating Officer stated that a G. D. entry was made regarding the report given by the 2nd respondent. So it is clear that 2nd respondent filed a private complaint in Court within one week from the date of the incident and the same was referred by the learned Magistrate to police for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr. PC. After police sent a final report, treating the case as non cognizable 2nd respondent filed a protest petition, upon which, the court took cognizance. Though the period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 352 IPC is one year from the date of offence as per section 468 (2) (b) Cr. PC. , I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings in this case are liable to be quashed on the ground of limitation, for the court taking cognizance of the case on 3-10-2000, in respect of an incident that took place on 15-1-1999. Sarwan Singh case (supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners was referred to in Tara Dutt (supra) case relied upon by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, which observed as follows:"the language of sub-section (3) of section 468 makes it imperative that the limitation provided for taking cognizance in section 468 is in respect of the offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved. This being the position, in the case in hand, when the respondents were charged under Section 468 read with Section 120b, for which the imposable punishment is seven years and Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and for such offences no period of limitation having been provided for in Section 468, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The High Court in recording its conclusion relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of punjab v. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34 = ( AIR 1981 SC 1054 = 1981 Crl LJ 722 ).
The High Court in recording its conclusion relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of punjab v. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34 = ( AIR 1981 SC 1054 = 1981 Crl LJ 722 ). In the said case, the respondent was charged under Section 406 for misappropriation. The challan was presented on October 13, 1976 and therein it was clearly mentioned that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972. The learned Trial Judge acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 468 but convicted him of the charge under section 406 of the Code of Criminal procedure. This Court came to the conclusion that since the charge-sheet itself mentions that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972, the cognizance was barred under section 468 (2) (c) of the Code. At the outset it may be stated that in the aforesaid case the Court had not considered the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was in fact not there on the statute book when the alleged offence was held to have been committed. But in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 468 which we have already considered this decision will be of no application and the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid decision to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand the cognizance itself was barred by limitation. "it is clear from Sarwan Singh case (supra) that the challan itself was presented into court four years after the date of offence for which the accused was found guilty. In this case, as stated earlier, 2nd respondent approached the Court well within one week from the date of the incident alleged. But the court referred the case to police for investigation, and after the police referred the case as non-cognizable and served the 2nd respondent with notice of their final report, he filed a protest petition, examined himself and other witnesses, whereupon the court took cognizance of the case. ( 6 ) FOR interpreting Section 468 Cr. PC, sections 469 and 470 also have to be looked into. As per Section 470 (1) of Cr. PC while computing the period of limitation, time during which another prosecution, with due deligence whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded.
PC, sections 469 and 470 also have to be looked into. As per Section 470 (1) of Cr. PC while computing the period of limitation, time during which another prosecution, with due deligence whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded. 2nd respondent who failed in his attempt to move the police came to Court with a complaint within one week from the date of incident, but the Court, without examining him and his witnesses, thought it fit to refer the case to police for investigation and the police, who cold shouldered him earlier, had, after investigation, having found that the incident did take place, treated it as non-cognizable and so the ball again came to the Court of the Magistrate, who after examining the 2nd respondent and his witnesses took cognizance of the offence under Section 352 IPC only. The fact that 2nd respondent failed to question the order of dismissal of his complaint under Sections 290, 324 447 and 506 IPC is of little consequence for deciding the point for consideration, because the delay was not due to any inaction or laches on the part of the 2nd respondent. It is well known that the act of Court shall prejudice none. Since 2nd respondent was not responsible for the delay in the Court taking cognizance of the case, though he filed the complaint almost immediately after the incident, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the complaint is liable to be quashed on the ground of limitation. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, I find no merits in this petition and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 8 ) THE criminal petition accordingly is dismissed.