ORDER: This application has been filed to revoke the leave already granted by this Court on 26.7.2001 in Application No.3186 of 2001. 2. The applicant/defendant in C.S.No.895 of 2001 who has filed this application, has contended as follows: The respondent/plaintiff has filed the suit for recovery of Rs.15 lakhs with interest at 36% per annum, in default directing the property mortgaged in favour of the plaintiff be sold for realisation of the amount. Apart from denying the liability to pay, the applicant has contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The consideration of dwelling house of the applicant/defendant situate within the jurisdiction of this Court or the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of this Court either in whole or in part will be relevant only in cases where the subject matter of the suit is not land or other immovable property. But as far as this case is concerned, in the suit apart from claiming a personal decree against the applicant, the respondent/plaintiff has also sought for the relief of sale of the mortgaged property. Hence the suit is one where the subject matter is immovable property. Since the immovable property is not within the original jurisdiction of this Court, this has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 3. The contention of the applicant is that under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act, when the property is situate outside the original jurisdiction of this Court, in a suit for land, this Court has no jurisdiction. The contention of the respondent/plaintiff is that it is not a suit for land, but it is a money suit based on mortgage. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant while relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bank of Madura Limited v. Balaramadass and Brothers and others, (1985)1 M.L.J. 245 : A.I.R. 1985 Mad. The contention of the respondent/plaintiff is that it is not a suit for land, but it is a money suit based on mortgage. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant while relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bank of Madura Limited v. Balaramadass and Brothers and others, (1985)1 M.L.J. 245 : A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 1, in a case in which the immovable property was situate at outside the jurisdiction of this Court, but mortgage by deposit of title deeds was created at Madras and all the defendants residing at Madras, this Court held that since the defendants are residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the applicant would contend that this decision has been impliedly overruled by a deciding of the Supreme Court in Adcon Electronics Private Limited v. Daulat and another, (2001)7 S.C.C. 698 : (2001)4 C.T.C. 39, which has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in S.K.J.Dhanasekar v. S.V.S.Jawaharlal, (2002)4 C.T.C. 653. The Division Bench of this Court in the said judgment held as follows: "4. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court in a recently reported case which is directly in point here. That is the case of Adcon Electronics Private Limited v. Daulat, (2001)7 S.C.C. 698 : (2001)4 C.T.C. 39. At para.7, of the judgment Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court has been set out. That clause is in pari materia with Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court. In para.9 of that judgment, the Court set out its analysis of the clause in the following terms: "Thus it is clear that under Clause 12 of the Letter Patent, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction will have power to receive, try and determine, (i) Suits for land or other immovable property if such property is situated within the local limits of original, jurisdiction of the High Court, or (2) all other cases. (a) if the cause of action has arisen wholly within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; (b) if prior leave of the Court has been obtained and the cause of action has arisen in part within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; or (c) If the defendants dwell or carries on business or personally work for gain within such limits. 5. It is thus clear that Clause 12 refers to two classes of case one suits relating to lands or other immovable properties, and the second, cases other than those relating to land or other immovable property. The dwelling of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Court or the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court whether in whole or in part will be relevant only in cases where the subject matter of the suit is not land or other immovable property. 6. The decision of this Court in Bank of Madura Limited v. Balramadoss and Brothers, (1985)1 M.L.J. 245 : A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 1, must be held have been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court by the said judgment. We may also record that we do not find ourselves in agreement with the analysis of Clause 12 made in the judgment of this Court recorded inBank of Madura Limited v. Balramadoss and Brothers, (1985)1 M.L.J. 245 : A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 1. 7. Clause 12 of the Letter Patent clearly refers at the first instance to "in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, it thereafter refers to "or in all other cases". The words "or in all other cases" refer to all cases and other than suits for land or other immovable property." 5. The present case is covered under Sub-Clause (2) of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court for which the cause of action has arisen within the local limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court and the defendant is also having dwelling house within such limits. 6. "A suit for land" covers three Clauses viz., (a) suits for the determination of title to land; (b) suits for possession of land; and (c) other suits in which the reliefs claimed, if granted granted would directly affect title to or possession of land. 6. "A suit for land" covers three Clauses viz., (a) suits for the determination of title to land; (b) suits for possession of land; and (c) other suits in which the reliefs claimed, if granted granted would directly affect title to or possession of land. In the present case the suit is only for recovery of money based one simple mortgage and on the failure to pay the money, the land has to be sold in execution of the decree. Therefore the contention of the applicant/defendant that the leave granted should be revoked is not sustainable and hence the same is rejected. 7. In the result, the application is dismissed. No costs. 8. Application No.290 of 2004 has been filed by the respondents/defendants 1 and 2 in the above Civil Suit to stay all further proceedings in the Civil Suit pending disposal of the application for referring the parties to a Sole Arbitrator. 9. Application No.291 of 2004 has been filed by the respondents/defendants 1 and 2 to refer the dispute between the defendants and the plaintiff to an Arbitrator. 10. The respondent/plaintiff M/s.Ceebros Property Development Private Limited has filed C.S.No.859 of 2003 against the applicants/defendants claiming a sum of Rs.12.50 lakhs from the first defendant and Rs.6.25 lakhs from the second defendant. The pleading in brief in the plaint are that the second defendant/respondent acting as a Broker introduced the first defen- dant-respondent and adjoining property owners for development of a property to an extent of 3 grounds and 1902 sq.ft., comprised in S.Nos.8/ 1 and 8/2 and after holding several rounds of discussions among themselves, a memorandum of undertaking was entered into among the plaintiff and the first defendant and owners of adjoining properties on 15.7.2000. Subsequently, a deed of agreement for developments was also executed on 17.9.2001, in pursuance of the agreement for development, the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs to the first defendant, land owner and Rs.5 lakhs to the second defendant as brokerage. Subsequently the first defendant cancelled the proposal and hence the suit to recover the money as mentioned above. 11. 10 lakhs to the first defendant, land owner and Rs.5 lakhs to the second defendant as brokerage. Subsequently the first defendant cancelled the proposal and hence the suit to recover the money as mentioned above. 11. Under Clause 16 of the memorandum of understanding it was agreed and covenanted that any dispute with reference to the interpretation of any clause or with reference to any other matter arising out of the agreement (MOU), the same shall be referred to Arbitrator Mr.P.B.Ramanujam, Advocate, who shall act as the sole Arbitrator, in other words, the matters were agreed to be subjected to Arbitration. 12. In view of the above clause in the memorandum of understanding the applicant’s pray that the dispute be referred to the Arbitrator. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff in these applications would contend that the development agreement dated 17.9.2001 does not contain any clause for arbitration and therefore the subject matter of the suit should not be referred for arbitration. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants would submit that the development agreement dated 17.9.2001 is nothing but a follow up of the memorandum of understanding there is a Clause 16, by which the parties have agreed to settle their disputes through sole Arbitrator Mr.P.B.Ramanujam. 13. A perusal of the memorandum of understanding would show that the agreement to be signed later is only a formal agreement and the formal agreement will follow after obtaining necessary patta and discharge of the subsisting mortgage over the property, in Clause 3(a)(b)(c)(d) and Clauses 4, 6, 7, 10 and 12 it has been categorically mentioned that a formal agreement will be entered into after payment of the refundable advance of Rs.10 lakhs, Rs.3 lakhs Rs.65 lakhs etc. A perusal of the memorandum of understanding which contains the above clauses would clearly show that the agreement to be entered into between the parties was only a formal agreement to be signed on fulfilling of certain contingencies or requirements. The development agreement dated 17.9.2001 is nothing but a follow up of the memorandum of understanding dated 15.7.2000 and therefore the agreement for development dated 17.9.2001 is only part and parcel of memorandum of understanding dated 15.7.2000. The development agreement dated 17.9.2001 is nothing but a follow up of the memorandum of understanding dated 15.7.2000 and therefore the agreement for development dated 17.9.2001 is only part and parcel of memorandum of understanding dated 15.7.2000. Though the agreement for development dated 17.9.2001 does not contain any clause for arbitration, the memorandum of understanding dated 15.7.2000 contain Clause 16 wherein the parties have agreed to refer their dispute to the sole Arbitrator Mr.P.B. Ramanujam. 14. Even in the memorandum of understanding it was agreed that the original title deeds of the properties of S.S.Perumal placed with Corporation Bank for availing certain credit facility shall be returned by S.S.Perumal and placed in the hands of Mr.P.B.Ramanujam before signing of the agreement. The intention of the parties to the memorandum of understanding was clear that a formal agreement for development will be signed later on fulfillment of certain conditions by either parties and therefore the agreement for development is inseparable from the memorandum of understanding. Therefore even though there is no clause in the agreement for development for referring a dispute between parties to the arbitrator, such a clause is available in the memorandum of understanding, and therefore the same is binding on both the parties. 15. Under Sec.8(1), if a party, in an action brought before the Court, in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, which the party applies not later than before his submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then the Court has to refer the parties to arbitration. Under Sec.5 of the Arbitration Act, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, in matters governed by arbitration, no judicial authority shall intervene. 16. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M/s.Pinckcity Midway Petroleum, (2003)3 C.T.C. 438, the Supreme Court held as follows: “Judicial Authority is mandated to refer parties to Arbitration once existence of clause is pointed out and such reference is obligatory. Once agreement containing arbitration clause is produced nothing remains to be done in original action except to refer to arbitration. Any objection as to applicability of arbitration clause to facts of case has to be raised before Arbitration Tribunal and Tribunal has to consider same under Sec.16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Once agreement containing arbitration clause is produced nothing remains to be done in original action except to refer to arbitration. Any objection as to applicability of arbitration clause to facts of case has to be raised before Arbitration Tribunal and Tribunal has to consider same under Sec.16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Trial Court cannot proceed with suit after application under Secs.5 and 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is filed.” 17. Since the parties have bound themselves under Clause 16 to refer their disputes to arbitration, the Application Nos.290 and 291 of 2004 are allowed and the matter is referred to arbitrator and till then all proceedings in the Civil Suit No.859 of 2003 are stayed. No costs.