Judgment B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. ( 1 ) BY this revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure, the original landlord challenges the order passed by the Joint Civil judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, below Ex. 11 in Special Civil Suit No. 685 of 1994. The Suit was instituted by present revision applicant for possession, recovery of arrears and for damages. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the applicant landlord that he is the owner of Plot No. 8 situated at Khankhoje Nagar, Manewada Road, Nagpur and said block was let out to the respondents on monthly rent of Rs. 700/- on 1-1-1992 for locating a shop. The defendants accordingly started a Metal and crockery shop in that block. They paid the rent from January, 1992 to April, 1992 and did not pay the rent thereafter. He, therefore, issued a registered A. D. Notice to the defendants on 30-11-1992 and demanded arrears of rent. The notice was replied to by the defendants in which they denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and stated civil Rev. Application No. 102 of 1998 decided on 9-12-2004. (Nagpur) that they were inducted in the said block by one Smt. Shantabai w/o Namdeorao zalpure. The applicant thereafter filed a Distress Warrant before the Small causes Court, Nagpur, for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 4200/ -. As the defendants denied his ownership, the Small Causes Court, dismissed this Distress warrant proceedings on 26-4-1993. It was the case of the applicant in those distress proceedings that the defendants filed fabricated rent receipts allegedly issued by Smt. Shanta Namdeorao Zalpure. In those proceedings, present respondent No. 1 Motiram stated that Ravindra has taken the premises from shantabai Zalpure and Ravindra was added as defendant No. 2 in Special Civil suit. No. 685 of 1994 subsequently initiated by the applicant for possession, recovery of arrears and damages. The applicant has stated that he issued a registered notice dated 28-4-1994 and demanded arrears of rent from Respondent no. 1 and also called upon him to vacate the premises by 31-5-1994 and expressly stated that from 1-6-1994, the said respondent will be treated as trespasser and will be liable to pay damages of Rs. 30/- per day. He stated that though notice was served, the respondent did not file any reply to it. 1 and also called upon him to vacate the premises by 31-5-1994 and expressly stated that from 1-6-1994, the said respondent will be treated as trespasser and will be liable to pay damages of Rs. 30/- per day. He stated that though notice was served, the respondent did not file any reply to it. Thus, in view of denial of title by tenant, the Revision applicant filed Special Civil Suit no. 685 of 1994. ( 3 ) IN this Special Civil Suit, the respondents filed an application under order 7, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and contended that the plaintiff has not terminated their tenancy as per the procedure provided under section 106 read with section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and without terminating the tenancy, the proceedings for ejectment and possession have been filed. It is further contended that the provisions of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and rent Control Order are applicable to the premises and the plaintiff (present revision applicant) has not obtained necessary permission from the Rent controller before filing the Suit for ejectment. It is contended that therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. The said application was opposed by present revision applicant by pointing out that the defendants have denied the ownership of the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff has forfeited the tenancy of the defendants and hence defendants are not entitled to take protection of Rent Control Order. After hearing both sides, the trial Court has found that the Revision applicant has not terminated the tenancy of respondents/ defendants No. 1 and 2 and hence suit cannot be proceeded with and cannot be entertained as no cause of action arose. ( 4 ) THIS order dated 20-6-1995 was sought to be reviewed by the present revision applicant, by filing MJC No. 159 of 1996. The revision applicant pointed out that by Notice dated 28-4-1994, he terminated the tenancy of defendants and postal acknowledgment thereof was also placed on record and those documents were not seen. It was stated that the Court has thus inadvertently not looked into the forfeiture notice and erroneously rejected the plaint without perusing the records. The Court was therefore, requested to review the order. This application for review was filed on 13-7-1995. It was stated that the Court has thus inadvertently not looked into the forfeiture notice and erroneously rejected the plaint without perusing the records. The Court was therefore, requested to review the order. This application for review was filed on 13-7-1995. The trial Court, has found that the revision applicant admitted that the defendants are tenant and it was necessary for him to obtain permission of the Rent Controller and as no such permission was obtained, the Suit was not maintainable. It has, therefore, held that this was not a fit case for reviewing the order passed while deciding Ex 11 on 20-6-1995. It, therefore, dismissed the application for review on 26-8-1997. In the present revision, the prayer is to quash and set aside the said order dated 26-8-1997 and to restore the Suit of Revision applicant back to the file. ( 5 ) SHRI Parate. Advocate arguing the matter for the applicant- landlord has contended that as it was the case of forfeiture of tenancy, the provisions of C. P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, are not at all applicable. He relies upon the judgment in the case of Lalabi vs. Dhelullakhan reported at 2003 (3) Mh. LJ. 544 and in the case of Ashwinikumar vs. Gangadhar reported at 1990 Mh. LJ. 18, to support his contention. ( 6 ) AS against this, Advocate Shri Dubey, appearing for the respondents - tenant contends that perusal of plaint shows that the revision applicant has treated the defendants as his tenants and as such, there was no infirmity in the order passed. He contends that the trial Court, has rightly considered the contents of the plaint for the purposes of deciding the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of civil Procedure Code and has correctly found that as the tenancy is not terminated, the suit was not maintainable as there was no cause of action. He further contends that the review application is also rightly rejected as before terminating the tenancy of defendants (respondents), the revision applicant ought to have obtained permission from the Rent Controller as required by Clause 13 (3) of the Rent Control Order. He further contends that the review application is also rightly rejected as before terminating the tenancy of defendants (respondents), the revision applicant ought to have obtained permission from the Rent Controller as required by Clause 13 (3) of the Rent Control Order. ( 7 ) THE reasoning given by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, in his order dated 26-8-1997 is that the revision applicant has admitted that the respondents are his tenant, therefore, it would be necessary for him to obtain permission of the Rent Controller and as no such permission is obtained, the case law cited by the revision applicant was found to be not applicable. The said case law was in relation to the scope of Order 47, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code regulating the review jurisdiction. ( 8 ) THE perusal of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the advocate for the revision applicant clearly demonstrates that the permission of rent Controller is not necessary, if it is a Suit for eviction of tenant on the basis of title. In ruling reported at 2003 (3) Mh. LJ. 544, the learned Single Judge of this Court, has relied upon the Division Bench judgment in the case of ashwinikumar Govardhandas Gandhi and another vs. Gangadhar Dattatraya gadgil reported at 7990 Mh. LJ. 18. The Advocate for the revision applicant has also cited this ruling of Division Bench. In this Division Bench ruling, which is specifically dealing with section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act and clause 13 of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, it has been held that permission under Rent Control Order is not necessary before terminating tenancy in cases where the tenant renounces his character as such by setting up title in third person or in himself and the suit for ejectment after giving notice of forfeiture of tenancy is maintainable in such case without obtaining permission of Rent Controller under the Rent Control Order. Para 19 of this ruling is important and it reads as under :"considering the scheme of the Rent Control Order and the class of the persons for whose benefit the provisions have been enacted, it is apparent that the benefit would become available only to a tenant on whom the notice is to be served, if he accepts his character as a tenant and not otherwise. If he repudiates the character of a tenant, he makes it obvious that he does not want to partake of a benefit conferred by the beneficial piece of legislation. We are fortified in this view by the observations of a division Bench of this Courtin Ratanlal Manikchand Shah vs. Chanbasappa Senganbasappa Chincholi, AIR 1978 Bom. 216, to the effect that a tenant, who disclaims his tenancy, does not fulfil the qualifications of section 5 (11) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947, and a tenant disclaiming the title of the claimant-landlord and his relationship of tenancy literally knocks out the very bottom of statutory protection, and this amounts to disclaiming the benefits available under the Bombay Rent Act. It was pointed out that a tenant disclaims the title of his landlord who accepts such disclaimer and seeks eviction upon the basis thereof, and the voluntary action of the tenant and its acceptance by the landlord results in a bilateral determination of the tenancy and takes the case out of the pale of section 5 (11) of the Bombay Rent Act. Evidently, forfeiture of lease arising out of condition (2) of clause (g) of section 111 of the Transfer of Property act would stand on a footing different from the conditions laid down in conditions (1) and (3) of clause (g ). The distinction made by item (a) of clause 13 (1) of the Rent Control Order cannot, therefore, be said to be without substance, and we find that the Legislature, in its wisdom, while treating the two classes differently, had a rational basis for classification and it would, therefore, be erroneous to regard the exclusion of the class of cases covered by condition (2) of clause (g) of section 111 of the transfer of Property Act to be inadvertent or a mistake. "thus, it is apparent that the reason given by the Court, below while rejecting the review application on 16-8-1997 is clearly erroneous and also unsustainable. ( 9 ) IN the first order dated 20-6-1995 passed by the Court upon an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, the Court has found that as there is no termination of tenancy by revision applicant, suit cannot be proceeded with and cannot be entertained as there is no cause of action. ( 9 ) IN the first order dated 20-6-1995 passed by the Court upon an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, the Court has found that as there is no termination of tenancy by revision applicant, suit cannot be proceeded with and cannot be entertained as there is no cause of action. In his application for review, the revision applicant has specifically pointed out that by serving a notice dated 28-4-1994, he has terminated the tenancy of the respondents and he has also pointed out in para 3 of that review application that office copy of said notice along with postal acknowledgment showing receipt thereof by respondents was available on record which had inadvertently lost sight of by the Court while deciding the application under Order 7, Rule 11 on 20-6-1995. The request was to review the order on this ground and for that purpose reliance was placed upon the decision of Bombay Court in the case of Nishit M. Prabhu Verlekar vs. Chandranath reported at AIR 1986 Bom. 46. However, the court while considering the application for review, has not considered this aspect as it found that the permission of Rent Controller was not obtained. ( 10 ) ADVOCATE Shri Dubey for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Bhaga Gujasing vs. Shrilekha Sitaram, reported at 2004 (3) Mh. LJ. 977. In the said ruling, this Court, has held that the trial Court, should have first decided the issue of tenancy as pleaded by original defendant before coming to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction. There the plaintiff had approached the Civil Court, with case that defendant was neither a tenant nor licensee but was a trespasser and there was neither a contractual nor statutory relationship between them. The Suit was, therefore, filed for possession, damages and mesne profit. The parties adduced evidence and Civil Court, did not appreciate the evidence adduced by the defendant to show that she was defendant in suit property. This approach of trial Court, was found erroneous by this Court. The case apparently has no application in the facts at hand. In another ruling in the case of Badhu Mal vs. Mahabir Prasad, reported at AIR 1988 SC 1772 , relied upon by Shri Dubey. This approach of trial Court, was found erroneous by this Court. The case apparently has no application in the facts at hand. In another ruling in the case of Badhu Mal vs. Mahabir Prasad, reported at AIR 1988 SC 1772 , relied upon by Shri Dubey. the provisions of section 23 of Provincial Small Cause courts Act were considered and it was found that said section does not mandate that Small Causes Court must invariably return the plaint in all cases in which the question of title is raised by the tenant in a suit for eviction. The Apex Court has found that in a suit instituted by the landlord against tenant on the strength of contract of tenancy, a question of title can also incidentally arise and can be gone into by Small Causes Court, though such a finding shall not be operative as res juclicata in a suit based on title. The case again does not have any application in the facts and circumstances of this revision. The Advocate for the respondents has contended that it is Small Causes Court alone which has jurisdiction in the matter and the Civil Suit was not tenable. This ruling of the Supreme Court does not support any such argument. He has also relied upon the ruling in the case of manstukhlal Dhanraj Jain vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale, reported at AIR 1995 SC 1102 , to canvass the same proposition. However, again the said judgment is in relation to provisions of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which covers disputes between the licensor and licensee. It does not relate to a suit in which the owner trying to evict a trespasser on the strength of his title. The third ruling on which reliance is placed by the Advocate for the respondents is in the case of kiritkumar vs. Champaben, reported at 7995 (2) Mh. LJ. 597. In this case, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the jurisdiction of the Court, is required to be decided on the basis of averment in the plaint and Court of Small causes has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit for ejectment against a gratuitous licensee. Again the facts of present revision are entirely different and hence this ruling also has no application. Again the facts of present revision are entirely different and hence this ruling also has no application. ( 11 ) UNDER the circumstances, the order dated 26-8-1997 passed by the Joint civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, below Ex. 1 in MJC No. 159 of 1996 is hereby quashed and set aside. The said MJC is therefore, restored back to file and the trial Court, shall proceed to dispose of the said MJC after hearing the concerned parties as early as possible in any case within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order by it. ( 12 ) THE Civil Revision Application is thus partly allowed. Rule is made absolute in above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Application partly allowed.