PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) WHAT is the valuation of the appeal for the purposes of the jurisdiction is the primal question involved presently? ( 2 ) CHAPTER V of the Allahabad High Court rules 1952 defines Jurisdiction of the Judges sitting alone or in Division Courts. A Single judge under Rule 2 of the Chapter has a limited pecuniary jurisdiction in respect of the various kinds of appeal or as mentioned therein upto but not exceeding 5 lakhs or one lakh rupees as the case may be. All other appeals shall be heard and disposed of by a bench of two Judges. ( 3 ) AS the aforesaid question is required to be answered keeping in view of the provisions of Arbitration Act 1996, civil Procedure Code 1908, Court-fees Act as amended in U. P. , it is not necessary to take into consideration factual matrix of the matter in great detail. Facts relevant to question, involved are discussed here. ( 4 ) THIS appeal has been reported by the stamp reporter as cognizable by Single Judge on the basis that the valuation of the appeal for the purposes of jurisdiction has been shown to be below Rs. 1 Lakh. At the time of hearing of the appeal for admission a preliminary objection was raised by Shri H. N. Singh, the learned counsel for the caveator- respondents disputing the valuation of the appeal being below Rs. 1 Lakh. He submitted that the valuation of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction is above Rs. 1 Lakh and is thus cognizable by a Division Bench under the rules of the Court. On this preliminary issue the counsel for the parties were heard. ( 5 ) FACTS for the disposal of the present issue lie in a narrow compass. The appeal arises out of an application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 by the present appellants, for grant of an injunction order. The said application has been rejected by the District Judge, Kanpur. ( 6 ) THE appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm constituted in pursuance of the partnership deed dated 3rd of July 1982. The appellant No. 2 and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are the partners of the said firm. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are presently residing at Calcutta. ( 6 ) THE appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm constituted in pursuance of the partnership deed dated 3rd of July 1982. The appellant No. 2 and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are the partners of the said firm. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are presently residing at Calcutta. The terms No. 11 and 12 of the deed are quoted below : (11) That all the partners shall be entitled to operate upon account or accounts of the firm and in the name of the business jointly or severally as may be mutually decided, between them from time to time. (12) That firm may raise funds, borrow money by way of loan, overdrafts etc. for their business or businesses from banks, financial institutions, government, non-government bodies and private parties secured or unsecured and on such terms and conditions as the partners may mutually agree upon. ( 7 ) THE respondents No. 1 and 2 have executed a general power of attorney dated 25-7-1987 In favour of the appellant No. 2 to act in their names and on behalf of the firm for all the transactions. The said partnership firm has a bank account C. C. A. Account No. 1650061063 with the respondent No. 3 namely the State Bank of India for the purpose to run the partnership firm. The said Bank account of the firm was being operated by the appellant No. 2 singly, prior to 3-10-2003. ( 8 ) IT appears that a dispute having arisen in between the parties, the appellant No. 2 on one hand and the respondents No. 1 and 2 on the other hand, {smt. Shanti Parolia and Smt. Sunil Parolia) wrote two letters both dated 3rd of October, 2003 (Annexure no. 4 to the affidavit) instructing the Bank to stop forthwith all withdrawals from the c. C. A. Account No. 1650061063 O. D. limit of Rs. 15 Lakhs in the name of the appellant firm and to stop payment and honouring all cheques etc. issued by or on behalf of the Modern Metal Industries. In the said letters it has been mentioned that all invert flow of the funds in any form such as deposit of cash, deposit of cheques, demand drafts etc. for clearing and credit should be continued to be accepted and credited in the said account in the usual manner without any hindrance. In the said letters it has been mentioned that all invert flow of the funds in any form such as deposit of cash, deposit of cheques, demand drafts etc. for clearing and credit should be continued to be accepted and credited in the said account in the usual manner without any hindrance. The State Bank of India in pursuance of the aforesaid letters informed the partnership firm by letter of the same date for stopping the payment. ( 4 ) THIS appeal has been reported by the stamp reporter as cognizable by Single Judge on the basis that the valuation of the appeal for the purposes of jurisdiction has been shown to be below Rs. 1 Lakh. At the time of hearing of the appeal for admission a preliminary objection was raised by Shri H. N. Singh, the learned counsel for the caveator- respondents disputing the valuation of the appeal being below Rs. 1 Lakh. He submitted that the valuation of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction is above Rs. 1 Lakh and is thus cognizable by a Division Bench under the rules of the Court. On this preliminary issue the counsel for the parties were heard. ( 5 ) FACTS for the disposal of the present issue lie in a narrow compass. The appeal arises out of an application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 by the present appellants, for grant of an injunction order. The said application has been rejected by the District Judge, Kanpur. ( 6 ) THE appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm constituted in pursuance of the partnership deed dated 3rd of July 1982. The appellant No. 2 and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are the partners of the said firm. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are presently residing at Calcutta. The terms No. 11 and 12 of the deed are quoted below : (11) That all the partners shall be entitled to operate upon account or accounts of the firm and in the name of the business jointly or severally as may be mutually decided, between them from time to time. (12) That firm may raise funds, borrow money by way of loan, overdrafts etc. (12) That firm may raise funds, borrow money by way of loan, overdrafts etc. for their business or businesses from banks, financial institutions, government, non-government bodies and private parties secured or unsecured and on such terms and conditions as the partners may mutually agree upon. ( 7 ) THE respondents No. 1 and 2 have executed a general power of attorney dated 25-7-1987 In favour of the appellant No. 2 to act in their names and on behalf of the firm for all the transactions. The said partnership firm has a bank account C. C. A. Account No. 1650061063 with the respondent No. 3 namely the State Bank of India for the purpose to run the partnership firm. The said Bank account of the firm was being operated by the appellant No. 2 singly, prior to 3-10-2003. ( 8 ) IT appears that a dispute having arisen in between the parties, the appellant No. 2 on one hand and the respondents No. 1 and 2 on the other hand, {smt. Shanti Parolia and Smt. Sunil Parolia) wrote two letters both dated 3rd of October, 2003 (Annexure no. 4 to the affidavit) instructing the Bank to stop forthwith all withdrawals from the c. C. A. Account No. 1650061063 O. D. limit of Rs. 15 Lakhs in the name of the appellant firm and to stop payment and honouring all cheques etc. issued by or on behalf of the Modern Metal Industries. In the said letters it has been mentioned that all invert flow of the funds in any form such as deposit of cash, deposit of cheques, demand drafts etc. for clearing and credit should be continued to be accepted and credited in the said account in the usual manner without any hindrance. The State Bank of India in pursuance of the aforesaid letters informed the partnership firm by letter of the same date for stopping the payment. ( 9 ) THE present appellants thereafter filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the following reliefs :a) "pass an ad interim order staying operation of the order dated 3-10-2003 issued by Respondent No. 3 {annexure C) stopping payments from the Bank Account of the firm, m/s. Modern Metal Industries, viz. . Bank account C/c A/c No. 01650061063, in pursuance of the letter written by Respondents no. . Bank account C/c A/c No. 01650061063, in pursuance of the letter written by Respondents no. 1 and 2; b) pass an ad interim order commanding the Respondents to revoke the instruction and action of stoppage of payment from the Bank Account of the firm, M/s. Modern metal Industries, viz. , Bank Account C/c a/c No. 01650061063 forthwith and further commanding them to permit payments to be made from the said Account without any obstruction and hindrance and in accordance with law; c) confirm the ad interim orders above- mentioned; d) pass any other order and/or grant any other relief as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper; e) award costs of the application. " ( 10 ) IN Para 13 of the said application it has been stated that several new orders for supplies were obtained by the appellant no. 2 for the firm from the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. These orders are contracts where under the firm has to perform its part of obligation of manufacturing and supplying products to the Defence Force within time bound period and within fixed and stipulated dead lines. The total sum of these orders has been shown to be Rs. 1,92,91,572/ -. Placing reliance upon the averments made in Para 13 of the application under Section 9 of the Act it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that fixation of valuation of appeal according to him is more than Rs. 1 lakh and thus the present appeal is cognizable by a Division Bench as per Rules of the Court. ( 11 ) HEARD the counsel for the parties at great length. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents placing reliance upon the aforesaid paragraph No. 13 of the application and para no. 7 of the rejoinder affidavit has submitted that the valuation of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction is above Rs. 1 Lakh. In contra Shri S. P. Gupta, Senior Advocate, submitted that the right claimed in the appeal is incapable of the valuation, it is sweet- will of the appellant to put any valuation. Indisputably no valuation is mentioned in the application under Section 9 of the Act filed before the Court-below. There is no provision under the said Act for making a valuation of relief under the Act. Indisputably no valuation is mentioned in the application under Section 9 of the Act filed before the Court-below. There is no provision under the said Act for making a valuation of relief under the Act. Reliance has been placed by him on Section 7 (iv-B) (A) of the Court-fees Act and upon the following two rulings; (1) AIR 1927 Madras 563 veeremma Vasireddi v. Marupudi Butchiah and (2) Sathappa Chettiar v. Ram Nathan chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 . Particularly reliance was placed by him on paragraph no. 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court which reads as follows :the question which still remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay Court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Section 7, sub-S. (iv) (b) deals with suits to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property and the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits is "according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. " Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under s. 7 (iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which value of the relief is sought. " ( 13 ) ELABORATING his argument it was submitted that there is a difference between the right of a partner to operate the Bank account and the amount standing in the bank account. The right to operate a Bank account of a partner is incapable of valuation and as s"uch it is Qpen to the appellant to put any valuation to this right. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents made a reference to certain provisions of c. P. C. such as Sections 6, 21 (2) Order 7 rule 1 (i), Order 7 Rule 2 (4) and Order 14 rule 2 (2) and submitted that a single Judge has a limited pecuniary jurisdiction. A Division Bench has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Reliance was placed by him upon m/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company v. Mrs. A Division Bench has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Reliance was placed by him upon m/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company v. Mrs. Vimla Panna Lai, AIR 1988 SC 1636 (p. 23), which reads as follows :"we are also of the view that the plaintiff cannot whimsically choose a ridiculous figure for filing the suit most arbitrarily where there are positive materials and/or objective standards of valuation of the relief appearing on the face of the plaint. These materials or objective standards will also enable the Court to determine the valuation for the purpose of Order VII Rule 1 (b) of c. P. C. " ( 15 ) IN Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh v. Paras Nath Singh, (2002) 1 SCC 304 : AIR 2002 SC 233 , it has been held as follows :"it is well settled that the Court-fee has to be paid on the plaint as framed and not on the plaint as it ought to have been framed unless by astuteness employed in drafting the plaint the plaintiff has attempted at evading payment of Court-fee or unless there be a provision of law requiring the plaintiff to value the suit and pay the Court-fee in a manner other than the one adopted by the plaintiff. The Court shall begin with an assumption, for the purpose of determining the Court-fees payable on plaint, that the averments made therein by the plaintiff are correct. Yet, an arbitrary valuation of the suit property having no basis at all for such valuation and made so as to evade payment of court-fees and fixed for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on some Court which it does not have, or depriving the Court of jurisdiction which it would otherwise have, can also be interfered with by the Court. It is the substance of the relief sought for and not the form which will be determinative of the valuation and payment of Court fee. The defence taken in the written statement may not be relevant for the purpose of deciding the payment of Court-fee by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is ultimately found to have omitted to seek an essential relief which he ought to have prayed for and without which the relief soughtjjbr in the plaint as framed and filed cannot be allowed to him, the plaintiff shall have to suffer the dismissal of the suit. If the plaintiff is ultimately found to have omitted to seek an essential relief which he ought to have prayed for and without which the relief soughtjjbr in the plaint as framed and filed cannot be allowed to him, the plaintiff shall have to suffer the dismissal of the suit. These principles of law were overlooked by the trial Court in passing the impugned order which was put in issue before the High court. We are further of the opinion that though the revision preferred by the plaintiff was directed against the order dated 1 -3-1997, the real question arising before the high Court was to find out whether the suit was properly valued and proper Court-fee was paid thereon in accordance with law. While doing so if the High Court was required to examine the correctness or otherwise of the order dated 17-12-1996 it should not have felt inhibited from doing so. In the facts of the present case we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the revision on the ground that the order dated 1-3-1997 was an order correcting a clerical or typing error only. " ( 16 ) TO decide the aforesaid controversy it is necessary to have a look to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines the word "court", which reads as follows :"court means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes High Court in exercise of its ordinary and original civil jurisdiction, having juris- diction to decide the questions forming subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such civil Court, or any Courts of small causes. ( 17 ) SECTION 9 of the Act which provides interim measures etc. by a Court says that a party may, before or during arbitration proceedings apply to a "court". ( 18 ) A joint reading of the aforesaid two sections in my mind provides the answer to the issue raised above. The crucial words are subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been subject matter of the suit. by a Court says that a party may, before or during arbitration proceedings apply to a "court". ( 18 ) A joint reading of the aforesaid two sections in my mind provides the answer to the issue raised above. The crucial words are subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been subject matter of the suit. The Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been subject matter of a suit will have Jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application under section 9 of the Act excluding any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court or any Court of small causes. ( 19 ) THE dispute between the parties as is clear from the reliefs claimed in the application is with regard to the order of the respondent No. 3 stopping the payments from the Bank account of the firm in pursuance of the letter written by the respondents No. 1 and 2. The other reliefs claimed in the application under Section 9 of the Act are the consequential reliefs. Therefore, the dispute between the parties is with regard to the letter/order dated 3rd of October 2003 issued by the State Bank of India in consequence of the letters issued on the same date by the respondents No. 1 and 2. To put it differently the right of the appellant No. 1 to operate the said account singly is under dispute. Indisputably the Bank has granted a cash credit limit up to Rs. 15 Lakhs in the said account. It was brought to my notice that there was a debit balance of Rs. 14,42,000/- and odd on 3rd of October 2003 vide page 61 of the paper book (Annexure no. 4 ). It is also relevant to notice here that by the impugned letters the appellant No. 1 was debarred from issuing cheques of withdrawal of the cash from the bank account but invert cash flow or-deposits were not stopped by the said letters. ( 20 ) COUNSEL for both the parties have placed reliance upon Section 7 (iv-B) (b) of the Court-fees Act amended in U. P. The said section provides that in suits for injunction plaint should be valued according to the amount at which the relief is sought. ( 20 ) COUNSEL for both the parties have placed reliance upon Section 7 (iv-B) (b) of the Court-fees Act amended in U. P. The said section provides that in suits for injunction plaint should be valued according to the amount at which the relief is sought. The first proviso says that such amount shall not be less than l/5th of the market value of the property involved or affected by the relief sought or Rs. 200/- whichever is greater. Explanation 2 (i) to the aforesaid section reads as follows :"explanation 2 In the case of suits (i) falling under Clauses (a) and (b), the property which is affected by the relief sought, and where the properties of both the plaintiff and defendant are affected, the property of the plaintiff so affected; (ii)and (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . shall be deemed to be property involved in or affected by the relief sought within the meaning of the proviso to the sub-section. "in view of above the Bank account having cash credit limit of Rs. 15 Lakhs in my opinion is the property involved in and is likely to be affected by the injunction sought for. ( 21 ) SECTION 85 of the Act contains Repeal and Saving clause. Sub-section 2 (b) of section 85 says that notwithstanding the repeal of the Arbitration Act 1940 etc. or rules made and Notifications published, under the Arbitration Act 1940 shall to the extent to which they are not repugnant to this Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Act. The allahabad High Court has framed Rule in exercise of power under Section 44 of the arbitration Act 1940. None of the counsel could point out any other rules framed by this Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. The Arbitration Rules framed as stated above are mentioned in chapter XXXI of the Allahabad High Court rules. These rules do not provide any mode for valuing the petition for the purpose of jurisdiction. ( 22 ) SCHEDULE II to the Court-fees Act 1870 Item No. 18 prescribes Court fees under the Arbitration Act 1940 for an applications under Section 14 or 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and other applications under the Arbitration Act 1940. These rules do not provide any mode for valuing the petition for the purpose of jurisdiction. ( 22 ) SCHEDULE II to the Court-fees Act 1870 Item No. 18 prescribes Court fees under the Arbitration Act 1940 for an applications under Section 14 or 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and other applications under the Arbitration Act 1940. Similarly 11-A of the Schedule provides Court-fees payable on memorandum of appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940. No specific provision for payment of Court-fees under the act 1996 could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 23 ) THE question arises as to what is the subject matter of the arbitration. None of the parties have made any reference to the arbitration petition. Both the parties made reference to the application under Section 9 of the Act. The subject matter of the arbitration is the amount likely to be affected by the exercise of the right of the appellant no. 2 to operate the Bank account. I do not agree with the contention of Shri H. N. Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents that since the turnover of the firm is more than rs. 1 crore, that should be the subject matter for the purpose of jurisdiction. The turnover of the firm is not in dispute in the present proceedings. The only dispute in the present proceedings is right of the appellant No. 2 to operate the Bank account singly. The appellant No. 2 was authorized to operate the bank account of the firm singly. It has been taken away. There is no dispute that the respondents No. 1 and 2 are the major partners of the firm. ( 24 ) IN view of the above in my opinion the valuation of the appeal should be at Rs. 15 Lakhs for the purpose of the jurisdiction. The appellants are directed to correct the valuation of the appeal. Let this appeal be listed thereafter before the appropriate Division Bench, if possible in the next cause list. Appeal has not yet been heard on merits and Mr. S. P. Gupta, learned senior counsel impressed me that the matter is urgent one. Order accordingly. .