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2004 DIGILAW 141 (MAD)

E. Rukmani v. State Represented by its Inspector of Police

2004-02-08

S.ASHOK KUMAR

body2004
Judgment :- The petitioner has filed the above Criminal Original Petition praying to call for the records and to quash the FIR in Crime No.768 of 2002 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Washermanpet, PEW Police Station, Chennai. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner is as follows: On 22.08.2002 at 5.00p.m. during prohibition raid near Mattu Mandai Railway Gate, Thiruvottriyur, the Inspector of Police, PEW, Washermanpet Police Station intercepted a Stationery Canter Van bearing Registration Number TN29 W 3232 when some men and women were found unloading some boxes. On seeing the police party, some of those persons escaped and 5 males and 3 women were apprehended by the police. A1 to A7 were arrested. On interrogation A1 produced bills and vouchers and stated that the material on load was phenoil and bleaching powder etc., On suspicion, the materials were opened and checked and found 10 Iron barrels containing 18000 Karnataka Sachets 100ml each, 10 plastic canes containing 4750 Karnataka Sachets 100ml each, 18 gunny bags containing 600 Karnataka Sachets 100ml in each gunny bag total containing 10800 Karnataka Sachets, 2 gunny bags containing 500 Karnataka Sachets in each gunny bag total containing 1000 Karnataka Sachets, 51 card board boxes each card board box containing 900 Karnataka Sachets in each containing 45,900 Karnataka Sachets and one cardboard box containing 600 Karnataka Sachets and in total there were 81,050 Karnataka Sachets i.e., 8105 liters of Arrack. A1 confessed that the Arrack sachets were supplied by the petitioner an arrack god own owner at Malur in Kolar District near Bangalore in Karnataka State. He also confessed that the bills and vouchers were bogus in nature and the van was owned by one Shanmuga Sundaram of Hosur. Therefore, a case in Crime No.768 of 2002 under section 4(1-A) aaa TNP Act r/w 328, 465, 471, 420 IPC& r/w 34 IPC was registered. After investigation the respondent filed a charge sheet against A12 to A17 for the alleged offence under section 120B IPC and 4(i)(aaa), 4(1-A) TNP Act, 465, 468, 471, 420 IPC r/w 120 B IPC wherein the petitioner herein is arrayed as A-16. Aggrieved over the same the petitioner has filed this petition. 3. After investigation the respondent filed a charge sheet against A12 to A17 for the alleged offence under section 120B IPC and 4(i)(aaa), 4(1-A) TNP Act, 465, 468, 471, 420 IPC r/w 120 B IPC wherein the petitioner herein is arrayed as A-16. Aggrieved over the same the petitioner has filed this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend (1) that except the confession statement of the accused, there is no other material to connect the petitioner with the alleged crime, (2) that the arrack sachets seized on 22.08.2002 are admittedly bearing the seal of Karnataka Government, which means they are the arrack supplied by the Karnataka Government to be sold in that State and selling arrack in the state of Karnataka is not an offence and (3) that when the said sachets purchased in Karnataka were subjected to chemical analysis, no poisonous substances including atropine was found whereas atropine was found only in three samples taken 10 days later in Horlicks bottles subsequently and therefore the petitioner should be discharged from the case. 4. Learned Government Advocate would contend that the petitioner has got several cases in Tamil Nadu and the confession of A1 reveals that arrack was purchased at Karnataka which is meant not for sale in Tamil Nadu and the samples taken from the loose arrack in possession of the accused found to contain atropine. 5. The fact that the van bearing the contraband was intercepted on 22.8.2002 and 81,050 sachets of Karnataka arrack with the seal of Karnataka Government were seized is not disputed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the FIR based on the confession of A1 the arrack sachets were purchased at Malur in Kolar District of Karnataka State. According to the prosecution, the petitioner is said to be an arrack god own owner at Malur. A perusal of Sec.161 Cr.P.C., statements of P.Ws 27 and 28 the manager and Senior Manager of Canara Bank, Hombe Gowda Nagar Branch would show that the petitioner has mortgaged her four properties in the said bank for the purpose of availing loan of Rs.1,15,20,000/- to one Perumal Samy alleged to be a close associate of the petitioner . For the purpose of availing the above loan to the said Perumal Samy the petitioner is said to have mortgaged four of her properties at Bangalore. For the purpose of availing the above loan to the said Perumal Samy the petitioner is said to have mortgaged four of her properties at Bangalore. Their further statement would also show that she has mortgaged the properties by deposit of the original documents as guarantor in respect of the loans availed by the said Perumal Samy, an arrack contractor at Malur. P.W.29 in the charge sheet is a clerk in the office of the Superintendent of Excise, Kolar District, Karnataka State and his statement would reveal that during the year 1.7.2002 to 30.06.2003, Malur Taluk arrack was taken by one Perumalsamy by paying 1,15,20,000/- through cheques from Canara bank, Hombegowda Branch of Bangalore and the said Perumalsamy paid Rs.38,40,000/- through Canara Bank Hombegowda Branch every month. It is also stated that the said Perumalsamy paid a E.M.D. of Rs.55,00,000/- at the beginning of the contract and as a contractor he has to offtake 33,000/- litres of arrack every month. For every litre of arrack Rs.20/- is collected and the said Perumalsamy is said to have paid the entire amount due to the Excise Department and there is no outstanding amount in his contract. His contract was closed on 30.6.2003 and he did not take the contract for the subsequent year. The arrack sachets were seized on 22.08.2002, i.e, the period during which the said Perumalsamy was a licensed contractor of the Karnataka Government for Malur Taluk. The case of the prosecution is also that according to A1, the arrack sachets were purchased at Malur town from the petitioner who is said to be a close associate of the said contractor Perumalsamy for whose contract the petitioner has given four of her properties as mortgage to the Canara Bank for availing a loan by Mr.Perumalsamy. Therefore, the 81,050 sachets, which bear the seal of Karnataka Government are the arrack sachets sold at Malur (even according to the prosecution case) in Karnataka State. It is also the evidence of P.W.30 in the charge sheet viz., Somasekar, Superintendent of Excise, Kolar District that the contractor should take over 33,000 litres of arrack each month at the rate of Rs.20/- per litre of arrack. According to the confession of A1 he purchased each sachet at Rs.2.15, that means for each litre of arrack the said Perumalsamy gets Rs.1.50 as his profit. According to the confession of A1 he purchased each sachet at Rs.2.15, that means for each litre of arrack the said Perumalsamy gets Rs.1.50 as his profit. The sale of arrack supplied by the Government in Malur of Karnataka State is not an offence. Because it is not prohibited by the Karnataka Government and the seller is a licensed contractor. It is not the botheration of the seller whether the purchaser is going to sell the arrack sachets in Karnataka or he is going to smuggle it to any other state. When the arrack sachets are brought to Tamil Nadu the possession of the same becomes an offence because sale of arrack is prohibited in Tamil Nadu. Therefore the sale of arrack sachets and the possession of the same by the petitioner or her associate in Malur of Karnataka state cannot be an offence at all. As far as the offence of transporting the same to Tamil Nadu is concerned, the petitioner herein has no connection at all. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that when the arrack sachets alleged to have been brought from Bangalore were subjected for chemical analysis, as per the chemical analyst's report no poisonous substances including atropine was found in items 1 to 4 and they were only arrack as per the qualities and contents of arrack. Atropine was found only in items 5,6 and 7 of the analyst's report which were the samples taken in bottles. The samples have been taken only on 3.9.2002 from a different place almost after 10 days from the date of seizure of the arrack sachets purchased in Karnataka. At the beginning of the confession itself A1 says that he was in custody of the police while giving the second confession. In the FIR dated 22.08.2002 itself it is stated that the confession of A1 was recorded and as per this confession, the petitioner was impleaded. But, there is no material to show that the samples taken in three bottles were materials of the loose arrack supplied by the petitioner. On the other hand, these three samples were taken in bottles from the loose arrack kept by A1 at a different place. Therefore there is no connection between the loose arrack said to have been in possession of A1 and the petitioner. 6a. On the other hand, these three samples were taken in bottles from the loose arrack kept by A1 at a different place. Therefore there is no connection between the loose arrack said to have been in possession of A1 and the petitioner. 6a. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would be that except the confession of the accused, there is no material to connect the petitioner with the crime. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed into service the following two decisions: 1. B.A. Ramaiah Vs. State of A.P. (AIR 1997 Supreme Court 496), wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "16. The legal position, therefore, is this: A statement contained in the FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner, be used against another accused. Even as against the accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory in nature nor can it be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction unless its maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act against its maker alone unless the admission does not amount to confession." 2. S. Ramalingam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1999 (1) LW (Crl.184), wherein this court held as follows: "5. It is no doubt true that there is the statement of the first accused implicating the second accused in the commission of the crime. That statement is definitely admissible against the maker as well as admissible under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, against the other accused as well as in the same case provided, there are other independent materials against the concerned accused also. Admittedly in this case, except the statement of the co-accused against the present petitioner, there is no other independent evidence available. In the absence of such material, I am of the opinion that the available statement of the co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence in the eye of law on the basis of which the court can take cognizance of. In other words, unless there is legal evidence before court, it may be impermissible for the court to take cognizance of any offence against any individual. In other words, unless there is legal evidence before court, it may be impermissible for the court to take cognizance of any offence against any individual. It is true that Section 56-D of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act creates as rule of evidence in the form of presumption against a person who is accused of an offence under the Act. But it must be remembered that the presumption that can be raised can only be form the legal admissible materials and not on materials that lacks the legal sanction. 6. In support of his arguments referred to above, the learned senior counsel brought to my notice a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in R.P. Kapur V. The State of Punjab (1960 M.W.N. (Crl) 177=AIR 1960 S.C.866) wherein their Lordships have laid down the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of this court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code as it then stood. In that Judgment, their Lordships have held as follows: "Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute the offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge the High Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question." Another judgement of the learned Single Judge of this court reported in Pragasam P. V. State rep. by Inspector of Police, Karaikal (1994-1-L.W. (Crl.208) was also brought to my notice by the learned senior counsel. The question of admissibility of the statement of a co-accused against another accused, came up for consideration in that case. The learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with that question had held as follows: "HELD: That the confession of "S" implicating the present petitioner is the only evidence available against him is not disputed. The question of admissibility of the statement of a co-accused against another accused, came up for consideration in that case. The learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with that question had held as follows: "HELD: That the confession of "S" implicating the present petitioner is the only evidence available against him is not disputed. It is true that under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as against the persons who made such confession. But, there should be substantive evidence before the confession of co-accused can be used to set at rest any doubt. Conviction based on confession of co-accused alone is illegal. Such confession can be used only for lending re-assurance of other substantive evidence. The statement given by an accused involving himself in the crime and also implicating third person cannot be proved legally in the court. It will be conflicting with Ss.25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. If such evidence or confession cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilising that statement against another person does not arise. The result is that reliance of such statement against another person while framing charge does not arise. In the absence of any such substantive evidence it is seen that there is practically no material against the present petitioner to be proceeded against. The proceedings herein against the petitioner, are liable to be quashed." The learned single judge in the above case had followed the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of India referred to above. Therefore it is clear according to me, that there is no legal evidence before the lower court in this case on the basis of which it can proceed against the second accused and on that ground alone, the proceedings pending now on the file of the lower court as far as the second accused is concerned has to be necessarily quashed." From the decisions cited above, it is clear that a statement contained in the FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case, cannot, in any manner, be used against another accused. When there is no corroborative evidence is available, the statement of the co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence in the eye of law on the basis of which the court cannot take cognizance of. 7. As regards the other charges under sections 465, 471 and 420 IPC are concerned, they are with regard to preparation of bogus vouchers and bills by A1 for the purpose of transporting the arrack sachets purchased at Malur in Karnataka State by a van from Hosur. There is no evidence to connect the petitioner that in any way she was concerned in the preparation of the bogus bills and the vouchers. Therefore, these sections are not connected with the petitioner. The petitioner is concerned only with regard to the sale of 81,050 sachets of Karnataka arrack for which I have already held that the selling of such arrack is not at offence on the place where they were sold. 8. As already held by the decisions cited above, there is no material to raise the presumption of guilt against the petitioner. When there is no legal evidence before the trial court in this case on the basis of which it can proceed against the petitioner, on that ground the proceedings pending now on the file of the lower court as far as this petitioner is concerned who is A-16 in the charge sheet, has to be necessarily quashed. 9. Since there are no legal or substantive evidence on record against the petitioner and as I have already held the statement of the co-accused in this case cannot be substantive or legal evidence against the petitioner/A16, in such circumstances, I am of the considered view that the proceedings in PRC.No.3 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsif -cum- Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvottiyur as far as this petitioner who is A-16 is concerned have to be necessarily quashed and accordingly it is quashed. Crl. O.P. is allowed.