ORDER 1. Certain extent of land in three villages was sought to be acquired pursuant to a notification issued under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act" for short). The said notification reads thus: "Part 1 M.P. Gazette dated 12-10-1984-1189Bhind dated 26-9-1984 S. No. Court Land - Sampadan - 1984-20472-75. Because the State Government feels that land described in columns 1 to 6 of the attached Schedule are needed for the public purpose mentioned in column 6 of the Schedule or likely to be needed, therefore in compliance with Section 4 sub-section (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (S. No. 1, San 1894) all the connected persons are hereby notified. The State Government authorised the officer mentioned in column 55 of the Schedule for using the power in this regard mentioned under Section 4(2). The State Government also directed that provision of Section 5-A will not be applicable to this land, because in his opinion the provision of Section 17 sub-section (1) is applicable to this land: . SEHEDULE Description of Land DistrictTehsilCity/VillageApproxi mate area (hectare)Authorised Officer under Section 4(2) Description of public purpose BhindGohadSinghwani 35.828 Director Industries, M.P. Bhind or his representative Industries establishment BhindGohadGurikha 39.708 dodo BhindGohadMalanpur 39.708 dodo The map of the land (plan) can be seen in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Bhind. By the name of Governor of M.P. and by his order sd/- H. Singh, Collector, Mandal Bhind And Padem, Deputy Secretary, M.P. Government, Revenue Department" 2. The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court questioning the validity of this notification alleging that it suffered from a number of infirmities, principal infirmity being that the said notification was totally vague in respect of the lands sought to be acquired. In that, neither the description of the lands i.e. survey number or khasra number were given nor the names of the landowners, whose lands were sought to be acquired in three villages, were given. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the Section 4(1) notification aforementioned. The respondents herein took up the matters in appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the order of the learned Single Judge to the extent that the notification issued under Section 4(1) was bad. The respondents herein took up the matters in appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the order of the learned Single Judge to the extent that the notification issued under Section 4(1) was bad. However, to balance the equities, the Division Bench held that the appellants could be compensated by giving enhanced compensation in respect of the lands of some of the appellants. Hence, these appeals. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment having agreed with the learned Single Judge that the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act was bad, ought not to have sustained the acquisition proceedings by only awarding enhanced compensation in respect of a few of the appellants. The learned counsel submitted that in the light of the judgment of this Court in M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shaftl the notification issued under Section 4(1) was vitiated and the learned Single Judge was right in quashing the said notification. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents made submissions to support the impugned judgment. They contended that having regard to the developments that have taken place in that area, this Court may not disturb the impugned judgment. They added that even the enhanced compensation amount can be given to the appellants. 5. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the aforementioned judgment, referring to earlier judgments, have held that notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, if it suffers from vagueness in regard to public purpose, such a notification cannot be sustained. In this judgment, reference is made to the judgment in Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.p2 wherein it is stated that the defect of non-mention of the locality where the proposed land was situated in the notification, was a serious defect vitiating the notification. The notification in that case also did not specify the survey number or khasra number of the land. In other words, the notification in the present case is as vague, if not more as in that case. In the said judgment, it is observed thus: (SCC pp. 174-75, para 13) "13. The notification in that case also did not specify the survey number or khasra number of the land. In other words, the notification in the present case is as vague, if not more as in that case. In the said judgment, it is observed thus: (SCC pp. 174-75, para 13) "13. In Narendrajit Singh v. State of u.p2 while dealing with the requirements of a valid notification under Section 4 of the Act, this Court d observed that the defect of non-mention of the locality where the proposed land was situate in the notification was a very serious defect vitiating the notification. In that case, the Schedule attached to the notification issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act read as follows: SCHEDULE DistrictParganaMauzaApproxi- mate areaFor what purpose requiredRemarkes RampurBilaspurGokal Nagri125 acresFor the rehabilitation of East Pakistan displased families, under the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India’. This Court opined that though Section 4(1) does not require the identity of the land which may ultimately be acquired to be specified with too many details but it undoubtedly casts upon the Government a duty to specify the locality in which the land is needed. In Narendrajit Singh case2 this Court also repelled the argument identical to the one raised by Mr Thakur that since detailed particulars of the land had been given in the notification issued under Section 6( 1) of the Act, the absence of those particulars in Section 4( 1) notification was of no consequence. The Court said: (SCC p. 129, para 10) In our view the defect in a notification under Section 4(1) cannot be cured by giving full particulars in the notification under Section 6(1). •• (emphasis in original) 6. No judgment was shown by the learned counsel for respondents either to distinguish or taking contrary view. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act could not be sustained. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in upholding the notification by merely enhancing the compensation. 7. Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside so far they relate to the appellants. 8. We make it clear that this order of ours does not prevent the respondents from initiating the acquisition proceedings afresh in regard to the very lands in question in accordance with law. 7. Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside so far they relate to the appellants. 8. We make it clear that this order of ours does not prevent the respondents from initiating the acquisition proceedings afresh in regard to the very lands in question in accordance with law. If the authorities decide to proceed with the acquisition proceedings afresh, they may commence the acquisition proceedings within a period of three months. We further direct that the parties shall maintain the status quo existing on the lands in question covered by these appeals for a period of three months or till the date the d acquisition proceedings commence, whichever is earlier. 9. No costs.