( 1 ) A-1 to A-3 in S. C. No. 42/97 on the file of Chairman, Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal-cum-III Additional Sessions Judge, Karimnagar are the appellants. The Circle Inspector of Police, Huzurabad filed charge sheet against A-1 for offences under Sections 498-A, 302 and 304-B IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and against A-2 and A-3 for offences under Section 498-A IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The facts of the case in brief are as hereunder: a-3 is the husband and A-1 and A-2 are the in-laws of Haseena, hereinafter referred to as deceased. The marriage of the deceased and A-3 was celebrated six months prior to the date of incident. At the time of marriage, the parents of the deceased presented clothes and other household articles to A-3 and A-3 and the deceased lived happily for some time. Subsequent thereto A-1 to A-3 harassed the decease in filthy language and warned him not to visit their house. On 12-1-1996 at about 1 p. m. the mother of the deceased came to know that the deceased was admitted in the Government Hospital, Huzurabad with burn injuries. The parents of the deceased went to the hospital and found the deceased with burn injuries. On enquiry the parents of the deceased came to know that at about 12 noon A-1 scolded the deceased for not bringing valuables at the time of marriage and poured kerosene on her and set fire. On the same day the complaint was lodged and the S. I. of Police, Huzurabad registered a case in Cr. No. 4/96 under Sections 498-A, 307 IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and issued F. I. R. and had taken up the investigation. During the course of investigation, the S. I. of Police, Huzurabad visited the Government Hospital, Huzurabad and recorded the statement of the deceased. As the health condition of the deceased was deteriorating, the S. I. of Police, Huzurabad filed requisition before Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad for recording dying declaration and the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad visited the Government Hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased and the deceased was referred to M. G. M. Hospital for further treatment. On 12-1-1996 at 4 p. m. the deceased died at M. G. M. Hospital while undergoing treatment. On 12-1-1996 at 4 p. m. the deceased died at M. G. M. Hospital while undergoing treatment. On 13-1-1996 the S. I. of Police, Huzurabad received information about the death of the deceased and altered the Section of law from Sections 498-A and 307 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act to Sections 498-A, 304-B, 302 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sent express altered F. I. Rs. to all the concerned. The S. I. of Police, Huzurabad visited M. G. M. Hospital, Warangal and gave requisition to the Executive Magistrate-cum-Mandal Revenue Officer, Hanamkonda to conduct inquest. Meanwhile the C. I. of Police, Huzurabad visited M. G. M. Hospital, Warangal and took up further investigation. The Executive Magistrate-cum-Mandal revenue Officer, Hanamkonda conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of panch witnesses. The Professor of Forensic Medicin, Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal conducted autopsy over the dead body. The C. I. of Police, Huzurabad recorded the statements of witnesses. On 20-1-1996 A-1 to A-3 were arrested at R. T. C. Bus Stand, Huzurabad and were interrogated and they were produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad for judicial remand and after completing the investigation charge sheet was filed. The C. I. of Police, Huzurabad recorded the statements of witnesses. On 20-1-1996 A-1 to A-3 were arrested at R. T. C. Bus Stand, Huzurabad and were interrogated and they were produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad for judicial remand and after completing the investigation charge sheet was filed. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Huzurabad had taken up the case as P. R. C. No. 50/96 and the same was committed to the Court of Session and the learned Sessions Judge had taken the case on file under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against A-1 and under Section 498-A IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against A-2 and A-3 and numbered the same as S. C. No. 42/97 and made over the same to the Assistant Sessions Judge, Huzurabad, who had resubmitted the entire records to the Sessions Division, Karimnagar as the offence under Section 302 IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and the learned Sessions Judge, Karimnagar heard the prosecution and also the defence version and framed charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC against A-1 to A-3, a charge under Section 302 IPC against A-1 and a charge under Section 302 IPC r/w. Section 34 IPC as against A-2 and A-3 and again the learned Sessions Judge made over the same to the Court of Chairman, Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal-cum-III Additional Sessions Judge, Karimnagar who had recorded the evidence of PW-1 to PW-16, marked Exs. P-1 to P-14 and also Exs. D-1 to D-4 and M. Os. 1 and 2 and ultimately came to the conclusion that A-1 is not guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and A-2 and A-3 are also not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. Section 34 IPC and acquittal had been recorded in relation to those offences, but however A-1 to A-3 were found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and convicted them and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of ten years. ( 2 ) HENCE the present Criminal Appeal. ( 2 ) HENCE the present Criminal Appeal. Sri Praveen Kumar, the learned counsel representing the appellants would submit that there is no acceptable evidence as far as A-3 is concerned and there is improvement in between the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased and also the oral dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased to PW-1 and PW-2. The learned counsel also had pointed out that the earliest statement said to have been recorded had been suppressed. Though in the dying declaration the deceased did not state about A-2, A-2 also was implicated by PW-1 and PW-2. There is some deviation in between what had been stated in Ex. P-1 and also the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. The learned counsel also had taken this Court through evidence available on record and in a case of this nature where there are certain inconsistencies or deviations in between the dying declarations, the version of the prosecution may have to be viewed with suspicion. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the findings recorded by learned Judge in this regard. Reliance was placed on Dandu Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of A. P. (AIR 1999 S. C. 3255), Public Prosecutor Vs. Jangili Nirmala (1996 (2) ALD (Crl) 940 (A. P.) (DB)) and Kamala Vs. State of Punjab (1993 Crl. L. J. 68 (SC) ). ( 3 ) ON the contrary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Mohd. Osman Shaheed made the following submissions. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the incident happened at the house of the husband/a-3 and the deceased died due to burns. The Counsel also would further maintain that the cumulative effect of all the happenings may have to be taken into consideration while appreciating harassment for dowry. In the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased the absence of the husband/a-3 at the spot at the relevant point of time itself appears to be very mysterious. The presence of A-2 was established. Merely because PW-1 and PW-2 are the relative witnesses their evidence cannot be discredited. The learned Counsel also had taken his Court through necessary ingredients to be satisfied to establish the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also maintained that the omissions pointed out are not material omissions. Reliance was placed on prakash Chander Vs. State (1995 Crl. The learned Counsel also had taken his Court through necessary ingredients to be satisfied to establish the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also maintained that the omissions pointed out are not material omissions. Reliance was placed on prakash Chander Vs. State (1995 Crl. L. J. 368), Shanti Vs. State of Haryana (AIR 1991 S. C. 1226) and Matadin Vs. State of U. P. ( 1997 (9) SCC 759 ). ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel. Ex. P-1 given by PW-1 reads as hereunder: i am resident of Ghanpur (Mulug ). Since last one year I am doing business in Iron at Huzurabad. I have celebrated the marriage of my daughter Haseena, aged 18 yrs. With one Abdul Raheem of Huzurabad about 6 months back. I have given all clothes and household articles to the in-laws in the marriage. For some days, they lead happy life. Later, I came to know that the in-laws and husband of my daughter started harassing my daughter for dowry. I came to know that on 10-1-96 my son-in-law burnt the bed given to him in the marriage. Yesterday i. e. , on 11-1-96 my son-in-law slapped me on my cheek saying that the bed is small. The father of my son-in-law also pushed my daughter away. They have abused us saying that we should not enter their house. Then we left the place. On 12-1-1996 myself and my wife have gone to canal and after washing clothes while we were returning we came to know that my daughter was in Huzarabad Hospital with burnt injuries. By the time we went thee and saw our daughter totally burnt. When we enquired, she disclosed that at 12. 00 Hrs. her father-in-law Raheem ordered me to leave since nothing was given in the marriage. When she was there weeping, he brought one kerosene can and poured the kerosene on me and set ablaze. Her father-in-law Abdul Raheem, mother-in-law Sultana Begum and her husband Kareem to get more dowry tried to kill my daughter. Hence, I pray for taking action against the above three persons. ( 5 ) EX. P-6, the dying declaration of the deceased reads as hereunder: pw-1, the father of the deceased deposed on this aspect On enquiry my daughter told me that her father-in-law and mother-in-law poured kerosene and set fire to her. Hence, I pray for taking action against the above three persons. ( 5 ) EX. P-6, the dying declaration of the deceased reads as hereunder: pw-1, the father of the deceased deposed on this aspect On enquiry my daughter told me that her father-in-law and mother-in-law poured kerosene and set fire to her. PW-2 the mother of the deceased deposed On enquiry my daughter told me that A-1 and A-2 (in-laws) poured kerosene and set fire to her. At that time A-3 was not in the house. PW-4 deposed On enquiry deceased told me that her in-laws (A-1 and A-2) poured kerosene and set fire to her. PW-16 the S. I. of Police in cross-examination deposed: after talking with Haseena I prepared Ex. P-5 requisition and filed the same before Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad. Haseena is in a position to answer the questions when I have seen her. I have recorded the statement of Haseena. PW-1 stated to me that the deceased and accused No. 3 lived happily for some time. I did not enquiry PW-1 how long deceased and accused No. 3 lived happily for some time. I did not enquiry PW-1 how long deceased and accused No. 3 lived happily. ( 6 ) THESE are the versions available relating to the episode of the prosecution. PW-1 no doubt deposed about the relationship and the death of the deceased in her in-laws house and he came to know through villagers that his daughter was admitted in Government Hospital at Huzurabad. Immediately he went to the hospital and found that the deceased was suffering with burn injuries all over the body and she was in a conscious state when he reached the hospital and on enquiry she told him that her father-in-law and mother-in-law poured kerosene and set fire to her. This witness also deposed that at the time of marriage he gave utensils and other household articles to the deceased and the deceased and his son-in-law lived happily for a period of six months after marriage. After six months he went to his son-in-laws house and questioned him why he burnt the strap (navaru) and then A-1 beat him and A-1 asked him (PW-1) not to come to his house. After six months he went to his son-in-laws house and questioned him why he burnt the strap (navaru) and then A-1 beat him and A-1 asked him (PW-1) not to come to his house. PW-1 further deposed that he does not know why A-1 threatened the deceased and the deceased did not inform anything to him and she did not inform anything due to fear of A-1. A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased and set fire to her. This witness also deposed about the other details of shifting the deceased to M. G. M. Hospital for treatment and the death of the deceased and Ex. P-1 is the complaint given by him. This witness in cross-examination deposed that he was present along with his daughter at the time when the Magistrate came to the Hospital and no doubt he denied the suggestion that he had tutored the deceased before arrival of the Magistrate and he also denied the suggestion that A-1 was falsely implicated due to grudge against A-1. ( 7 ) PW-2 also deposed in a way corroborating the evidence of PW-1. This witness denied several suggestions. This witness also deposed that it is not true to say that she stated to police that A-1 along poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. Ex. D-1 was marked as a contradiction. This witness also denied the suggestion that they tutored the deceased to say against A-1 to A-3. PW-3 simply deposed that he came to know about the incident through mediators. Pw-4 deposed that the deceased is her brothers daughter and she also deposed about the presentations made at the time of marriage and she further deposed that on enquiry deceased told her that her in-laws A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene and set fire to her. This witness was cross-examined at length and this witness deposed that she had not stated before police as in Ex. D-2 and she had denied several other suggestions put to her. PW-5 and PW-6 were declared hostile. PW-7 deposed that he heard some noise from the opposite house and went to the house of the accused and had seen the gathering and had seen the deceased with burn injuries and she was shifted to Hospital in a jeep. D-2 and she had denied several other suggestions put to her. PW-5 and PW-6 were declared hostile. PW-7 deposed that he heard some noise from the opposite house and went to the house of the accused and had seen the gathering and had seen the deceased with burn injuries and she was shifted to Hospital in a jeep. This witness in cross-examination deposed that he had not stated to police that the father-in-law of the deceased i. e. , A-1 and others had taken the deceased to Government Hospital as in Ex. D-3. He also deposed that he had not stated to the police that he went to the house of A-1 and sensed smell of kerosene as in Ex. D-4. PW-8 deposed about the seizure of five litre kerosene tin and half burnt saree. Police pasted slips on the tin and half burnt saree. MO-1 is the five litre kerosene tin and MO-2 is the half burnt saree pieces. Ex. P-4 is the scene of offence panchanama. ( 8 ) PW-9 is the Munsif Magistrate who had deposed about the requisition Ex. P-5 received from S. I. of Police and Ex. P-6 is the dying declaration recorded by him. The contents of Ex. P-6 already had been referred to supra. In cross-examination this witness deposed that by the time he reached the hospital the patient as well as the Doctor were in jeep and he was in the jeep for 15 minutes. He asked only two questions and he did not put any question to verify whether anybody tutored her and he had not asked her whether she had any grievance against A-1 to A-3. The deceased was in a serious condition and the Doctor was about to take her to M. G. M. Hospital and so he did not put any other questions. It is pertinent to note that the learned Judge recorded reasons in detail at paras 22 and 23 of the Judgment and ultimately recorded a finding that Ex. P-6 dying declaration does not inspire the confidence of the Court. The learned Judge also observed that in view of the principles laid down in the decisions which had been cited it may not be safe to convict the accused basing on Ex. P-6 dying declaration since it does not inspire the confidence of the Court. ( 9 ) PW-10 is the photographer who deposed about Exs. The learned Judge also observed that in view of the principles laid down in the decisions which had been cited it may not be safe to convict the accused basing on Ex. P-6 dying declaration since it does not inspire the confidence of the Court. ( 9 ) PW-10 is the photographer who deposed about Exs. P-7 and P-8. PW-11 is the M. R. O. who deposed about Ex. P-9 inquest panchanama. In cross-examination this witness deposed that the parents of the deceased told him at M. G. M. Hospital that the father-in-law of the deceased poured kerosene on her. The M. R. O. recorded the statement of the parents of the deceased. PW-12 on receipt of requisition from the Executive Magistrate-cum-M. R. O. Warangal conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased. Ex. P-10 is the post mortem examination report. He opined that the deceased died due to burns to the best of his knowledge and belief. PW-13 deposed about Ex. P-11 medical certificate and the endorsement made on Ex. P-6 to the effect that the patient was conscious and was able to give statement and answer the questions put to her. PW-14, M. R. O. , deposed about Ex. P-9 inquest panchanama and also deposed that the panchas opined that the deceased received burn injuries due to pouring of kerosene by her father-in-law and mother-in-law and her husband harassed her for additional dowry. Pw-15 is the Inspector of Police who deposed about certain details of investigation and filling of the charge sheet. He deposed that PW-5 and PW-6 stated to him as in Exs. P-2 and P-3 respectively. This witness also deposed that PW-2 did not tell to him that they did not pay the agreed amount of dowry to A-3. PW-2 did not state to him that A-1 to A-3 demanded the agreed amount of dowry from them. PW-2 did not state to him that A-1 to A-3 demanded additional dowry amount from them. PW-2 did not state to him that A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. PW-2 did not state to him that A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. PW-2 did not state to him that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. Certain suggestions put to her had been denied. PW-2 did not state to him that A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. PW-2 did not state to him that A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. PW-2 did not state to him that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene on the deceased. Certain suggestions put to her had been denied. He further deposed that PW-4 did not state to him that she informed the dowry harassment meted out to A-1 to A-3 to caste elders. PW-4 did not state to him that she was present when A-1 to A-3 demanded dowry from PW-1. PW-4 did not state to him that A-1 to A-3 approached the caste elders demanding divorce from the deceased. PW-4 did not state to him that disputes arise between PW-2 and A-1 to A-3 after knowing the real caste of A-1 to A-3 by PW-1 and PW-2. This witness also deposed that it is not true to say that PW-7 did not state to him as in Ex. D-4. It is not true to say that Pw-7 did not state to him as in Ex. D-3 and it is not true to say that PW-2 did not state to him as in Ex. D-1 and it is not true to say that PW-3 did not state to him to him as in Ex. D-2. PW-16 is the S. I. of Police, Huzurabad who had deposed about all the details of the investigation. It is pertinent to note that this witness deposed in cross-examination that after talking with the deceased he prepared Ex. P-5 and filed the same before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad and the deceased was in a position to answer the questions when he had seen her and he had recorded the statement of the deceased. It is pertinent to note that the said statement is not produced before the Court. The learned Judge viewed Ex. P-6 dying declaration with suspicion and was not inclined to rely upon the same. Despite the said findings recorded placing reliance on the other evidence available on record the learned Judge recorded certain findings and ultimately held that the guilt of the accused had been proved. Ex. The learned Judge viewed Ex. P-6 dying declaration with suspicion and was not inclined to rely upon the same. Despite the said findings recorded placing reliance on the other evidence available on record the learned Judge recorded certain findings and ultimately held that the guilt of the accused had been proved. Ex. P-6 dying declaration of the deceased, the oral dying declarations said to have been made by the deceased to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 and the evidence of PW-16 relating to the recording of statement of the deceased at the earliest point of time already had been referred to supra and the contents of Ex. P-1 also had been pointed out while commencing the discussion itself. ( 10 ) IN Pompiah vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 S. C. 939) it was held: a dying declaration is relevant and material evidence in the prosecution of the assailants and a truthful and reliable dying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction even though it is not corroborated. But the Court must be satisfied that the declaration is truthful. The reliability of the declaration should be subjected to a close scrutiny, considering that it was made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity to test its veracity by cross-examination. If the Court finds that the declaration is not wholly reliable and a material and integral portion of the deceaseds version of the entire occurrence is untrue, the Court may, in all the circumstances of the case, consider it unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the declaration alone without further corroboration. ( 11 ) IN Chakiri Saidulu Vs. State of A. P. (1994 APLJ (Crl) 516) it was observed that the consistency must be with regard to the assailants and the manner in which the incident had happened and it is impossible to hold that in a case where there are more than one dying declarations, the Court has to compare all the dying declarations in order to assess the extent of incrimination. In state of Gujarat Vs. Khumansingh Karan Singh (AIR 1994 S. C. 1641) it was observed: there is no doubt that there is inconsistency between the first dying declaration and the subsequent two dying declarations which betrays the possibility of her being amenable to tutoring. In state of Gujarat Vs. Khumansingh Karan Singh (AIR 1994 S. C. 1641) it was observed: there is no doubt that there is inconsistency between the first dying declaration and the subsequent two dying declarations which betrays the possibility of her being amenable to tutoring. It is quite clear the relationship was strained due to the bad blood between her and her mother-in-law. The possibility of false involvement could not be ruled out and the High Court, therefore, thought that in the absence of corroborative evidence, it is unsafe to rely mainly on the inconsistent dying declarations. ( 12 ) A Division Bench of our High Court in the decision referred (2) supra held that where the deceased died of burn injuries and the earliest statement of the deceased before the doctor in the presence of her mother and another witness is to the effect that she caught fire due to the burst of stove and the subsequent statement before her son is that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene over her and set fire and in the later and the last declaration she stated before the Magistrate that only A-1 poured kerosene and set fire, it was held that acquittal of accused can be sustained in view of conflicting versions given by the deceased in her various declarations. In the decision referred (1) supra the Apex Court held at paras 14, 15 and 16: ( 13 ) IN Ext. P-11 (which is a dying declaration given to the Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class) the context stated by the declarant was altogether different. The relevant portion is extracted below: my mother-in-laws name is Narayanamma, my husbands name is Dandu Lakshmi Reddy. In the morning at 6. 00 a. m. when I was sweeping, my mother-in-law Narayanamma and my husband Laxmi Reddy both poured kerosene on me, lit the match-stick and set me to fire. The above material divergence between two dying declarations pertaining to the occasion for launching the murderous attack on the deceased did not create any impression in the minds of the learned Judges of the High Court, as they have observed thus: though there is difference in the version of the deceased as to what she was doing at the relevant point of time the fact remains that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene and lit fire to her. These aspects are mentioned in Exs. P-11, P-14. These aspects are mentioned in Exs. P-11, P-14. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the accused-appellants. ( 14 ) THUS the High Court has sidelined such a noticeable discrepancy looming large as between the two different statements made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of dying declaration is a restricted area, the Court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime. Either the context spoken to one was wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course. In the decision referred (3) supra the Apex Court held at para-8: if we examine all these dying declarations one by one we notice glaring inconsistencies as to who exactly poured kerosene oil and set fire or whether she caught fire accidentally. Suicide however is ruled out. In Ex. PB/2 recorded by PW-2 the deceased stated that her mother-in-law sprinkled kerosene oil from behind and burnt her. In the next statement Ex. DA recorded by Dr. Jaison Chopra, CW-1, she is alleged to have stated that her clothes got burnt catching fire from the stove, thereby indicating that it was an accident. In the third statement Ex. PJ recorded by CW-2 she was rather vague as to who exactly poured kerosene oil and set fir eon her and she only stated that it could be possible that her mother-in-law and father-in-law might have set the fire after pouring kerosene oil. On 30-9-79 Ex. PD was recorded in the presence of three doctors. PW-7, PW-3 and CW-1 wherein she stated that she turned to the store and she heard her mother-in-law and father-in-law talking behind her and suddenly they poured kerosene oil and they set her on fire. The trial Court and the High Court discarded the other statements and relied only on Ex. PB/2 recorded by PW-2 wherein she implicated only her mother-in-law. So far Ex. DA recorded by DW-1 is concerned, the High Court pointed out that CW-1 was also present when Ex. The trial Court and the High Court discarded the other statements and relied only on Ex. PB/2 recorded by PW-2 wherein she implicated only her mother-in-law. So far Ex. DA recorded by DW-1 is concerned, the High Court pointed out that CW-1 was also present when Ex. PD was recorded and that at any rate there was no occasion for CW-1 to record such statement and that he must have done the same at the instance of the accused. After having carefully examined the record and facts and circumstances, we do not think that a remark of this nature against CW-1, a responsible doctor is called for. The mere fact that CW-1 Dr. Jaison Chopra was present when Ex. PD was recorded on the next day does not necessarily mean that he could not have recorded Ex. DA on the previous day. As a matter of fact, even in Ex. PD recorded by a team of doctors, she implicated both mother-in-law and father-in-law. This itself shows that she was bent upon implicating both of them at a later stage. In this context it is also noteworthy that DW-2, the husband of the deceased supported the plea of the accused. He deposed that both the accused namely his mother and father were away to Dandi Swami Mandir on the day of occurrence and that at about 8-15 a. m. he heard the shrieks raised by the deceased from the kitchen. He picked up a blanket and went running into the kitchen apprehending that she might have caught fire due to bursting of the gas cylinder. He covered her with the blanket and brought her out and his clothes also caught fire and he became unconscious and regained consciousness in the hospital. In the cross-examination by the prosecution he denied the suggestion that he made a false statement with a view to save his parents. The deceased in all her dying declarations has clearly stated that her husband namely DW-2 came and rescued her. Therefore DW-2s evidence cannot simply be brushed aside on the ground that he might have given such a version to save his parents and his evidence further shows that the occurrence could be due to accident. Viewed from this angle also the version given in the statement made before CW-1 in Ex. DA that it was due to accident, is not improbable. In Ex. Viewed from this angle also the version given in the statement made before CW-1 in Ex. DA that it was due to accident, is not improbable. In Ex. PJ she only expressed a suspicion against both her mother-in-law and father-in-law the accused examined DW-1 Satpa an attesting witness of the statement Ex. PJ. He supported the defence version. Thus it can be seen that there are glaring inconsistencies in those dying declarations. Both the courts below, however, held that PW-2 Dr. Rupinder Singh is a reliable and independent witness, therefore the statement recorded by him has to be accepted and accordingly convicted the appellant. We must observed that PW-2 simply recorded the statement of the deceased but the contents of that statement have to be subjected to a close scrutiny in the light of many other circumstances since the conviction has to be based on the sole dying declaration Ex. PB/2. A dying declaration should satisfy all the necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are more than one dying declarations they should be consistent particularly in material particulars. Just like PW-2, PW-7, PW-3 and CW-1 are also respectable doctors and independent witnesses who spoke abut the contents of Ex. PD in which she implicated both her father-in-law and mother-in-law specifically as having participated in the crime. Under these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion the dying declarations are inconsistent and in such a situation we just cannot pick out one statement namely Ex. PB/2 and base the conviction of the appellant on the sole basis of such a dying declaration. The courts have cautioned that in view of the fact that the maker of the statement cannot be cross-examined, the dying declaration should be carefully scrutinized. In the instant case the deceased was wavering for the reasons best known to her. The inconsistency between Ex. PB/2 and Ex. PD is enough to manifest the same. That being so, we do not think that either Dr. Jaison Chopra, CW-1 or S. I. Vidya Sagar, CW-2 who claimed to have recorded Ex. DA and Ex. PJ should be blamed. Having given our earnest consideration, we feel that under these circumstances it is highly unsafe of convict the appellant on the sole basis of the dying declaration Ex. PB/2 recorded by PW-2. ( 15 ) THE evidence available on record relating to the harassment, Ex. P-1, Ex. DA and Ex. PJ should be blamed. Having given our earnest consideration, we feel that under these circumstances it is highly unsafe of convict the appellant on the sole basis of the dying declaration Ex. PB/2 recorded by PW-2. ( 15 ) THE evidence available on record relating to the harassment, Ex. P-1, Ex. P-6 the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 if carefully scrutinized, the allegations relating to the harassment appear to be as vague as vagueness can be and specific and clear evidence is not available. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the learned Judge in fact was not inclined to place reliance on Ex. P-6. Even if Ex. P-6 is to be taken into consideration, the version in Ex. P-6 is different from the version said to have been made before PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4. The improved version is that A-2 also had been implicated. No doubt the consistent version is the absence of A-3 at the relevant point of time. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor no doubt made submissions at length placing reliance on the presumptions available in this regard. In the decision referred (5) supra it was held: sections 304-B and 498-A are not mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of cruelty. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of cruelty but having regard to the common background to these offences the meaning of cruelty or harassment will be the same as given in explanation to Section 498a under which cruelty by itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B it is the dowry death that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to cruelty any time after the marriage. Further a person charged and acquitted under section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to cruelty any time after the marriage. Further a person charged and acquitted under section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B. ( 16 ) RELIANCE also was placed on the decision referred (4) supra. In the decision referred (6) supra the Apex Court at paras 10 to 12 held: the first premise stands established in this each that the death of Neelam Rani took place within seven years of her marriage though the precise date of her marriage is not in evidence. (It is admitted by both sides that her marriage took place in the year 1983 ). The second premise that death was caused by burns is a factum which has not been disputed even by the appellant himself. In order to establish the third ingredient that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry, a plea is made to resort to the legal presumption envisaged in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. It reads as hereunder: 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is show that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or ion connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. ( 17 ) IT is imperative, for invoking the aforesaid legal presumption, to prove that soon before her death she was subjected to such cruelty or harassment. ( 17 ) IT is imperative, for invoking the aforesaid legal presumption, to prove that soon before her death she was subjected to such cruelty or harassment. Here, what the prosecution achieved in proving at the most was that there was persisting dispute between the two sides regarding the dowry paid or to be paid, both in kind and in cash, and on account of the failure to meet the demand for dowry, Neelam Rani was taken by her parents to their house about one and a half years before her death. Further evidence is that an attempt was made to patch up between the two sides for which a panchayat was held in which it was resolved that she would go back to the nuptial home pursuant to which she was taken by the husband to his house. This happened about ten to fifteen days prior to the occurrence in this case. There is nothing on record to show that she was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand for dowry during the period between her having been taken to the parental home and her tragic end. ( 18 ) IN the absence of any such evidence it is not permissible to take recourse to the legal presumption envisaged in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. That rule of evidence is prescribed in law to obviate the prosecution of the difficulty to further prove that the offence was perpetrated by the husband, as then it would be the burden of the accused to rebut the presumption. Criminal law would be set in motion by lodging F. I. R. It is true that F. I. R. need not be comprehensive, exhaustive or of encyclopedic in nature and all evidentiary details need not be specified therein. But however, absence of core or essentials of the prosecution version may have to be viewed with suspicion. No doubt this would depend upon the nature of the first informant. Facts would vary from case to case and first information report to be judged in the backdrop of the facts of a given case depending upon the nature of the informant, his knowledge of the essentials and other attendant facts. It is also true that all omissions may not deserve due consideration in judging the veracity of the witnesses or the episode of the prosecution. It is also true that all omissions may not deserve due consideration in judging the veracity of the witnesses or the episode of the prosecution. However, if the Court is satisfied that the omissions are of such a nature which are material, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that such omissions are to be taken into consideration while deciding the truth or otherwise of the prosecution version. ( 19 ) ON the aspect of the contradictions Exs. D-1 to D-4, submissions at length were made by both the learned Counsel. In the decision referred (7) supra while dealing with the statements to police and omissions in the said statements and the effect thereof it was held: the statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and could not take the place of evidence in the Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit consideration, but mere small omission with not justify a finding by a Court that the witnesses concerned are self-contained liars. ( 20 ) RELIANCE also was placed on the decision referred (1) supra wherein the Apex Court held: if the Court has not put any question to the witness with reference to his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code, it is impermissible for the Court to use that statement later even for drawing any adverse impression regarding the evidence of that witness. What is interdicted by the Parliament in direct terms cannot be obviated in any indirect manner. Thus the Court cannot sidestep the crucial evidence of father and mother of deceased which diametrically went against the version of the deceased in her dying declaration. ( 21 ) THE contradictions Exs. D-1 to D-4 and the omissions pointed out especially in the evidence of PW-2 are definitely material omissions which may have to be taken into consideration. Apart from this aspect of the matter, in the light of the inconsistent versions in the dying declaration Ex. ( 21 ) THE contradictions Exs. D-1 to D-4 and the omissions pointed out especially in the evidence of PW-2 are definitely material omissions which may have to be taken into consideration. Apart from this aspect of the matter, in the light of the inconsistent versions in the dying declaration Ex. P-6, the oral dying declaration said to have been made to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 and also the non-production of the police statement said to have been recorded by PW-16 and also in the light of the fact that PW-5 and PW-6 were not inclined to support the version of the prosecution, the conviction and sentences imposed by the learned Judge on the strength of such evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 in the considered opinion of this Court definitely cannot be sustained in the light of the inconsistencies and doubtful versions of the episode of the prosecution. The very absence of A-3 was made a serious ground of attack by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It is needless to say that on the ground of suspicion a person cannot be convicted unless there is acceptable evidence brought before the Court. No doubt certain incident just prior to the happening of the incident on the fateful day also had been pointed out. Due to the said enmity the possibility of foisting of the case as against the appellants/accused also cannot be ruled out and it also pertinent to note that the evidence available on record would go to show that when the Magistrate arrived at the spot PW-1 was present at the spot. In the light of the facts and circumstances, the conviction recorded and the sentences imposed by the learned Judge definitely cannot be sustained and they are hereby set aside and acquittal is hereby recorded. The Criminal Appeal is allowed. The Bail bonds of the appellants shall stand cancelled.