C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF in O. S, No. 50 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, machilipatnam, who filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, dated 27-1-1980 said to have been executed by the first respondent in respect of Ac. 6-70 cents in R. S. Nos. 39/1, 39/2, 39/2b of lokumudi Village of Kaikalur Taluq, within the boundaries mentioned in the schedule appended to the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) is the appellant in this appeal. His case, in brief, is that he, who is the cultivating tenant of the suit land, having agreed to purchase the same from first respondent for Rs. 3 6,000/- entered into an agreement of sale dated 27-1-1980, with the first respondent and paid Rs. 20,000/- to the first respondent on that day and agreed to pay the balance amount of Rs. 16,000/- on or before 26-2-1980, and in case of delay that amount has to be paid with interest at 12% per annum. Since first respondent committed default in payment of land revenue, revenue authorities attached the paddy heap in R. S. No. 39/2 and the paddy heap in the land of Nayudamma, and so he paid the arrears of land revenue and got the attachment raised. After having come to know that first respondent is intending to alienate the suit land he got issued a telegraphic notice to Respondents 1 and 2, and followed it by a registered notice for which first respondent sent a reply with false allegations and alienated the suit land to Respondents 2 and 3. ( 2 ) THE case, in brief, of the first respondent (first defendant) is that the agreement dated 27-1-1980, relied on by the appellant is not true and is brought into existence by the appellant with the help of uppalapati Raghava Rao, a retired tahsildar, with a view to defraud her. The suit land, along with Ac. 8-08 cents belonging to Kolli Nayudamma, was in the management of the aforesaid Uppalapati raghava Rao, and his wife Atchamma, who are her family friends. After coming to know that the said Raghava Rao and his wife were not honest and were intending to purchase the entire extent of Ac. 14-88 cents at a low price, her husband agreed to sell the land of Ac. After coming to know that the said Raghava Rao and his wife were not honest and were intending to purchase the entire extent of Ac. 14-88 cents at a low price, her husband agreed to sell the land of Ac. 14-88 cents to the second respondent under agreements of sale dated 5-4-1980 and put him in possession thereof on the same day and thereafter she and Nayudamma extracted sale deeds in favour of the 2nd respondent and his nominees and got them registered. With a view to get over those sale deeds, uppalapati Raghava Rao must have set up the appellant by bringing into existence the agreement of sale dated 27-1-1980 relied on by the appellant, and got issued a notice with false allegations, for which a reply was got issued. Appellant in fact has no means to purchase the suit land. The attachment of the paddy heap for the alleged arrears of land revenue in respect of the said land is a make believe affair, and is not true and so the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 3 ) THE case of Respondents 2 and 3 (Defendants 2 and 3) is that when the suit land, and Ac. 8-08 cents belonging to Kolli nayudamma were offered for sale by the first respondent and Kolli Nayudamma second respondent having agreed to purchase the same for a consideration of Rs. 8,000/- per acre, under agreements of sale, from them on 5-4-1980 and thereafter obtained registered sale deeds from the first respondent and Kolli Nayudamma in their names and in the names of their nominees. Appellant who is the son-in-law of the sister- in-law (wife s sister) of Uppalapati raghava Rao, a retired Tahsildar, a family friend of the first respondent and Kolli nayudamma, had set up the appellant, since he failed in his attempt to purchase the land under his management from the first respondent and Nayudamma at the price of his choice, Raghava Rao got the suit filed in the name of the appellant by fabricating an agreement of sale in favour of the appellant. Appellant in fact was never in possession of the suit land or the other land purchased by them and others from the first respondent and Nayudamma. Proceedings relating to attachment of paddy heaps in R. S. No. 39/2 and the lands of nayudamma etc. Appellant in fact was never in possession of the suit land or the other land purchased by them and others from the first respondent and Nayudamma. Proceedings relating to attachment of paddy heaps in R. S. No. 39/2 and the lands of nayudamma etc. , must have been created with the help of the village karanam, chavalipadu group of villages, who is a close friend of Raghava Rao, in connivance with the other officers in the village, to strengthen the case of the appellant. ( 4 ) BASING on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled five issues for trial. In support of his case, the appellant examined himself as P. W. 1 and four other witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 4 and marked Exs. Al to A18. In support of the case of the respondents, second respondent examined himself as d. W. I, first respondent was examined as d. W. 2, and another witness was examined as D. W. 3 and Exs. Bl to B24 were marked on their behalf. Basing on the evidence on record, the Trial Court held on Issues 1 to 4 which relate to the question whether the agreement of sale dated 27-1-1980, relied on by the appellant, is true or not, and if he paid Rs. 20,000/- to the first respondent on the day of the agreement, whether the appellant was put in possession of the suit land under the agreement of sale relied on by the appellant and if he is entitled to the relief of specific performance, held against the appellant, and consequently, on Issue No. 5, which relates to the relief, dismissed the suit with costs. Hence, this appeal. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the trial Court clubbed Issues 1 to 4 it could not focus its attention on the issues independently, which resulted in a diffused judgment. It is his contention that the Trial court, without properly considering the evidence of the scribe and attestors of Ex. A1 agreement in the right perspective, and without keeping in view the failure of the respondents in sending Ex. A1 to an expert for his opinion, erred in holding that Ex. A1 is not a true and genuine document by merely comparing the signatures of the first respondent in Ex. A1 with those in Ex. B6 and B7. A1 agreement in the right perspective, and without keeping in view the failure of the respondents in sending Ex. A1 to an expert for his opinion, erred in holding that Ex. A1 is not a true and genuine document by merely comparing the signatures of the first respondent in Ex. A1 with those in Ex. B6 and B7. It is his contention that when Exs. B6 and B7 are not admitted by the appellant, they ought not to have been taken as containing the admitted signatures of the first respondent It is his contention that in view of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence act, when the appellant examined the attestors, and the scribe and when nothing useful was elicited during their cross- examination to discredit their evidence there can be no impediment for holding that Ex. A1 is duly proved. It is also his contention that the Court below was in error in drawing an inference against the appellant for his non examining Atchamma, who did not figure as an attestor to Ex. A1 and whom the appellant did not cite as a witness. It is his contention that since exs. A-5 to A-8 clearly establish the possession of the appellant over the suit land, and when the evidence of P. W. 6 shows that appellant paid arrears of land revenue from 1387 to 1389 Fasli, in respect of the suit land, it is clear that appellant is in possession of the suit land as tenant and when the appellant deposited the balance sale consideration due and payable under ex. A1 as per the orders of the Trial Court, appellant is entitled to a decree. The contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent is that since the Trial Court gave cogent reasons for its conclusion that ex. A1 is a forged and fabricated document, and since even for the naked eye, the signatures in Ex. Al and the admitted signatures of the first respondent do not tally, the finding of the Trial Court that ex. A1 is a forged and fabricated document needs no interference. A1 is a forged and fabricated document, and since even for the naked eye, the signatures in Ex. Al and the admitted signatures of the first respondent do not tally, the finding of the Trial Court that ex. A1 is a forged and fabricated document needs no interference. It is his contention that since the evidence on record clearly establishes that first respondent was not in arrears of land revenue and that attachment of the paddy heap for the alleged arrears of land revenue is a make believe affairs and was brought into existence by uppalapati Raghava Rao, there are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court. ( 6 ) THE points for consideration are1. Whether Ex. Al, the agreement of sale relied on by the appellant is true? 2. If so, whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as per the terms of the agreement? 3. To what relief? ( 7 ) POINT No. 1: Section 68 of the evidence Act, dealing with proof of documents requiring attestation, relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, has no relevance for deciding this appeal since an agreement of sale or sale deed are documents which do not require attestation. Merely because the scribe and attestors of a document are examined, the Court is not bound to give a finding that the document is duly executed, when the other evidence on record reveals the inherent improbability of the document being executed by the executant So merely because appellant examined the scribe and attestor of Ex. A1, it cannot automatically be held that Ex. A1 is true and genuine. ( 8 ) THE specific case of the appellant is that he is the tenant of the first respondent in respect of the suit land. That fact is denied by the respondents. Significantly ex. A1 does not show that appellant is in possession of the suit land as tenant of the suit land. Ex. A1 reads. . . . . . . From the above recitals it is seen that the suit land was put in possession of the appellant on the date of settlement of the terms of sale, which date is not mentioned in Ex. A1. So it is clear from the recitals in Ex. A1, that appellant was not the tenant in respect of the suit land. . . From the above recitals it is seen that the suit land was put in possession of the appellant on the date of settlement of the terms of sale, which date is not mentioned in Ex. A1. So it is clear from the recitals in Ex. A1, that appellant was not the tenant in respect of the suit land. Thus it is clear that the appellant came to Court with a false case, knowing it to be false. ( 9 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court below was in error in comparing the signature in Ex. A1 with those in Exs. B6 and B7, which, according to the learned counsel, cannot be treated as admitted signatures, has no force. His contention that documents signed in the presence of the party concerned only can be taken as documents containing admitted signatures cannot be accepted. The case of the appellant is that Exs. B6 and B7 are sham and nominal documents. So it is clear that appellant admitted execution of Exs. B6 and b7 by the 1st respondent. In fact the allegation in the plaint is that since first respondent brought Exs. B6 and B7 into existence in favour of Respondents 2 and 3, he made Respondents 2 and 3 parties to the suit. So, Exs. B6 and B7 should be treated as admitted documents containing the signature of the first respondent. That apart, since the Trial Court did not solely rely on the signatures of the 1st respondent in exs. B6 and B7, but had also taken into consideration the signatures of 1st respondent in Ex A18, which is a document produced by the appellant himself, it cannot be said that the Trial Court erred in comparing the disputed signatures in Ex. Al with the signatures of 1st respondent in Exs. B6, B7 and A18. Section 73 of Evidence Act, empowers the Court to compare the disputed signatures with admitted signatures. As rightly observed by the Trial Court, mere look at the signatures of first respondent in exal with those in Exs. B6, B7 and A18 shows that the signatures in Exal are not of the first respondent. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court also took into consideration the capacity of the appellant to pay Rs. 20,000/- to the first respondent by the date of Ex. Al, for deciding its genuineness. B6, B7 and A18 shows that the signatures in Exal are not of the first respondent. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court also took into consideration the capacity of the appellant to pay Rs. 20,000/- to the first respondent by the date of Ex. Al, for deciding its genuineness. Appellant as P. W. I stated that he sold his land and paid an amount of rs. 20,000/- to the first respondent. He relied on Exs. A2 to A4 in support of his said contention. Ex. A2 is a sale deed, dated 28-1-1978, executed by the appellant in favour of one Kuncha Chinnamma for rs. 4,500/ -. The recitals therein show that the appellant received Rs. 2,892/- and the rest of the amount of Rs. 1,608/- went in discharge of his debts. The recital in Ex. A3 show that the appellant sold the land covered thereby for Rs. 4,000/- and received Rs. 1322- 50ps and the remaining amount went in discharge of his debts. The recitals in Ex. A4 show that the land covered thereby was sold for Rs. 21,000/- and that appellant received Rs. 15,000/- and the rest of the amount went in discharge of his debts. Thus, Exs. A2 to A4, show that appellant received a total cash of about Rs. 19,000/- and the remaining amount went in discharge of his debts. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the consideration mentioned in Exs. A2 to A4 is not the actual consideration, and that those lands were sold for a higher consideration than that was mentioned in those sale deeds cannot be accepted for three reasons. Firstly because the purchasers in whose favour Ex. A2 to A4 were executed were not examined by the appellant to swear to the fact that they paid more amount than that is mentioned in those sale deeds. Secondly such contention is barred under sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act. Thirdly appellant, while deposing as P. W. I in o. S. No. 125 of 1980 stated that after he made the sales under Ex. A2 to A4, he discharged the family debts, and was having cash of Rs. 11,700/ -. Exs. A2 to A4 are of the year 1978, Ex. Al is of the year 1980. When the appellant was having Rs. A2 to A4, he discharged the family debts, and was having cash of Rs. 11,700/ -. Exs. A2 to A4 are of the year 1978, Ex. Al is of the year 1980. When the appellant was having Rs. 11,700/- in 1978; it is difficult to believe that he could retain that money and make it swell to rs. 20,000/- for payment to the first respondent under Exal, in 1980. Significantly appellant claims to have parted with rs. 20,000/- as hand loan, without any document, to Krishna Murthy and Atchamma. As rightly observed by the Trial Court if it is a fact, it would show that appellant is very close with the said Krishna Murthy and atchamma, who according to the first respondent, have set up the appellant and are behind to the litigation. In the above circumstances, the capacity of the appellant to pay Rs. 20,000/- under Ex. Al on the day of its alleged execution is doubtful. ( 11 ) THE Trial Court adverted to several discrepancies in the evidence of P. Ws. l, 3 and 4, which are material discrepancies, for holding that Exa1 was not executed by the first respondent. The fact that appellant, who according to the evidence of p. W. 4, is a resident of Gannavaram, failed to explain as to why he intended to purchase land at Lokumudi Village, Kaikalur taluk was also kept in view by the Trial court to hold against the appellant. ( 12 ) THE Trial Court was error in placing reliance on the letters said to have been written by Atchamma, when the said atchamma is not examined. So, I do not wish to take into consideration the said letters for deciding this appeal. ( 13 ) STRONG reliance is placed on ex. A5 notice of attachment of the paddy for arrears of land revenue, and Ex. A6 receipt showing that appellant paid the arrears of land revenue on behalf of the first respondent on 2-5-1980 for establishing the genuineness of Exal Here, it should be stated that as per Section 11 of the revenue Recovery Act standing crop only, but not a paddy heap, can be attached. In fact in Chegon Venkataramadas v. Bonam latchamma, AIR 1966 AP 277, it is held that Section 11 of the Revenue Recovery act does not empower attachment of crop after the same has been cut and taken away. Since Exs. In fact in Chegon Venkataramadas v. Bonam latchamma, AIR 1966 AP 277, it is held that Section 11 of the Revenue Recovery act does not empower attachment of crop after the same has been cut and taken away. Since Exs. B15 to B21 show that first respondent paid the land revenue in respect of the suit land even by 26-3-1980 and since P. W. 2 and P. W. 6 admitted that there were no arrears of land revenue, and since the Revenue Recovery Act does not contemplate attachment of paddy heap in the land of another person other than that of a defaulter, it is easy to say that P. W. 6 was acting under the directions or instructions of somebody else, who can only be raghava Rao, a retired Tahsildar living in the village. So, it is clear that Ex. A5 was brought into existence for the purpose of the suit. For all the above reasons, I hold that Ex. A1 is not a true and genuine document. The point is answered accordingly. ( 14 ) POINT No. 2: In view of my finding on the first point though it is not necessary to give a finding on this point. I wish to give a finding on this point also. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the fact that the appellant could not deposit the amount for a period of 4 months after the Trial Court passed an order to deposit the balance amount due under Ex. A1 into Court was erroneously taken as a circumstance against the appellant for holding that appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, because in case of an agreement to sell immovable property, time is not the essence of contract and so the fact that the amount stipulated was not deposited within the time granted by itself is not a ground for negativating the relief of specific performance. ( 15 ) AS per the terms contained in ex. A1, if appellant were to fail to pay the balance amount payable there under on the stipulated date, appellant has to pay the balance amount of Rs. 16,000/- with interest at 12% per annum from the due date, i. e. , 26-2-1980 till date of payment. When Court directed deposit of the balance payable under ex. Al, appellant admittedly deposited rs. 16,000/- with interest at 12% per annum from the due date, i. e. , 26-2-1980 till date of payment. When Court directed deposit of the balance payable under ex. Al, appellant admittedly deposited rs. 16,000/- only on 4-7-1985, i. e. , more than five years after the date agreed for the performance of the contract. Since the appellant who agreed to pay interest at 12% p. a. on the balance sale consideration, in case of default in payment on the stipulated date, failed to deposit the balance amount with interest on 4-7-1985, shows that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per the terms of the contract. So, the finding of the Court below that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, needs no interference and so I also hold that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract ( 16 ) POINT No. 3: In view of my findings on Points 1 and 2, I find no merits in this appeal and so the appeal is dismissed. No costs.