Judgment :- Prabha Sridevan, J. The sole accused is the appellant. He was charged with committing the murder of his wife, Devi on 9.7.2001 at 7.45 pm at Door No.76, V Street, Vijayaraghavapuram, Saligramam, Chennai-93, by stabbing her with a knife. He was found guilty of the offence and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows:- The deceased had gone to the house of her mother Tmt. Rajamani, P.W.2 for her confinement and delivered a girl child. At 7.30 pm on 9.7.2001, the appellant came to the house of P.W.2. At that time, the deceased was with her child on her lap. There was a wordy quarrel between the couple. The deceased went inside the house. The appellant followed her inside the house, picked up a knife, M.O.1 and stabbed the deceased. This was seen by P.W.2. At the time of occurrence, P.W.2, her daughter Vasanthi (not examined), her son-in-law Subramani (not examined), Nithyanandan (P.W.9) and one Nathan (not examined) were present outside the house. The door of the room in which the offence took place was bolted by the appellant when he followed the deceased. On hearing the cries of the deceased and the alarm raised by P.W.2, they broke open the door and went inside. When the door opened, the accused ran out with the knife in his hand. The deceased was lying in a pool of blood. She was immediately taken to Surya Hospital by P.W.1, Subramani and Nathan, who had come there on hearing the commotion. At the hospital, the deceased was pronounced dead by P.W.3, who issued Ex.P.2, the Accident Register. P.W.9, who was visiting his mother-in-law who lives opposite P.W.2's house, also heard the noise and rushed to the house of P.W.2. He accompanied P.W.1 and others when they entered the house of P.W.2 by breaking open the door upon hearing the cries of the deceased and P.W.9 also saw the accused coming out of the house with M.O.1, knife in his hand. P.W.9 tried to stop him and in that process, he sustained an injury in his right hand. At about 7.45 pm, P.W.7, who lives in the house opposite P.W.2's house and who was watching T.V. at that time, after hearing the commotion, came out of his house. P.W.9 tried to stop him and in that process, he sustained an injury in his right hand. At about 7.45 pm, P.W.7, who lives in the house opposite P.W.2's house and who was watching T.V. at that time, after hearing the commotion, came out of his house. He saw the accused coming out of the house of P.W.2 with a blood stained knife in his hand and run towards the IV Street. At about 8 pm, P.W.9 was taken to the K.K. Nagar Hospital by the police for treatment of his injury, and on examination by the Doctor P.W.4, Ex.P.3, the injury certificate, was issued. At about 9 pm on 9.7.2001, P.W.11, the Inspector of Police, received the complaint, Ex.P.1 from P.W.1, registered a case in Crime No.1137 of 2001 and commenced the investigation. He went to Surya Hospital and sent the body of the deceased for post mortem examination along with the requisition, Ex.P.4. He forwarded Ex.P.11, the Express F.I.R. to the Judicial Magistrate and to other higher authorities. He then proceeded to the scene of crime and conducted the inquest. He prepared the rough sketch, Ex.P.12 and the observation mahazar, Ex.P.9. At about 11.05 pm on 9.7.2001, he recovered M.O.4 to M.O.8, viz. the blood stained child mattress, blood stained child frock, blood stained cloth, sample earth and sample cement floor respectively, from the scene of occurrence. He recorded the statements of the witnesses on 9.7.2001 and 10.7.2001. The inquest report is Ex.P.13. At 2.30 pm on 10.7.2001, the appellant was arrested and the admissible portion of the confessional statement given by the accused is Ex.P.8. At 3.30 pm on the same day, in the presence of witnesses, P.W.11 recovered M.O.1, knife under Ex.P.7, mahazar. At about 4 pm, he remanded the accused to judicial custody. P.W.5, the Doctor, conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased on 10.7.2001 and issued the Post Mortem Certificate, Ex.P.5. Ex.P.6 is the Serology Report. The blood stained M.Os. were sent for chemical analysis and the reports are marked as Exs.P.14, 15 and 16. P.W.11 completed the investigation and thereafter filed the charge sheet. 3. On being questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused pleaded innocence. 4. During the trial, on the side of the prosecution, 11 witnesses were examined, 16 exhibits were marked and 10 material objects were produced. P.W.11 completed the investigation and thereafter filed the charge sheet. 3. On being questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused pleaded innocence. 4. During the trial, on the side of the prosecution, 11 witnesses were examined, 16 exhibits were marked and 10 material objects were produced. The appellant did not examine any witness nor did he produce any documentary evidence. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai found the accused guilty of the offence under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment and therefore this appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the evidence on the side of the prosecution is full of inconsistencies. He submitted that it is not clear whether the alleged crime had taken place behind closed doors and whether any one was inside the room when the appellant is alleged to have stabbed the deceased. According to him, the presence of P.W.1 at the scene of crime is extremely doubtful and from the rough sketch Ex.P.12, it is clear that the witnesses, viz. P.W.7 and P.W.9 could not have seen anything. He submitted that P.W.2 could not have been an eye witness, since she speaks of one stab, while Ex.P.5, the Post Mortem Certificate, indicates six injuries. He submitted that Ex.P.3, the Injury Certificate relating to P.W.9 does not indicate the of injury nor the nature, and the evidence of the Doctor concerned, viz. P.W.4, is also not clear. He submitted that when the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.9 are not reliable, the only other witness left is P.W.7, whose evidence was not sufficient to convict the appellant. Alternatively, the learned counsel submitted that the wordy quarrel between the accused and the deceased and the fact that the accused had not come to the house of P.W.2 armed with M.O.1 would be mitigating circumstances. Learned counsel also submitted that portions of the confessional statement could be relied on to support the case of the appellant so as to show that there were mitigating circumstances and therefore, the sentence under Section 302, I.P.C. should at least be modified to one under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. 6. Learned counsel also submitted that portions of the confessional statement could be relied on to support the case of the appellant so as to show that there were mitigating circumstances and therefore, the sentence under Section 302, I.P.C. should at least be modified to one under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, would submit that there is absolutely no dispute regarding the fact that the appellant had come to the house where his wife was staying and that he had quarreled with her. According to him, the mother of the deceased, P.W.2 had seen the accused stab the deceased and even otherwise, the evidence of P.W.7 and P.W.9, who had seen the accused come out from the scene of crime with the blood stained knife, M.O.1 in his hand would go to show that the case of the prosecution was proved to the hilt. According to the Additional Public Prosecutor, there were no mitigating circumstances in this case. 7. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution has proved its case and whether there are any mitigating circumstances warranting reduction of sentence. 8. The fact that the accused had gone to fetch his wife and take her back to his house on the date of occurrence is not in dispute. P.W.2, the mother of the deceased, has stated in her chief-examination as follows : In cross-examination, she would state as follows : In re-examination, she has stated as follows : 9. P.W.1, owner of a sweet stall at Door No.31, Arcot Road, Saligramam and who resides at Door No.16, Vijayaraghavapuram, Saligramam, claims that he had returned home from his stall at about 7.45 pm and as he was passing by the V Street on his motorcycle, he found that there was a commotion in the house of P.W.2. Actually, he first says, viz. the house of the accused, but he later corrects himself. According to this witness, the accused and the deceased were fighting and the brother-in-law of the deceased and one auto driver were standing there. The accused told the deceased that she should return with him. He was forcing her to go with him, but the deceased kept telling him that since the child was just about a month old, she could not leave right away. The accused told the deceased that she should return with him. He was forcing her to go with him, but the deceased kept telling him that since the child was just about a month old, she could not leave right away. So saying, the deceased went inside the house and the accused rushed after her. According to P.W.1, because the accused was rushing in, they also went inside the house and then the accused stabbed the deceased in her chest and abdomen. According to P.W.1, when they went to stop the accused, he threatened them stating that he would stab them also with the knife and therefore, frightened, P.W.1 came out and the accused bolted the door from inside after pushing them. Thereafter, P.W.2 shouted and they went inside the house by breaking open the door. When they went inside, the accused ran through the other door. According to P.W.1, they chased the accused. P.W.9 tried to stop the accused and sustained injuries. However, the accused escaped with the knife. It is thereafter that P.W.1 went in an auto to Surya Hospital with the deceased and the doctor pronounced her dead. In cross-examination, P.W.1 says that he was there at the scene of crime totally for only about five minutes, "rk;gt ,lj;jpy; ehd; bkhj;jk; 5 epkplk; jhd; ,Ue;njd;/" In re-examination, P.W.1 clarifies that when they broke open the door, the accused came out of the same door, 10. P.W.7 is a retired security guard. He lives in Door No.12, Anna Street. His house and the house of P.W.2 are on either sides of Anna Street. On 9.7.2001 at about 7.45 pm, he was watching a Hindi programme on television when he heard the noise. So, he came out of his house and saw the accused coming out of the house of P.W.2 with a blood stained knife and running through the IV Street. A little while later, the mother of the deceased, her daughter and others brought the deceased out of their house, put her in an auto and took her to the hospital. In cross-examination, he has stated that Anna Street is a busy street and that a 60 watt bulb was burning at the time when he saw the deceased. According to him, the knife held by the accused would be about 6 inches in length. He did not attempt to stop the accused. 11. In cross-examination, he has stated that Anna Street is a busy street and that a 60 watt bulb was burning at the time when he saw the deceased. According to him, the knife held by the accused would be about 6 inches in length. He did not attempt to stop the accused. 11. P.W.9 is a driver in a private company. The house of P.W.2 is right opposite to the house of his mother-in-law. According to P.W.9, on 9.7.2001 at about 7.45 pm, he was going to the house of his mother-in-law, when right opposite, he saw the quarrel in the house of P.W.2. The accused was standing outside the house and shouting. The deceased was inside the house carrying her baby. When the shouting increased, the accused went inside the house and shut the door.- On hearing the deceased scream, the sister of the deceased, her husband, one Nathan, P.W.1 and P.W.9 himself broke open the door and went inside. The accused came out of the house, holding M.O.1 in his hand. According to P.W.9, he tried to stop the accused and in that attempt, he sustained injury in his right hand. He has identified M.O.2, the shirt as the shirt worn by the accused when he saw him at the time of occurrence. In cross-examination, P.W.9 has stated that he heard the noise and only after that, he went to the house of P.W.2, that Nathan and Subramani went into the house first and he went behind them and also that he sustained injury only when he tried to prevent the accused from running. 12. The rough sketch, Ex.P.12, shows that the house of P.W.7 is on the eastern side of Anna Street and the house of P.W.2 is to the west of Anna Street; IV Street is to the north of Anna Street and V Street is to the south. There are two doors in Door No.76, where the crime took place on V Street, but it is the evidence of P.W.2 that there are two portions which have been let out to tenants. So, it is obvious that the entry to the house of P.W.2 is only through Anna Street. 13. P.W.2, the mother of the deceased speaks of the presence of P.W.9 at the time of occurrence. The presence of P.W.1 at the time of the occurrence is mentioned by P.W.9 also. So, it is obvious that the entry to the house of P.W.2 is only through Anna Street. 13. P.W.2, the mother of the deceased speaks of the presence of P.W.9 at the time of occurrence. The presence of P.W.1 at the time of the occurrence is mentioned by P.W.9 also. We have the evidence of four witnesses, two who claim to be eye witnesses to the crime (P.W.1 and P.W.2) and two who had seen the accused run immediately after the crime (P.W.7 and P.W.9). It is admitted that there was a wordy quarrel between the accused and the deceased immediately before the occurrence took place. 14. The evidence of P.W.1 that he saw the accused stab the deceased is difficult to believe. He claims that he followed the accused because the accused rushed into the house behind the deceased after forcing her to come with him and that he saw the accused stab the deceased. His evidence that the accused threatened him is not corroborated by any other witnesses. In fact, in her cross-examination, P.W.2 has stated as follows : It is not clear from the evidence, as extracted above, whether the accused stabbed the deceased behind the close door or in the presence of the witnesses and it is difficult to accept that P.W.1 and P.W.2 are eye witnesses. If the accused had already stabbed the deceased the door was open, there is no explanation as to why he would thereafter bolt the door from inside. Even though the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that they saw the accused stab the deceased is difficult to believe, it has been amply proved that both P.W.1 and P.W.2 saw the accused come out of the bolted room immediately after the occurrence. To this extent, their evidence must be accepted. 15. The evidence of P.W.9 is natural, accurate and believable. He says as follows : There had been a loud quarrel between the husband and the deceased and the deceased had gone inside the house. The accused had rushed behind her, bolted the door from inside and it is only after they heard the screams of the deceased that all of them have broken the door and entered in. The evidence of P.W.9 is believable and his presence there is natural and more importantly, he is also the injured witness. The accused had rushed behind her, bolted the door from inside and it is only after they heard the screams of the deceased that all of them have broken the door and entered in. The evidence of P.W.9 is believable and his presence there is natural and more importantly, he is also the injured witness. P.W.1 has referred to in his evidence of P.W.9 trying to stop the accused and getting himself injured in that process. P.W.2 does not talk of the injury to P.W.9, but that is hardly material since P.W.2, being the mother of the deceased, might not have noticed the injury sustained by P.W.9. Moreover, P.W.9 clearly speaks of the manner in which he sustained the injury. P.W.4 is the Doctor who examined P.W.9. His evidence is that the police brought P.W.9 stating that he was injured at about 8 pm on 9.7.2001 and when P.W.4 examined P.W.9, he had informed P.W.4 that a known person had stabbed him at 8 pm. In his evidence, P.W.4 has expressed his inability to fix exactly the time at which P.W.9 took treatment and he also admits that in Ex.P.3, he has not mentioned where the injury had been inflicted. The crucial extracts from Ex.P.3 are as follows: "Nature of Injury and treatment - } Alleged to have State simple, grievous or } been assaulted by opinion reserved } one known person Vijayaraghavapuram, Anna Street, Chennai. with knife on 9.7.01 at 8.00 P.M. today at O/E : Conscious, Answering questions. Pulse : 86 B.P. : 110/80 mm of Hg. Injuries : 1. Abrasion over the Right hand 1 cm x 1 cm. CVS, RS, NS, NAD. Treatment given. Treated as O.P." The fact that P.W.4 does not mention exactly when P.W.9 was brought to him is not a serious defect in his evidence. The presence of P.W.9 at the scene of crime in or about the time of occurrence is clearly established and he is the injured witness. And the time of injury as spoken to by P.W.4 and referred to in Ex.P.3 is also believable, since the time at which the occurrence is said to have taken place is 7.45 pm. The presence of P.W.9 at the scene of crime in or about the time of occurrence is clearly established and he is the injured witness. And the time of injury as spoken to by P.W.4 and referred to in Ex.P.3 is also believable, since the time at which the occurrence is said to have taken place is 7.45 pm. As per the case of the prosecution, after the accused stabbed the deceased, P.W.1 and others bad broken the door open and entered the room and at that time, the accused had rushed out with M.O.1, knife in his hand and in his attempt to stop the accused, P.W.9 had got injured. Therefore, the time of injury as stated by P.W.4, viz. 8 pm is also acceptable. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.9 is believable. 16. One of the inconsistencies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to the evidence of P.W.1 as to the injuries inflicted by the accused on the deceased and the injuries as found in Ex.P.5, the Post Mortem Certificate. P.W.2 says that there was only one stab, "xnu Fj;jhf", whereas P.W.1 talks of stabs in the chest and the abdomen, "vjphp fj;jpia vLj;J njtpapd; be";R. tapW Mfpa ,l';fspy; fj;jpahy; Fj;jpdhh;". However, the Post Mortem Certificate, Ex.P.5, shows six injuries : "1. Scratch abrasion on the outer aspect of upper 3rd of right arm 2 x 0.2 cms. 2. Multiple scratch abrasions of varying sizes 2-1.5 x 0.2 cms seen over the right side back and outer aspect of right buttock. 3. Incised scratch seen over the back of right arm close to elbow 3 x 1 cms. 4. Oblique cut injury with regular margins on the outer aspect of middle of right arm 3 x 1.5 cms x muscle deep. Both ends were less acute. Bruising of the triceps muscles seen. 5. Cut injury with regular margins in front of right shoulder close to axilla 3.5 x 0.6 cms x cavity deep. Lower end of the wound was acute and upper end of the wound was less acute. 6. Both ends were less acute. Bruising of the triceps muscles seen. 5. Cut injury with regular margins in front of right shoulder close to axilla 3.5 x 0.6 cms x cavity deep. Lower end of the wound was acute and upper end of the wound was less acute. 6. The weapon had cut through the first intercostal space on the right side in the midclavicular line and entered into the right thoracic cavity producing a through and through cut injury measuring 2 x 1 cms on the middle lobe of the right lung and punctured the inferior vanecave (I.V.C.) Right lung was collapsed. Direction of the wound was slightly downwards, backwards and to the left. Whole tract measured 16 cms approximately." 17. As per the Post Mortem Certificate, Ex.P.5, there are six injuries on the deceased and as per the opinion of the Doctor, P.W.5, the injuries which caused the death are injury numbers 5 and 6. The Doctor, P.W.5, in his evidence, has stated as follows : The post mortem was conducted on 10.7.2001 at 11.05 am. According to P.W.5, the death should have occurred between 5.05 pm and 11.05 pm on 9.7.2001. The opinion of the Doctor, P.W.5, therefore, corresponds with the case of the prosecution that the death occurred at 7.45 pm on 9.7.2001. It is pointed out on behalf of the appellant that when the evidence of P.W.2 is that the accused gave the deceased only one stab and actually when there were six injuries, of which at least two were fatal injuries, the evidence of P.W.2, who claims to be the eye witness, must be rejected and therefore, the case of the prosecution must fail. 18. P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.9 have all seen the accused come out of the room with the blood stained knife in his hand after the door was broken open and P.W.7 has also seen the accused on Anna Street, running towards the IV Street, with M.O.1, knife in his hand. Therefore, even if the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 insofar as they claim to have seen the occurrence cannot be believed, on that ground alone the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected in its entirety. Therefore, even if the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 insofar as they claim to have seen the occurrence cannot be believed, on that ground alone the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected in its entirety. The prosecution has clearly established that the accused had stabbed the deceased at about 7.45 pm on 9.7.2001 with M.O.1, knife, since four witnesses have seen the accused with the knife, three of them immediately after the act, and one, a little later. The evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7 that they saw the accused with the knife immediately after the act must be accepted. The evidence of P.W.7, the security guard, is also natural. On hearing the commotion, this witness, who was watching television in his house, has come out and has seen the accused running from Anna Street to the IV Street with the blood stained M.O.1 in his hand. His evidence is also natural and believable. 19. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that Ex.P.16, the Serology Report, states the result of grouping test done in respect of M.O.1, knife (Item No.8) as inconclusive and therefore, the link between M.O.1 and the crime has not been established. The diagram of the knife is found on the reverse of Ex.P.7, mahazar, under which the steel knife was recovered and it is seen therefrom that the blade of the knife is 17 cms long, which corresponds to about 6 inches and the evidence of P.W.7, must be understood to mean the blade and in any event, the injured witness has identified the knife, M.O.1. P.W.1 has also identified M.O.1. In 2002 S.C.C. (Cri.) 641 [Keshavlal vs. State of M.P.], the Supreme Court has held as follows : "Criminal Trial - Bloodmarks/Trail/ Bloodstains - Non-availability of serologist report - Effect of, if the evidence of eyewitness is otherwise trustworthy - Non-ascertainability of the blood group cannot be made a basis to discard the evidence of the witness who otherwise inspire confidence of the court and are believed by it - Evidence Act, 1872, S.45 - Serologist report". Therefore, non-ascertainability of the blood group cannot outweigh the evidence of the eye witnesses. Since we have also held that P.W.1 and P.W.2 could not have seen the occurrence, the discrepancies regarding the number of stabs are not material. Therefore, non-ascertainability of the blood group cannot outweigh the evidence of the eye witnesses. Since we have also held that P.W.1 and P.W.2 could not have seen the occurrence, the discrepancies regarding the number of stabs are not material. The evidence of P.W.9, the injured witness, supported by the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7 clearly establishes that the appellant had caused the death of the deceased by stabbing her with M.O.1. 20. Next, we come to the mitigating circumstances. The crucial witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 speak of the loud quarrel that took place between the accused and the deceased immediately preceding the occurrence. P.W.7 also speaks of noise emanating from the house of P.W.2 at about 7.45 pm on the date of occurrence. P.W.9 also speaks of the quarrel between the accused and the deceased. The accused had actually come to the house of P.W.2 not with the intention of quarreling with the deceased, but to take her back to his house. The deceased had refused to go with him and went inside the house. The accused had lost his temper and rushed after her and had bolted the door from inside. The witnesses also say that the accused picked up the knife which was lying in the house of P.W.2. It is clear, therefore, that the case would come under Exception IV to Section 300, I.P.C. 21. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decisions : In 1996 (I) L.W. (Crl.) 9 [Vairamuthu vs. State], the accused was charged with the offence under Section 302, I.P.C. The evidence in that case showed that the deceased had used abusive and vulgar words and "on the spur of the moment, he took out a knife and stabbed the deceased". To arrive at a decision as to what exactly was the offence that the appellant had committed, the Division Bench in that case took into consideration not only the evidence of P.W.1, but also the confession statement given by the accused, leading to the recovery of the knife, in which he had said that he had got provoked by the deceased and therefore stabbed him. The Division Bench observed, "Though this confession will not be admissible and cannot be used against the accused, in rare cases, it can be looked into in his favour." The Division Bench held as follows : "The Courts in so many Judgments have held that the confession given by the accused/appellant before the police, under S.25 of the Evidence Act, though cannot be used against the accused/appellant, it is quite permissible in rarest of rare cases to use the same in favour of the appellant, for the cause of preservation of justice and for the purpose of deciding the nature of the offence, which he had committed." On this ground, the appeal filed by the accused was allowed, the conviction and sentence under Section 302, I.P.C. was set aside and the accused was found guilty of the offence under Section 304, Part-II, I.P.C. 22. In 2003 S.C.C. (Cri.) 765 [Ghapoo Yadav vs. State of M.P.], the Supreme Court held that in order to apply Exception IV to Section 300 I.P.C., it must be shown that there was a sudden quarrel, that there was no pre-meditation and the offender must not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and when the accused had caused the injuries in the heat of the passion, upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight, Exception IV to Section 300, I.P.C. is clearly attracted. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that when there is a sudden fight, "the homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side". 23. In 1995 (1) L.W. (Crl.) 12 S.N. [Rangaswami Gounder vs. State], the accused caused the death of his wife and her mother while making present to the new born baby of his brother. 23. In 1995 (1) L.W. (Crl.) 12 S.N. [Rangaswami Gounder vs. State], the accused caused the death of his wife and her mother while making present to the new born baby of his brother. In that case, while considering the question of sentence, the Division Bench observed as follows : "From a careful perusal of the accusations levelled against him, any one placed in such a situation, pretty certain it is, we feel, would have deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation and once the power of self-control is either lost or deprived of, it goes without saying, reasons never prevail and animal passion overwhelms and the person like the accused, in such a situation, cannot be expected to see any rhyme or reason of what he was doing, by weighing his acts in golden scales. The act of the accused, placed in such a situation, in delivering blows by means of pestle, like M.O.1 series, on the heads of D.1 and D.2, besides causing injury to P.W.1, cannot be stated to be anyone done with requisite mens rea, taking his case within anyone of the four clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code; and if at all his act is one that would fall under Exception I to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, punishable under Section 304, Part-I, Indian Penal Code." In 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 469 [Ramesh Laxman Pardeshi vs. The State of Maharashtra], the Supreme Court held as follows : "I.P.C., Sc.302 and 304, Part-I - One injury inflicted, upon provocation without pre-meditation, on the spur of the moment - Intention of causing death cannot be attributed - Exchange of filthy language resulting in provocation - Prosecution witnesses suppressing the words spoken - Offence, held, fell under S.304, Part-I, and not S.302." In that case also, the conviction was altered from one under Section 302, I.P.C. to one under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. In 1997 (2) L.W. (Crl.) 532 [Venkatesan vs. State by Inspector of Police, Tiruporur], the accused caused the death of his wife following a quarrel due to her illicit intimacy. The Division Bench, in that case, held as follows: "Grave and sudden provocation, plea of - Words and gestures by the deceased at the relevant time would certainly give rise to grave and sudden provocation in the minds of appellant, resulting in loss of control - Accused surrendering and giving statement - Offence attracted Exception I of S.300 - Conviction u/S.302, I.P.C. altered into one u/S. 304 Part-II." 24. In 1995 S.C.C. (Cri.) 160 [Jagdish Prasad vs. State of M.P.], the Supreme Court held as follows: "As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated, provided the testimony of that single witness is found out entirely reliable. In that case, there will be no legal impediment for recording a conviction. But if the evidence is open to doubt or suspicion, the court will require sufficient corroboration." In A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1094 [Surinder Kumar vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh], it was urged on behalf of the State that the appellant had attacked an unarmed person and had caused as many as three injuries which showed that he had acted in a cruel manner. However, the Supreme Court held as follows : "Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly." ..... "The High Court refused to grant him that benefit on the ground that he had acted in a cruel manner, but we do not think that merely because three injuries were caused to the deceased it could be said that he had acted in a cruel and unusual manner." The Supreme Court, therefore, convicted the accused for the offence under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C. 25. In the instant case also, it is not a unilateral provocation and there was no pre-meditation in the mind of the appellant. The appellant had come to the house of P.W.2 unarmed. Since the appellant had committed the act without pre-meditation after his quarrel with the deceased and in the heat of passion and as there is nothing to show that the appellant had taken an undue advantage, the only conclusion that could be arrived is that it is a culpable homicide, but not amounting to murder. Since the appellant had committed the act without pre-meditation after his quarrel with the deceased and in the heat of passion and as there is nothing to show that the appellant had taken an undue advantage, the only conclusion that could be arrived is that it is a culpable homicide, but not amounting to murder. Therefore, the offence committed by the appellant does not come under Section 300, I.P.C. warranting punishment under Section 302, I.P.C., but it falls under Exception IV to Section 300, I.P.C. 26. The medical evidence is that the appellant had inflicted six injuries, out of which at least two were fatal injuries. The appellant did not stop with one stab, but continued to stab the deceased and the only conclusion is that the act of the appellant was done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the appellant shall be punished under Section 304, Part-I, I.P.C., with rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of his payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The period of imprisonment already undergone shall be taken into account for calculating the sentence of imprisonment awarded under this judgment. The appeal is partly allowed as indicated above.