Judgment :- P.D.Dinakaran, J. The revenue is the appellant in this appeal filed against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 'C' Bench, Chennai dated 23.5.2004 made in I.T.A.No.1065/Mds/96, with reference to the assessment year 1990-91. 2.1. The facts of the case, so far as they are relevant are as under: The assessee is a Sugar Mill. For the assessment year 1990-91, the assessee had claimed relief under Section 32AB of the Income Tax Act (for brevity "the Act") to the tune of Rs.9,17,145/-. The Assessing Officer, by order dated 6.11.1995, finding that the assessee had earned interest from Bank Interest which was shown by the assessee as Income from other sources, held that deduction under Section 32AB of the Act is allowable only in respect of the income from the "Profits and Gains of Business" and not from "Income from other sources". 2.2. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax, who by order dated 12.3.1996, confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal of the assessee. 2.3. The assessee preferred a further appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by order dated 23.5.2004, following the decision of the Apex Court in APOLLO TYRES LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2002] 255 ITR 273, allowed the appeal of the assessee. Hence, the revenue has preferred the present appeal on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 32AB of the Act to the extent of Rs.9,17,145, even though interest earned on deposits out of surplus fund is "Income from other sources" is valid in law? and (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in justifying in granting deduction, when the preamble to Section 32AB of the Act clearly indicates that relief is admissible for such profits derived under the head "Profits and Gains from business or profession" is valid in law? 3. The Apex Court in APOLLO TYRES LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2002] 255 ITR 273, held as under: ".. 3. The Apex Court in APOLLO TYRES LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2002] 255 ITR 273, held as under: ".. the business of the assessee company of buying and selling of units was an "eligible business" as contemplated under section 32AB, and the income earned from its investment in the units of the Unit Trust of India had to be included in computing the profits of "eligible business" under Section 32AB. The fact that the income was shown under a different head of income did not deprive the assessee company of the benefit under section 32AB so long as the investment in the units was in the course of its "eligible business"." (emphasis supplied) 4. In CARBORANDUM UNIVERSAL LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2004] 265 ITR 372, this Court, held that: ".. the Assessing Officer had excluded the amount of dividend received as also the income by way of interest and rents by relying on the facts that those incomes were to be taxed under the Act as income from other sources. By doing so, he had failed to give effect to the plain language and the mandate of Section 32AB(3) of the Act." 5. When an identical question, viz., whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that "business profits" for the purpose of Sec.32AB of the Act could include other income such as interest, rent and dividend, was raised for our consideration in T.C.(A) No.801 of 2004, by judgment dated 30.9.2004 (to which I am a party), this Court, following the decision reported in CARBORANDUM UNIVERSAL LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2004] 265 ITR 372, held against the revenue. 6. From the law as enunciated from the decisions, referred to above (i) APOLLO TYRES LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2002] 255 ITR 273; (ii) CARBORANDUM UNIVERSAL LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2004] 265 ITR 372; and (iii) Judgment dated 30.9.2004 made in T.C.(A) No.801 of 2004, we are of the firm opinion that no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.