COMMON ORDER: These two writ petitions arise out of the orders of the Revenue Authorities which were ultimately concluded and confirmed by the Revisional Authority viz., the first respondent herein revision petition Nos.3 and 4 of 1995 dated 5.4.1997. The impugned proceedings related to 59 cents of agricultural dry lands in Survey No.1067/1A at Chinthamani Village and 47 cents of Nanja lands in Survey No.269/ A in Puliankudi Village. The petitioner is common both the writ petitions and the contest was as between the petitioner and his two other elder brothers viz., M/s.Kuthalingam Pillai and Ramaiah Pillai. Respondents 4 to 11 are stated to be the legal heirs of Kuthalingam Pillai, while respondents 13 to 17 are stated to be the legal heirs of the 12th respondent viz., Ramaiah Pillai. 2. Some brief facts which are required to be stated are, that the petitioner and his brothers viz., Kuthalingam Pillai, Ramaiah Pillai and one other person Gopalakrishnan are the sons of one Thiru late Palvannan. There was a partition deed on 19.11.1963 and it is stated that the properties in question were allotted to the share of the father. According to the petitioner, the property situated in Puliankudi village in Survey No.269/ A was subsequently sold to him by his father on 28.5.1973, while the one situated in Survey N.1067/A at Chinthamani Village was settled on him by his father on 6.4.1977. It is also on record that the petitioners moved the Civil Court in O.S.No.42 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sankaran Koil for declaration and recovery of possession, which suit was filed as against the petitioner’s father as well as M/ s.Kuthalingam Pillai and Ramaiah Pillai. The said suit was decreed in his favour of 21.10.1983. It was appealed against by M/s.Kuthalingam Pillai and Ramaiah Pillai as well as others in A.S.No.145 of 1983 which was also dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tenkasi by judgment dated 27.1.1986. There was a second appeal a as against the judgment and decree of the lower Courts in S.A.No.560 of 1986 which was also dismissed by this Court at the admission stage by order dated 27.3.1986. However, the learned Judge observed that any application said to be pending before the concerned Tahsildar, Record of Tenancy Rights can be disposed of in accordance with law irrespective of the dismissal of the second appeal. However, the learned Judge observed that any application said to be pending before the concerned Tahsildar, Record of Tenancy Rights can be disposed of in accordance with law irrespective of the dismissal of the second appeal. It will have to be stated that in the course of hearing of the second appeal, it was stated before this Court that the applications filed by the respondents for registering their names as cultivating tenants came to be dismissed for non-prosecution and that the applications for restoring the same were pending as on the date when the second appeal was disposed of. 3. In the abovesaid background, when we consider the claim of the respondents, I find that only after the dismissal of the second appeal on 27.3.1986, M/s.Kuthalingam Pillai and Ramaiah Pillai moved the Tahsildar, Record of Tenancy Rights under Act XXV of 1955 by way of fresh applications dated 2.6.1986 and 11.7.1986. In the said applications, it was claimed that earlier applications were filed in the year 1978 which were dismissed for default and that necessary applications for restoration were filed subsequently which were not disposed of till that date. The present applications filed by the contesting respondents under Secs.4(2) and 5(2) of the Act were disposed of by the Tahsildar by order dated 31.7.1991 holding that the contesting respondents were validly inducted as cultivating tenants and that therefore they were entitled for protection under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XXV of 1955. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the second respondent, the Special Deputy Collector (Revenue), who also confirmed the order of the Tahsildar, as against which revisions came to be preferred in R.P.Nos.3 and 4 of 1995 before the first respondent viz., The Divisional Revenue Officer, who by the orders impugned in these writ petitions has confirmed the orders of the second and third respondents. 4. Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that by virtue of the nature of the Civil Court decree, the authorities functioning under Act XXV of 1955 ought not to have ventured to declare the rights of the contesting respondents and to hold them as cultivating tenants. According to the learned counsel, the authorities failed to exercise their jurisdiction in the manner known to law and that there was no acceptable material or evidence to support the conclusions reached by the authorities below. According to the learned counsel, the authorities failed to exercise their jurisdiction in the manner known to law and that there was no acceptable material or evidence to support the conclusions reached by the authorities below. The learned counsel would also contend that when once the status of the contesting respondents have been found to be trespassers by the Civil Court, the authorities lacked jurisdiction by the Civil Court, the authorities lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim of the contesting respondents. 5. As against the above submissions, Mr.A.R.Nixon, learned counsel appearing for respondents 4 to 11 and Mr.Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for respondents 13 to 17 would contend that irrespective of the Civil Court decree, the authorities functioning under Act XXV of 1955 had every jurisdiction to deal with the claim of the contesting respondents as cultivating tenants, and that in the absence of any specific issue framed in the suit as to whether the contesting respondents where trespassers, any conclusion on that score by the Civil Court can have no effect on the other authorities. Learned counsel also contended that the claim of the contesting respondents got crystallised long prior to the so called sale deed and the settlement deed of the years 1973 and 1977 respectively and in the circumstances, the declaration of the rights as cultivating tenants by the authorities below cannot be interfered with. It is lastly contended that in any event, if for any reason it were to be held that the authorities failed to adduce appropriate reasoning to support the conclusions and in the event of setting aside of those orders, the matter would be remitted back for fresh consideration. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am convinced that the stand of the petitioner merits acceptance in every respect. In fact Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ramalingam v. District Revenue Officer, A.I.R. 1992 Mad. 97 in support of his submission. In the said decision, the legal position as regards the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under Act XXV of 1995, vis-a-vis, the Civil Court decree has been succinctly set out which requires extraction for our present purpose. The same has been set out in paragraph 8 which reads as under: "8. 97 in support of his submission. In the said decision, the legal position as regards the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under Act XXV of 1995, vis-a-vis, the Civil Court decree has been succinctly set out which requires extraction for our present purpose. The same has been set out in paragraph 8 which reads as under: "8. As far as the relevance of the findings of the Civil Court in respect of the proceedings under the Act is concerned, the matter is not res Integra. A Full Bench of Periathambi Gounder v. District Revenue Officer, (1980)2 M.L.J. 89: A.I.R. 1980 Mad. 180 (F.B.), has taken the view that in all matters which may arise incidental to the determination of the matters mentioned in Sec.3(2) of the Act, the Record Officer or the appellate or revisional authority cannot be said to have exclusive jurisdiction and with reference to such matters, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to have been barred or ousted under Sec.l6-A of the Act. In Balasubramaniam v. Shamsu Thaireez, (1985)98 Mad L. W. 536, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the question once again and held that the Civil Court can go into the jurisdictional issues, which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authority. The Division Bench also came to the conclusion that it would be a different matter if the matter had gone to the Civil Court and a decision had been rendered by the Civil Court and on the questions raised anterior to the decision of the authority under the act, and that in such an event the findings of the Civil Court cannot be ignored. In Palanisami Gounder v. Bhallammal, (1987)10 Mad L.W. 367, Nainar Sundaram, J. who was a party to the Division Bench judgment reported in Balasubramaniam v. Shamsu Thaireez, (1985)98 Mad L.W .536, had occasion to consider the question in the form in which it has been raised before us on behalf of the appellant. The learned Judge declared the position that the authorities functioning under the Act cannot eschew from consideration the decisions of the Civil Court and that they are as much relevant and vital as any other material in adjudicating the rights of parties under the provisions of the Act. The learned Judge declared the position that the authorities functioning under the Act cannot eschew from consideration the decisions of the Civil Court and that they are as much relevant and vital as any other material in adjudicating the rights of parties under the provisions of the Act. In Karuppanna Gounder v. Ammal Appan, (1983)101 Mad L.W. 194, Nainar Sundaram, J. in a second appeal arising out of a suit for injunction had occasion to consider the issue in the light of the earlier judgments and declared the position that unless the primary relief asked for is one of declaration of the status of a party as a cultivating tenant, a suit for injunction cannot be said to be not maintainable in a Civil Court in which incidentally there could be a consideration and finding with reference to the nature and character of possession and status and possession of the parties." 7. Going by the Division Bench judgment, it is clear that while a party may not be able to seek for a declaration of the status of a party as a cultivating tenant in the Civil Court, a suit for declaration cannot be said to be not maintainable in the Civil Court in which, incidentally there can be a consideration and finding with reference to the nature and character of possession and status of the party. In fact, it is also made clear in the above decision that Civil Court decree either filed during the pendency of the applications before the Revenue Authorities or subsequent to that should be given due weight by the authorities concerned who deal with the applications under Act XXV of 1955. 8. In the light of the ratio laid down in the abovesaid Division Bench judgment, when we consider the case on hand, even though the contesting respondents would claim that their application under Act XXV of 1955 were pending as on the date when the second Appeal came to be disposed of, it will have to be held that such a stand of the contesting respondents cannot be accepted. It is their own case that the present impugned orders came to be passed in the applications filed by the contesting respondents on 2.6.1986 and 11.7.1986 respectively. It is their own case that the present impugned orders came to be passed in the applications filed by the contesting respondents on 2.6.1986 and 11.7.1986 respectively. Even though they made a reference to some earlier applications filed by them in the year 1978, it will have to be held that those petitioners came to be dismissed, long before the filing of the present applications. In fact, it can never be held that the present applications were continuation of the earlier proceedings. In any event, such a claim will not also improve the case of the contesting respondents. 9. The claim of the contesting respondents before the respondents 1 to 3 was that they were validly inducted as tenants by their father Mr.Palvannam. As against the abovesaid claim, according to the petitioner, after the partition on 19.11.1963, he become the owner by virtue of a sale deed executed by his father on 28.5.1973 in respect of the lands situated in Survey No.269/ A, as well as based on the settlement deed executed by the father on 6.11.1977 in respect of the lands situated in Survey No.1067/1 A. As regards the abovesaid rival claims, there is absolutely no valid consideration or reasons in the orders impugned in these writ petitions. On the other hand, the correctness of the said claim made by the petitioner was considered threadbare in the civil suit filed by the petitioner in O.S.No.42 of 1980 as well as in A.S.No.145 of 1983 preferred by the contesting respondents. 10. When we apply the Division Bench judgment to the facts of this case, I find that the conclusions so reached by the trial Court as well as by the lower Appellate Court was perfectly in order. It cannot be held that ‘the nature of declaration made and the findings rendered for granting the relief of Recovery of possession by the Civil Court was not in derogation of the scope of consideration to be made as per the provisions contained in Act XXV of 1955. In fact, such a right claimed by the petitioner in the civil suit, could have been deal with only by the Civil Court and there could have been no scope for the respondents 1 to 3 to deal with those issues. 11. In fact, such a right claimed by the petitioner in the civil suit, could have been deal with only by the Civil Court and there could have been no scope for the respondents 1 to 3 to deal with those issues. 11. The contention that in the absence of a specific issue as regards the trespass, the Civil Court ought not to have rendered a finding, it will have to be stated that the said discussion and conclusions by the Civil Court was necessitated in order to render a finding for the purpose of granting the relief to the petitioner insofar as it related to recovery of possession. When the suit for declaration and recovery of possession as claimed by the petitioner based on the sale deed and the settlement deed executed by his father was fully maintainable, the consequential con- clusions of the Civil Court were inevitable and such conclusion virtually non-suited the contesting respondents in so far as their claim made under Act XXV of 1955. I say so because when once the status of the contesting respondents as regards their possession was found to be unlawful, which conclusions came to be rendered based on the acceptable legal evidence, that by itself would exclude the jurisdiction of respondents 1 to 3 to deal with the claim of the respondents on the basis that they were validly inducted as cultivating tenants into the lands. In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in the decision referred to above has made it clear that the Decree of the Civil Court should not be ignored while dealing with the applications under the said Act. Unfortunately, such an approach was never made by the concerned authorities. On that the said authorities, inasmuch as, it does not require any further detailed investigation or examination in order to render a binding decision in these writ petitions which has arisen out of the orders of the respondents 1 to 3 impugned in these writ petitions. Unfortunately, such an approach was never made by the concerned authorities. On that the said authorities, inasmuch as, it does not require any further detailed investigation or examination in order to render a binding decision in these writ petitions which has arisen out of the orders of the respondents 1 to 3 impugned in these writ petitions. Therefore, going by the available materials on record, when the statutes of the contesting respondents as regards the possession has been found to be wholly unauthorised by the Civil Court, which decision is binding on the concerned parties and which is also to be taken note of by the concerned authorities while dealing with the applications filed under Act XXV of 1955, the conclusion is inescapable that the petitioner alone is entitled to retain the contesting respondents herein. Therefore, the orders impugned in the writ petitions cannot be sustained under Act XXV of 1955 and the same are liable to be set aside and they are accordingly set aside. The writ petitions stand allowed. No costs.