M. KATJU, ACJ. By means of aforesaid two appeals the petitioner employee as well as the District Judge, Ballia have challenged parts of the impugned judgment and order dated 10-1-2001 rendered by the learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 54434 of 1999. 2. The petitioner-employee while assailing the order of the learned District Judge dated 17-12-1999 (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition) had pleaded in the petition that he was appointed as a paid apprentice Clerk in the Judgeship of District Ballia as back as 11-9-1981 on ad-hoc basis. Since then he had been working in the establishment for intermittent periods till he took the competitive test for regular selection as a departmental candidate in the year 1983. He succeeded and his name appeared in the list of selected candidates notified in the result sheet. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had already approached the administrative side of this Court after he was ceased from work w. e. f. 1-9-1982 which representation after due consideration was allowed by the Court and order communicated vide letter dated 15-10-1986 (Annexure 2 to the Writ Petition) directing the District Judge that the representation of the petitioner was allowed as a consequence whereof he would be employed in the Judgeship as a special case. This direction of the High Court given to the District Judge, Ballia was complied with and he was given employment in pursuance thereto w. e. f. 21-10-1986. He continued working on the post of Clerk till 7-4-1987. Meanwhile a dispute of seniority of the petitioner with one A. K. Pandey arose in the establishment, which was referred to this Court which was settled on the administrative side vide order dated 25-1-1988 (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition ). The District Judge, Ballia by the aforesaid order dated 25-1-1988 was asked to place the petitioner over the name of A. K. Pandey in the gradation list of the Judgeship. This letter in fact, while treating the petitioner as senior to A. K. Pandey, crystallized his status in the establishment of Class III employees of the Judgeship which position of a regularly appointed Clerk in the establishment he enjoyed till passing of the impugned order of the respondent- District Judge. This letter in fact, while treating the petitioner as senior to A. K. Pandey, crystallized his status in the establishment of Class III employees of the Judgeship which position of a regularly appointed Clerk in the establishment he enjoyed till passing of the impugned order of the respondent- District Judge. Moreover, as stated in para-8 of the writ petition, the High Court on administrative side further recognized the seniority of the petitioner in the establishment of the Judgeship when it rejected the representations of several Clerks who included Pashupati Nath and 17 others as communicated to the District Judge vide letter dated 25-8-1988 (Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition ). It was stated therein that those representations regarding seniority dispute with the petitioner-R. N. Chaubey had been rejected after careful consideration. In para-9 of the petition it was stated that the petitioner was confirmed on his post vide order dated 4-2-1991. 3. After a lapse of about 13 years of the petitioner having served on the establishment of the Judgeship of Ballia as a Clerk, the present episode of misfortune for the petitioner commenced when the District Judge served him with a show cause notice dated 16-11-1999 (Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition) after the entire seniority dispute and the controversy regarding status of the petitioner had been settled under the aforesaid directions issued by the High Court on the administrative side. Thereafter before a reply to the show cause notice could be submitted by the petitioner for want of certain copies of documents and inspection of the record demanded by him (Annexures 7 to 9), the impugned order was passed altering his status from a regular and confirmed Clerk in the establishment to the position of a petty ad-hoc employee in the Judgeship. In addition to the said direction a recovery of the sum of Rs. 90,273/-was also issued. 4. The petitioner having been genuinely aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the respondent, preferred this petition praying for quashing of the impugned order dated 17-12-1999 and also for a direction to restrain the respondent from interfering in payment of his salary in the then pay scale of Rs. 4000- 6000/ -. 5. 90,273/-was also issued. 4. The petitioner having been genuinely aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the respondent, preferred this petition praying for quashing of the impugned order dated 17-12-1999 and also for a direction to restrain the respondent from interfering in payment of his salary in the then pay scale of Rs. 4000- 6000/ -. 5. The aforesaid petition was contested and a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent- District Judge (appellant in Special Appeal No. 151 of 2001) admitting that the petitioner was appointed as ad-hoc Clerk in the Judgeship on 15-9-1981 and served for intermittent period upto 31-8-1982. His status all through remained that of an ad-hoc employee. The respondent however admits that the direction given vide letter dated 15-10-1986 (Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition) was to give employment to the petitioner as a special case. It also admits that the other letters communicating the directions of the High Court on the administrative side dated 25-1-1988 (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition) was received but the same was presumably given because the Court was not posted with the relevant facts relating to the petitioners employment in the Judgeship and there was no occasion for deciding any seniority dispute of the petitioner on the administrative side by the High Court. In paras 9 and 10 of the counter affidavit it is pleaded that since full and correct facts were not available with the Court and hence the said direction cannot be treated to be of any advantage to the petitioner. In para-11 of the counter affidavit, the respondent did not admit the contents of para-9 of the petition wherein it was contended that the petitioner was confirmed on his post vide order dated 4-2-1991. It was further stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner was never eligible for regular appointment at any point of time during the period he served in the Judgeship and his regularization could not be done in accordance with the relevant rules. He was not entitled to any seniority and he always had the status of an employee not beyond what he was treated by the respondent-District Judge while passing the impugned order dated 17-12-1999. 6. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed reiterating the facts stated in the petition and controverting what has been pleaded in the counter affidavit. He was not entitled to any seniority and he always had the status of an employee not beyond what he was treated by the respondent-District Judge while passing the impugned order dated 17-12-1999. 6. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed reiterating the facts stated in the petition and controverting what has been pleaded in the counter affidavit. The facts of the regular appointment in view of the directions issued by the Court on administrative side and subsequent confirmation of the petitioner in the year 1991 were also reiterated. 7. The learned Single Judge, after having considered the respective cases of the parties, partly allowed the petition and modified the impugned order of the respondent-District Judge giving direction that no recovery of the sum of Rs. 90,273/-would be made from the salary of the petitioner but he however dismissed the Writ Petition for other relief whereby it was sought to set aside the directions given by the District Judge treating the petitioner as an ad-hoc employee in the Judgeship. 8. We have heard Sri R. N. Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri G. K. Singh, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner appellant of Special Appeal No. 30/2001 and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-appellant of Special Appeal No. 151 of 2001. We have also called for the original record of the petition and have thoroughly gone through the entire record of the case. 9. The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned judgment has dwelt upon the propriety of treating the petitioner as a regularly appointed employee in the establishment of the Judgeship and has tried to demonstrate that the entire service career of the petitioner since 1981 till 1999 when the impugned order was passed by the District Judge, Ballia was hardly of any avail for treating him as regularly appointed employee on the establishment. The learned Single Judge has not looked into the aspect about gross legal impropriety committed by the District Judge in ignoring the directions given by this Court on the administrative side vide two letters dated 15-10-1986 (Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition) and 25-1-1988 (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition ). In any view of the matter, it is quite apparent from the impugned order of the District Judge that he has deliberately bypassed the specific directions of this Court while passing the said orders referred to above. In any view of the matter, it is quite apparent from the impugned order of the District Judge that he has deliberately bypassed the specific directions of this Court while passing the said orders referred to above. These directions were for giving employment to the petitioner on the establishment of the Judgeship and thereafter deciding his seniority in the gradation list of the Clerks of the Judgeship. Both the directions of this Court were complied with in letter and spirit by the erstwhile District Judges and no attempt was made at any point of time before this impugned order was passed by the respondent to post the administrative side of this Court about the real facts and figures which find passing reference in Paras 9 and 10 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the responded. As to whether or not there was an occasion for deciding the seniority of the petitioner and also for giving him employment in the Judgeship, nothing was stated and no finger was raised at any point of time since 1986 to 1999. For a reasonably long period of about 13 years the petitioner had served the Judgeship with all his capability and sincerity at his command. 10. Soon after the petitioners seniority was decided by this Court on the administrative side and communicated to the District Judge, Ballia vide letter dated 25-1-1988 (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition), there had been representations of Pashupati Nath and 18 others who were questioning the said decision. Those representations contained all the facts and figures, and the representations were considered carefully by the High Court and have been rejected and communicated to the District Judge vide aforesaid letter dated 25-8-1988. The then District Judge however, at that point of time also did not speak out or communicate such facts to the High Court as to afford occasion on the administrative side of the Court to alter its decision/direction dated 25-1-1988 and 25-8-1988 (Annexures 3 and 4 to the Writ Petition ). A period of 13 years during which the petitioner had enjoyed the status of regularly appointed and confirmed employee on the establishment of the Judgeship, is a reasonably long period to entitle him to negate all sorts of objections howsoever potent it may be against his status in the service. A period of 13 years during which the petitioner had enjoyed the status of regularly appointed and confirmed employee on the establishment of the Judgeship, is a reasonably long period to entitle him to negate all sorts of objections howsoever potent it may be against his status in the service. Obviously, a sudden development created by entertaining objections from those employees whose contentions had already been negatived by this Court on the administrative side, was a highly improper act on the part of the District Judge who could go to the extent of passing the impugned order treating the petitioner as an ad-hoc employee in total disregard to the directions given by this Court and already acted upon by his predecessor District Judges. 11. While holding the aforesaid view in the present matter, we have given serious consideration to the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge, while justifying the order of the District Judge, passed in total disregard and defiance of the directions given by this Court on the administrative side, has tried to project that the very birth of the petitioner in service was wholly against the rules and regulations and the respective orders made for his appointment and fixation of his seniority in the cadre of Class III employees on the establishment was not in accordance with the U. P. Subordinate Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 and the Rules regarding the regularization of service of ad-hoc employees in U. P. 12. Be that as it may, the order of this Court on the administrative side referred to above, passed with regard to employment and seniority of the petitioner had not been challenged for a long period of 13 years before any competent Court of law. In such circumstances, even illegal orders and decisions taken by the authorities cannot be said to be non existent and the co-employees who have preferred to challenge it after such a long gap before the District Judge cannot be said to have any right to assail it at that point of time. In such a situation the direction of this Court for giving employment to the petitioner and further direction to give him a particular placement in the gradation list, cannot be said to be an order suffering from infirmity. In such a situation the direction of this Court for giving employment to the petitioner and further direction to give him a particular placement in the gradation list, cannot be said to be an order suffering from infirmity. If in fact, the aggrieved co-employees were aggrieved, they should have approached the competent authority or Court of law to challenge those orders communicated to the District Judge, Ballia. The respondent District Judge while passing the impugned order was not competent to avoid the directions of this Court given in relation to the employment of the petitioner. Whether or not the petitioners employment in the Judgeship and his subsequent confirmation and placement in the gradation list was in accordance with the relevant Rules and regulations was not a question to be considered by the District Judge at the time when he passed the impugned order after about 13 years of the directions given by this Court, nor was it proper for the learned Single Judge to justify the impugned order passed by the respondent. In Halsburys Laws of England 4th Edition, (Reissue) Volume 1 (1) in para-26, page 31, it is stated: "if an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes: and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved. " 13. Likewise in the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edition, at pages 259-260, the law is stated thus: "the erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and voidable decisions. The Courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarized as follows: (1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a Court of competent jurisdiction. " Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edition -1994, have stated the law thus at pages 341-342 : ". . . . . . . . . . every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. " Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edition -1994, have stated the law thus at pages 341-342 : ". . . . . . . . . . every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage Lord Radcliffe said : An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects. " 14. The aforesaid statements of law have been extracted in a decision of the Apex Court given in State of Kerala v. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and Ors. , reported in J. T. 1995 (8) S. C. 533. 15. The view taken by the Apex Court in this case fortifies our view that the decision of this Court taken in the case of the petitioner on the administrative side and communicated to the District Judge, Ballia could not be disregarded by the respondent while serving as a Judge subordinate to this Court. The decision taken by the Court in the year 1986 and 1988 and duly acted upon by the respondents predecessors District Judges about more than a decade earlier could not be so lightly reviewed by the District Judge, rather the respondent was wholly incompetent to take such a decision in blatant disregard to the directives given by the Court. 16. In Dr. 16. In Dr. M. S. Mudhol and another v. S. D. Halegkar & others, reported in 1993 (2) E. S. C. 245 (S. C.), the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar matter has held that if an employee is holding the post for the last 12 years though without having requisite academic qualification, he could not be disturbed from the said position at this late stage and he was not at fault when the selection was made. Para-6 of the judgment of the Apex Court reads as below: "since we find that it was the default on the part of the 2nd respondent, Director of Education in illegally approving the appointment of the first respondent in 1981 although he did not have the requisite academic qualifications as a result of which the 1st respondent has continued to hold the said post for the last 12 years now, it would be inadvisable to disturb him from the said post at this late stage particularly when he was not at fault when his selection was made. There is nothing on record to show that he had at that time projected his qualifications other than what he possessed. If, therefore, in spite of placing all his cards before the selection committee the selection committee for some reason or the other had thought it fit to choose him for the post and the 2nd respondent had chosen to acquiesce in the appointment, it would be inequitous to make him suffer for the same now. Illegality, if any, was committed by the selection committee and the 2nd respondent. They are alone to be blamed for the same. " Likewise a Division Bench of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Srivastava v. District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur, now Maharajganj, 1994 ACJ 781, has held that even if the appointment of an employee is bad on account of violation of the rules and regulations for such employment but if he has worked for about 12 years, his removal from the employment or disturbing him in his status would be highly unfair. Para-3 of the judgment is quoted below: "it is true that the appointment of the appellant was in violation of Regulation 4 of Chapter III and was as such, illegal, but he has worked in the institution from 1971 to 1978, when his service was terminated. Para-3 of the judgment is quoted below: "it is true that the appointment of the appellant was in violation of Regulation 4 of Chapter III and was as such, illegal, but he has worked in the institution from 1971 to 1978, when his service was terminated. But this order of termination was stayed by this Court, on account of which he continued to work upto the time when his writ petition was dismissed in August 1991. It will be highly unfair to remove a person from service after about 20 years, on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal. Division Bench of this Court in Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, 1990 (1) UPLBEC 189 (supra) has held that it will be unfair and unjust to unsettle the career of an employee who has worked for about eight year. In Smt. Rani Srtvastava v. State of U. P. (supra) another Division Bench did not permit the appointment of Head Mistress to be put to an end after five years, even though there was infirmity in making her appointment. Supreme Court in Dr. M. S. Mudhok v. S. D. Halegkar (supra) has observed that it would be undesirable to disturb a principal after 12 years on the ground that he was not eligible at the time of his appointment, because it would be inequitous to make him suffer after such a long time. " 17. It is not disputed that the petitioner was given employment on ad-hoc basis in the year 1981 in the Judgeship. Thereafter for intermittent periods he worked and then was ceased to work. Later on, under the directions given by this Court on the administrative side in the year 1986, he was asked to be taken in the employment of Judgeship as a special case and the order was compiled with. Later on, again in the year 1988 his representation regarding seniority was decided by this Court and communicated to the respondent, which too was complied with by the District Judge. As a result he remained all through in service as a regularly appointed employee on the establishment since 1986 and meanwhile also enjoying his promotion as and when he was found fit for the same. As a result he remained all through in service as a regularly appointed employee on the establishment since 1986 and meanwhile also enjoying his promotion as and when he was found fit for the same. All of a sudden and abruptly his status could not be altered by an order coming from the District Judges pen passed in total disregard to the directions given by this Court. We are surprised as to how such an order could be found legally justifiable by the learned Single Judge. 18. By passing the impugned order, the respondent-District Judge has also conducted himself in utter violation of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the High Court to exercise complete administrative control over the subordinate Courts. This control also extends to all functionaries attached to the said Courts including the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate Courts. 19. In a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in The State of West Bengal & another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 S. C. 447, there is a categorical finding that the word court is used in Article 235 of the Constitution of India compendiously denotes not only to the Court proper but also the Presiding Judge. The latter part of Article 235 talks of the man who holds the post. In this Constitution Bench judgment several decisions rendered in different cases by different High Courts including that of Calcutta (N. N. Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, AIR 1961 Cal. 1 ) and Andhra Pradesh (Mohd. Ghouse v. State of A. P. , AIR 1959 A. P. 497) have been discussed and approved. In the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mahomed Ghouse v. State of A. P. (supra), Article 235 has been interpreted as including not only the person presiding over that Court but also all the functionaries of that Court and any matters pertaining thereto. When such interpretation given by the Andhra Pradesh has been approved in Bagchis case (supra) it should be deemed that the Supreme Court has also given the same interpretation to the latter part of Article 235. As a settled interpretation the term court is used in the widest sense and it is not confined only to the Presiding Judge but also includes other functionaries and ministerial staff. As a settled interpretation the term court is used in the widest sense and it is not confined only to the Presiding Judge but also includes other functionaries and ministerial staff. Such a view has also been adopted while interpreting the latter part of Article 235 of the Constitution of India by the Gujarat High Court in the case of R. M. Gajjar v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1978 Gujarat 102 (FB) and Punjab & Haryana High Court in Shri Amar Singh v. The Chief Justice, Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh & others, AIR 1976 Punjab & Haryana 215 (FB ). The Punjab & Haryana High Court at page 220, in the aforesaid decision has very clearly held that the control vested in High Court squarely extends to the Presiding Officers and also to functionaries and ministerial staff attached to the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the aforesaid case of R. M. Gajjar (supra) while relying upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Bagchis case (supra) and also upon the Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Amar Singhs case (supra) has observed: "both on principle and authority, we must, therefore, answer the second question by holding that the control vested in the High Courts under Article 235 of the Constitution is exercisable not only over members of the judicial service of the State as defined under Article 236 (b) but even the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate Courts are also ultimately subject to such control. " 20. This administrative control of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary of the State is in furtherance of the administration of justice and such control in the real sense of the term is to be taken as complete control. 21. The aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bagchis case (supra) as well as another Constitution Bench judgment given in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court and another, AIR 1974 S. C. 710, makes the position fully crystallized that the legislative intention of the framers of the Constitution was quite clear on the point that the functioning of the judiciary in the country has to be kept wholly independent. For this purpose, the complete administrative control including control over the functionaries attached to the subordinate Courts has to be included while giving administrative control to the High Court over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in the aforesaid view of the matter if the High Court takes a decision on its administrative side that the particular individual is to be taken on the establishment of the ministerial staff of a District Court it becomes imperative on the part of the District Judge to comply with those instructions because the order passed in that context is by virtue of the administrative power conferred upon the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India and is binding on the District Court. It is in the aforesaid background that the predecessor District Judges of the respondent had complied and given effect to the orders passed by the High Court on 15-10-1986 (Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition) and 25-1-1988 (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition ). If after a lapse of 13 years long period, the respondent has opted to bypass those decisions and the directions given by this Court relating to the petitioners employment, obviously he has acted in complete violation of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. 22. The learned Single Judge has altogether overlooked this aspect of the matter and has simply tried to find one or the other reason for justifying the whole illegal order passed by the District Judge, which is patently violative of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. 23. Thus, on the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the employees petition challenging the order of District Judge dated 17-12-1999 (Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition) treating him as an ad-hoc employee in the lowest grade, cannot be legally sustained, and is set aside. 24. The appeal of the petitioner-employee thus deserves to be allowed and the relief sought for in the petition should be, and is, granted. As regards the Appeal of the respondent District Judge, it lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 25. 24. The appeal of the petitioner-employee thus deserves to be allowed and the relief sought for in the petition should be, and is, granted. As regards the Appeal of the respondent District Judge, it lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 25. The Special Appeal No. 30 of 2001 is hereby allowed and the appellants petition for the relief of quashing the impugned order of the District Judge dated 17-12-1999 (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition) and for a writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondent from interfering with the payment of salary to the petitioner in pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000/-is also allowed. The impugned order dated 17- 12-1999 (Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition) is hereby quashed and a direction in the nature of mandamus is issued to the respondent to restore the status-quo ante with regard to the payment of salary to the petitioner in the pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000/-which he was drawing at the time of passing of the impugned order. The respondent shall also grant all consequential benefits which had become due to the petitioner after passing of the aforesaid impugned order, deeming it that the said order was not passed. The appellant-writ petitioner will also be paid arrears with interest at the rate of 10% per annum within 3 months from the date of this judgment. 26. The Special Appeal No. 151 of 2001 of the respondent is hereby dismissed. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to cost. Appeal dismissed. .