JUDGMENT 1. - The suit for eviction, inter alia on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement, and recovery of arrears of rent filed by the plaintiff-respondent was decreed by the Addl. District Judge No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 16.2.1991. The learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the Civil First Appeal on 3.7.2000 filed by the tenant-defendant and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Hence, this special appeal filed by the tenant. 2. Briefly put, the plaintiff-respondent filed the suit aforesaid on 8.3.1982 with the averments in the plaint that on the first floor of the premises situated at 62 Shopping Centre, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, three rooms, kitchen, latrine and bathroom were taken on rent by the defendant from him on 1.9.1980 at a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-. According to the plaintiff, advance rent for the month of September, 1980 of Rs. 750/- was paid on 1.9.1980 and receipt was obtained. However, the tenant did not make payment of any further rent and the rent was due from the month of October, 1980. Alleging default in payment of rent for over six months; the plaintiff averred that he was entitled to evict the tenant on the ground of default. The plaintiff also averred that in the land in question, the plaintiff and his brothers Chiranjilal, Banshidhar, Narainlal and Govind Prasad were co-owners and all the brothers were carrying on business in the State of Assam and by rotation residing at Jaipur with their families. According to the plaintiff, the premises in which he was residing was not sufficient for the whole family and the demised premises were required by him for himself and his brothers. The plaintiff also averred his suffering greater hardship for want of accommodation. 3. The defendant contested the suit on several scores. He averred in the written statement that the plot in question was of Jamna Devi and the plaintiff was living on rent in this house and also recovering rent. It has been alleged that the suit premises were taken on rent on 1.9.1980 at a monthly rent of Rs. 251/- only and not Rs. 750/- per month. According to the defendant, the premises were earlier on rent with one Vimla Devi Somani at the monthly rent of Rs. 251/-only. He had made the payment of the rent of Rs. It has been alleged that the suit premises were taken on rent on 1.9.1980 at a monthly rent of Rs. 251/- only and not Rs. 750/- per month. According to the defendant, the premises were earlier on rent with one Vimla Devi Somani at the monthly rent of Rs. 251/-only. He had made the payment of the rent of Rs. 251/- for the month of September, 1980 but no receipt was given. The defendant denied his having committed any default and averred that rent was sent by money order which was returned back and then the rent was deposited under section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act'). The defendant denied the averments regarding reasonable and bona fide necessity and averred that the house which is referred by the plaintiff to be available with the defendant was with him before taking the suit premises on rent and in those premises, the defendant was running a workshop and was not used for residence. 4. The plaintiff by way of rejoiner asserted the rate of rent to be Rs. 750/-per month and denied the averments regarding money order and deposit in the Court under section 19-A of the Act. 5. The learned trial Court framed seven issues for determination of the questions involved in the case. Issue No. 1 on the question about rate of rent and issue No. 2 on the question of default were framed. Issue No. 3 on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity, issue No, 4 on the question of comparative hardship and issue No. 7 on the question of partial eviction were framed. Issue No. 5 was framed on the question as to whether other brothers of the plaintiff were necessary parties and issue No. 6 as to whether defendant was entitled for special costs? 6. After evidence of the parties, the learned trial Court took up the decision on the issues. On issue No. 1, the learned trial Judge considered the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties and found that by the documentary evidence (Ex.1) and so also the statements of independent witnesses, Chouthmal and Banshidhar, the rate of rent of Rs. 750/- per month was established. On issue No. 1, the learned trial Judge considered the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties and found that by the documentary evidence (Ex.1) and so also the statements of independent witnesses, Chouthmal and Banshidhar, the rate of rent of Rs. 750/- per month was established. The learned trial Judge also considered the fact that the alleged previous tenant Vimla Devi was the Aunt of the defendant and this material witness was not produced by him. The learned trial Judge also took into consideration the location and extent of the premises comprising of three rooms, kitchen, latrine and bathroom at important locality of Shastri Nagar in Jaipur and found that rate of rent cannot be believed to be Rs. 250/- per month. In the over all circumstances, issue No.1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff. With the rate of rent having been found to be Rs. 750/- per month, the alleged money orders and deposits under section 19-A at the rate of Rs. 251/- per month were held to be of no avail and the defendant was held to be defaulter in payment of rent in issue No. 2. The question in issue No. 5 about the other brothers of the plaintiff to be necessary parties was also decided against the defendant as he has admitted to have taken the premises on rent from the plaintiff and thus the plaintiff was the landlord under the Act. 7. The question of reasonable and bona fide necessarily was considered in issue No. 3 and the learned trial Judge after thorough appreciation of the evidence on record found that the plaintiff has been able to establish the total number of family members to be about 28 which includes brothers of the plaintiff and their children and the plaintiff having only a five bed rooms accommodation was in need of additional premises. 8. While considering the question of comparative hardship in issue No. 4, the learned trial Judge considered the fact that defendant was having other premises available with him near the suit premises in which he has alleged to have established a factory. The said premises were not fit to be occupied for residence was not established and looking at the need asserted by the plaintiff, the trial Judge weighed comparative position of the parties and found the plaintiff to be suffering more hardship. The said premises were not fit to be occupied for residence was not established and looking at the need asserted by the plaintiff, the trial Judge weighed comparative position of the parties and found the plaintiff to be suffering more hardship. The learned trial Judge also found that the need of the plaintiff would not be satisfied by partial eviction. In view of the findings on issues No. 3, 4 & 7, the plaintiff was found to be entitled to the decree for eviction and defendant's claim for compensatory costs was required to be rejected. The learned trial Court therefore passed the decree for eviction and for arrears of rent while permitting adjustment of the rent previously deposited by the defendant-tenant Under Section 19-A & 19-CC and so also Ids. 13(4) of the Act during pendency of the suit. 9. The defendant-appellant challenged the decree passed by the learned trial Court in First Appeal No. 65/1991. The learned Single Judge took up again the decision of the case issue wise and with further analytical discussion of the oral and documentary evidence on record found that the premises were taken on rent at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month. Accordingly, the deposit Under Section 19-A & 19-C was also held to be invalid. The plaintiff was held to be the landlord on issue No. 5. While considering the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity, the learned Single Judge considered the entire evidence over again and found that by the evidence of the plaintiff, it was categorically established that plaintiff required the suit premises reasonable and bona fide. The learned Judge affirmed the findings on issue No. 3 so also on issue No. 4 & 7. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were therefore affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs. 10. The appellant tenant has attempted to assail the concurrent findings by the learned trial Judge and the learned first appellate Judge primarily on the ground that admittedly, the plaintiff and his brother were living in Assam and the need as put forward by the plaintiff of visiting Jaipur by rotation cannot be believed. It has also been suggested that brothers and their family cannot be said to be the members of the family for the purposes of grounds mentioned in Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. It has also been suggested that brothers and their family cannot be said to be the members of the family for the purposes of grounds mentioned in Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. This appeal remained part heard on 30.9.2004 and was ordered to be listed for completion of arguments on 13.10.2004. Learned counsel for the appellant in the meantime has submitted an affidavit of the appellant to the following effect : "1. That I do not have any residential place in Jaipur except the above mentioned address, where I am living presently as tenant. 2. That I do not own any residential house in Jaipur, or any of my relatives have any residential house of their own in Jaipur. 3. That I have a house in Islampur, Distt. Jhunjhunu which is a joint Hindu property and I have only one room for my share." 11. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and have scanned through the material on record and pondered over the matter. 12. For the purposes of deciding this appeal, we may take up the questions involved in the appeal issue wise. The finding of fact on issue No. 1 has rightly been arrived at by both the Courts regarding the rate of rent to be Rs. 750/- per month. The appellant attempted to allege the rate of rent to be Rs. 251/- per month and for this purpose, the rate of rent of previous tenant Vimla Devi was relied upon, however, this tenant Vimla Devi who was none other than Aunt (father's sister) of the appellant was not produced in evidence. The premises were taken on rent in the month of September, 1980 and from the next month of October, 1980 itself, the rent has been allegedly sent by money order and then deposited in the Court under section 19-A (at the rate of Rs. 251/- per month). The concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Courts after thorough and complete analysis of the evidence on record including receipt Ex.1 does not suffer from any illegality or any error of law. As a necessary corollary, the defendant having failed to make payment of the agreed rent, rightly been found to be defaulter in payment of rent in issue No. 2. 13. As a necessary corollary, the defendant having failed to make payment of the agreed rent, rightly been found to be defaulter in payment of rent in issue No. 2. 13. Before adverting to the core question involved in the case regarding reasonable and bona fide necessity, we may refer to the issue No. 5 in this case. The plaintiff has asserted in the plaint that suit property was of co-ownership of himself and his brothers. It remains undeniable that the defendant-tenant has taken the premises on tenant from the plaintiff. However, issue No.5 was framed on the question whether the brothers were necessary parties in the suit? The learned Courts have rightly decided that the plaintiff being the landlord was entitled to maintain the suit. We may point out that Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with such plea of necessity of joining other co-owners as parties in the landlord tenant dispute has explained the principles of law in detail in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath & Ors. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 184 and has held thus : "The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owner as such." (para 14) 14. The principles has been further explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) & Ors., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 178 . The relevant part could be usefully extracted hereunder:- "It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. [See Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath & Dhannalal Kalawatibai, SCC para 25 . This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement." (Para 6) 15. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement." (Para 6) 15. The disagreement of other co-owners or any conflict of interest has not even been remotely suggested, what to say of establishing the same. We are clearly of the opinion that the very plea raised by the defendant-tenant was fundamentally misconceived and has rightly been negatived by the two Courts. 16. Now, coming to the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement (issue No. 3), we find that both the learned trial Judge and learned first appellate Judge have meticulously and objectively considered the evidence on record and have found proved as a fact that premises was required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord. Considering the submissions on the part of tenant-appellant, in our opinion, merely because in the need stated by the landlord, permanent occupancy be one set of family has not been stated does not nullify the requirement nor is sufficient to draw any inference against the plaintiff. On the contrary, it has been averred and proved that brother and their family were coming to Jaipur from Assam in rotation and the premises available with him were not sufficient to meet the requirement of the vast and expanding family. Amongst other, it has also been established that plaintiff has two married sons and there were three college going children and eight other school going children of the plaintiff and his brothers. The factum of brothers and their family members visiting Jaipur and staying for sufficiently long duration has not been denied by the defendant-tenant and on the contrary, the learned Courts have noticed that plaintiff has not been cross-examined on these significant facts. Further, the defendant himself has admitted in his statement that although the members of family were living in Assam but they do visit this place and one brother was living here at Jaipur). The facts established by the plaintiff leave no manner of doubt that requirement put forward by the plaintiff is reasonable as well as bona fide. 17. Further, the defendant himself has admitted in his statement that although the members of family were living in Assam but they do visit this place and one brother was living here at Jaipur). The facts established by the plaintiff leave no manner of doubt that requirement put forward by the plaintiff is reasonable as well as bona fide. 17. The plaintiff has been able to establish the element of need, much beyond mere desire by the further evidence to the effect that sometimes for want of accommodation, the members of the family of the plaintiff would make night stay at the residence of Banshidhar, PW 3. 18. The defendant has not been able to show even remotely that the need put forward by the plaintiff was actuated by any extraneous consideration or with any oblique motive. That being the position, we are clearly of the opinion that need stated by the plaintiff cannot be taken to be mere pretence or a pretext to secure eviction. In our opinion, two Courts have rightly arrived at the conclusion of bona fide requirement and we are satisfied that on the given facts, the need to occupy the premises is nature, real, sincere and honest. The tests for judging such requirement as explained by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Ramdas v. Ishwarchand, (1988) 3 SCC 131 and so also Shivswaroop v. Maheshchand, (1999) 6 SCC 222 have been clearly and correctly applied in the present case. 19. The question of other brothers being not the members of the family does not detain us at all as ground of eviction under section 13(1)(h) of the Act, inter alia, provides for reasonable and bona fide requirement by the landlord (i) for the use and occupation of himself or his family. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff has proved his own need to occupy the premises, the plaintiff and his brothers have been shown to be the members of the Hindu Undivided Family, and therefore, the plaintiff was certainly entitle d to seek eviction under section 13(1)th) of the Act. 20. We may further point out that the word 'family' having not been defined in the Act, for the purposes of Section 13(1)(h) of the Act, has been consistently explained by this Court to be given extensive and workable meaning. As back as in the case Lalchand v. Mst. 20. We may further point out that the word 'family' having not been defined in the Act, for the purposes of Section 13(1)(h) of the Act, has been consistently explained by this Court to be given extensive and workable meaning. As back as in the case Lalchand v. Mst. Mohini Bai, 1962 RLW 693 , the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed that broadly speaking the word 'family' would include a person's wife or husband and their children; or his or her parents living with them as members of a common household; his or her brothers and sisters constituting a joint Hindu Family; a widowed daughter or her children etc. The learned Judge observed that there appeared to be consensus of judicial opinion that as used in the context, the term 'family' should be given broad and liberal meaning. The cases of Radhavallabh v. Damodardas, 1964 RLW 587 , Abdul Hafiz Khan v. Jethu Ram, 1981 WLN (UC) 401 and Sardar Dan Singh v. Sardar Bhag Singh, 1999 DNJ (Raj.) 153 could be cited as a few other examples where the narrow interpretation to the word 'family' has not been countenanced and the persons otherwise not answering to the technical meaning of the word `family' have been accepted to be the members of the family for the purposes of Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. 21. For the purposes of this aspect of the 'requirement' of the landlord under the rent legislation, the principles of interpretation relating to such provisions have been explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 . Although in the case of Joginder Pal (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was concerned with provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 wherein this ground of eviction is couched in the language that for a non-residential building, the landlord has to show "if he requires it for his own use.". The words "own use" given a literal meaning would be much narrower than "family". The words "own use" given a literal meaning would be much narrower than "family". However, the Hon'ble Apex Court, even while dealing with this phraseology of 'his own use' addressed to the question as to whether it should be assigned a narrow meaning i.e. individual requirement of the landlord alone or it should be assigned a wide liberal meaning so as to respect the context in which it has been used? Hon'ble Supreme Court refereeing to the fundamental principles of interpretation of statutes and .so also principles relevant for interpretation of the provisions contained in Rent Control Law took a review of various decisions of various High Courts dealing with different rent legislation's. The Hon'ble Court summed up thus : "The judicial opinion leans entirely in favour of assigning the expression "his own" requirement of the landlord a liberal, wide and useful - even an extended - meaning as that would advance the purpose of enacting the provisions, discarding a narrow interpretation." (Para 23) 22. In the fact situation of the present case, when the plaintiff and brothers have been shown to be the members of Hindu Undivided Family, the need of their stay at Jaipur by rotation and for their children is clearly the requirement of the landlord for use and occupation of himself or his family as contemplated by Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. 23. So far the question of comparative hardship (issue No. 4) is concerned, we find that this question has also been rightly addressed to by the two Courts. On one hand, need of residence of the vast family of the plaintiff and his brothers has been shown and on the other hand, the defendant is shown to be having other premises at the nearby place available with him in which he carries on a factory/workshop. We may notice that even during the course of hearing of this appeal, when the appellant-tenant came out with affidavit, as quoted herein-above, he took care to use guarded language of not having any residential accommodation and did not refer to the premises referred by two Courts. Be that as it may, even if/the said premises are not taken into consideration, we are clearly of the opinion that when judged for comparative hardship in view of the substantial need stated by the plaintiff, he would suffer more hardship than the tenant who can still obtain other premises on rent. Be that as it may, even if/the said premises are not taken into consideration, we are clearly of the opinion that when judged for comparative hardship in view of the substantial need stated by the plaintiff, he would suffer more hardship than the tenant who can still obtain other premises on rent. We may also notice the facts available on record including the admission of Vijay Kumar, DW-2, brother in-law of the tenant wherein it does appear that Arun Kumar, tenant was carrying on business at Calcutta and Delhi. 24. So far the question of partial eviction (issue No. 7) is concerned, apart from the fact that two Courts have found from the-evidence of the defendant himself that need of the plaintiff would not be satisfied by partial eviction, the other facet of the matter is that suit premises comprise of one single residential unit (of three rooms, one kitchen, one latrine and bathroom). In such kind of single unit residential premises, by partial eviction, neither the need of residence of the landlord or his family could be satisfied nor even the family of the defendant could live reasonably. 25. In view of the aforesaid, findings on issues No. 3, 4 & 7 deserve to be and are affirmed. No other point was urged. Therefore, the appeal being devoid substance deserves to be dismissed. 26. The respondent has not appeared before us and in the over all facts and circumstances of the case, although we feel that landlord is entitled to secure eviction but tenant deserves to be afforded reasonable sufficient time for making alternative arrangements. In the circumstances of the present case, we grant eighteen months' time from today to the appellant to vacate the suit premises (i.e. on or before 12.4.2006), however, on the following terms and conditions:- (i) The appellant shall personally submit an undertaking supported by affidavit before the trial Court within six weeks from today to the effect that on or before the expiry of the period of eighteen months from today (i.e. on or before 12.4.2006), he shall hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. He shall also undertake not to cause any damage to the suit premises nor to make any alteration and not to assign, sublet or in any manner part with possession to any other person of the suit premises and not to put the premises to any use other than residence and not to cause any nuisance. (ii) The appellant shall deposit the arrears, if any, of the decretals amount and costs and shall further pay to the landlord the amount for use and occupation of the suit premises at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month or deposit in the trial Court or bank account of the plaintiff month by month on or before 15th day of the next month. 27. We make it clear that upon the appellant's failure to comply with any of the conditions aforesaid or violating any terms of the undertaking, the plaintiff shall be entitled to execute the decree forthwith in accordance with law. 28. In the result, subject to the concession aforesaid, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The respondent having not appeared, the costs of the present appeal are made easy.Appeal Dismissed. *******