A. LALA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of a reversal decree. Such reversal decree is arising out of the finding of the Court of first instance that the suit be dismissed on contest with cost as against the defendant. ( 2 ) OUT of the issues, maintainability of the suit in its present form, validity of the notice, non joinder of necessary parties, and all such points were decided by holding the above view. The first appellate Court carefully considered the various aspects of the matter. The first Appellate Court held that there was a joint tenancy, and the notice addressed to and served upon the sole defendant, and presumed that no notice of attornment was served upon the defendant etc. ( 3 ) IT is factually admitted position that the notice was served upon the defendant for ejectment from the suit premises c/o a particular firm. It is the case of the defendant that he or their family members are running business under the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF ). Therefore, the notice which had been served solely on the defendant was bad because he was not the sole defendant in respect of the premises in question. On the other hand, the plaintiff was not the original owner of the suit premises. She purchased the property from the original owner. In the Court below when the tenant was asked to produce either rent receipts he was not in a position to produce the same. The counter foils could not be available since the plaintiff was the subsequent purchaser of the suit premises. Hence, the first Appellate Court came to a conclusion that non disclosure of rent receipts would draw an adverse inference against the defendant. Counter foils could not be called upon from the plaintiff because of the reason that she was not the original owner. ( 4 ) SO far the applicability of the notice as regards West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is concerned that will be served under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act provided one lives within the municipal area of any township or city. If not, it will be served upon the tenant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, one has to understand the content and merit of the notice to come to a conclusion. If not, it will be served upon the tenant under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, one has to understand the content and merit of the notice to come to a conclusion. Mere making a reference under section 80 of the Act or the Code of Civil Procedure is a wrong incorporation in such notice which can not vitiate the entirety of the notice, if not the defendant/tenant fails to understand the real import of service of such notice. There is no such case that the defendant failed to understand the merit. Therefore, such notice can not be construed even on the score, a bad notice. ( 5 ) WHEN I find that there is a joint tenancy and the service of the notice can not be fatal, no supportive case can construe a legal necessity to come to a conclusion in favour of the appellant. Even then, since the second Appellate Court is the forum for consideration of definite substantial questions of law, it will not throw away the second appeal at the threshold without proper application of mind. That is why, although no point was formulated at the time of admission of the appeal, four points were formulated at the time of finality of the second appeal. Such second appellate Court is empowered to formulate the same. The points formulated by Mr. Asish Bagchi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant are as follows: a)whether the ejectment notice is good enough for the purpose of institution of the suit as against the defendant? b)whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? c) whether relief forfeiture can be sought for on account of unwritten lease? d)whether the reversal decree is based on surmise or conjecture? ( 6 ) I have already discussed about the notice and whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties or not. Yet, when certain judgments are referred to this Court, the same has to be dealt with carefully. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Bagchi, ratio of the judgment reported in 1966 ILR 252c is to be applicable herein. By showing paragraph 8 of such judgment he contended that the suit was failed therein on the fact that the person concerned on which the tenancy devolved, are the heirs, and without impleading them, the suit must fail. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Bagchi, ratio of the judgment reported in 1966 ILR 252c is to be applicable herein. By showing paragraph 8 of such judgment he contended that the suit was failed therein on the fact that the person concerned on which the tenancy devolved, are the heirs, and without impleading them, the suit must fail. ( 8 ) EVEN from the ratio of the judgment I find that the proof of service of notice of eviction on one of the heirs is sufficient to maintain the suit for eviction against the other heirs of deceased tenant, but notice of eviction must be addressed in the name of other heirs though service of notices upon all the heirs and it need not be proved. In paragraph 8, the Court observed that in only cases of joint tenancy, a suit against any of the joint tenants will be enough to entitle the landlord to have a decree for eviction. But before coming to such conclusion on the factual position, at least, I have to be satisfied whether at all such points was taken by the defendant seriously before both the Courts or not. My reading of the plaint and the evidence does not speak so. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, the plaintiff stated, ?defendant was a tenant with respect to the aforesaid premises as described in the Schedule below??. English month?. In answer to that in paragraph 3 of the written statement the defendant contended, ?the contents of paragraph 2 of the plaint are substantially correct?? of the defendant?. Therefore, there is a clear admission in the pleading in respect of the fact that the defendant was the tenant. The defendant adduced evidence by saying, ? the contents of the written statement are correct?. Therefore, it is established factually that the defendant has accepted him as tenant in respect of the premises under the landlord. Therefore, the validity of the notice, after such discussion, can not be said to be bad, apart from the other points which are germane for the purpose of due consideration. ( 9 ) MR. Sudhis Dasgupta, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent/plaintiff contended by citing judgments reported in AIR 1965 SC 1937 (Begum Noorbanu and Ors. Therefore, the validity of the notice, after such discussion, can not be said to be bad, apart from the other points which are germane for the purpose of due consideration. ( 9 ) MR. Sudhis Dasgupta, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent/plaintiff contended by citing judgments reported in AIR 1965 SC 1937 (Begum Noorbanu and Ors. v. Deputy Custodian General of Evacues Property) that an objection as to non service of notice can properly be taken up by the third parties but only by the person on whom the notice is not serviced. On repeated questions it has been answered that excepting the defendant, nobody had come forward to be the party or parties in the suit nor any application was made by the defendant for addition of parties. Therefore, such point is not very much relevant on that score. In AIR 1963 SC 468 (Kanji Manji v. The Trustee of the Port of Bombay), once it was held that the tenancy was joint, a notice on of the joint tenants sufficient and the suit for the same reason is also good. In AIR 1989 SC 1470 (H. C. Pandey v. G. C. Paul), it was held that when notice terminating tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was addressed to the tenant and was served upon him, i. e. the original tenant to pay rent on behalf of and acted on behalf of the heirs of the original tenant, the service of notice to only one of the joint tenants could not be said to be insufficient. In (2001)5 Supreme Court Cases 1 (Ashok Chintamanjuker and Ors.) it was further held that in case of joint tenancy, notice on any of the tenants is valid and a suit impleading one of them as a defendant is maintainable. ( 10 ) ALTHOUGH a question raised by Mr. Bagchi that most of the cases are in relation to post decree period, according to me, the principle which has been laid down to govern the field, definitely arose to nullify the decree which was obtained by the service of such notice which ultimately held as sufficient. Therefore, the principle cannot be ignored only on the ground that the decree has already passed. Therefore, such objection of Mr. Bagchi can not be acceptable. ( 11 ) ON account of forfeiture, Mr. Therefore, the principle cannot be ignored only on the ground that the decree has already passed. Therefore, such objection of Mr. Bagchi can not be acceptable. ( 11 ) ON account of forfeiture, Mr. Bagchi contended that although there are few decisions going totally in favour of non applicability of the condition of forfeiture on the ground of ejectment covered by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy, yet such point required a further discussion by this Court. He stated that relief against forfeiture will be available under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act and also under section 114a of such Act. Section 114 of the Act gives relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent. That section 114a speaks about relief against forfeiture in certain other cases. Therefore, both the sections are dealing with the relief of forfeiture under certain circumstances. Here the case is for non payment of rent. Therefore, there is hardly any possibility to bring such event under the category of section 114a. That apart, rule 114 and 114a is applicable in the case provided conditions of forfeiture as prescribed under section 111 (g) of the Act is applicable. Definition of lease which has been given under section 106 of the Act is a deviation from section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 106 will be applicable in respect of certain circumstances. For example, in our State, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, is applicable in the municipal area. Therefore, if any dispute crops up in respect of the tenancy where municipal area is not available, how it will be dealt with? It will be obviously dealt with under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which is well established by now. Therefore, whether West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, will apply specifically or sections 106 of the Transfer of Property Act apply in respect of tenancy, the result about applicability of clauses of forfeiture is same or similar. ( 12 ) THERE are various judgments on that score. I find excepting judgment of Justice P. B. Mukherjee reported in 69 Calwn 399 (D. C. Singh v. S. Mohammed), all other Division Bench judgments including the judgment reported in AIR 1985 Cal 1 (Sadhu Saran Prasad and Anr. v. Rabindra Nath Saha and Ors.), clearly say that in case of premises tenancy forfeiture clause can not be made applicable. I find excepting judgment of Justice P. B. Mukherjee reported in 69 Calwn 399 (D. C. Singh v. S. Mohammed), all other Division Bench judgments including the judgment reported in AIR 1985 Cal 1 (Sadhu Saran Prasad and Anr. v. Rabindra Nath Saha and Ors.), clearly say that in case of premises tenancy forfeiture clause can not be made applicable. Therefore, I have to discuss what would be the fate when only section 106 will be applicable even there is the applicability of section 114a of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 13 ) ALTHOUGH both the judgments either reported in AIR 1998 Cal 472 (Metal Press Works Ltd. v. J. K. and Sons) or AIR 1985 Cal 1 (supra), are applicable in respect of West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, but it can be safely said that such ratio will be applicable even in the area within the State where such Act will not be applicable. Otherwise, there would a conflicting situation amongst the two areas. Now the question is how it can be said that same principle will be applicable everywhere? The answer is source of clause of forfeiture is the condition of lease. Therefore, at first I have to construe whether tenancy is lease or not. Lease is compulsory registrable document under the Transfer of Property Act. Definition of leaser is confined into section 105 of the Act. Admittedly section 106 is a departure from such section. What is the extent of such departure? Section 106 of the Act deals with periodic tenancy only, like the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Therefore, when there is a vacuum of such Act the same will be supplemented by section 106 of the Act. Such lease is determinable upon notice. Periodic tenancy either under section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act or under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot come under the definition clause of lease under section 105 of the Act, thereby applicability of section 114 or section 114a is in vain. In 69 Calwn 399 (supra) Justice P. B. Mukherjee proceeded on a complete different footing and came to a conclusion in that way which can not pursue me. In 69 Calwn 399 (supra) Justice P. B. Mukherjee proceeded on a complete different footing and came to a conclusion in that way which can not pursue me. His Lordship's view as that non obstanti clause under section 13 of the State Act does not override the section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act because that section does not help the landlord to get a decree for ejectment but in fact prevents him from getting a decree for ejectment on the ground of non payment of rent. Firstly, protection or prevention is principally similar in both the above sections. Secondly, there is no scope of applicability of section 114 of the said Act in view of section 106 of the Act. Therefore, situation of tenancy under section 13 of the State Act and under section 106 of the Central Act in absence of the application in the zone is similarly placed and be governed by the laid down principles. ( 14 ) LAST be not the least, the ground of reversal - whether it is based on conjecture and surmise. According to me, whenever there is a specific finding on the point of law available based on the fact, there is hardly anything to construe as surmise and conjecture. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, taking into totality of the matter, I am of the view that the second appeal must fail and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. No order is passed as to costs. Decree will be drawn up expeditiously. Lower Court records will be sent down as expeditiously as possible preferably by 2nd of April 2004. The appropriate Court will take steps, if any, within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order or from receiving the Lower Court records, whichever is later. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order is to be supplied to the parties within a period of fortnight from the date of putting necessary requisites. Appeal fails