ORDER 1. One Hirday Ram, the original owner of the suit property, had three wives namely Kubja, Pari and Uttamdassi. Kubja who predeceased him had given birth to a daughter Tikami. Hirday Ram through a Will dated 1-101938 bequeathed a part of the property to his daughter Tikami and the remaining property was given to the two wives for their maintenance with the condition that they would not have the power to alienate the same in any manner. The property was to revert back to his daughter Tikami as absolute owner after the death of the two wives. Hirday Ram died. His second wife Pari also died in 1939 and her share came to vest in the third wife, Uttamdassi. 2. After the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Uttamdassi sold a part of the property to one Sandup on 28-11-1958, predecessor-in-interest of Respondents 1 and 2. Sandup mortgaged back the property to Uttamdassi. Uttamdassi on 2-12-1958, made a gift of another property in favour of Respondent 3 who in turn sold it to Respondent 4. 3. The appellant herein, the daughter of Tikami and granddaughter of Hirday Ram, filed a suit challenging the alienation made by Uttamdassi by way of sale and gift and seeking a decree of declaration that the alienation made by Uttamdassi would not affect her reversionary rights. The suit was decreed by the trial court on 12-7-1961. Appeal preferred by Uttamdassi was dismissed on 25-1-1963. The decree became final as it was not put to challenge in further appeal in the High Court. 4. On 24-5-1975 Uttamdassi gifted the property sold by her to Sandup in 1958 in favour of Respondent 5. The appellant again filed a suit challenging the alienation and seeking a declaration that the alienation made by Uttamdassi would not affect her reversionary rights. The trial court dismissed the suit. Appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was accepted by the first appellate court. The gift made by Uttamdassi in favour of Respondent 5 was held to be void ab initio and a declaration was given that the alienation made by Uttamdassi would not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiff. This decree also became absolute as the same was not put to any further challenge. Uttamdassi gifted a part of the property in favour of Respondent 5 by way of a Will dated 27-12-1986. Uttamdassi died on 1-1-1987. 5. This decree also became absolute as the same was not put to any further challenge. Uttamdassi gifted a part of the property in favour of Respondent 5 by way of a Will dated 27-12-1986. Uttamdassi died on 1-1-1987. 5. After the death of Uttamdassi, the appellant brought a suit for possession of the suit property being the nearest reversioner and on the basis of the earlier decrees obtained by her. The trial court dismissed the suit on 22-8-1989. Relying upon V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy1 it was held, inter alia, that though the suit property was given to the wives of Hirday Ram as limited owners but in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Uttamdassi became the absolute owner of the suit property and had the right to alienate the same by way of sale, gift or Will. 6. Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed on 30-9-1991 by the first appellate court holding, inter alia, that the declaratory decrees obtained by the appellant did not operate as res judicata inter se parties as same were passed in suits failed by the appellant as presumptive reversioner of the widow of Hirday Ram and the present suit was filed after her death for possession as owner. 7. The appellant preferred a regular second appeal which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment of the High Court holding, inter alia, that interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act; 1956 was a pure question of law and the earlier decrees obtained on the interpretation of law in the case of Karmi v. Amru2 cannot operate as res judicata in the face of the contrary interpretation put to Section 14 in the later decision of this Court in V. Tulasamma easel. It was observed that the declaratory decree of 1978 (in the second suit) was given after the interpretation of and declaration of the law by this Court in V. Tulasamma easel, therefore, these decrees were erroneous on points of law and could not operate as res judicata. The earlier decree of 1961 could not operate as res judicata as the same was based on interpretation and declaration of law as given in Karmi case2 which stood superseded by the later judgment in V. Tulasamma easel. 8. The earlier decree of 1961 could not operate as res judicata as the same was based on interpretation and declaration of law as given in Karmi case2 which stood superseded by the later judgment in V. Tulasamma easel. 8. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Teg Singh v. Charan Singh3 in the context of declaratory decrees obtained under the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, as amended by Act 12 of 1973, held that though a suit to contest an alienation of immovable property under the customary law may not lie after the coming into force of the amending Act of 1973, but adeclaratory decree already obtained by a reversioner would continue to be operative as the amending Act does not render such a decree a nullity. 9. In Kesar Singh v. Sadhu4 this Court took a different view. In that case a declaratory decree was obtained in the year 1924 by a reversioner on the basis of custom. After the death of the vendor in the year 1978, a suit for recovery of possession was filed. Suit was dismissed. In appeal judgment anddecree passed by the trial court was set aside. The appeal was allowed and the suit for possession was decreed as prayed for. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant. Decree for possession passed by the first appellate court was confirmed. The decree-holder put the decree in execution. The defendant judgment-debtor filed an application that the decree passed in favour of the decree-holder could not be executed after the repeal of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920. That the right given in the customary law to challenge the alienation having been taken away by the amendment made later, the decree passed by the trial court was a nullity. The executing court dismissed the application. The High Court dismissed the revision aggrieved against which an appeal was filed in this Court. This Court allowed the appeal and held that the view taken by the High Court that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to raise the question regarding the executability of the decree in execution proceeding was not correct. It was held that a point which goes to the root of the jurisdiction can be raised in the execution proceedings as well. This Court allowed the appeal and held that the view taken by the High Court that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to raise the question regarding the executability of the decree in execution proceeding was not correct. It was held that a point which goes to the root of the jurisdiction can be raised in the execution proceedings as well. Since the Amendment Act of 1973 was applicable at the time of passing of the decree by the first appellate court the decree was a nullity and therefore not executable. 10. Correctness of this view was doubted in Surain Singh v. Lakhmira Singh5 decided on 1-10-1996 and the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench. It was observed in this case that proceedings initiated under the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 stood finalised in the year 1944, much before the coming into force of the amending Act, 1973. As the declaratory decree had become final its validity was not affected by a later amendment of the Act. In the opinion of the Bench the decision in Kesar Singh case4 required reconsideration and accordingly the matter was referred for decision to a three-Judge Bench. Before the three-Judge Bench, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution as some of the legal representatives of the contesting party were not brought on record. No final adjudication on merits took place on this point. 11. In Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh6 this Court took the view that a suit for possession would not be maintainable on the basis of a declaratory decree as the declaratory decree did not convey any title in favour of the reversioners. This case was under the Hindu law. Widow of the original owner in the year 1954 made a gift and got the land mutated in favour of her d adopted sons. Reversioners filed a suit seeking a decree that the alienation made by the widow was not binding on their reversionary rights. The suit was decreed and it was held that the gift made by the widow would not affect the rights of the reversioners. The property was remutated in the name of the widow. In the year 1970, the widow again gifted the suit property to the adopted sons. She died in the year 1973. The suit was decreed and it was held that the gift made by the widow would not affect the rights of the reversioners. The property was remutated in the name of the widow. In the year 1970, the widow again gifted the suit property to the adopted sons. She died in the year 1973. A suit for recovery of possession by the "reversioners on the basis of the earlier declaratory decree was dismissed holding that the widow continued to be in possession of the property even after the declaratory decree obtained by the reversioners and enlarged her rights under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to full ownership and, therefore, she being the absolute owner could make a gift of the property to her adopted sons in the year 1970. 12. In view of the seemingly contradictory views taken by this Court in Teg Singh case3, Kesar Singh case4 and Balwant Singh case6 in our view the matter requires to be considered by a Bench of three Judges to resolve the dispute. Accordingly, the matter be placed before Honble the Chief Justice of India to constitute the larger Bench.