Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.-Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 06.03.2003 passed in Misc. Appeal filed by the appellant against rejection of his claim to compensation on account of death allegedly caused due to accident caused by the vehicle of the Respondent No.1 on 210.1989. 3. The learned Single Judge has opined that the appellant has suffered for want of requisite legal assistance and failure on the part of the learned Counsel for the claimants to produce requisite evidence. 4. We are of the opinion that where the Court comes to the conclusion that a good cause is lost on account of legal assistance being not rendered to a litigant and for default of a Counsel assisting the claimant in getting the relief or on account of a faulted procedure, it ought not to be the sound reason for failure of a just cause and to give a proper trial. 5. It is oft said that the procedures are hand tools for fathering justice and not masters for scuttling and stultify the justice. 6. Looking back to the proceedings, one finds that in the first instance, in the present case after the claimant was examined and cross-examined on 02.07.1996, the claim was ordered to be consigned to record by holding that the claimants have led no evidence vide order dated 02.07.1996. That order was subjected to Misc. Appeal No. 275/1997 which was allowed on 20.09.2001 noticing that the trial Court was not justified in consigning the claim to record when evidence of the plaintiff was being recorded, his statement had been recorded, still without closing his evidence and without calling upon the respondents in response, and without deciding the claim on merit, there was no justification for consigning to record. 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant has brought to the notice of the Court that if after recording the statement of claimants, the Tribunal was not inclined to grant adjournment it ought to have fixed the case for evidence of the non-applicants but could not have refused to proceed with the case. 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant has brought to the notice of the Court that if after recording the statement of claimants, the Tribunal was not inclined to grant adjournment it ought to have fixed the case for evidence of the non-applicants but could not have refused to proceed with the case. The respondents had objected to this contention inter alia on the ground that because no order was made for awarding any compensation, the appeal was not maintainable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and only against determination of amount, an appeal lay to the Court. This objection was not sustained by the Court by finding that even if the order is held to be not appeal able, a revision would not have been barred and it was a case in which the Tribunal has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by refusing to proceed with the matter and/or at any rate, the jurisdiction was exercised with material irregularity and illegality. After setting aside the order, the Court directed the parties to appear before the Claims Tribunal on 010.2001 with further stipulation that on 010.2001, the Tribunal shall fix the date for producing the evidence, if any by claimants, and after recording evidence, the Tribunal shall proceed further in accordance with law. Since, the Court found that there were some latches on the part of the claimants-appellants also in leading evidence in time, the cost was awarded to the non-claimants. 8. Be that as it may, in furtherance of this order on 010.2001, the parties appeared before the Tribunal and next 011.2001 was fixed as next date for producing evidence of the claimants on 011.2001, while Counsel for the respective parties were present but the claimants or their witnesses were not present and the Court in its discretion closed the evidence of the appellants and matter was fixed for recoding the evidence on behalf of the respondents. On 211.2001 while Counsel for the claimants was present none was present on behalf of the respondents and the Court directed to proceed ex parte against the present appellants and case was adjourned to 012.2001 for final arguments. On 012.2001, the case was adjourned without assigning any reason for not hearing ex parte arguments to 112.2001. On 112.2002, the case was adjourned at the instance of applicants to 112.2001. 9. On 012.2001, the case was adjourned without assigning any reason for not hearing ex parte arguments to 112.2001. On 112.2002, the case was adjourned at the instance of applicants to 112.2001. 9. On 112.2001, an application was moved on behalf of the applicants stating that the claimants were to produce their evidence on 011.2001 but on that date, the State holiday was declared on account of death of a Senior Sitting Member of Legislative Assembly and a Former Minister Kishan Motwani. On account of this holiday in State, the claimant remained under impression that there must be holiday of Courts also and under this impression he could not appear on that date. However, his Counsel was present and an opportunity was prayed to examine the witnesses who were present in the Court on that date before proceeding further. A copy of this application was given to the Counsel for the respondents; otherwise the proceedings were ordered ex-parte. 10. The fact that the Sitting MLA and Ex-Minister had died and on that account a State holiday was declared on 011.2001 and all State offices were closed was not in dispute. The application was ultimately rejected on 13.03.2002. After that the case was adjourned several times at the request of Counsel for the respondents or for Court’s own reasoning. The application for calling documents relating to vehicle which was plied under the control of army people was also rejected simultaneously. Notwithstanding that the hearing of the case in the absence of leading any evidence was ordered to proceed ex parte and that order was never recalled, the Counsel for the respondents was heard at the time of final hearing and the claim petition was rejected, solely on the ground that claimant had failed to prove negligence on the part of driver of the vehicle which caused the death of husband of the claimant. 11. It may be noticed that the claimant herself has been examined and subjected to cross-examination. The factam of accident was not at all in dispute. The fact that accident was caused by the vehicle owned by Union of India in its defence was also not in dispute.The facts about the amount of salary drawn by the deceased at the time of accident and age of deceased being 45 years were also not in dispute. The factam of accident was not at all in dispute. The fact that accident was caused by the vehicle owned by Union of India in its defence was also not in dispute.The facts about the amount of salary drawn by the deceased at the time of accident and age of deceased being 45 years were also not in dispute. But, since the appellant had alleged rash and negligent driving by the driver of the vehicle, but about negligence on the part of driver was not stated with only statement on record, and the respondent had denied the negligence of the driver and the Tribunal held that since it is not proved that accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the vehicle, the claimant is not entitled to claim any compensation. 12. This plea also found favour with the learned Single Judge and notwithstanding the lament about conduct of case and inadequacy of legal assistance rendered, the appeal was dismissed vide Judgment under appeal. 13. We are unable to sustain with the end conclusion of the claim reached either by the Tribunal or by the learned Single Judge. .14. Firstly, the learned claims Tribunal had fallen into error when it declined to consider the application of appellant dated 112.2001 to examine the witnesses present in Court by recalling the order closing evidence on erroneous assumption that it was left with no discretion in this matter because of the direction in the order dated 20.09.2001. Passed by this Court on 20.09.2001 in S.B Civil Misc. Appeal No. 275/1997 while setting aside the order dated 02.07.1996. The Court has directed as under:- .“We direct the learned Counsel for the parties to appear before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur on 010.2001. On that day, the Tribunal shall fix the date for producing the evidence if any by the claimants and on that day if no evidence is produced, the Tribunal shall proceed further in accordance with law” .15. Obviously, no prohibition to act in accordance with law was contained in the direction. Whether in given circumstances, evidence of a party is to be closed or when evidence of a party is closed because of non-appearance of the party or witness, it is for the Court to consider on merit of .any application to reopen the evidence so closed and allow further opportunity to lead evidence. Whether in given circumstances, evidence of a party is to be closed or when evidence of a party is closed because of non-appearance of the party or witness, it is for the Court to consider on merit of .any application to reopen the evidence so closed and allow further opportunity to lead evidence. It depends on existence of sufficient cause, which could have prevented a party from producing evidence, when it was closed. A Court, in the absence of specific direction to the contrary cannot refuse to look into the merit of such application in accordance with its own view of facts and decide it by interpreting the direction to proceed further in accordance with law to mean direction to close the evidence and not exercise its jurisdiction even if grounds for exercise of such jurisdiction are shown to exist to the detriment of a fair trial. 16. The Claims Tribunal has found that there was a public holiday declared on 011.2001, which could have led any common man to assume that the Court as a public institution may also have been closed and bona fide not appear in the Court. It was apparently a case in which a Court acting in accordance with law with commitment to a fair trial would ordinarily grant the request specially so when the request was made to examine the witnesses who were produced and present in Court, and no proceeding since 011.2001 had otherwise taken place. The Tribunal thus did not act in accordance with law by erroneously assuming that an injunction of the Court existed to the contrary. 17. For the same reason, the learned Single Judge erred in not taking note of above chronology of facts of this case. 18. Ordinarily, in such circumstances the Court would have set aside the order of learned Single Judge as well as the Claims Tribunal and remanded the case back to the Tribunal to allow the appellants to have an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the claim. However, we find that accident took place as back as on 210.1989 almost 15 years before. The facts about accident with the vehicle owned by the respondents and death of petitioner’s husband caused on account of such accidents is not in dispute. The age of deceased at the time of accident and his last drawn emoluments before death is also not in dispute. The facts about accident with the vehicle owned by the respondents and death of petitioner’s husband caused on account of such accidents is not in dispute. The age of deceased at the time of accident and his last drawn emoluments before death is also not in dispute. But, for enquiring into negligence of driver of the vehicle, material to award compensation is available on record. 9.19. The question, therefore, is whether in the absence of a finding against the respondent about rashness or negligence on the part of driver of vehicle in driving can the compensation be declined to the heirs of deceased? In other words, to put it in positive can a claim be maintained before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the basis of strict liability propounded in Rylands vs. Fletcher, 1868 (3) HL 330. The issue is no more res integra. .20. The apex Court has answered the question in positive in favour of claimants more than once. In Kaushuuma Begam vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2001 (2) SCC 9 , the Court posed the same question for itself in a case in which accident took place on 20.03.1986 resulting in death of a 35 years old young man earning a monthly income of Rs. 1,500/-by doing business. The claim of his widow to compensation was declined solely on the ground that there was neither rashness nor negligence in driving the vehicle hence the driver had no liability and the corollary of which is that the owner has no vicarious liability to pay compensation to the dependants of the victim. The Court concluded:- .“Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the rule in Rayland vs. Fletcher, can be followed at least until any other new principal which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. “No fault liability” envisaged in Section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former, the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under the count. In the former, the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under the count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permit that compensation paid under “no fault liability” can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident, which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless anyone of the exception would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them.” 10.21. In coming to this conclusion, the Court referred to acceptance of the principal of strict liability as propounded in Ryland vs, Fletcher (Supra), by the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. , 1987 (1) SCC 395 , Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India, 1990 (1) SCC 613 , Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., 1991 (4) SCC 584 and as observed and apply to motor accident claims in Gujarat SRTC vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 (3) SCC 234 . 22. In Gujarat SRTC case, 1987 (3) SCC 234 , the Court had observed the need to extend principal of strict liability enunciated in Rylands vs. Fletcher (Supra), more than a century ago. Keeping in view the dangers and hazards unleashed on road on account of fast moving vehicles, the Court had said: “When the Fatal Accident Act, 1855 was enacted there were no motor vehicles on the roads in India. Today, thanks to the modern civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principal of liability defined in Rylands vs. Fletcher. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principal of liability defined in Rylands vs. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all.” 23. The above principle was extended and applied by the Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begam’s case in a claim arising under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 24. The above principle of extending strict liability for no fault of owner who brings danger to the door steps of people was reiterated in M.P. Electricity Board vs. Shail Kumari & Ors., 2002 (2) SCC 162 . 25. In somewhat same vein, a Division Bench of this Court invoked another principle of res ipsa loquitor to award compensation to victim of an accident, even in the absence of any specifies plea in the claim petition about rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. Reference in this connection may be made to RSRTC vs. Mangal Singh, 2003 (3) WLN 31. 26. In view of the above position of law settled by the decision of Supreme Court, the appellant is entitled to claim compensation on account of death of her husband caused due to accident with vehicle of respondent on public road, without proof of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle on principle of strict liability. Therefore, it would not be just now even after 15 years of the death of victim that the appellant his widow be driven back to trial Court only to prove such fact which is not essential for determining a just compensation to be awarded. 27. So far as determination of compensation is concerned, on facts undisputed and available on record, the case has also a parallel in Kaushnuma Begam’s case. 28. The appellant had claimed Rs. 4,13,900/-on various accounts as under:- 1.Festival and last rites Exp. 27. So far as determination of compensation is concerned, on facts undisputed and available on record, the case has also a parallel in Kaushnuma Begam’s case. 28. The appellant had claimed Rs. 4,13,900/-on various accounts as under:- 1.Festival and last rites Exp. Rs.12, 000/- 2.Expense for transportation of relatives of deceased to Jodhpur Rs.4, 000/- 3.Damages caused to new cycle Rs. 500/- 4.Loss of consortium Rs. 1,00,000/- 5.Mental agony Rs. 75,000/- 6.Loss of income Rs. 3,02,400/- Total Rs.4, 93,900/- 29. What has come on record and is not in contention is that the deceased was employed in Border Security Force, as per averment in reply to claim. He was 45 years of age at the time of death. His last drawn emoluments were Rs. 1,693/-as Dhobi employed under Commandant BSF STC, Jodhpur as per certificate dated 112.1989 issued by him, which is on record as Exhibit-1. In addition to it the claimant in her statement had stated in her cross-examination that deceased was doing laundry work at home also and earning some amount from it. 30. In like circumstances the apex Court in Koushnuma Begam’s case has chosen to adopt the structured formula for providing in the Second Schedule to Motor Vehicles Act, even in the case falling under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 where accident had occurrence in 1986, and it was not on statute book. 31. Taking into account the annual income of Rs. 21,000/-considering the last drawn emoluments and additional income earned by him by laundry work at home, and applying a multiplier of 13 taking his age to be 45 plus at the time of death, the figure indicated in structured formula comes to about Rs. 2,55, 000/-. When 1/3rd is deducted therefrom the balance would be Rs. 1,70,000 /-. We deem it just and fair to fix the said sum as total compensation payable to the appellants. The compensation amount shall bear interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of claim made by the appellants. The amount claimed by the appellant under Section 140, if any, shall be deducted from principal amount as on the date of its payment and interest would be re-calculated on the balance of principal sum from such date. The compensation amount shall bear interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of claim made by the appellants. The amount claimed by the appellant under Section 140, if any, shall be deducted from principal amount as on the date of its payment and interest would be re-calculated on the balance of principal sum from such date. We further direct that the amount shall be deposited in MACT, Jodhpur within three months and appropriate order shall be passed by the Claims Tribunal for its apportionment and disbursement amongst claimants who are heirs and dependents of the deceased. 32. There shall be no order as to costs