Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2004 DIGILAW 1558 (RAJ)

Pintu @ Lal Singh v. The State of Rajasthan

2004-10-26

KHEM CHAND SHARMA

body2004
JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal Appeal u/s. 374 Cr.P.C. by appellant- Pintu @ Lal Singh arises out of the judgment and order dated 21.11.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Bharatpur by which the learned Special Judge has convicted the appellant for offence u/ss. 376(2)(g) and 366 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month on the first count and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days on the another count. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that PW-7 Roshan Singh submitted a written report, Ex.P/7 at Police Station Sewar alleging therein that on 14.1.1999 in the night at 2.00 a.m., co-accused-Lukman and three others induced and kidnapped his daughter aged 16 years. The complainant stated that he can identify the accused, if confronted. The complainant plain ant specifically involved one Laxmi W/o Pooran Jat of his village in kidnapping his daughter. Laxmi happened to be the sister of accused-Lukman. According to the report, the accused had stayed at the residence of Laxmi on 13.1.1999. It was alleged that accused, with an intention to steal, also took away one gold ring, a gold chain and gold ear-rings. It was alleged that Bhagwani and Samandar had seen the accused taking away his daughter in the night at 2.00 p.m. Thereupon, the complainant and his neighbours contacted Mst. Laxmi in the night itself and some altercation took place between them. According to the report, Laxmi admitted the fact of girl being kidnapped by the accused and assured that girl would be returned within 3-4 days. 3. On the above report, police registered a case for offence u/ss. 363, 366 & 379 IPC vide FIR Ex.P/8 and proceeded with the investigation. In the course of investigation, the police inspected the site, prepared site plan and recorded the statements of witnesses u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. The statement of victim girl was also recorded u/s. 164 Cr.P.C. The prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination to find out whether she was ravished or not. Co-accused along with appellant were arrested and on completion of usual investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. 4. Co-accused along with appellant were arrested and on completion of usual investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. 4. On the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation and placed before it, the learned trial Court framed charges for offence u/ss. 366 & 376(2)(g) IPC against the appellant. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and got exhibited some documents. After the prosecution evidence was complete, the appellant was examined u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, one witness (DW-1) Ashok was examined. 6. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge found the accused-appellant guilty of having committed offence punishable u/ss. 366 & 376(2)(g) IPC and according convicted and sentenced him in the manner stated herein above. Hence this appeal against conviction. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment, the evidence and material on record. 8. In the cases involving sexual assault, the age of the prosecutrix plays vital role. Therefore, firstly it has to be seen as to what was the age of the prosecutrix at the time of commission of offence. The School transfer certificate, Ex.P/2 produced on record mentions the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 25.8.1983. Thus, accordingly to this certificate her age at the time of incident was 15 years 4 months and 15 days. The prosecutrix herself in her examination in chief has stated her date of birth as 25.8.1983 but she was not subjected to cross-examination on the point of her date of birth. PW-13 Dr. Sahab Singh who had examined the prosecutrix has deposed that on the basis of X-ray report and physical examination her age, in his opinion, was 15 to 17 years. PW-7 Roshan Singh, father of the prosecutrix has deposed that his daughter studied in the school and he had filled in the admission form. It may be noted that Dr. Bhanwar Singh, Radiologist has not been examined in evidence to prove his report. However, PW13 Dr. Sahab Singh has got exhibited the report, Ex.P/19 prepared by Dr. Bhagwan Singh, which mentions the age of the prosecutrix as 17-19 years. It is thus evident that PW-7 Roshan has not stated the age and date of birth of his daughter. Bhanwar Singh, Radiologist has not been examined in evidence to prove his report. However, PW13 Dr. Sahab Singh has got exhibited the report, Ex.P/19 prepared by Dr. Bhagwan Singh, which mentions the age of the prosecutrix as 17-19 years. It is thus evident that PW-7 Roshan has not stated the age and date of birth of his daughter. The original application form alleged to be filled in by Roshan Singh has also not been tendered in evidence and, therefore, no weightage can be attached to Transfer Certificate, Ex.P/2. As regards medical evidence, Dr. Sahab Singh has stated the age of the prosecutrix between 15 to 17 years, while X-ray report indicates her age between 17-19 years. Therefore, there is no evidence to conclude that the age of the prosecutrix was below 16 years on the day of occurrence. 9. Mr. V.P. Bishnoi, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that there was an inordinate delay in informing the police of the incident. According to him, the incident took place on 14.1.1999, while the report of the incident was lodged on 18.1.1999 i.e. after 4 days of the incident. The prosecution has not been able to offer any explanation whatsoever for such an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. According to the learned counsel, this unexplained delay of 4 days raises serious doubt on the genesis of the prosecution case. 10. I have pondered over the above argument. Delay in lodging the report ipso-facto is not fatal to the prosecution case. It is well settled that in the cases involving sexual assault, the delay in reporting the matter to the police by itself is not fatal to the prosecution. The Courts cannot over-look this important fact that in sexual offences delay in lodging the report can be due to variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and lodge a complaint of the incident which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and honour of her family. It is only after giving a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged. It has also be kept in mind that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR and therefore, it cannot be said that delayed FIR is illegal. It is only after giving a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged. It has also be kept in mind that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR and therefore, it cannot be said that delayed FIR is illegal. In the present case, PW-7 Roshan, father of the prosecutrix in his report, Ex.P/7 has stated the cause of late lodging the report. The report indicates that in the night of incident, Mst. Laxmi had assured him that his daughter shall come back within 3-4 days and on that assurance he waited for return of his daughter, but when the prosecutrix did not return within the aforesaid time, he lodged the report on 18.1.1999. As observed above, the complaint of a sexual offence is generally lodged after giving a cool thought since it concerns the reputation of the victim girl and the honour of her family and therefore, keeping in mind the reputation and honour of the family, particularly when complaint was hopeful of his daughter's return within 3-4, complaint lodged the report on fourth day of incident. The complainant in his statement before the Court stated the same facts. Thus, the delay in lodging the report stands satisfactorily explained. 11. Referring the prosecution evidence, learned counsel next contended that appellant has been falsely'involved in the instant case and the story put forward by the prosecution appears to be highly improbable. According to the learned counsel, there was heavy fog in the night of incident and therefore, it was not possible for any body to see any one standing at a distance of 5-7'. According to him, PW-4 Bhagwan Singh and PW-6 Ram Narayan have admitted that there was fog in the night of incident. On the strength of climatical condition, learned counsel argued that it was not at all possible for the prosecutrix to have identified the accused standing on roof of the house. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above argument. Undoubtedly, PW-4 Bhagwan Singh and PW-6 Ram Narayan have admitted that there was fog in the night of incident. Bhagwan Singh has deposed that one could not have seen beyond 5-7', while Ram Narayan deposed that one could not have seen beyond one feet. PW-5 Samandar has denied that there was any fog in the night of incident. Undoubtedly, PW-4 Bhagwan Singh and PW-6 Ram Narayan have admitted that there was fog in the night of incident. Bhagwan Singh has deposed that one could not have seen beyond 5-7', while Ram Narayan deposed that one could not have seen beyond one feet. PW-5 Samandar has denied that there was any fog in the night of incident. Be that as it may, no suggestion was put to the prosecutrix that she could not identify or see the accused on roof as a result of fog. Admittedly the prosecutrix and the accused belonged to the same family. The appellant happens to be the cousin of the prosecutrix. Over and above, the important fact is that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix and there was every possibility of the appellant being identified by the prosecutrix. 13. As regards the argument of learned counsel as regards allegation of rape alleged to be committed by the appellant does not appear to be probable, inasmuch as co-accused-Lukman wanted to marry the prosecutrix and therefore, a person would never permit another person to have sexual intercourse with a girl, whom he is likely to marry, suffice it to say that no such general and broad proposition can be laid down. As per the prosecution case, the appellant remained present on the roof at the time of kidnapping and thus he actively helped co-accused-Lukman in kidnapping the prosecutrix. It has also come in evidence that appellant terrorised the prosecutrix at the point of `Katta' and wanted her to accompany them silently. The possibility of co-accused-Lukman having permitted the appellant for sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix under threat and fear cannot be ruled out, since the appellant had a `Katta' in his hand. Active assistance rendered and help extended by the appellant in kidnapping the prosecutrix could also be one of the reasons for permitting him to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. For the reasons therefore, the argument of false implication and the story being improbable does not appeal to me. 14. Lastly, Mr. Bishnoi appearing for the appellant contended that appellant has been involved solely on account of enmity. He argued, no doubt the appellant and prosecutrix are cousin brother and sister, but the family members of both sides were not having cordial relations on account of dispute over a room and were not even on speaking terms. 15. 14. Lastly, Mr. Bishnoi appearing for the appellant contended that appellant has been involved solely on account of enmity. He argued, no doubt the appellant and prosecutrix are cousin brother and sister, but the family members of both sides were not having cordial relations on account of dispute over a room and were not even on speaking terms. 15. The enmity is a double edged weapon. However, strained relations did not prompt the father of the prosecutrix to lodge a report against the appellant. The appellant was not named in the FIR. It is only after the prosecutrix was recovered and she narrated the entire ill episode, the criminal action was put in motion against the appellant. It may be noted that no one can imagine that a unmarried girl aged about 16-17 years would falsely implicate her own cousin brother at the cost of her own reputation and honour of her family and would ruin her entire future, that too Wo on a petty dispute over a room between her family and that of appellant's family. 16. The prosecutrix in her deposition has categorically deposed that the appellant and accused-Lukman committed rape on her forcibly without her consent, in the village forest. Her deposition finds corroboration by the statement of PW-12 Dr. Saroj Singh who medically examined the prosecutrix and found rapture of her hymen. Absence of injuries on the body and private parts of the prosecutrix is obvious for the reason that she was examined by Dr. Saroj Singh after 12-13 days of the incident. She was kidnapped on 14.1.1999 and could be recovered only on 26.1.1999 and was then subjected to medical examination on 27.1.1999 and that being the reason Dr. Saroj Singh did not notice any injury except rapture of hymen, which is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape. 17. As observed above, on reappraisal of evidence it could not be estab lished beyond doubt that the age of the prosecutrix was below 16 years on the day of incident, but the presumption u/s. 114-A of the Evidence Act in case of gang rape would be raised against the appellant that he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent, inasmuch as the prosecutrix has categorically deposed that appellant had forcible sexual intercourse without her consent. No suggestion was put to the prosecutrix that appellant had sexual intercourse with her consent, nor any evidence has been led in defence to rebut the said presumption. In my considered view, the testimony of the prosecutrix is worthy of credence and inspire much confidence. Having placed implicit reliance on her testimony it must be concluded that prosecution has been able to prove charges against the appellant beyond doubt. The finding of guilt against the appellant arrived at by the trial Court, therefore, cannot be interfered with and the conviction of the appellant deserves to be maintained. 18. In the result, this appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. The conviction of the appellant u/ss. 366 & 376(2)(g) IPC and the sentences awarded thereunder are maintained.Appeal dismissed. *******