ORDER 1. Heard the counsel appearing on both sides. The appeal was taken for final disposal though it had appeared today in the Admission List with the consent of both counsel. 2. This appeal is filed by the management. The Second respondent was a workman under the management. He was dismissed from service. An Industrial dispute was raised and the matter was referred to the Labour Court. The management, during the pendency of the reference, took action against some workmen including the second respondent and dismissed him from service. Since it was during the pendency of the dispute, the management made an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for approval of the order of dismissal. The approval was not granted by the Labour Court and the application made in that behalf by the Management was rejected. The Management filed C.W.J.C. No. 903 of 1983(R) in the High Court challenging the refusal of permission. That writ petition was dismissed. The Management filed an appeal L.P.A. No. 21 of 1987(R) challenging the dismissal of the writ petition. That appeal was also dismissed. The result was that the subsequent dismissal of the workman by the Management did not become effective. 3. According to the workman, he was not allowed to resume duly notwithstanding the dismissal of the letters Patent Appeal by the High Court. Therefore, he filed a writ petition before the High Court as C.W.J.C. No. 1930 of 1989(R) seeking an appropriate direction in that behalf. That writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn so as to enable the workman to seek relief before the appropriate forum on the ground that the management was not allowing him to join duty although its application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act had been dismissed. The Management, after the dismissal of the writ petition as withdrawn, permitted the workman to join service and he, accordingly, joined the service in February. 1992. According to the Management, the workman was also given the monetary benefits that were due to him on the basis that he continued to be in service. The workman raised a claim that he was not paid what was legitimately due to him and he should have been treated on par with one B.N. Singh who was in fact his junior. The Management did not accede to this request of the workman. The workman raised a claim that he was not paid what was legitimately due to him and he should have been treated on par with one B.N. Singh who was in fact his junior. The Management did not accede to this request of the workman. In that context, the workman purported to make an application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act before the Labour Court for recovery of money due from the employer in terms of that Section, The workman claim that he should have been treated on a par with B.N. Singh and his emoluments including the perquisites and allowances should have been calculated on a par with that of B.N. Singh. The Management resisted the application by contending that the application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act was not maintainable; that the case B.N. Singh was entirely different, that whatever was due to the workman has been paid and that he was not entitled to any relief in the proceeding initiated before the Labour Court. The Labour Court did not specifically answer the question whether it had jurisdiction under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act to adjudicate on such a dispute but proceeded to order that the workman was entitled to get the arrears of wages, leave wages and incentives at par with B.N. Singh from the date of termination of his services till date taking into consideration the usual up-gradation and revision of wages and after deducting the amounts already paid to the workman and that the workman is not entitled to get any allowance such as bonus, leave travel concession, conveyance allowances, medical expenses and house rent. The Management challenged this order of the Labour Court in the writ petition. C.W.J.C. No. 1297 of 2000. It was contended on behalf of the Management that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act to pass ah order of this nature when the very entitlement of the workman to the relief claimed was an industrial dispute and, in the absence of any adjudication of right by the Industrial Tribunal or by any other competent Court. Other contentions were also raised by the management. The learned single Judge practically upheld the plea of the Management that the application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act was not maintainable before the Labour Court in the circumstances. Other contentions were also raised by the management. The learned single Judge practically upheld the plea of the Management that the application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act was not maintainable before the Labour Court in the circumstances. But, the learned Single Judge proceeded to say that the impugned order of the Labour Court could be sustained in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution. This was in the view the learned Single Judge took that B.N. Singh was junior to the workman and it was the pendency of the proceeding that deprived the workman of further benefits that might have been due to him. Thus, the writ petition was dismissed. This is what is challenged before us in this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the decisions of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr., 1995 Lab IC 330 and State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3734 . Counsel emphasized, as was emphasized by the Supreme Court, that to grant relief under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act, there must be a pre- existing right. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said : "The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre- existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered, just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within the jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act while the latter does not." 5. Here, it appears to us that what the learned Single Judge has done is to take note of a situation covered by the latter part of the observation of the Supreme Court quoted above. In other words, it was only his feeling that what was claimed or granted by the Labour Court was just and fair that induced him to decline to interfere with the order of the Labour Court. Even assuming that his view on that aspect is correct, this is exactly what is not permitted to be done under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act as clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the State Bank of India case (supra). Even assuming that his view on that aspect is correct, this is exactly what is not permitted to be done under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act as clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the State Bank of India case (supra). In other words, in an application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act, relief can be granted only if the right had been recognised already and the benefits flow from such recognition and not otherwise. 6. We also find some difficulty in agreeing with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of the Labour Court under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act could be sustained with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution. Whether Article 14 was violated as far as the workman was concerned, was a question which had to be adjudicated upon and one could not assume that merely because B.N. Singh was junior at one point of time, that there has been violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover by resorting to Article 14, we do not think that an order passed by the Labour Court which was clearly outside its jurisdiction, could be sustained and on the materials that are available in the ease, that part of the case also requires to be adjudicated upon and not assumed. 7. Thus, on finding that the proceeding under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act was misconceived and that the Labour Court has acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order and the learned Single Judge was not justified in declining to interfere with it. we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allow the writ petition and quash the order of the Labour Court challenged in the writ petition. We make it clear that this will not stand in the way of the workman to approach the appropriate forum for relief if he is so entitled to if. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.